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INTRODUCTION 
1. The Aims of the EMCA 
While harmonization or convergence of European Company Law can be achieved by a toolbox of measures, 
until now the tools have been confined largely to Regulations, Directives, Recommendations and Corporate 
Governance Codes. It is submitted that there is a need to provide new measures to develop future European 
company law and that a European Model Act (EMCA) would be a useful tool for European integration in 
this area. The objective of the EMCA project thus is to establish, on a solid scientific foundation, a new 
way forward in European company law inspired by the US Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA). 
The EMCA is designed as a free-standing general company statute that can be enacted by Member States 
either substantially in its entirety or by the adoption of selected provisions. 
This approach differs from previous European company law initiatives, as it is a general settlement of the 
debate on which of the two regulatory approaches is superior – regulatory competition or harmonization. 
The EMCA offers the Member States a harmonized company law, but leaves it to each Member State to 
decide whether it will offer its businesses the advantages given by harmonization. The major benefit from 
an integrated company law framework is that it establishes similar conditions for company shareholders 
and third parties all over the EU, thus facilitating cross-border investment and trading by ensuring 
shareholder rights and rebuilding investor confidence. The EMCA is not a mandatory harmonization 
instrument, as Member States are not bound to follow the Model Act. Thus the EMCA can promote 
regulatory competition, but can also act as a tool for a harmonization of, and convergence between, Member 
States’ company laws. 
At the same time the EMCA allows for special local considerations and for experimentation with new or 
different ideas, as Member States are free to opt out of parts of the Model Act in order to implement national 
company law innovations. 
The EMCA can be regarded as a tool for better regulation in the EU since it provides a coherent, dynamic 
and responsive European legislative framework. Member States can benefit from using the Model Act as a 
company law paradigm, as it will be a modern competitive Companies Act. Moreover, the project allows 
the EU Commission the opportunity to take part in, or to support, a continuous modernization of the Model 
Act, without forcing legislation on the Member States. 
The EMCA may be viewed as a dynamic piece of legislation capable of being continuously developed in 
response to the changing environment and market conditions that modern businesses face. The EMCA may 
thus overcome some of the criticism of traditional inflexible law-making, as it will offer a more informal 
and organic convergence of European company law. 
2. The European Model Act Group 
The implementation of the project is coordinated by the European Model Companies Act Group (the 
EMCA Group), which was officially formed at a meeting at Aarhus University (Denmark) in September 
2007. Since then additional members joined and the Group currently consists of prominent company law 
scholars from 22 Member States. The group members have been almost consistent during the period of 
preparation, see the list of members below. 
Information on the EMCA group and the EMCA project can be found here: 
http://law.au.dk/en/research/projects/european-model-company-act-emca 
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The Group is independent from business organizations as well as from the governments of the Member 
States and the European Commission. It was financed exclusively through academic funding. The EMCA 
does not have – nor is it intended to have – political authority. Its impact will thus ultimately depend on its 
quality and usefulness. In this sense, the EMCA is close to the MBCA but also, as noted, to the “Principles 
of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations” (ALI Principles), written over a 15-year period 
beginning in the late 1970s by a committee of academics and practitioners, under the auspices of the 
American Law Institute (ALI).1 
The European Commission has expressed its support for the project, and the representatives of the 
Commission were invited to attend the meetings of the Group as an observer and discussion partner.2 
Although designed mostly for Member States, a clear decision was taken at the outset however that the 
EMCA would not be restricted by existing EU-legislation. Thus, where the Group considered that 
provisions of existing EU law are not appropriate or efficient, the EMCA reflects the preferred alternative. 
                                                     
1 M. Klausner, A US view of the European Model Companies Act, ECFR 2015, p. 363; C. Teichmann, Modellgesetze für 
Kapitalgesellschaften in den USA (MBCA) und Europa (EMCA), Festschrift für Theodor Baums, 2017, p. 1227. 
2 See also the Report of the Reflection Group on the Future of European Company Law (http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/company/docs/modern/reflectiongroup_report_en.pdf), 5 April 2011, p.12 (recommendation 4). 
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The Members of the Group: 
• Professor Paul Krüger Andersen, Aarhus University, Denmark (Chairman, 2007-2017) 
• Professor Jan Andersson, Jönköping University, Sweden (as of April 2014) 
• Professor Gintautas Bartkus, Vilnius University, Lithuania 
• Professor Theodor Baums, Goethe University Frankfurt am Main, Germany 
• Professor Blanaid Clarke, Trinity College Dublin, Ireland 
• Professor Pierre-Henri Conac, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg (Chairman, 2017 onwards) 
• Professor Waltschin Daskalov, University of National and World Economy Sofia, Bulgaria 
• Professor Paul Davies, Oxford University, UK (until May 2010) 
• Professor José Engrácia Antunes, Catholic University of Portugal (Porto), Portugal 
• Professor Guido Ferrarini, University of Genoa, Italy 
• Professor Mónica Fuentes Naharro, Complutense University of Madrid, Spain 
• Professor Paolo Giudici, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano, Italy 
• Professor Brenda Hannigan, University of Southampton, UK (as of January 2011) 
• Professor Susanne Kalss, Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, Austria 
• Professor András Kisfaludi, Eötvös Loránd University, Hungary 
• Professor Harm-Jan de Kluiver, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
• Professor Adam Opalski, University of Warsaw, Poland (as of April 2013) 
• Professor Maria Patakyova, Comenius University Bratislava, Slovakia 
• Professor Evanghelos Perakis, University of Athens, Greece 
• Professor Jarmila Pokorná, Masaryk University, Czech Republic 
• Professor André Prüm, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg 
• Professor Joti Roest, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands (as of September 2012) 
• Professor Juan Sánchez-Calero, Complutense University of Madrid, Spain 
• Professor Matti J. Sillanpää, Turku School of Economics, Finland 
• Professor Rolf Skog, University of Göteborg, Sweden (until April 2013) 
• Professor Stanislaw Soltysinski, Poznań University, Poland (until April 2013) 
• Professor Christoph Teichmann, University of Würzburg, Germany 
• Professor Isabelle Urbain-Parleani, University of René Descartes Paris V, France 
• Professor Andres Vutt, University of Tartu, Estonia 
• Professor Martin Winner, Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, Austria 
• Professor Hans de Wulf, University of Gent, Belgium 
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Associated Company Law Experts: 
• Professor Ronald Gilson, Columbia Law School, Stanford Law School, USA 
• Professor Isabelle Corbisier, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg 
• Professor Rolf Dotevall, University of Göteborg, Sweden 
• Professor Karsten Engsig Sørensen, Aarhus University, Denmark 
• Professor Joachim Hennrichs, University of Köln, Germany 
• Professor Stanislaw Soltysinski, Poznań University, Poland (as of April 2013) 
Project Researchers: 
• Post. doc. Evelyne J. B. Sørensen, Aarhus University, Denmark 
• Research Assistant Dorthe Kristensen Balshøj, Aarhus University, Denmark 
 
The members of the Group are recognized and experienced company law professors with extensive 
experience in drafting company regulations at national and EU levels. 
The work of the Group has been coordinated by a chairman: Professor Paul Krüger Andersen from Aarhus 
University (Denmark). Aarhus University also hosts the secretariat. Since the publication of the EMCA in 
2017, Professor Pierre-Henri Conac from the University of Luxembourg is the chairman. 
European Model Companies Act 2017 
Introduction 
5 
The Authors of the EMCA: 
Due to the fact that the EMCA took 10 years to be drafted, not all Members of the EMCA Group could 
take part from the start to the end of the project. Therefore, there is a difference between the Members 
and the authors. 
• Professor Paul Krüger Andersen, Aarhus University, Denmark 
• Professor Jan Andersson, Jönköping University, Sweden 
• Professor Gintautas Bartkus, Vilnius University, Lithuania 
• Professor Theodor Baums, Goethe University Frankfurt am Main, Germany 
• Professor Blanaid Clarke, Trinity College Dublin, Ireland 
• Professor Pierre-Henri Conac, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg 
• Professor Isabelle Corbisier, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg 
• Professor Waltschin Daskalov, University of National and World Economy Sofia, Bulgaria 
• Professor José Engrácia Antunes, Catholic University of Portugal (Porto), Portugal 
• Professor Mónica Fuentes Naharro, Complutense University of Madrid, Spain 
• Professor Paolo Giudici, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano, Italy 
• Professor Brenda Hannigan, University of Southampton, UK 
• Professor Susanne Kalss, Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, Austria 
• Professor András Kisfaludi, Eötvös Loránd University, Hungary 
• Professor Harm-Jan de Kluiver, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
• Professor Adam Opalski, University of Warsaw, Poland 
• Professor Maria Patakyova, Comenius University Bratislava, Slovakia 
• Professor Evanghelos Perakis, University of Athens, Greece 
• Professor Jarmila Pokorná, Masaryk University, Czech Republic 
• Professor Joti Roest, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
• Professor Matti J. Sillanpää, Turku School of Economics, Finland 
• Professor Stanislaw Soltysinski, Poznań University, Poland 
• Professor Christoph Teichmann, University of Würzburg, Germany 
• Professor Isabelle Urbain-Parleani, University of René Descartes Paris V, France 
• Professor Karsten Engsig Sørensen, Aarhus University, Denmark 
• Professor Andres Vutt, University of Tartu, Estonia 
• Professor Martin Winner, Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, Austria 
• Professor Hans de Wulf, University of Gent, Belgium 
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3. Theory and Methodology 
3.1. Legal Theory on Different Legal Tools for Regulation 
In its 2003 Action Plan, the European Commission called for “alternative tools for regulation”, in other 
words alternatives to EU Directives implemented in national company laws.3 One alternative is “soft law”, 
such as corporate governance codes and other self-regulatory measures. 
Usual Companies Acts and soft law are sources of law placed in the hierarchy of national sources of law.4 
Companies Acts as well as soft law are both aimed at the authorities applying the law and at the persons, 
legal or otherwise, applying them. Model Acts are different, but it is not quite clear how to categorize them. 
They may contain “principles” in the way used, for example, in the Definitions and Model Rules of 
European Private Law (DCFR)5, defined as “principles [...] intended to be applied as general rules (on 
contract law) in the European Union.” As such, principles can have a normative function in the Member 
States. Partly the EMCA conforms with such a view: The EMCA seeks to promote basic principles of 
European company law, such as equal rights for shareholders, and other rules on minority protection, 
principles on directors’ duties of loyalty and care and principles of creditor protection.6 A number of basic 
principles are defined in the EMCA Chapter 1 on General Company Law Principles. 
However, the EMCA also seeks to provide a model for a full text Companies Act, which can be used as a 
model for future or partial legislation in Member States, for candidate countries to the European Union 
(especially currently in the Balkan area) and, if interested, to other European or neighbouring countries 
(Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Ukraine…). 
As mentioned above, the purpose of the EMCA is to offer Member States and all European countries, at a 
low cost, a tool for the convergence of European company legislation that is simultaneously flexible and 
capable of allowing Member States and all European countries to deal with new developments in the 
economy. Being inspired by the best solutions in each Member States, the EMCA should contribute to the 
circulation of models and legal transplants in the EU.7 
Beyond this goal, the purpose of the EMCA is also to offer a source of inspiration to all countries in the 
world that are looking to modernize their company law. The EMCA represents an European vision of 
company law and offers an alternative to countries who do not wish to only refer or be influenced by the 
United States approach to corporate law, whether the MBCA (Model Business Corporation Act), the 
Delaware General Corporate Law (DGCL) or the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and 
Recommendations.8 
3.2. Some Fundamental Problems and Approaches 
When analyzing company regulation in Member States and developing the EMCA, a number of 
fundamental problems appeared and a number of approaches had to be clearly defined. 
As a superior criterion for the choice of the regulatory method, the Group has accepted that the EMCA 
should be based on an appreciation of the following policies: 
• Simplification of regulation, 
                                                     
3 Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union – A Plan to Move Forward 
(COM(2003) 284 final). See also the Commission’s follow-up consultation on future priorities for the Action Plan on Company 
Law and Corporate Governance, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/consultation/final_report_en.pdf. 
4 See e.g. R. Nielsen and C. D. Tvarnø, Retskilder & Retsteorier, 2nd ed. (2008), p. 56; P. Craig and G. De Búrca, EU Law: Text, 
Cases, and Materials, 4th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2008), Chapter 3; D. Chalmers, G. Davies and G. Monti, European Union 
Law - Text and Materials, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2010), Chapter 3. 
5 C. von Bar, E. Clive and H. Schulte-Nölke (eds.), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, Draft 
Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), Outline Edition (2008), p. 9.  
6 E. Ferran, The Place for Creditor Protection on the Agenda for Modernisation of Company Law in the European Union, ECFR 
2006, pp. 178-221. 
7 See H. Fleischer, Legal Transplants in European Company Law – The Case of Fiduciary Duties, ECFR, 2005, pp. 378-397. 
8 See M. Klausner, A US view of the European Model Companies Act, ECFR, 2015, pp. 363-369. 
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• Flexibility of regulation, 
• Reducing agency and transaction costs. 
These same policies have also been accepted by the EU Commission as part of its 2006 Strategic Review 
of Better Regulation.9 
In recent years, the Commission has worked on assessing initiatives within the area of Company Law. 
Among others, this has resulted in a report of the Reflection Group “On the Future of EU Company Law” 
(April 5 2011), the Commission’s Green Paper (COM(2011) 164 final), and the Commission’s 2012 Action 
Plan (COM(2012) 740 final). 
In the Commission’s 2012 Action Plan, three main lines of action are identified; enhancing transparency, 
engaging shareholders and supporting companies’ growth and their competitiveness.10 
The Commission’s work and plans have been taken into account by the EMCA Group’s assessment and 
design of the Model Act. Thus, for example, the Group has emphasized recommendations stating that 
regulation should promote the company’s long term planning and an increased weighting of the 
management’s observation of risk management. Dealing with national differences in company regulation 
and legal traditions, the EMCA takes a functional approach, meaning that the starting point for the analysis 
is company problems regardless of whether a problem is, for example, dealt with in the national Companies 
Act or the national insolvency act. For example, the duty of a director to ensure that a company does not 
continue to operate once it is foreseeable that the company cannot survive is regulated in the Insolvency 
Act 1986 as wrongful trading in the UK and in the Companies Act 2009 under the law of liability in 
Denmark. Further, the regulation of private companies (AG/SA/Plc. etc.) vs. public companies 
(GmbH/Sarl, Ltd. etc.)/traded companies is based on how typical companies of each type function. Among 
other things, this is reflected in the Chapter on management which allows different management structures. 
In line with the principles on simplification, flexibility and reduced agency costs, there are some necessary 
considerations on 
• the choice between mandatory and non-mandatory (default) rules, 
• the use of disclosure rules vs. substantive rules, 
• the choice between codes/self-regulation and substantive (Model Act) rules. 
In general, prior to the 2008 financial crisis, non-mandatory rules, EU Recommendations and codes/self-
regulation were considered preferable, but the Group examined in detail, if and how these general principles 
should be used in the EMCA, and whether the 2008 financial crisis has altered the formerly preferred 
general view on this question. 
With respect to simplification, the Group took the view that the EMCA needs to contain rules on all relevant 
company law matters. The various Companies Acts of the EU Members States vary in size. For example, 
large and detailed regulation can be found in France, Germany, Sweden and the UK, while shorter and less 
detailed regulation can be found in Denmark, Greece, Luxembourg and Poland. The EMCA aims to reach 
a balance between general and detailed regulation. In reaching this balance, the Group has taken into 
consideration the Member States’ practical experience of their domestic legislation as well as the huge 
theoretical work, history and cultural influence behind the different Companies Acts. However, those 
aspects of the Acts which were too closely related to national traditions (and not of widespread application) 
were not considered. The intention thus was to avoid overly detailed regulation in the EMCA. 
                                                     
9 See COM(2006) 689. 
10 K. Hopt, Corporate Governance in Europe: A Critical Review of the European Commission’s Initiatives on Corporate Law and 
Corporate Governance, NYU Journal of Law & Business 12 (2015), pp. 139-213. 
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The Group gave particular consideration to the choice between mandatory and non-mandatory (default) 
rules. The EMCA proceeds on the accepted European tradition in company law that an important goal of 
the EMCA is the protection not only of outside shareholders but also of creditors. This remains the case 
even if this goal is supplemented with new goals, such as the use of company law as a tool for economic 
efficiency and competitiveness or a tool to promote other societal goals (see Section 3.4 below). Thus, rules 
on creditor and shareholder protection are mandatory rules. These include for example a large number of 
the rules on capital protection which are contained in the Chapters on formation, companies’ capital, 
general meeting and minority protection. However, the approach of the Group is to avoid drafting overly 
burdensome and costly rules. 
Other rules, in particular with respect to the organization of the company, take the approach of non-
mandatory rules allowing companies to organize themselves with flexibility according to their actual needs, 
within the framework provided by the EMCA. 
Generally, there is a need for a proper mix of mandatory, default and soft (i.e. comply or explain) rules 
with more room for default rules applicable to private companies. Corporate scandals and the recent 
financial crisis neither justify a radical deregulation nor a hastily adoption of burdensome and untested 
formalities. 
Special consideration is taken with respect to the division between private and public companies (see 
Section 6 below). 
In determining whether an issue should be regulated in the EMCA or dealt with by Member States in the 
form of self-regulation, a number of issues were considered. An examination of national corporate 
governance codes indicated that the codes differ in many ways. Some are very detailed and others are 
shorter and focus primarily on principles. Also, standards of what is considered as good corporate 
governance vary. Furthermore, EU Recommendations, such as the Recommendation on Directors’ 
Remuneration in Listed Companies (2009/385/EC), have been implemented differently in the various 
Member States. There is no short answer or formula as to how to deal with these issues. In the EMCA the 
approach is considered Chapter-by-Chapter and Section-by-Section, see below Section 3.4. 
Finally, the EMCA, as a model Companies Act, does not purport to deal with securities regulation/capital 
markets law, nor with all kinds of regulatory rules that can be seen as flanking measures of corporate law 
and that are often intended to combat abuses in the area of tax or social security or economic crime. 
3.3. Use of Comparative Method 
The most important working method to be used during the preparation of the EMCA was the comparative 
method. Since the members of the Group have solid knowledge – both as academics and in practice – of 
the Companies Acts of the various Member State, it was possible to use a combination of the 
“Länderbericht” (national report) method and the analytic method.11 
The comparative process started with questionnaires on each topic in order to gain a general view of 
similarities, differences, new ways to deal with problems and recent issues. At the same time, a collection 
of Companies Acts was established for specific analyses of problems and solutions. The analyses were 
carried out by working groups, chaired by one member, and representing more than one Member State 
(old/new Member States, common law/civil law countries etc.). The chair and members of each working 
group was also chosen considering that their national law, could serve as references for the EMCA on this 
topic. The reasons were the success of the national Member State law in this area, or its modernity. 
However, all national Companies Acts were analysed when drafting the chapters in order to have a blend 
of national traditions (civil law countries/Nordic countries etc.). It was considered also that using national 
law on certain issues would allow courts and practitioners in Member States adopting parts or the whole of 
the EMCA, to easily refer to the case law developed under the provisions which served as inspiration.  
In certain circumstances, external company law experts were invited by the Group.  
                                                     
11 See e.g. K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd ed., (Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 32; and O. 
Lando, Kort Indføring i Komparativ Ret, 3rd ed., (DJØF Publishing, 2009), pp. 206-207. The Länderbericht method compares 
national legal systems to each other. When applying the analytical method one parameter at a time is dealt with from the perspective 
of the two or more legal settings. 
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The working groups prepared the first drafts of the respective Chapters. The drafts were discussed, revised 
and agreed on in meetings (at least twice a year) by the entire Group. 
3.4. Use of Law and Economic Theories 
Over the last decade or two there has been a paradigm shift in European company law. In short, under the 
influence of the US, the aim of company legislation/regulation has shifted from being exclusively 
shareholder and creditor protection to explicitly including the promotion of economic efficiency.12 The 
former is reflected primarily, but not exclusively, in the maximization of profits for shareholders (see 
further below). Use of economic theory and law and economy studies have become a natural part of the 
development of company regulation13 particularly in the areas of corporate governance, financing of 
companies and takeovers. 
The project aims to ensure that the contribution, which law and economics have made to company law and 
corporate governance in recent years, is incorporated and exploited in the EMCA. 
As noted earlier, traditional company law is aimed at protecting a company’s shareholders and creditors. 
The shareholders must be ensured influence and profit, and creditors must be protected against losses which 
are not a result of taking reasonable commercial risks. These goals remain important for any Companies 
Act. 
In order to ensure that the shareholders are able to play an active role in the company’s decision–making 
process, a growing number of measures have been adopted both at national and EU levels. For example, 
the EU Shareholders’ Rights Directive (2007/36/EC) provides new rights for shareholders of listed 
companies to attend and vote at general meetings remotely, to raise questions and to gain access to relevant 
information. The amendments to the shareholders’ rights directive adopted in 2017 reinforce this approach, 
for instance on the issue of compensation of directors and managers (“say on pay”).14 Similarly, the 
Directive on Takeover Bids (2004/25/EC) regulates takeovers of public listed companies and provides for 
the protection of minority shareholders by implementing a mandatory bid rule as well as requiring the 
disclosure of adequate information to the shareholders of the target companies. The purpose of these 
measures is to ensure an improvement of the corporate governance system. In its 2011 Corporate 
Governance Green Paper, the Commission stated that shareholders need to take a more active role and 
concludes “It therefore seems useful to consider whether more shareholders can be encouraged to take an 
interest in sustainable returns and longer term performance, and how to encourage them to be more active 
on corporate governance issues”.15 To underline that the Group shares this view, Chapter 1 of the EMCA 
contains a provision on the principle of shareholder democracy. 
                                                     
12 See e.g. the Lisbon Treaty and several revisions of national Companies Act, such as Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and the 
UK. The overall purpose of the regulation is described as “the tandem of improving the competitiveness of EU Company and better 
regulation”. 
13 See e.g. the Danish “Debatoplæg om Aktivt Ejerskab” from 1999, drafted by the Ministry of Trade and Industry. In the 
Commission’s Action Plan 2003, the main objectives are 1) strengthening shareholders’ rights, and 2) to foster efficiency and 
competitiveness of business. The words efficiency and competitiveness are the basic principles in Company Law reforms, e.g. in 
Denmark, Finland and the UK. The tracks that were laid down with the 2003 Action Plan has been continued and developed with 
the Commission’s 2012 Action Plan, the 2011 Reflection Group’s Report and the Commission’s 2011 Green Paper. The Green 
Paper cites the Commission’s Communication “Towards a Single Market Act” as saying that “[i]t is of paramount importance that 
European businesses demonstrate the utmost responsibility towards not only their employees and their shareholders but also 
towards society at large.” The 2011 Green Paper further cites that these elements “also contribute to the competitiveness of 
European business, because well run, sustainable companies are best placed to contribute to the ambitious growth targets set by 
‘Agenda 2020.’” 
14 Proposal of Directive of the European Parliament and the Council amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement 
of long-term shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards certain elements of the corporate governance statement, 
COM(2014) 213 final. 
15 Green Paper on The EU corporate governance framework (COM (2011) 164 final), p. 3. 
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The debate has dealt with the possibility of constructing company law rules that encompass incentives for 
more active involvement by shareholders. In particular, recent experience of the lack of control of directors’ 
remuneration in the form of share options and bonus schemes has illustrated the importance of 
shareholders’ activism. According to Recommendation (2009/385/EC), the structure of directors’ 
remuneration should promote the long-term sustainability of the company and ensure that remuneration is 
based on performance. As this Recommendation can be implemented into national Companies Acts or 
corporate governance codes building on the experiences in the Member States, the Group considered 
whether the Recommendation should be implemented legally in the EMCA or if it is sufficient to deal with 
the problem in the national corporate governance codes. Some basic principles of the Recommendations 
are implemented in Chapter 8 of the EMCA on management of the company. 
The economic theory which arguably has had, and still has, the largest impact on company law is the 
principal/agent theory.16 The main focus of this theory is on the company’s organization. The theory 
concerns the interaction between owners and managers and, in particular, how the owners can control the 
managers. The shareholders must expend time and resources to control the managers and defray the so-
called “agency costs”. The EMCA seeks to improve shareholders’ opportunities to control managers and 
to reduce agency costs. (see Chapter 9 on directors’ duties and Chapter 11 on general meetings.) 
The traditional principal/agent theory focuses on shareholders as principals; however, especially in 
continental Europe it is recognized that there are additional principals such as employees, creditors and the 
society as a whole. Following that trend, the EMCA also encompasses the relationship between companies 
and such stakeholders.17 (see Chapter 9 on directors’ duties). 
Another economic theory, which has had a great impact on the regulation of takeovers, is the theory on 
“market for corporate control”.18 This theory suggests that takeovers, and the threat of a takeover, have a 
disciplinary effect on managers and thus incentivize them to operate their companies more efficiently. The 
EU’s Takeover Bid Directive (Directive 2004/25/EC) is based in part on an acceptance of this theory. While 
the theory is not without its weaknesses, the EMCA also acknowledges the importance of this theory. While 
the Takeover Bid Directive (the 13th Directive) was considered as a part of company law directives it is 
now considered as a part of securities regulation. Thus, the EMCA only considers issues that are of 
importance with respect to company law matters (see Chapter 13). 
Recently, questions have been asked about the economic foundation of takeover regulation and, in a broader 
sense, on the fundamental objectives of European company law. It has been argued that European 
companies should have further legal obligations such as taking into account human and environmental 
interests, corporate social responsibilities and sustainable development.19 
                                                     
16 See M. C. Jensen and W. H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 
Journal of Financial Economics 3 (1976), pp. 305-360. 
17 Cf. J. Armour, L. Enriques et. al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach, 3nd edition (Oxford 
University Press, 2017), p. 22: “the appropriate goal of corporate law is to advance the aggregate welfare of all who are affected 
by a firm’s activities, including the firm’s shareholders, employees, suppliers, and customers, as well as third parties such as local 
communities and beneficiaries of the natural environment.” See also G. Roth and P. Kindler, The Spirit of Corporate Law, 2013, 
p. 7, stressing the importance of protecting creditors and shareholders by mandatory rules. 
18 H. G. Manne, Mergers and the market for corporate control, Journal of Political Economy, (1965), p. 110. 
19 See e.g. D. E. Merrick, For whom are corporate managers trustees?, Harvard Law Review 45 (1932), p. 1145; M. C. Jensen, 
Value maximization, stakeholder theory, and the corporate objective function, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 14 (2001), 
pp. 235-256; M. Blair and L. Stout, A team production theory of corporate law, Virginia Law Review 85 (1999), p. 247; J. 
Parkinson, The legal context of corporate social responsibility, Business Ethics: A European Review 3 (1994), pp. 16–22; P. K. 
Andersen and E. J. B. Sørensen (2011): The Principle of Shareholder Primacy in Company Law from a Nordic and European 
Regulatory Perspective, in: Neville, Mette et al.: The European Financial Market in Transition (Kluiver Publishing, 2012). 
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Many of these interests have been safeguarded by Member States in their own domestic legislation. An 
example of this would be the “enlightened shareholder value” perspective of directors’ fiduciary duties in 
Section 172 of the UK Companies Act 2006.20 The Group has further examined in which way these 
objectives should be implemented in the EMCA. Generally, the Group agreed that companies must take 
developments in society and changes in society’s goals into account. Securing environment, sustainable 
development (CSR) is not considered as the fundamental and mandatory objective of company law but 
should primarily be considered by special regulation in the various fields. However, there is a clear 
tendency that such goals are also recognized in company law, accounting law and corporate governance 
codes. See in particular Chapter 8 on directors’ duties and Chapter 13 on reorganization of companies. 
Corporate finance theorists have since the 1960’s developed a series of models, the aim of which is to 
develop an optimal capital structure of companies. This theory has also had a considerable influence on 
company law. These theories have also been considered and taken into account by the EMCA Group. 
Company law rules must facilitate a flexible adjustment of the company’s capital. The Group shares the 
view that companies should be allowed wide discretion in deciding how to organize the capital structure of 
the company. Such rules must at the same time secure shareholder influence and control without ignoring 
the interests of creditors. (see Chapter 6 on financing the company and Chapter 7 on companies’ capital.) 
Economic theories represent a necessary foundation for the configuration of single provisions of the 
EMCA. A main theme of the EMCA project is to consider the effect which the 2008 financial crisis has 
had on the aforementioned theories. For example, the financial crisis gives rise to questions as to whether 
the previous trend to “optimize” the optimal capital structure needs to be corrected. The trend in the ten or 
so years before the financial crisis was to operate companies with less equity capital and more debt. A 
predominant view held by economic theorists has justified that approach. In some Member States thus 
company law as well as accounting regulation is built on economic theory which has underlined the 
advantage of a high debt ratio. However, it is appropriate to re-examine this balance between risk and return 
on the one hand, and the protection of creditors and other constituencies in company law and accounting 
rules on the other. Risk management, focusing on directors’ duties, provides for an example of this view 
(see Chapter 8). 
The group is aware of the fact that particular types of conflicts may arise within private companies.21 A 
private company usually is composed by a small number of shareholders. Agency problems in relation to 
the directors are thereby reduced, in most cases there is no clear separation between ownership and 
management. Instead, conflicts amongst shareholders become more important with particular attention to 
be paid to the conflict between minority and majority shareholders. The EMCA is following the one-law 
model (see Section 8 below) aiming at both public and private companies thereby taking into account the 
particular needs of typical private companies (see Section 7 below). 
4. Comments to the Act 
Most chapters include general comments as an introduction which explain the rationale behind the choices 
made. Also, after each provision of the EMCA, a description and explanation is given of the content of the 
provision. The existing EU regulation on each particular issue is described, and where the Group agreed to 
deviate from the EU position, the rationale for doing so is set out clearly in the Comments. 
The Comments to the Sections also identify and explain important differences in national rules among 
Member States. The Comments also include sometimes references to key judicial decisions in Member 
States, which had an influence on the provisions adopted in the EMCA. 
Further, the Comments make it clear, if necessary, whether single provisions of the EMCA are mandatory 
or non-mandatory. 
                                                     
20 Explanatory comments on Section 172 of the UK Companies Act 2006 are given by B. Hannigan, Company Law, 4th ed. (Oxford 
University Press, 2016), pp. 220–227 and P. L. Davies, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law, 9th ed. (London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2012), p. 540. 
21 See for example G. Bachmann, H. Eidenmüller, A. Engert, H. Fleischer and W. Schön, Regulating the Closed Corporation (De 
Gruyter, 2013) as well as J. McCahery, E. Vermeulen, Corporate Governance of non-listed companies, 2008. 
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5. International Aspects of Company Law 
The EMCA addresses the international dimension of company law. According to the EMCA Chapter 1 
Section 13, the EMCA reflects the principle of freedom of movement within Europe. Thus, the EMCA 
contains chapters on cross-border mergers and divisions and further on cross-border transfers of seat and 
branches. 
6. Output and Working Method 
6.1. Output 
As noted above, the Group believes that the EMCA can be a tool for better regulation in the EU. Member 
States will benefit from using the Model Act as a company law paradigm. The EMCA will be easy to use 
as an alternative to drafting national Companies Acts, not least for newer Member States which may more 
easily adopt the European standard. Individual Member States can also benefit from the comparative 
dimension of the project, and the project can allow all Member States to take advantage of the experiences 
of the individual States and newest regulatory practices. 
The EMCA will contribute to disseminating standards of best practice throughout the Member States as 
well as fundamental principles of European Company Law. The EMCA is not to be understood a simple 
restatement of the prevailing legal solutions found in the majority of the EU company laws. It embraces 
innovative concepts found only in some jurisdictions or legislative proposals which work well. 
An EMCA drafted and continuously developed by the Group will, as mentioned above, be able to respond 
rapidly to the changing circumstances and market conditions that modern businesses face. 
Thus, the EMCA has the potential to prove as an effective catalyst to improve European company law. The 
success of the US Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) in improving the single states’ Companies 
Acts supports this expectation.22 
6.2. Working Method 
The project was broken down into a number of sub-projects based on the different areas of company law. 
Thus the project covers all parts of company law issues regarding public as well as private companies (see 
below Comments to Chapter 1, Section 3). 
The EMCA regulates the following issues: 
• general company law principles 
• the formation of companies 
• the duties of directors, the organization of companies (corporate governance issues) 
• Shares 
• Shareholder meetings and protection (including minority protection) 
• The financing of companies 
• Share capital structures (capital protection) 
• The re-structuring of companies (mergers, divisions, conversions) 
• Liquidation, bankruptcy, etc. 
• Liability of directors, shareholders and others 
• Cross-border issues 
• Accounting and auditing 
• Employee representation 
                                                     
22 See on Model Acts in the United States Th. Baums and P. K. Andersen, The European Model Company Law Act Project, Essays 
in Honour of Eddy Wymeersch, 2009, p. 12-14 (ECGI Working Paper Series in Law, p. 9) with references. 
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• Groups of companies 
• Branches 
• Registrar and the registration process 
The approach to each sub-project is the same. Each sub-project started with a comparative analysis of the 
existing company laws of the Member States in the given area. The comparative analysis considered the 
harmonization that had been carried out at EU level and included studies of how EU company law had been 
implemented in each Member State, as well as studies of national law on non-harmonized areas. The 
analysis also included studies of special national, legal and/or business considerations. 
Members of the Group prepared national reports for the comparative study. The national reports were 
analyzed with a view to establishing trends and original solutions and establishing what EU law requires 
as a minimum standard in each area. The reports served as working material for the drafting of the EMCA. 
Special working groups were formed for drafting different parts of the Model Act. A Postdoctoral 
researcher and a number of ad hoc company law experts were also involved in research which supported 
the project. 
The Group met biannually for two days in various places in Europe and drafts were continuously discussed 
and approved by the Group during these meetings. The progress of the Group was published on the EMCA 
website: 
http://law.au.dk/en/research/projects/european-model-company-act-emca 
The goals of the EMCA and the progress of the Group were also published in international and national 
journals. 
It has also been an aim of the project to generate research on different parts of the EMCA and some of the 
more fundamental issues raised such as the impact of model acts, the choice of regulatory methods, law 
and economics of the suggested model acts etc. For that purpose, the Group presented the EMCA at a 
number of international seminars and conferences. Furthermore, after the first draft was finished in 2015, 
the public was invited to comment on the draft chapters (see Section 8 below). 
The first draft was presented at an international conference in September 2015 at the Wirtschaftsuniversität 
in Vienna hosted by Professors Martin Winner and Susanne Kalss. The goal of the conference was to 
receive comments from high-level experts from Europe and the United States in order to improve the draft. 
Several colleagues from the United States were invited in order to provide comments from the US and 
MBCA perspectives: 
• Ron J. Gilson, Columbia Law School, Stanford Law School, EMCA Associated Company 
Law Expert 
• Jill E. Fisch, University of Pennsylvania Law School 
• Mike Klausner, Stanford Law School  
• Hillary A. Sale, Washington University Law, Member of the ABA Corporate Law Committee 
The nature and results of the discussions was published in the European Company and Financial Law 
Conference (ECFR) in order to ensure transparency of the adoption process.23  
After the presentation of the first draft of the EMCA in Vienna in September 2015, the Group revised the 
published draft in order to take into account all comments and drew up the final Act. After this, the EMCA 
was officially disclosed at a ceremony in Rome, as a symbolic place of European unity and construction, 
at the University La Sapienza on the 30st of March 2017. This date was chosen to take place on the same 
month of the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome. The Ministries of Justice of Italy and of Lithuania 
were represented and delivered speeches. 
                                                     
23 See ECFR 2016, pp. 193-374. 
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The EMCA is available for download on the SSRN (https://www.ssrn.com/en) and on ECGI 
(http://www.ecgi.org). 
The EMCA Group will continue as an organization on an on-going basis to meet to discuss legal 
developments, review and offer proposed revisions to various parts of the Model Act, take into account 
comments received and expand the comment sections. This is similar to the mission of the Corporate Laws 
Committee of the American Bar Assocation (ABA) in the US which is to adopt amendments to and provide 
expert commentary on the MBCA. 
Therefore, the EMCA Group calls academics, young researchers, companies, business associations, judges, 
notaries, experts and the general public to make comments to this edition. Comments can be sent to any 
member of the EMCA. In each chapter, the main reporter and members of the working group have been 
indicated so that comments relating to specific chapters should be sent to them. Comments will be taken 
into account in the next edition. 
7. The EMCA covers both private and public companies 
The Companies Acts of almost all EU Member States divide companies in two categories: public 
companies (AG/Plc. etc.) and private companies (GmbH/Ltd. etc.), with sometimes sub-categories. The 
distinction is not based on the size of the company but primarily on the fact whether its shares can be 
offered to the public/be publicly traded.24 
The private company is the dominant company form in all Member States. Thus, the Group is aware that 
the EMCA must be designed in a way that recognizes the need for a flexible regulatory framework covering 
private companies. 
The current EU regulation covers only some of the issues that are regulated in the Companies Acts of the 
Member States. For example, most of the issues relating to company management structure and directors’ 
duties are not covered by EU Directives and the draft for the 5th Company Law Directive on company 
structure has been abandoned.25 In addition, like most of the other EU Directives, the proposed 5th Directive 
only dealt with public companies, and in general the regulation of private companies is left to the Member 
States. 
Some Member States have decided to keep the regulation of private companies close to that of public 
companies, by for instance extending the application of EU directives to them. This applies especially to 
mandatory rules protecting creditors and shareholders. Other Member States have implemented the 
Directives to apply to public companies only. Since the EMCA prefers a simple and flexible framework, a 
number of rules contained in the EMCA apply to both public and private companies. 
In particular, as concerns the management structures of small and medium sized companies (SMEs), there 
is a need for simple and flexible provisions. Such provisions can be freely implemented by the individual 
Member States, and the EMCA as well is free to choose which regulation is preferred, to the extent that the 
private company form is chosen. 
Even if flexibility is an overall aim for private companies as well as for public companies, it is appropriate 
to provide for different requirements regarding management systems as for private and for public 
companies. With respect to the choice of a management system, there should be even more flexibility 
provided for private companies. However, it seems possible to formulate provisions on directors’ duties 
which are equally applicable to SMEs as well as large companies (see Chapter 9). 
                                                     
24 See, for example, the Danish Companies Act, paragraph 6, Swedish Companies Act, Chapter 12,  Sections 7-8. The former 
Danish Act on private companies (anpartsselskaber) aimed at regulating companies with only a little capital and few members. 
The Danish White Paper 1498/2008 on Modernizing Company Law, p. 32 states that both the public company form and the private 
company form are used by small and medium size companies. The committee therefore decided not to use a distinction based on 
the criterion of size. See also the SPE proposal, Article 3(1)(d). 
25 Proposal for a Fifth Directive on the coordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and 
outsiders, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of Article 59, second paragraph, with respect to 
company structure and to the power and responsibilities of company boards, COM(1972) 887 final. The proposal was officially 
withdrawn in 2001. Also a preliminary draft of a Directive on groups of companies has been abandoned. 
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With its 2008 proposal for a Regulation on the Statute for a European private company (Societas Privata 
Europaea – SPE)26, the EU Commission started an initiative in the field of small and medium sized 
companies. The SPE proposal aimed to create a new European legal form, which was intended to enhance 
the competitiveness of SMEs by facilitating their establishment and operation across the single market. If 
the SPE Statute had been adopted, the SPE would have been an alternative to establishing and carrying on 
businesses by means of national companies. The proposals in the Statute were not limited by restrictions 
in the company law Directives. For example, the provisions on capital (minimum capital/distribution) did 
not need to follow the requirements in the Second Council Directive. The draft SPE Statute would thus 
have put pressure on national lawmakers to establish company legislation that could match the SPE Statute. 
A main problem with drafting an SPE Statute was however that it remained necessary to refer to the 
different national company law legislations. Therefore and also for other reasons such as the issue of the 
real seat and co-determination, the SPE Statute was not adopted. The fact that Regulations must be adopted 
by unanimous vote also prevented the adoption of the SPE which underlines the limits of EU harmonisation. 
The 2014 proposal of directive on the single-member private limited liability company, creating the 
Societas Unius Personae (SUP) tried to achieve a more limited harmonisation.27 The SUP is targeted only 
at private companies.28 
As said, the recommendations of the EMCA provide for a complete text covering both public and private 
companies. Thus, the EMCA makes another attempt to achieve European convergence in this area. 
Even though most small companies in fact choose the private company form, there are also some SMEs 
that are public companies. There are also large companies organized as private companies. However, the 
raison d’être for having two different company forms is to allow each company to choose a form which 
works best for the company. Thus, in certain areas more flexible rules are needed for small companies 
and/or companies with few shareholders (close companies). On the other hand, there are special demands 
for shareholder protection in close companies compared to public companies (especially listed companies). 
This is for example the case regarding minority protection (see Chapter 11 on general meeting and minority 
protection). 
Although public companies can offer shares to the public, most large companies have only a few 
shareholders and are not financed by the market. If such companies prefer a more flexible company form 
it is possible for them to adopt the private company form as an alternative. 
The general view taken in the EMCA is that the provisions covering private companies are tailored to fit 
the needs of typical private companies as they exist in the different Member States. Even if the distinction 
between public and private companies generally is not based on size or number of shareholders, this will 
not exclude the possibility that certain provisions would apply depending on the size of the company or the 
number of shareholders as a criterion. The Group considered, with respect to each provision, whether the 
provision should apply to private companies and public companies respectively. 
The following method of interpretation of the EMCA should therefore be used: unless otherwise stated, a 
provision applies to both private and public companies. The EMCA is constructed in a way which draws 
very clear lines between provisions which apply to private, public and publicly traded companies (see 
Section 8 below). 
8. The EMCA uses a one law model 
Almost all Member States have two company forms but the legislations vary.29 
                                                     
26 COM(2008) 396 final, p. 4. 
27 COM(2014) 212 final. 
28 See P.H. Conac, The Societas Unius Personae (SUP): A “Passport” for Job Creation and Growth, ECFR 2015, pp. 139-176; J. 
Lau Hansen, The SUP Proposal : Registration and Capital, idem, pp. 177-190; V. Knapp, Directive on Single-Member Private 
Limited Liability Companies: Distributions, idem, pp. 191-200; C. Teichmann, Corporate Groups within the Legal Framework of 
the European Union: The Group-Related Aspects of the SUP Proposal and the EU Freedom of Establishment, idem, p.202-229; 
S. Harbarth, From SPE to SMC: The German Political Debate on the Reform of the “Small Company”, idem, pp. 230-237; C. 
Malberti, The relationship between the Societas Unius Personae proposal and the acquis: Creeping Toward an Abrogation of EU 
Company Law?, idem, pp. 238-279. 
29 E. Wymeersch, Comparative Study of the Company Types in Selected EU States, ECFR 2009, pp. 71-124. 
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From a formal perspective, a number of Member States have two-law-systems such as Austria, Germany, 
Italy and Spain. A large number of Member States such as Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK use a one-law model. Other Member States have 
adopted a Commercial Code or a general Act on Business Associations, regulating all types of companies, 
such as is the case in the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia. The structure of 
these Acts takes both the form of a division into special subjects or a division into a general and a special 
Section. 
The Group has considered whether to draft a one-law or a two-law model. Arguments in favor of a one-
law model are that the distinction between the two traditional company forms (private and public 
companies) is becoming less significant and is being replaced by a more apt distinction which differentiates 
between companies whose shares are traded on regulated or alternative market (listed companies) and 
companies that are not. A large number of provisions should therefore be directed at all limited liability 
companies or only at listed companies. Further, experiences in some Member States have shown difficulties 
with the interpretation of two company laws with similar -but not exactly the same – regulations covering 
private companies and public companies respectively. Especially, in smaller Member States, it can take 
time before courts decide on the interpretation of a single provision. Therefore, it is more cost effective that 
the interpretation applies to both public and private companies. 
Arguments regarding interpretation can, however, be used both in favor or against the drafting of a one-
law model. 
Arguments against a one-law model are that the overwhelming majority of the EU legal systems regulate 
public and private companies independently (both those influenced by the German and French traditions). 
Moreover, main EU directives and national company law regulations regulate the two types of companies 
independently.  
The Model Law Group has decided to use a one-law model in the first place, for the sake of simplicity, to 
increase flexibility as the private company law model would be the default one, and to anticipate current 
development that private and public companies are becoming closer in terms of substantive regulation in 
the Member States.  
The EMCA therefore contains regulation on three categories of companies: 
• the private company 
• the public company 
• the publicly traded company 
Definitions and Comments to these different categories are stated in Chapter 1, Sections 1.02 and 1.03. 
Regarding public traded companies, there is a borderline between securities regulation and company law. 
The EMCA does not deal with securities regulation in general, but since public traded companies are public 
companies, certain parts of the regulation are a natural part of Companies Acts. This is in particular the 
case concerning directors’ duties, general meetings and minority protection. 
9. The EMCA is largely enabling 
As noted from a US perspective, the EMCA contains some mandatory terms but is largely enabling.30 If 
the EMCA is adopted by a Member State or any country, partially or fully, it provides companies operating 
with a wide range of choice with respect to either adopting the EMCA’s terms or customizing provisions 
to suit their circumstances. Therefore, the EMCA is flexible enough to be adapted to the unique needs of 
each country. 
                                                     
30 M. Klausner, A US view of the European Model Companies Act, ECFR 2016, p. 363. 
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10. The EMCA consists of broad standards. 
Key provisions of the EMCA consist of broad standards as opposed to specific rules. The issue of whether 
to have specific rules or broad standards was discussed intensively in the EMCA Group as both provide 
advantages and disadvantages. Specific rules provide legal certainty but reduce the flexibility of the Act 
which was a key goal of the EMCA. Broad standards make protection of minority shareholders and 
creditors very dependent on the quality of the judiciary in each country, which may vary considerably. 
Also, ex-post protection is less effective than ex ante protection if the judiciary is not effective. As Professor 
Paolo Giudici (whose roots are from Sicily) remarked, any rule contained in the EMCA should take into 
account business practices and court capabilities from Helsinki and Aarhus to Palermo. This was dubbed 
by the Group as the “Palermo Rule”. Indeed, the issue of the judiciary is key and it has been advocated for 
Member States who would adopt the EMCA to adopt also a Model Corporate Court.31 This is unlikely to 
occur in Europe despite the fact that their track record is excellent, as proved by the Delaware Chancery 
Court in the US and the Amsterdam Enterprise Court in the Netherlands. 
Therefore, in the EMCA itself and in each chapter a balance was struck. Overall, it was decided that 
flexibility should prevail so that specific rules would only apply if imposed by company law directives or 
because of the risk of having a too broad standards. However, a Member State, or any country, might adopt 
more specific regulations in order to fit its unique situation and historical legal background and to 
compensate for a weak judicial system. Therefore, again, the EMCA is flexible enough to be adapted to the 
unique needs of each country. 
11. IT 
The EMCA recommends the use of IT as much as possible. This is in line with the Commission’s Action 
Plan and Directive (2009/101/EC)32 on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies. 
The EMCA contains pertinent provisions, for example on formation by online registration, electronic 
communications between companies and shareholders and electronic general meetings. However, it is also 
taken into account that the opportunities to use information technology vary between the Member States.
                                                     
31 R. Gilson, A Model Companies Act and A Model Company Court, ECFR 2016, pp. 351–362. 
32 Directive 2009/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on coordination of safeguards which, for the protection 
of the interests of members and third parties, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the second 
paragraph of Article 48 of the Treaty, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent (codified version). The purpose of this 
Directive is to undertake a codification of First Council Directive of 9 March 1968 on co-ordination of safeguards which, for the 
protection of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of 
Article 58 of the Treaty, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent throughout the Community. 
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General Comments33 
1. EU law 
Chapter 1 includes a differentiation between the different types of companies, regulated by the EMCA and 
some general principles which are explained in this Chapter. 
Most of the EU company law Directives deal with public companies and listed companies. However, as 
stated in Section 3, the EMCA deals with public and private companies. 
Generally, the EMCA deals with limited liability companies as outlined in Article 2(1)(a) of Directive 
2005/56/EC (cf. Article 1 in Directive 2009/101/EC). 
Chapter 1 contains a number of General Principles which echo certain fundamental principles of company 
law set out in Directives including Directive 2009/101/EC on coordination of safeguards which, for the 
protection of the interests of members and third parties (originally the 1st Company Law Directive), the 
Takeovers Bid Directive (2004/25/EC), the Cross-border Merger Directive (2005/56/EC), the Shareholders 
Rights Directive (2007/36/EC) and Directive 2012/30/EU. An example is the principle of equality. 
2. National law 
Most directives, except Directive 2009/101/EC, only apply to public companies. The national company 
laws of the Member States take different positions to the question whether the rules provided for by the 
company law Directives should apply to private companies as well. In Belgium, Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden, the company law Directives for the most part also apply to private companies, whereas the UK, 
Netherlands (since the 2012 Flex BV) and Luxembourg for example, which are economically liberal 
countries, have taken the opposite position and hence do not apply the company law Directives to private 
companies. In most of the other countries, the regulation of private companies is only to some extent 
inspired by the EU Directives applying to public companies. 
3. Considerations 
The EMCA contains rules for both private and public companies, including listed companies. The EMCA 
is organized such that the sections, if not otherwise indicated, deal with both private and public companies. 
It is made clear in the specific sections and the appertaining comments whether there are special rules 
concerning private companies and listed companies. The Group does not have a clear-cut stance on whether 
the Directives concerning public companies should also concern private companies. This matter is dealt 
with in the specific parts of the EMCA. Generally, the Group aims to draw up a flexible and not too onerous 
Model Law. Hence, it is continuously considered whether the rules concerning public companies could be 
more flexible, for example by exploiting the Directives’ possibilities of derogation. Within a number of 
legal areas, the difference between the regulation concerning public and private companies will be smaller, 
which partly explains the structure of the Model Law. 
The Group has found it suitable to commence the EMCA by establishing a number of general principles, 
which partly define the overriding purpose of the regulation in the EMCA, and partly serve as a means for 
interpretation of the specific rules of the EMCA. 
In this respect, the EMCA Group has been especially inspired by the Finnish Companies Act.
                                                     
33 The working group on Chapter 1 was chaired by Professor Paul Kruger Andersen (University of Aarhus, Denmark). 
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PART 1 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Section 1.01 
Short Title and Scope 
(1) This Model Act shall be known and cited as the European Model Companies Act (“EMCA”). 
(2) The EMCA applies to companies as indicated in this Act. 
Comments 
Re 1) The short title provided by Section 1 creates a convenient name for a European Model Law applying 
to companies. See the Introduction for a general description of the development of this Act, the purposes it 
is intended to serve and the principles under which it was prepared. 
Re 2) See comments to Section 3 in regard to the type of companies covered by the EMCA. 
Section 1.02 
Definitions 
(1) “Company”: A limited liability company formed and registered under the EMCA. 
(2) ”Offer to the public”: A communication to persons in any form and by any means, presenting sufficient 
information on the terms of the offer and the securities to be offered, so as to enable an investor to decide 
to purchase or subscribe to these securities. This definition shall also be applicable to the placing of 
securities through financial intermediaries. 
(3) “Management board”: In countries with a one-tier board system, the board of directors; in countries 
with a two-tier board system, the management board being responsible for the management of the company. 
(4) “Supervisory board”: the body being responsible for the supervision of the management body in 
countries with a two-tier board system. 
(5) “Director”: A member of the management body or of the supervisory body of a company. 
(6) “Board”: The single board of directors in the one-tier system and the supervisory and management 
board in the two-tier system if not stated explicitly otherwise. 
(7) “Subscription price”: The price to be paid to the company for each share issued by the company. 
(8) “Securities”: Transferable financial instrument as defined by Article 4(15) of Directive 2014/65/EU. 
(9) “Traded Company”: A publicly traded company whose securities are listed or on traded on a regulated 
market or a multilateral trading facility, as defined respectively by Article 4(21) and (22) of Directive 
2014/65/EU, in one or more Member States. 
(10) “Registrar”: The natural or legal person responsible for receiving the documentation set out in 
Chapter 3 of the EMCA and issuing the certificate of incorporation. 
Comments 
Re 1) Section 1 determines which company forms are covered by the EMCA. 
A limited liability company is a company in which the liability of members is limited by its instrument of 
incorporation. The definition of limited liability company should be understood in accordance with the 
definition in Article 2(1)(a) of Directive 2005/56/EC on cross-border mergers of limited liability 
companies, i.e. a company as referred to in Article 1 of Directive 2009/101/EC, see Section 3 of Chapter 
1. 
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The EMCA deals with public and private limited liability companies. Private companies are typically small 
or medium companies that require limited liability and legal personality but do not require access to public 
funding through the general capital markets although they can sometimes sell bonds by private placement. 
Usually, financing comes from contributions by the members themselves or alternatively by bank finance. 
Therefore, the disclosure requirements for these companies are less onerous and the regulation is generally 
more flexible, see Introduction point 3.1 of the EMCA. 
Public companies exist in all EU Member States. This company form is designed for larger enterprises, 
which generally have access to the capital markets in order to raise finance, both in terms of equity capital 
from shareholders and loan capital from bondholders. These companies are genuinely capital companies in 
that they usually have a large and diverse number of shareholders. Such companies often give rise to agency 
problems as a result of the perceived separation of ownership and control. 
However, large companies are not restricted to the public company form and small companies are not 
restricted to the private company form. Thus, the legal distinction between public and private companies 
stated in the EMCA is not based on the company’s size, but rather on whether shares can be offered to the 
public and be publicly traded. 
The distinction is consistent with the proposal for the European Private Company (SPE) Statute Article 
3(d) and the Companies Acts of a number of Member States, among them Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, Poland, and Sweden. 
Re 2) The definition of the term “offer to the public” is derived from the Prospectus Directive 2003/71/EC, 
Article 1(d). 
Re 3 and 4) The comments to EMCA Chapter 8 on management refer in detail to the definitions of the 
terms “director”, “managing body” and “supervisory body”. 
Re 5) As discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8, Member States operate on the basis of a one- tier system, 
a two-tier board system or a variant. This organisation applies for public and sometimes also for private 
companies. In Ireland and the UK, each company has only one board of directors which may comprise both 
executive and non-executive directors. In these Member States, the term “director” refers to members 
belonging to this board. In other Member States, like Germany, there is both a management board charged 
with carrying out executive functions and a supervisory board charged with supervising the former. In such 
jurisdictions, the managing director may not be a member of either board. In a growing number of Member 
States, among them Lithuania, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Portugal, companies can choose between different board models. When using the term director, the EMCA 
refers to the members of the management body as well as a supervisory body of a company. Thus, the term 
director is used in sections where the duties of directors rest with the management body as well as the 
supervisory body, for example in cases of conflict of interest. 
Re 9) Traded companies can be further classified depending on where they are publicly traded. With respect 
to publicly traded companies there are two main categories regulated in the EU: 
• a listed company is a publicly traded company whose securities are listed on or are traded on a 
regulated market as defined by Article 4(14) of Directive 2004/39/EC 
• a listed company is a publicly traded company, whose securities are listed on or traded on a 
multilateral trading facility according to the definitions in Article 4(15) of Directive 2004/39/EC 
Only a small percentage of public companies registered in EU Member States trade their securities on a 
regulated market and fall into the first category above. Companies traded on a regulated market are 
generally subject to the full application of EU Directives whereas companies trading on alternative markets 
are subject to the relevant (usually less onerous) regulations of the relevant exchange. 
The various sections of the EMCA indicate whether they apply to public companies trading on a regulated 
market and also to public companies traded on a multilateral trading facility (MTF). 
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Section 1.03 
Private and Public Companies 
(1) A company may be public or private. 
(2) The shares of a private company may not be offered to the public. 
(3) Unless otherwise prescribed, this Act shall apply to private as well as public companies. 
Comments 
The EMCA deals with public and private companies limited by shares, as these types of companies are the 
ones most commonly used within the EU. Other types of limited liability business structures such as limited 
partnerships, co-operative limited companies and European companies are not addressed by the EMCA. 
The drafters of the EMCA had in mind the following types of companies (as enumerated in Directive 
2009/101/EC) as a guide for legislators: 
• in Austria: 
die Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung; die Aktiengesellschaft; 
• in Belgium: 
naamloze vennootschap/société anonyme, commanditaire vennootschap op aandelen/société en 
commandite par actions, personenvennootschap met beperkte aansprakelijkheit/société de personnes à 
responsabilité limitée; 
• in Bulgaria: 
акционерно дружество, дружество с ограничена отговорност, командитно дружество с акции; 
• in Croatia: 
dioničko društvo, društvo s ograničenom odgovornošću 
• in Cyprus: 
δημόσιες εταιρείες περιορισμένης ευθύνης με μετοχές ή με εγγύηση, ιδιωτικές εταιρείες περιορισμένης 
ευθύνης με μετοχές ή με εγγύηση; 
• in the Czech Republic: 
společnost s ručením omezeným, akciová společnost; 
• in Denmark: 
aktieselskab, kommanditaktieselskab, anpartsselskab; 
• in Estonia: 
Osaühing, aktsiaselts; 
• in France: 
la société anonyme, la société en commandite par actions, la société à responsabilité limitée, la société par 
actions simplifiée; 
• in Finland: 
yksityinen osakeyhtiö/privata aktiebolag, julkinen osakeyhtiö/publikta aktiebolag; 
• in Germany: 
die Aktiengesellschaft, die Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien, die Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung; 
• in Greece: 
ανώνυμη εταιρία, εταιρία περιωρισμένης ευθύνης, ετερόρρυθμη κατά μετοχές εταιρία; 
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• in Hungary: 
Korlátolt felelősségű társaság, nyilvánosan működő részvénytársaság; 
• in Ireland: 
companies incorporated with limited liability; 
• in Italy: 
società per azioni, società in accomandita per azioni, società a responsabilità limitata; 
• in Latvia: 
akciju sabiedrība, sabiedrība ar ierobežotu atbildību, komanditsabiedrība; 
• in Lithuania: 
akcinė bendrovė, uždaroji akcinė bendrovė; 
• in Luxembourg: 
la société anonyme, la société en commandite par actions, la société à responsabilité limitée, la société par 
actions simplifiée; 
• in Malta: 
kumpannija pubblika/public limited liability company, kumpannija privata/private limited liability 
company; 
• in the Netherlands: 
de naamloze vennootschap, de besloten vennootschap met beperkte aansprakelijkheid; 
• in Poland: 
spółka z ograniczoną odpowiedzialnością, spółka komandytowo-akcyjna, spółka akcyjna; 
• in Portugal: 
sociedade anónima, sociedade em comandita por acções, sociedade por quotas; 
• in Romania: 
societate pe acțiuni, societate cu răspundere limitată, societate în comandită pe acțiuni; 
• in Slovakia: 
akciová spoločnosť, spoločnosť s ručením obmedzeným; 
• in Slovenia: 
delniška družba, družba z omejeno odgovornostjo, komaditna delniška družba; 
• in Spain: 
la sociedad de responsabilidad limitada, la sociedad anónima; 
• in Sweden: 
privata aktiebolag, publika aktiebolag; 
• in the United Kingdom: 
companies incorporated with limited liability. 
The EMCA regulates both public and private companies within one Act but within its Chapters it 
distinguishes, where appropriate, between provisions dealing only with public companies or only with 
private companies. In the latter case, where justifiable, the EMCA relaxes the regulatory requirements and 
looks to formulate rules that take special consideration of the typical ownership structure of private 
companies. 
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The philosophy behind the implementation of the GmbH in Germany in 1892 was that the risk of misuse 
might be reduced if a company could not ask the public for financial support. As a consequence, a private 
company will usually have fewer shareholders than a public company. A decisive factor in private 
companies is the owners’ personal relations among each other and the relations to the management rather 
than the number of owners. The same philosophy lies behind the Directive 2012/30/EU on capital – which 
is also reflected in most of the Member States classification of companies with respect to public and private 
companies. Section 3 carries on this tradition taking into account the special need of owners of a private 
company. 
Section 1.04 
Legal Personality and Limited Liability of Shareholders 
(1) A company shall acquire legal personality upon registration. 
(2) Save as otherwise provided in the EMCA or in the articles of association, a shareholder shall not be 
liable for more than the amount of share capital for which the shareholder has subscribed or agreed to 
subscribe. 
Comments 
Legal personality means that a company is a legal entity distinct from its shareholders. A number of the 
EU Directives and Regulations refer to companies with legal personality and the acquisition of legal 
personality. For example, Article 8 of Directive 2009/101/EC provides for actions undertaken “before a 
company being formed has acquired legal personality”. Article 1(3) of Council Regulation (No 2157/2001) 
on the Statute for a European Company (“SE”) provides that an SE shall have “legal personality”. However, 
EU regulation does not provide for a definition or a definitive rule concerning the meaning of the term. 
Council Regulation (No 2137/85) on the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG) states in Article 
1(2) that a formed group shall from the date of its registration have the capacity, in its own name, to have 
rights and obligations of all kinds, to make contracts or accomplish other legal acts, and to sue and be sued. 
While EU legislation and the domestic legislation of a number of Member States such as Finland, Portugal 
and Sweden expressly provide that a company has legal personality, other Member States like Denmark, 
Ireland and the UK do not use the term “legal personality” in their Companies Acts. 
In most Member States, the company is incorporated as a separate legal person upon registration. This is 
also the case in the SE Regulation (cf. Article 16(2)) and stated in the previous EPC proposal (cf. Article 
9). In Luxembourg, the parties to the contract may decide to delay the acquisition of corporate personality 
and incorporation occurs upon the entering into of a contract for the formation of the company by notarial 
deed. Likewise, in the Netherlands, legal personality commences upon the execution of a notarial deed, 
which is to be registered later. 
In some Member States such as Austria, Germany, Poland, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden companies (i.e. 
companies not yet registered, termed “Vorgesellschaft” in Germany) can enter into contracts, 
acquire/transfer property, sue and be sued upon signing the articles of association or upon granting the 
notarial deed (see further EMCA Chapter 2.). Hence, before registration, these companies enjoy legal status 
similar to a registered company. Registration remains relevant however for the purpose of determining the 
liability of the promoters and managers. 
In the view of the EMCA Group, the deciding factor is not whether the law applies the term “legal person” 
but when certain provisions are applicable, such as in the case of signing the instrument of incorporation 
and registration. 
In the EMCA, registration means that the company not only has full legal personality but also that 
shareholders and managers have no personal liability for the obligations of the company arising after 
registration. The concept of a company as a legally distinct entity in the EMCA means that the company 
has capacity to enter contracts, own property and sue or be sued (see Section 4). The company possesses 
these powers and duties in its own name. 
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Under the EMCA, the company does not exist as such before registration. However, the subscribers and 
shareholders become bound when they sign the instrument of incorporation, see Chapter 2, Section 3. In 
that sense, it can be said that the company is formed upon signing the instrument of incorporation (cf. the 
Swedish Companies Act 2005, hereafter Swedish Companies Act ,2:4). Thus, the fact that a company first 
receives legal personality on the day of registration does not mean that it may not start its activities before 
then. The instrument of incorporation must state the date when the formation of the company becomes 
effective, see Chapter 2, Sections 4 and 5. 
The managers may carry out activities on behalf of the company in anticipation of registration. These 
activities are regulated by Chapter 3 (see Section 2) of the EMCA which sets out the legal consequences 
of measures taken on behalf of a company before registration. This provides an incentive to the persons 
who agree to form a company to complete the registration process. 
The instrument of incorporation must identify the date at which the formation becomes legally effective. 
Legally effective means that the income from this date is the company’s income and similarly the expenses 
are then the company’s expenses. The company can choose a date before the date of the instrument of 
incorporation where the company’s formation becomes legally effective. This is especially relevant when 
the company takes over an existing business. According to Chapter 2 sections 3 (2)(k) and 5, the company 
must state the date when the formation becomes legally effective. In the case where a company takes over 
an existing business, the company also needs to choose a date for which the formation starts regarding 
accounting. National accounting laws decide the companies’ first accounting period and thereby the day of 
takeover. When choosing the date where the formation becomes legally effective, the company must 
respect the accounting rules. Similarly, national tax rules may limit the extent to which the company can 
be formed with retroactive effect. According to the EMCA it is also possible to choose a date ahead in time, 
see comments to EMCA Chapter 2, Section 3 (2)(k). 
Off-the-shelf companies are permitted or at least not prohibited in all Member States. However certain 
Member States regulate their operation. For example, in Germany, the Federal High Court of Justice has 
required that rules on the formation of companies be applied per analogiam at the time the off-shelf 
company becomes active. Member States such as Luxembourg and Greece provide for the application of 
the judicial dissolution of dormant companies to off-the-shelf companies 
Off-the-shelf companies can be used to avoid long registration procedures and the personal liability arising 
from activities before registration takes place (see above). The EMCA has no provisions on off-the-shelf-
companies but assumes that they are legal according to national law. It should also be noted that if only a 
short period of time is required to register a company, for example because online registration is available, 
this obviates the need for such companies see Chapter 3, Section 34. 
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PART 2 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
Section 1.05 
Capital and the Maintenance of Capital 
(1) The company must have a share capital. The share capital shall be denominated in the company’s 
accounting currency (which may be any currency). 
(2) The assets of the company may be distributed to the shareholders only as provided in this Act. 
Comments 
Re 1) In the UK, larger companies often have classes of shares in different currencies, usually dollars and 
euros in addition to sterling. However, in most Member States there may only be one currency and the 
Group prefers this. Some Member States, such as the Netherlands for the Flex BV, allow the use of the 
national of a single foreign currency. The EMCA also allows this possibility in order to increase flexibility. 
Re 2) The fundamental principle of distribution of the company’s capital is expressed in Section 5(2). 
Detailed provisions can be found in EMCA Chapter 7 on capital of companies. A distribution can take 
place in the form of: a dividend (EMCA Chapter 7), a reduction of share capital (EMCA Chapter 7), an 
acquisition of own shares (EMCA Chapter 7) and on a dissolution of the company (EMCA Chapter 14). 
In many Member States, a concealed distribution is seen as an illegal circumvention of the rules on 
distribution, see further Chapter 7 on capital. 
Section 1.06 
Purpose of the Company 
(1) Unless otherwise provided in the articles of association, the purpose of the company is to increase its 
value. 
(2) A company may only be formed to pursue a lawful object. 
Comments 
Re 1) Normally, the purpose of the company is to maximize the value of the company. It is important to 
ensure that both investment in and management of companies is carried out with a long-term and 
sustainable view, which is essentially a question of perspective, whereas the actual duration of any 
investment or management effort is less relevant as it is possible to act with beneficial long-term 
consequences within a short-time frame just as it is possible to harm the long term prospects of a company 
by continued mismanagement or by remaining passive over an extended period. 
It is also important to differentiate between the stakeholders. A long-term perspective from management 
and board members is particularly important for the viability of companies. This is consistent with the view 
of the EU Commission that the primary responsibility of a company is to promote long-term viability.34 It 
is also the accepted position of all Member States. That is also why it is important for example that 
directors’ remuneration schemes encourage this. On the other hand, it seems more difficult and less sensible 
to try to promote a long-term perspective from shareholders by simply focusing on the duration of their 
investment. The very act of selling their shares in a company encourages liquidity and may also be a very 
potent warning to incumbent management that it is failing and may ultimately help takeovers that promote 
a more efficient use of the resources. To reward shareholders simply because they endure may be a 
disservice to the company. Lock-in effects should therefore be avoided. 
                                                     
34 See 2011 Green Paper on ‘The EU corporate governance framework’ (COM(2011) 164 final) and the Report of the Reflection 
Group on the Future of EU Company Law (the report is available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
company/docs/modern/reflectiongroup_report_en.pdf). See further the “Action Plan: European Company Law and Corporate 
Governance – A Modern Legal Framework for More Engaged Shareholders and Sustainable Companies” (COM(2012) 740/2). 
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A path to promote long-term viability could involve encouraging corporate social responsibility (CSR), 
transparency and active ownership, and developing tools to support a constructive dialogue between 
shareholders and companies. For that purpose, there is a need to reduce costs and remove legal obstacles 
and regulatory barriers that preclude shareholders from actively engaging in companies. However, it should 
be recognized that even prudent long-term planning cannot guarantee future success. Consequently, it 
seems that the law should foremost focus on providing companies the necessary flexibility to ensure their 
long- term viability under rapidly changing business conditions while taking into account the interest of 
stakeholders. It should not attempt to block the necessary failure of inefficient companies. 
The exception in Section 6(1) provides for companies established for non-profit making or altruistic 
purposes. The Group considers that Section 6(1) is not inconsistent with the view that companies at the 
same time can contribute to social and environmental objectives, through integrating corporate social 
responsibility as a strategic investment as an integral component of their core business strategy, their 
management instruments and their operations. This is in line with the UN-Principles (UN Global Compact 
and UN PRIX).35 In Denmark, for example, the 2013 Companies Act covers companies that solely have 
altruistic purposes, and the requirement that companies should pursue economic profit has been removed.  
There is an obvious connection between the purpose of the company and the powers and duties of the 
directors. Directors must exercise the powers granted to them for a proper purpose. They owe a duty of 
good faith to the company to act in the company’s best interest. While these matters are dealt with in 
Chapter 9 of the EMCA on directors’ duties, it is worth noting that wider factors are likely to be considered 
relevant to an assessment of proper conduct in this regard. For example, Section 172 of the UK Companies 
Act 2006 introduces wider corporate social responsibility into a director’s decision-making process. See 
further Chapter 9 of the EMCA on directors’ duties and Chapter 11 of the EMCA on general meetings. 
In addition, accounting rules in Member States like Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Ireland 
and the UK demand that the annual accounts of traded companies include narrative reports which, while 
giving an account of the company’s business and performance, also address broader environmental, social 
and community issues affecting the company. In other countries, like Austria and Germany, this obligation 
is confined to companies of a certain size. 
Re 2) The purpose of a company is distinct from the objects which set out the parameters of permitted 
corporate activity. The latter is set out in the articles of association in accordance with Chapter 2, Section 
4(e). A company may restrict the objects of the company in the articles of association but that is not a 
requirement. The objects of a company and economic profit will be discussed further in the comments to 
Chapter 2, Section 3(2) and Section 4 below. 
Section 1.07 
Transferability of Shares 
A share may be transferred and acquired without restrictions, unless otherwise provided in the articles of 
association. 
Comments 
Article 3(d) of the 2nd Company Law Directive 2012/30/EU provides that information on “the special 
conditions if any limiting the transfer of shares” must appear in the statutes, the instrument of incorporation 
or a separate document published in accordance with the procedure laid down in the laws of each Member 
State. This gives flexibility regarding the free transferability of shares. This is also reflected in Section 7. 
Any limitation on transferability will have to be expressly provided for in the articles, the memorandum or 
a separate document open to public inspection and is subject to the requirement of Chapter 5 on shares. A 
subscriber for shares of limited transferability should thus have full knowledge of this fact at the time the 
company is formed. 
                                                     
35 On United Nations Global Compact see http://www.unglobalcompact.org. 
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In a number of Member States the Companies Acts may provide for the option that transfers of shares in 
private companies require board approval or even shareholder approval. Transfers of shares are 
substantially less restricted in public companies. This reflects the fact that in practice, restrictions are more 
needed in close companies. As a common principle, the EMCA provides for a principle of transferability. 
According to securities regulation, shares which are traded on the regulated market must be freely 
transferable (see Article 45 of Directive 2001/34/EC on the admission of securities to listing and on 
information to be published on those securities). 
Chapter 5 deals with different kinds of restrictions on the transfer of shares. 
Chapter 11 deals with the possibility of introducing restrictions on transfer after the formation of a 
company. 
Section 1.08 
Equality of Shares 
All shares shall carry equal rights in the company, unless otherwise provided in the articles of association. 
Comments 
Section 8 concerns private as well as public companies. 
Section 8 concerns the question of issuing various classes of shares. There has been a widespread discussion 
in recent years about proportionality between risk and control. In 1990, the Commission came forward with 
a proposal to the 5th Company Law Directive36 that aimed to remove a number of voting restrictions. This 
proposal was included as an amendment to the proposed 5th Company Law Directive dealing with the 
structure of the public company. The debate has primarily focused on the “one-share, one-vote” (OS/OV) 
system. The proposed Directive was withdrawn and Member States have the freedom to allow different 
classes of shares. Since then the Commission has given up on the attempt to achieve a “one share, one vote” 
system, but the debate has continued. The High Level Group of Company Law Experts on issues related to 
Takeover Bids (2002) proposed that proportionality between ultimate economic risk and control meant that 
share capital which has an unlimited right to participate in the profits of the company or in the residue on 
liquidation, and only such share capital, should normally carry control rights, in proportion to the risk 
carried.37 Thus recommendations were made to deal with pre-bid defenses which led directly to Article 11 
of the Takeovers Directive (2004/25/EC). Article 11 introduces the break-through rule which was designed 
to increase the number of takeovers in the EU by eliminating governance arrangements which might 
otherwise impede takeovers. This provision recognizes that disparate voting rights are a feature of European 
company law and gives Member States the option of making provision for them in the context of a takeover 
of a company. 
There are substantial differences in the various Member States regarding the right to have share classes and 
voting limitations. Germany and Poland, for example, have chosen the system of “one-share, one vote” as 
a principle which however also admits non-voting preference shares.  
The Group is of the opinion that systems which allow share classes and voting limitations are not less 
efficient than systems which do not allow such differentiation. In a number of cases the market can – and 
will – force companies to have only one class of shares. In general shares are financial instruments among 
others. Thus, investors must decide which kind of instrument they want to buy. 
According to the EMCA, shareholders are allowed to opt into a system of share classes and voting 
limitations once this is provided for in the articles of association. In such cases, the articles of association 
must describe the rights of different classes of shares, see Chapter 2, Section 4(2)(j). 
See further on shares, voting rights and economic rights in the EMCA Chapter 5. 
                                                     
36 The original proposal dates from 1972, OJ 1972, C7. Amendments: OJ 1983, C 240 and OJ 1991, C7. 
37 Final Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in 
Europe (04.11.2002), p. 39. 
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Section 1.09 
Equal Treatment of Shareholders and Minority Protection 
All shareholders who are in the same position must be afforded equal treatment by the company. 
Comments 
In order to protect minority shareholders, particularly where decisions are made by a simple majority (see 
Chapter 11), it is essential that safeguards are introduced. Article 46 of the 2nd Company Law Directive 
provides that for the purposes of the implementation of that Directive, the laws of the Member States shall 
ensure equal treatment to all shareholders who are in the same position. Article 33 of the same Directive 
provides an example of this principle in operation in its requirement that pre-emption rights apply whenever 
share capital is increased for cash consideration. The pre-emption right is found in the EMCA Chapter 6 
on financing.  
The equal treatment principle is also set out in the Shareholders Rights Directive (2007/36/EEC) Article 4 
of which provides that companies that have their registered office in a Member State and whose shares are 
admitted for trading on a regulated market situated or operating within a Member State, must ensure “equal 
treatment for all shareholders who are in the same position with regard to participation and the exercise of 
voting rights in the general meeting”. In the EMCA, the term “equal” has the same meaning as the term 
“equality”. 
In the shortest form the principle of minority protection is expressed, for example, in a general clause as 
formulated similarly in the Danish, Finish and Swedish Companies Acts: The general meeting, the board 
of directors and the managing body shall not make decisions or take other measures that are conducive to 
conferring an undue benefit to a shareholder or another person at the expense of the company or another 
shareholder. The German Stock Corporation Act (§ 53a), the Greek Law on companies limited by shares 
(Article 30), and the Polish Commercial Companies Code (Article 20) state explicitly that shareholders in 
the same position have to be treated equally. 
EMCA Chapter 11 on general meeting provides for a general clause. A basic principle of equal rights can 
also be found in Chapter 5 (on shares). 
The equal treatment principle is not absolute. For example, Article 33 of Directive 2012/30/EU itself sets 
out the circumstances in which pre-emption rights may be avoided. As will be clear from subsequent 
chapters, the EMCA also provides for circumstances in which deviations from the principle will be 
permitted. (see for example Chapter 6 on the pre-emption right.) 
Section 1.10 
The Majority Principle 
The right of the shareholders to take decisions regarding the affairs of the company is exercised at the 
general meeting. Unless otherwise decided in law or in the articles of association, decisions shall be taken 
by simple majority of the votes cast. 
Comments 
It is necessary to allow a determined majority to manage the company’s business operations. But in order 
to prevent the majority from being able to oppress the minority, the EMCA also contains general and 
specific mandatory rules which limit the majority’s freedom of action. For example, it allows companies 
to have supplementary rules in the articles of association demanding super majority voting etc. It also 
establishes the principle of equal treatment in Section 9 above. Similarly, the majority principle and other 
provisions on minority protection are contained in Chapter 11 on general meetings. 
The term “general meeting” in this Section does not require that decisions should always be taken at a 
physical meeting. On the contrary, Chapter 11 on general meetings allows the company to have electronic 
meetings, to make determinations on the basis of written resolutions etc. These decisions will be regarded 
as decisions made by a “general meeting”. Therefore, “general meeting” also designate collective decisions 
by the shareholders. 
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Section 1.11 
Directors’ Duty of Loyalty and Care 
A director of a company has a duty of care and a duty of loyalty. 
Comments 
The duties of directors include mainly two general principles. Firstly, the directors must exercise care in 
avoiding harm to the company. And secondly, the directors have a duty of loyalty in placing the company’s 
interests ahead of their own. 
The two principles are broadly recognized in European company law, but most of the Member States’ 
Companies Acts have no provision directly expressing the two principles. An exception is the UK 
Companies Act part 10, Chapter 2, which has a statutory statement of directors’ duties. A statutory 
statement is also included in Ireland in the Companies Act 2014. 
The precise contents of the principles of duty of care and duty of loyalty are explained in Chapter 9 on 
directors’ duties. 
Section 1.12 
Shareholder Democracy 
(1) The general meeting is the highest authority of the company. 
(2) Shareholders may include provisions in the articles of association establishing the manner in which the 
company will operate. Provisions contrary to a mandatory provision of this Act or some other Act, or 
contrary to the rules of appropriate conduct, are void. 
Comments 
Re 1) As noted in Section 10, shareholders take decisions at the general meetings. The board of directors 
runs the company. The division of tasks between the general meetings and board of directors is found in 
Chapter 8 (Management of the Company) and Chapter 11 (General Meeting). The systems of division in 
various Member States are different. In some Member States, the general meeting may take any decision 
regarding company matters. This is in principle the situation in the Nordic countries. In other Member 
States such as Germany, however, there is a strong division between the power of directors and the general 
meeting. It is important, however, to understand that the ultimate power in companies belongs to 
shareholders at the general meeting. The provisions in the EMCA should support and promote 
shareholders’ opportunities to monitor the management and to take decisions regarding the company. This 
approach is in line with modern corporate governance thinking.38Thus, the principle of shareholder 
democracy should be understood as an overall goal or direction when considering the individual provisions 
of the EMCA. To a large extent it follows the intention expressed by the EU Commission that there is a 
case for aiming to establish a real shareholder democracy in the EU. It should not be seen as a specific rule, 
for instance to follow the principle of “one share – one vote” – which has been abandoned by the 
Commission. Further, the principle is not a principle that all decisions should be taken by the general 
meeting. The EMCA aims at ensuring that the most fundamental and important decisions should be agreed 
on by the general meeting and that the shareholders have effective means to exercise their rights at the 
general meeting and to be active shareholders. 
Re 2) The provision in Section 12(2) is inspired by the Finnish Companies Act (624/2006) Chapter 1 
Section 9. 
The principle indicates that Section 12 determines that shareholders have the freedom to design the 
company according to their preferences. Restrictions on this freedom arise due to mandatory requirements 
of shareholder protection, creditor protection and possibly other legislation in the fields of employment, 
safety etc. The principle can also be seen as a supplement to the majority rule described in Section 10. 
Section 12 determines that shareholders have the final say within the company. 
                                                     
38 See Green Paper on The EU corporate governance framework (COM(2011) 164 final). 
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The principle set out in Section 12 does not indicate that shareholder value in the narrowest sense is a 
mandatory aim for companies (see also comments to Section 6). What Section 12 does imply is that it is an 
overall principle and aim of the EMCA is that the EMCA should be designed and interpreted in a way as 
to allow and encourage shareholders to exercise their rights as shareholders. 
The Commission has set about enhancing shareholders’ rights particularly in listed companies. Thus, the 
Shareholders Rights Directive (2007/36/EC) and the Commission’s Green Paper39 and the 2012 Action 
Plan establish requirements in relation to the exercise of certain shareholder rights attaching to voting shares 
in general meetings of companies whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market situated or 
operating within a Member State. The reason behind the Directive is to reduce the problems for 
shareholders in companies with large numbers of shareholders and with (typically) a separation between 
shareholders and the management. In typical private companies it is even more obvious that it is appropriate 
for the shareholders to decide on company matters. 
Section 1.13 
Freedom of Movement within Europe 
Unless otherwise prohibited in law, private and public companies are allowed to establish in or move their 
activities or seat, real or statutory, to other Member States of the EU without interruption of legal 
personality. 
Comments 
Articles 49 and 54 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) contain the principle 
of free establishment for persons and companies. Thus, private and public companies can establish branches 
and subsidiaries in other Member States. 
Furthermore, EU case law (C-411/03, Sevic) states that restrictions on mergers between companies in 
different Member States are contrary to Article 49 TFEU. 
The Cross-border Merger Directive (2005/56/EC) allows cross-border mergers. The Directive is 
implemented in most Member States and the implementation in a number of Member States also includes 
cross-border divisions. 
The transfer of the main seat was included in the proposal of the 14th Company Law Directive. However, 
the adoption of this Directive is postponed. On 2 February 2012 the European Parliament adopted a 
resolution making recommendations to the Commission on a 14th Company Law Directive on the cross-
border transfer of company seats.40 
An alternative to cross-border mergers, the transfer of the main seat etc. would be the formation of a 
European Company (SE) and a European Private Company (SPE). The SE has only been of limited interest 
in most of the Member States. In addition, the project on the SPE has not yet been realized. 
Access to cross-border business activity, including cross-border corporate mobility, is at the core of the 
fundamental freedoms provided to companies by the Treaty. It is also a fact that it is important for the 
integration of the European markets and the competitiveness of European businesses to have such access 
in an efficient way.41 This cross-border framework cannot be completed sufficiently by contract, soft law 
or national legislation alone. A common EU-framework is needed to facilitate cross border activity and 
mobility, and to reduce costs and increase legal certainty when conducting business across borders. 
A cross-border context normally calls for a common cross-border solution and this solution can be different 
from what applies to purely national settings. In a cross-border context the most important thing is to ensure 
that an appropriate degree of protection is found taking into account the cross-border element and taking 
into account already acquired rights. 
                                                     
39 See Green Paper on The EU corporate governance framework (COM(2011) 164 final). 
40 For a text of the European Parliament resolution see: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-
TA-2012-0019&language=EN&ring=A7-2012-0008. 
41 Report of the Reflection Group on the Future of EU Company Law of 2012 (the report is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/reflectiongroup_report_en.pdf). 
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Company law is rarely the decisive factor for a company in its considerations in relation to cross-border 
corporate mobility. The stakeholder responses to the Commission consultation on the results of the study 
on the operation and the impacts of the statute for an SE-Company showed that it is normally a combination 
of different factors that dictates where a company chooses to locate and relocate.42 It should be 
acknowledged that corporate mobility is already possible, but the tools at hand are not as cost-efficient as 
they could be. 
Thus, from a user perspective the most important contribution that company law can provide is a clear and 
cost-efficient framework to facilitate companies’ cross-border mobility and restructuring needs. An 
appropriate degree of protection of relevant stakeholders needs to be included in the framework, balancing 
the interests of businesses with the interests of stakeholders. 
The Group considers that there is a need – in support of the Treaty’s principle on freedom of establishment 
– to formulate a principle on free movement of companies within the EU in relation to company law. 
In addition, this principle should be given substance, for example, by means of rules on international 
mergers and divisions and by means of rules on transfer of seat (see Chapter 13).
                                                     
42 The most important factors seem to include: efficient tax rules, flexible employment law, legal certainty, transparency and 
simplicity in company law as well as low registration costs and efficient and reliable regulatory authorities. The importance of an 
economic approach to location decisions was also stressed and some went as far as suggesting that company law has little relevance, 
as compared to the market itself. These views generally correspond to the majority of the views expressed at the Conference on 
the future of EU company law “European Company Law: The way forward” 16-17 May 2011, Brussels. Cf. also public 
consultations held by the European Commission, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/seat-transfer/2004-
consult_en.htm#market. 
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General Comments 
1. EU law 
Directive 2009/101/EC (recasting the 1st Company Law Directive of 1968) includes provisions for the 
protection of the interests of members and third parties such as the disclosure of a company’s registered 
office and its objects. Directive 2009/101/EC applies to private as well as public companies. 
Directive 2012/30/EU (recasting the Directive 77/91/EEC or 2nd Company Law Directive) as amended by 
Directive 2006/68/EC) coordinates national provisions concerning the formation of public companies, such 
as minimum capital requirements, distributions to shareholders, and increases and reductions in capital. 
The requirements include the following: 
• the articles of association must include certain information as stated in Articles 2 and 3 of Directive 
2012/30/EU; 
• the minimum subscribed share capital must not be less than € 25,000, and 
• shares may not be issued at a price lower than their nominal value, and where there is no nominal value, 
their accountable par as stated in Articles 8 of Directive 2012/30/EU. 
The provisions of Directive 2012/30/EU apply exclusively to public companies and as there are no 
equivalent EU provisions applying to private companies, the EMCA Group is free to decide whether to 
adopt the provisions stated in Directive 2012/30/EU to private companies. It considered this question on a 
section by section basis. Where such rules are imposed on private companies in the EMCA, modifications 
may have been introduced in order to avoid unnecessary burdens being imposed on private companies. 
2. National law 
Member States have taken different views regarding the implementation of secondary EU legislation. As 
to public companies, all Member States were obliged to implement the mandatory provisions of Directive 
2012/30/EU. However, there are differences regarding the implementation of the non-mandatory provisions 
of the Directive. Directive 2012/30/EU, relaxes some of the capital rules, such as the rules on formation, 
own shares (see EMCA Chapter 5 on shares), shareholder loans and financial assistance (see EMCA 
Chapter 7 on companies’ capital). Generally, the EMCA contains similar relaxations in respect of public 
companies. 
As to private companies the situation is quite different in the various Member States. As noted above, 
Member States are free to apply concepts similar to those applicable to public companies or they may adopt 
their own national measures. 
See further explanations in the comments to the sections of Chapter 2. 
3. Considerations 
As noted above, there are different positions in Member States regarding private companies. A number of 
Member States, among them the Nordic countries and Poland, apply most of the rules in Directive 
2012/30/EU to private companies. This for example is the case regarding the rules on contributions in kind. 
Member States such as Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK, on the other hand, have moved away from the 
Directive. All Member States derogate from the Directive’s requirement of minimum capital. 
The objective of Directive 2012/30/EU is to provide various safeguards to protect the rights and interests 
of shareholders and creditors of public companies. This is achieved through clarification, codification and 
coordination of national provisions relating to the formation of public companies. 
It should be noted that the amendments in 2006 and 2012 relax some of the original rules of the former 2nd 
Company Law Directive. The EMCA makes use of this trend to relax formal requirements. However, 
generally, it is the view of the Group that the fundamental principles of Directive 2012/30/EU should also 
apply to private companies. 
Regarding the method of company formation, there are two different approaches: the successive method 
and the simultaneous method. The EMCA Group has decided to use the latter, see Comments to Section 
3(5). 
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The EMCA Group has discussed whether it should be possible to use so-called real non-par value shares. 
There has been a degree of uncertainty as to whether non-par value shares comply with EU law. However, 
such shares have been introduced in the Finnish Companies Act and the Group considers that non-par value 
shares should be allowed, see below Section 8. 
Further, the EMCA Group has considered the Directive´s enumeration of the contents of the Instrument of 
Incorporation and the articles of association. The Group has chosen a simplified solution, which is 
connected with the fact that the EMCA is derogating from the Directive´s rules on lapse of incorporation.
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PART 1 
FORMATION OF COMPANIES 
Section 2.01 
Method of Formation 
A company may be formed by: 
(a) the creation of a company in accordance with the EMCA; 
(b) the transformation of an association or other legal entity if allowed by legislation applying to such 
entities; 
(c) the merger of existing companies; 
(d) the division of an existing company. 
Comments 
Section 1 lists the different means by which a company which is to be governed by the EMCA may be 
established The most common way is to establish a company following the procedure described in this 
Chapter of the EMCA. 
Article 15 of Directive 2012/30/EU states that pending coordination of national laws at a subsequent date, 
Member States shall adopt the measures necessary to require provision of at least the same safeguards as 
are laid down in Articles 2 to 12 in the event of conversion of another type of company into a public 
company (Section 1 (2)). The approach of the EMCA is consistent with this (see Chapter 4, Section 1 on 
transformation). 
Formation by the transformation (Section 1 (2)) from a company without corporate status shall be governed 
by national law applicable to the transforming company. 
In many Member States, there are restrictions on the type of entity which may become a private or public 
company (see EMCA Chapter 4, Section 1 on transformation). 
In the event of a merger (Section 1(3)) or a division (Section 1 (4)), one or more new companies are created. 
Chapter 13 deals with mergers and divisions of companies established under the EMCA. 
A private company can be converted to a public company and vice versa (“re-registered”). This will not 
give rise to the winding up of the company or lead to any loss or interruption of its legal personality, see 
Chapter 4, Sections 2-4.  
Section 2.02 
Subscribers 
A company may be formed by one or more persons, legal or natural. Persons who do not have a contractual 
capacity according to national law may not be subscribers. 
Comments 
A number of different persons are involved in the formation of a company. The term “promoter” is often 
used to refer to persons who undertake to form a company and to take the necessary steps to accomplish 
this task. The term would not normally include professional service providers such as lawyers, accountants 
and notaries. Promoters are considered to be fiduciaries and various duties and responsibilities are imposed 
upon promoters in different jurisdictions pursuant to common law and statute. Another group of persons 
who are crucial to the formation of a company is the “subscribers”. These persons subscribe to the 
Instrument of Incorporation thus agreeing to become its initial members on the company’s registration. 
Once the company’s shares are issued to them, they become “shareholders”. 
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In most Member States only one person is needed to form a company. Private companies are subject to the 
Directive 2009/102EC (12th Company Law Directive) on single-member private limited liability companies 
which require that Member States allow a private company to have a sole member when it is formed unless 
its legislation provides that an individual entrepreneur may set up an undertaking the liability of which is 
limited to a sum dedicated to a stated activity. As to public companies, Member States are free to decide 
on a minimum number of shareholders. In many countries, the requirement to have more than one 
subscriber in public companies reflects historical rules with seven being the usual number. This figure 
originates from the UK 1846 Companies Act. For example, in Belgium, seven persons are required. In 
Portugal, five persons are required, unless the State owns the majority of the share capital. France followed 
the UK model but reduced in 2015 the minimum number of shareholders for public companies, from seven 
to two. In Ireland, traditionally seven subscribers were required but the Irish Company Law Review Group 
noted that this requirement “originated in the early life of company law and has survived without analysis 
or review rather than as a consequence of analysis and review”. The new Irish Companies Act 2014 thus 
requires only one subscriber for private companies limited by shares which is the Irish model company 
(Irish Companies Act 2014, Section 17). The trend in Europe is clearly in eliminating any minimum number 
of shareholders. The Group also considers that there is no convincing reason to restrict the number of 
subscribers to a minimum number. 
In a small number of Member States, there are further restrictions on the type of persons who may establish 
a company. In Poland, for example, private and public companies may not be formed solely by another 
single-shareholder (Polish Commercial Companies Code, Section 151(1) and Section 301(1)). No such 
limitations are imposed by the EMCA. 
Some Member States require that subscribers must be domiciled within the EU. The EMCA does not 
contain such a requirement in Section 2(1). The subscriber’s domicile must, however, be disclosed to the 
registration authority, see Section 3(2)(a)). 
National law may differ regarding the contractual capacity of persons such as minors, bankrupts etc. but 
this is considered to be a matter of contract law and not regulated in the EMCA. 
Section 2.03 
Instrument of Incorporation 
(1) The subscribers are responsible for, and must sign, the Instrument of Incorporation. 
(2) The Instrument of Incorporation must contain at least the following information: 
(a) the company’s proposed name; 
(b) the name and domicile of the subscriber(s) ; 
(c) the date of the Instrument of Incorporation; 
(d) the number of shares subscribed for by each subscriber; 
(e) the price to be paid by the subscribers to the company for each share; 
(f) the terms of payment by the subscribers for the shares; 
(g) the amount of subscribed capital and the amount of capital which will be paid up at the time the 
company is registered; 
(h) the total amount, or at least an estimate, of all the costs payable by the company or chargeable to 
it by reason of the formation; 
(j) any special advantage agreed or arranged, at the time the company is formed for anyone who has 
taken part in the formation of the company or in transactions leading to the grant of such advantage; 
(k) the proposed members of the management body and, if a supervisory body is required, the 
supervisory body; 
(l) the proposed auditors of the company, where auditors are required; and 
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(m) the date the formation of the company becomes legally effective pursuant to Section 5. 
(3) Agreements on matters that are dealt with but not approved in the Instrument of Incorporation are not 
enforceable against the limited liability company. 
(4) The proposed articles of association shall be included in or attached to the Instrument of Incorporation. 
(5) By signing the Instrument of Incorporation or authorizing its signature, the subscriber subscribes for 
the number of shares indicated in the Instrument of Incorporation. 
(6) The term and duties of the proposed directors and, if already appointed, the auditors shall begin as of 
the signing of the Instrument of Incorporation. The formation of a company shall lapse where no application 
for registration has been made by the company within 4 weeks of the signing of the Instrument of 
Incorporation, or where the Registrar through a decision which has become final, has refused registration. 
(7) If the formation lapses the amount paid for subscribed shares shall be repaid. The subscribers and 
members of the management and supervisory bodies shall be jointly and severally liable for such 
repayments. 
Comments 
Section 3 of the EMCA covers private as well as public companies. 
The EU Company Directives do not define the term “Instrument of Incorporation” and Article 2 of 
Directive 2012/30/EU merely covers the contents of the instrument of incorporation, which is similar to 
the approach taken in this Section. The primary purpose of the Instrument of Incorporation is to evidence 
the intention of the subscribers to form a company and become members of that company on formation, 
see Section 3(5). The key information for investors and creditors regarding the internal allocation of powers 
between the directors and members of a company will be set out in one place, namely the articles of 
association set out in Section 4. 
Re 1) In most cases, the promoters of the company will become subscribers of the company. However, this 
is not necessary. Their task is to prepare the Instrument of Incorporation and to identify subscribers, see 
below. However, individuals who wish to participate in the formation of a company must subscribe their 
names to the Instrument of Incorporation and they become the company’s founding members. 
Re 2) Article 2 of Directive 2012/30/EU provides for a minimum amount of information to be disclosed in 
the Instrument of Incorporation thus allowing Member States to require other elements to be added to the 
documents to be disclosed. Since the EMCA provides for simultaneous formation, all the necessary 
documents including the articles of association must be prepared at the outset. Thus, there is no reason to 
duplicate the requirements in the Instrument of Incorporation and articles of association. Therefore, aside 
from the company’s name which is cited for identification purposes, the instrument of incorporation only 
includes issues which are not mentioned in the articles of association. The division between the contents of 
the Instrument of Incorporation and the articles of association is such that the issues that determine the 
company´s enduring organization are in the articles of association, while all the other information which is 
relevant to the company at the time of formation is in the instrument of incorporation. This is important as 
the articles of association will then provide shareholders and external stakeholders with a single accessible 
constitutional document. This is consistent with the approach taken in the UK and following the 
recommendations of the Company Law Reform Steering Group in its final report (paragraph 9.4). 
The Instrument of Incorporation should indicate the price to be paid by the subscribers on formation for 
each shares. This includes information as to whether the capital should be paid in cash or in kind, see also 
Section 9 below. Further information can be found in the articles of association, see Section 4. 
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Article 2(c) of Directive 2012/30/EU provides that the Instrument of Incorporation should include the 
amount of the authorized capital or where there was none, the amount of the subscribed capital. The term 
“authorized share capital” refers to the amount of share capital stated in the Instrument of Incorporation 
with which the company proposes to be registered. Until this capital has been allotted, it will not show the 
assets of the company and could even serve to mislead investors. In practice, it acts more as a restriction 
on directors’ actions as directors need to seek shareholder approval to increase the authorized amount. The 
UK Companies Act 2006 removed this distinction upon the recommendation of the Company Law Review 
Steering Group (Final Report, paragraph 10.6). The Group believes that authorized capital is not necessary 
to protect shareholders and therefore the EMCA makes no reference to authorized capital. 
Section 3(2) contains information about fundamental issues regarding the company structure. Further 
regulation on different issues can be found in the different Chapters of the EMCA: on share capital see 
Chapter 3, Section 7; on terms of payment see Chapter 3, Sections 7(5) and 10; on price to be paid for the 
shares see Chapter 3, Section 12; and on the need for auditors (a number of Member States do not mandate 
auditors in small companies in keeping with the 4th Company Law Directive (78/660/EEC)) see Chapter 
12. 
Re 3) The Instrument of Incorporation should constitute the complete basis for share subscription. 
Therefore agreements on matters that are dealt with but not approved in the Instrument of Incorporation 
should not be enforceable against the limited liability company. Section 3(3) is inspired by Section 27(4) 
of the Danish Companies Act and Chapter 2 Section 11 of the Swedish Companies Act. 
Re 4) There may be one document or two depending on whether the articles of association are included in 
the Instrument of Incorporation or attached thereto. In any event, the articles of association must contain 
the information set out in Section 4 below. 
EU law leaves it to national law to determine whether a company is “established” by the “simultaneous 
method” or by the “successive method”. The former means that the drawing up of the Instrument of 
Incorporation and other necessary documentation and the subscription for shares is accomplished at the 
same time. The subscribers may sign for the majority of the shares and they together with such other persons 
as may from time to time acquire shares become members of the company. The subscribers can stipulate 
the content of the statutes and the organization of the company. There is no need to arrange any further 
organisational meeting of subscribers. This method is adopted for example in Denmark, Finland, Sweden 
and in the UK. By contrast, with the “successive method” there are separate stages for the signing of the 
Instrument of Incorporation, the subscription for shares and the original general meeting. The EMCA 
provides for simultaneous formation. 
As noted above there may be shareholders other than the original founding members. In public companies 
there may be an offer to the public and even in private companies it is possible to invite others to subscribe 
for shares to a limited extent. 
According to the general principles of contract law, subscribers for shares are treated as offerors to the 
company and the company may subsequently decide whether to accept the offer and allot the shares or to 
reject the offer. In order to avoid the fact of the subscribers’ offers misleading future shareholders or 
creditors, the shares subscribed for must subsequently be allocated to the subscribers and they may not be 
allotted a lower amount of shares, see Section 7(4). 
Re 6) Although the company does not possess a separate legal personality until registration (see Chapter 1, 
Section 4(1) and Chapter 3, Section 2), directors are appointed at the time the Instrument of Incorporation 
is signed (see Section 3(2)(j)) and thus their duties commence at this time (see Section 3(6)). Chapter 3, 
Section 2 deals with operations before registration. 
If auditors have been appointed by the time the Instrument of Incorporation has been signed, their duties 
commence at this time. However, there may be no need for an auditor to be appointed at this point of time 
(see Section 3(2)(k)). 
The complete status of persons as directors is achieved at the point of registration. For example, registration 
implies that they are able to bind the company by contracts (see Chapter 1, comments to Section 4). 
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Re 7) Section 3(7) is derived from Chapter 2 Section 24 of the Swedish Companies Act 2005. If the 
application is filed after the four-week period post signing of the Instrument of Incorporation or if an 
application does not fulfil the formation procedure, the Registrar will refuse registration and the registration 
process will be required to re-commence. In such a case, the share capital contributed will be repaid. 
The time limit for application varies between the various Member States. For example, Section 40(1) of 
the Danish Companies Act provides for 2 weeks and Chapter 2 Section 22 of the Swedish Companies Act 
provides for 6 months. Other Member States such as France for example do not foresee a time limit for 
application. The necessity to have a four-week period has been questioned by some EMCA commentators 
who argued that it was excessive and this period may warrant shortening depending on the circumstances 
of the different jurisdictions. 
Section 2.04 
Articles of Association 
(1) The articles of association must contain at least the following information: 
(a) the name of a company; 
(b) whether the company is private or public; 
(c) in so far as they are not legally determined, the rules governing the number of, and the procedure 
for appointing, members of the bodies responsible for representing the company with regard to third 
parties, the management bodies and the allocation of power among those bodies; 
(d) the duration of the company, if it is limited; 
(e) the objects of the company 
(f) the share capital of the company 
(g) the nominal value, if any, of the shares subscribed and the number thereof; 
(h) the number of shares subscribed without stating the nominal value; 
(j) the special conditions, if any, limiting the transfer of shares; 
(k) where there are several classes of shares, the information under ((g), (h) and (i)) for each class and 
the particular rights attaching to the shares of each class; 
(l) whether the shares are registered or bearer, and any provisions relating to the conversion of such 
shares unless the procedure is laid down by law; 
(m) the nominal value of the shares or, where there is no nominal value, the number of shares issued 
for a consideration other than in cash, together with the nature of the consideration and the name of the 
person providing this consideration; 
(2) The articles of association shall, when registered, bind the company and the members of it. 
Comments 
The EMCA uses the term “articles of association” to refer to the document which makes up the 
“constitution” that every registered company must have and follow. In some jurisdictions such as Ireland 
the term “constitution” in relation to a private company limited by shares is used to refer to this document. 
In other jurisdictions such as the UK, the term “constitution” has a broader meaning referring not just to 
the articles of association but also to certain other shareholders’ resolutions. 
The EMCA requires the same minimum information as is required by Article 3 of Directive 2012/30/EU. 
Hence, the requirements in Section 4(1)(a)-(m) are mandatory. Section 4(1)(a)-(m) refers to later provisions 
stated in the various chapters of the EMCA, such as to Section 6 on name, Section 7 on share capital, and 
Section 8 on shares with nominal value or no-par value shares. In addition, the articles of association may 
contain further provisions regarding matters set out in other chapters of EMCA (cf. Chapter 5). 
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Article 2(b) of Directive 2012/30/EU requires companies to state their objects in the statutes or the 
Instrument of Incorporation and these objects determine the company’s capacity. A statement of the 
company’s object clause may have legal consequences in three ways. Firstly, the directors only have the 
authority to act within the stated object (see directors’ authorities and right to representation in Chapter 8 
on management). Secondly, the object is a limitation regarding the rules on representation. Finally, in order 
to protect minorities, the directors have a duty to act within the stated objects. Where they do not do so, 
they may be liable to the minority (see Chapter 11 on minority protection). The requirement to disclose the 
object must be understood in line with this provision. The objects of the company determine the kind of 
business in which the company can engage. Thus it is a permanent limitation of the company’s business. It 
may be changed however according to the rules of changing the articles of association. 
It is commonly acknowledged in Member States, that shareholders can make shareholder agreements 
which contain supplementary provisions to the articles of association, for example on the transfer of shares 
and shareholder voting. Shareholder agreements bind the shareholders but not the company. Unlike articles 
of association, shareholder agreements are not generally disclosed to the public (unless market rules so 
require of listed companies). The EMCA does not contain any regulation on shareholder agreements but 
assumes that shareholder agreements are recognized in the Member States’ national laws. 
According to Article 3(a) of Directive 2012/30/EU, information concerning the company’s registered office 
must be made public. The Directive does not require that the information appear in the articles of 
association or in the Instrument of Incorporation as it can also made public in a “separate document 
published in accordance with the procedure laid down in the laws of each Member State”. Thus, the address 
should be stated in the executive order of the national authorities. The EMCA does not prescribe the 
contents of the executive orders because of the existence of these different systems. Thus, for example, the 
Danish authorities have moved the demand for location and address to the executive order in order to make 
it simpler to change the address of an office without requiring a change to the articles of association. 
Re 2) The shareholders have a right to expect that the company will operate within the framework set by 
the articles of association. The articles are thus binding. A similar provision exists in the UK and Ireland. 
There, a company’s constitution forms a statutory contract between the company and its members, and 
between each of the members in their capacity as members to the same extent as if there were covenants 
on the part of the company and each member to observe those provisions (Sec. 31 Irish Companies Act 
2014 and Sec. 33 UK Companies Act 2006). 
Chapter 11 of the EMCA provides that the articles of association can only be altered by a super majority 
decision at a general meeting of shareholders. 
The purpose of Sections 3 and 4 is to ensure that potential shareholders receive all information needed to 
invest in the company. Further information may be made available subsequently pursuant to the 
requirements of the Prospectus Directive and national rules on prospectuses in securities law. 
Section 2.05 
Time of Formation 
The company shall be deemed formed when the Instrument of Incorporation has been signed by all its 
subscribers or upon such other date as is set out pursuant to Section 3(2)(l) in the Instrument of 
Incorporation. 
Comments 
Section 5 prescribes the time the company is formed. The company will be formed either upon the signature 
by the subscribers of the Instrument of Incorporation or upon such later date as is set out in the Instrument 
of Incorporation. 
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The freedom provided for in Section 5 to choose the date upon which formation becomes effective is 
consistent with the national law in a number of Member States (see comments to Chapter 1, Section 4). As 
noted in Section 3(2)(l), the Instrument of Incorporation may decide that the company is formed either 
before or after the Instrument of Incorporation has been signed. It is important to note that formation in this 
context does not denote the time the company is incorporated and becomes a separate legal entity able to 
exercise all the functions of an incorporated company as this does not occur until the company is registered 
(see Chapter 1, Section 4). Instead it refers to the time when an operational entity is established and business 
may be conducted in its name. From this time, the company’s management may undertake certain activities 
without incurring personal liability in order to prepare for the incorporation and subsequent functioning of 
the company (see Chapter 3, Section 2(4)). This is the time the contract between the subscribers is formed 
and the obligations arising thereunder come into existence. In addition, the time of formation determines 
the time when the company’s income from business transactions is considered as company income and 
thus it has an effect on the commencement of the accounting period. 
Certain limitations may apply to the chosen date arising from national tax law and accounting provisions 
when capital is paid up by way of cash contributions, etc. (see for example Danish Companies Act Section 
40(3)-(6)). 
Section 2 of Chapter 3 provides for the regulation of operations prior to registration when the company is 
in the process of being registered. 
Section 2.06 
Name 
(1) Companies shall be under an obligation to, and shall have an exclusive right to, use the term “private” 
or “public limited company” or any abbreviations derived therefrom. 
(2) The names of companies must differ from each other. The registration of a name is without prejudice 
to any claim which another person may have with respect to the improper use of a name in a manner 
contrary to national law. 
(3) The name of a company must not be likely to mislead the public as to the nature of its business 
activities. 
Comments 
Re 1) Article 2(a) of Directive 2012/30/EU requires public companies to disclose information about their 
legal organisational form and name. However, EU law does not provide for rules authorizing abbreviations 
of the two company types or prohibiting names which may be confused with existing registered companies. 
Section 6 deals with names belonging to both private and public companies. 
Pre-clearance by the Registrar is not required in the majority of Member States. However, registration may 
be refused if the name is similar to an existing name or if it is potentially misleading according to the files 
at the Registrar. In considering the company’s name, the Registrar is not required to consult information 
from trademark registers etc. Consequently, most Member States advise applicants to conduct their own 
checks on their choice of name for the company in order to avoid a refusal on the grounds that the name 
has been used before. It is not intended that registration be conclusive evidence that a name is unique. 
Chapter 3 of the EMCA sets out the registration rules for companies and describes the role of the Registrar. 
Re 2) The company name must not include surnames, names of firms, specific names of real property, 
trademarks, logos, etc., that do not belong to the company or anything which may be confused therewith. 
National law on trademarks and national marketing etc include more detailed provisions on names. The 
rules in Section 6(2) and (3) should be understood as a part of these regulations. 
Re 3) The name must not include any specification of undertakings which have no connection with the 
objects of the company. If the name describes a specific activity, it must not be maintained in that form if 
the nature of the activities changes significantly. 
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Article 12 of Directive 2009/101/EC contains provisions relating to the nullity of companies. Among the 
cases where the nullity of a company may be ordered under the Directive is where the Instrument of 
Incorporation and the articles of association do not state the name of the company. If a company name turns 
out to be misleading or otherwise illegal, the consequence should not be nullity of the company but rather 
a court decision on the legality of the name. See further in Chapter 3. 
Section 2.07 
Share Capital 
(1) Public companies and private companies shall have a share capital. The share capital in public 
companies shall be at least € 25,000 or the equivalent in any other currency. Private companies may decide 
on the amount of their minimum share capital. 
(2) The minimum capital of the company must be fully subscribed. If the minimum capital has not been 
fully subscribed, the formation of the company and the obligations of the subscribers shall lapse. 
(3) Subscriptions for shares shall be listed in the Instrument of Incorporation. If shares have been 
subscribed subject to reservations, the subscription shall be void. 
(4) No subscriber may be allotted shares of a smaller amount than that subscribed for by that subscriber in 
the Instrument of Incorporation. 
Comments 
Re 1) There has been much debate about the necessity to have a minimum capital. Article 6(1) of Directive 
2012/30/EU requires that a minimum share capital of € 25,000 be subscribed for public companies. Under 
Directive 2009/101/EC, two alternative time periods are set for having this minimum capital - the time the 
company is incorporated or the time the company is authorized to commence business. There is no similar 
requirement for private companies. Private companies may for example choose a share capital of €1. 
The requirements of the EMCA regarding share capital for public companies are consistent with Directive 
2012/30/EU both with respect to minimum capital and with respect to the requirements to provide for 
evidence that capital is paid up. Payment for shares of a company is governed by Sections 10 and 11. 
With respect to share capital in private companies, not all Member States have adopted the minimum capital 
requirement stated in Directive 2012/30/EU. While, the majority of Member States apply minimum capital 
requirements to private companies, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK do not. In several 
Member States such as Denmark and Sweden, the minimum capital in private companies has been reduced 
in recent years. In Spain, for instance, a minimum capital of only €3,000 is required. In Germany the 
minimum capital requirement for the GmbH is as a regular matter € 25,000 (§ 5 I GmbH). But if the form 
and name of an “Unternehmergesellschaft” (UG) is chosen which is also a private limited liability 
company, there is only a capital requirement of € 1 (§ 5a I GmbH). However, for the UG there are strict 
rules to build up reserves up to € 25,000 (§ 5a III, V GmbH). Also, the Greek “private company” introduced 
in 2012 as an alternative to the Greek “EPE” (GmbH) can have a zero capital. In Poland, the minimum 
share capital in private companies has been reduced to approximately €1200 but a new draft of the 
applicable law provides for 1 zloty minimum coupled with a solvency test and other instruments to protect 
the company and its creditors. In the Netherlands, since the revision of the law on private companies in 
2012, creditors (and other stakeholders of the company) are protected by a distribution test while the 
minimal capital and the system of capital maintenance have been abolished. In Luxembourg, a simplified 
private limited company (société à responsabilité limitée simplifiée or sarl-s) has been introduced in 2016 
and can have a capital of € 1. Like in Germany, it needs to build up reserves up to € 12,000 which is the 
minimum capital for private companies. 
Article 19 of the SPE proposal also stated a capital requirement for the SPE of at least € 1. 
European Model Companies Act 2017 
Chapter 2 – Formation of Companies 
49 
In reality minimum capital requirements are arbitrary and do not take into account the riskiness of the 
business. They may also send inappropriate signals to the marketplace. The fact that money was available 
on a particular date does not mean that it remained with the company beyond that date. It is thus arguable 
whether a minimum capital rule offers creditors any real form of protection. If too high a figure is 
determined, it may deter persons from incorporating, impede capital rising and lead to forum shopping. On 
the other hand it might be considered that the requirement to raise a specified amount of finance may focus 
the minds of the subscribers on the business risks associated with their venture and in many cases put them 
to the effort of convincing a third party as to the viability of the project. On balance, the Group recommends 
that both private and public companies should have a share capital but that the requisite minimum level, 
according to Directive 2012/30/EU, applies only to public companies. 
Re 2) In terms of the time period, the EMCA applies the minimum capital requirement at the time the 
company is incorporated, i.e. registered in the meaning of the EMCA (see EMCA Chapter 3, Section 1). 
In some Member States, there is a limit to the number of shareholder for private companies. In Ireland the 
current limit is 149 (Section 17(4) Irish Companies Act 2014), in France (Article L. 223-3 Commercial 
Code) and Luxembourg (Article 181 of the Luxembourg Companies Act) it is 100. Companies with 
shareholders above this limit can only be public companies. In the majority of Member States, however, 
there is no limit and that is the option adopted by the EMCA, see above Section 3. 
Although only public companies may offer shares to the public, companies are free to choose either a 
private or a public company. Thus, the EMCA does not prescribe a maximum number of shareholders in 
either public or private companies. 
Re 4) Subscriptions for shares are considered to be offers to subscribe for shares. In order to avoid 
misleading creditors and future investors, subscribers are not allowed to subscribe for a large amount of 
capital and subsequently withdraw their subscriptions before allotment. 
Section 2.08 
Nominal Value or No-par Value 
(1) The shares of a company may have a nominal value or a no-par value as provided in the Instrument of 
Incorporation. 
(2) If the shares have a nominal value, all shares of that class in the company shall have the same nominal 
value. Accountable par may differ between shares. 
(3) If the shares in the company have a nominal value, the amount to be credited to the share capital for 
each share at incorporation shall be at least equal to the nominal value. 
Comments 
Article 3 (b) of Directive 2012/30/EU provides that the statutes, the Instrument of Incorporation or a 
separate document published in accordance with the procedure laid down in the laws of each Member State 
in accordance with Article 3 of Directive 2009/101/EC must state the nominal value of the shares 
subscribed, and, at least once a year, the number thereof. The “nominal value”, in relation to a share, refers 
to a monetary amount, expressed as an amount, multiple, fraction or percentage of a currency. However, 
Article 3 (h) confirms that there is no requirement to issue shares with a nominal or “par” value and 
companies may issue shares with non-par value. 
The majority of Member States allow companies the same choice. This is for example the case in Denmark 
(stykkapitalandele), Germany (Stückaktien) and Sweden (kvotaktier). According to the Swedish Companies 
Act 1:6 only “kvotaktier” are allowed. If the share capital is divided into several shares, each share 
represents a certain proportion (quotient) of the share capital; the portion constitutes the share’s quotient 
value. In other words, the quotient value can be calculated by dividing the registered share capital by the 
numbers of shares issued by the company. Other countries such as Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain 
and the UK require shares to have a fixed nominal value. 
The EMCA allows companies to choose between nominal value and no-par value. 
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The argument for allowing no-par value share varies. First, the Finnish justification of the adoption of no-
par value shares is that the nominal price does not reflect the issue price or the market price and thus it is 
of dubious value. Second, it is argued that no-par value shares give companies more flexibility, gives 
shareholders a better understanding of the shares’ actual value, and allows for an easier transfer for non-
Euro Member States from the national currency to the Euro. Third, it is argued that it is easier to carry out 
an increase in share capital because in a no-par value system, paper share certificates need not be changed. 
Finally, the preparatory works to the Finnish Companies Act point out that systems using nominal values 
are problematic with respect to IAS/IFRS-standards. 
Apart from Finland, the European systems that purport to allow no-par values are however not to be 
considered as real no-par value systems. This is because these countries have kept a prohibition on selling 
shares below par. This is the case for example in the Swedish Companies Act where Section 2:15 states: 
“the payment for a share may not be less than the shareholder’s quotation value.” The prohibition on selling 
shares below par stems from Article 8 of Directive 2012/30/EU which provides that shares in a public 
company “may not be issued at a price lower than their nominal value, or where there is no nominal value, 
their accountable par”. The term “accountable par” refers to the value obtained by dividing nominal capital 
by the number of shares outstanding. 
The Swedish and the UK authorities have considered that Directive 2012/30/EU hinders a complete 
transition to a real non-par value system in which there would not be any ban on issuing shares below the 
nominal value or any legal provisions regarding the book value. 
The Finnish authorities, in turn, have taken a different position which is in keeping with US developments 
(starting in California (Cal. Corp. Code 409) leading to the U.S. Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA 
§6.21)) where the whole concept of par value has been abolished. According to the Finnish Companies Act 
(Section 3:5), a company can choose to continue stating the nominal value/book value. In such a case, the 
prohibition on selling shares below par is kept. The new draft aimed at amending the Polish Commercial 
Companies Code is similar to the Finnish Companies Act allowing the companies to choose “real” non-par 
value shares or continue to retain the traditional nominal value system. The Finnish Companies Act also 
permits and actually prefers a system of shares without any reference to either nominal or fractional value. 
This assumes that there is no prohibition on selling shares below par. The Finnish Companies Act allows 
the subscription price of share issues to be entered into the unrestricted equity- capital fund. The EMCA 
Group considers that the Finnish system is in compliance with Article 8 of Directive 2012/30/EU although 
this is a moot point. More than 90 % of Finnish companies now choose a non-par value system. 
The EMCA Group agrees that the real non-par value system should be allowed or at least be optional. 
Accordingly, Section 8(3) only prohibits selling shares below par where companies choose a system with 
a nominal value (see Section 12 below). One possibility raised within the Group is the requirement for the 
name of the company to reflect the fact that a real non-par system applies. 
The rules in relation to share issuance etc. are covered in Chapter 6. 
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PART 2 
PAYMENT FOR SHARES 
Section 2.09 
Consideration for Shares 
Shareholders shall pay the agreed consideration in cash or provide the agreed consideration in kind in 
accordance with the Instrument of Incorporation. 
Comments 
Directive 2012/30/EU regulates the form of consideration to be paid upon the issue of shares. The EMCA 
allows for payment in cash or in kind. The following sections regulate the quality of the consideration and 
the level of consideration which must be provided. Sections 9-11 are in line with Directive 2012/30/EU. 
Section 2.10 
Payment in Cash 
(1) In public companies, at least 25 per cent of the nominal value of the company’s capital or, in the absence 
of a nominal value their accountable par and any premium, shall be paid up before registration. 
(2) In public companies, unless otherwise provided in the articles of association or the terms of allotment, 
payment of the remaining capital can be demanded by the company at any time. 
(3) In public companies, upon transfer of a share, which is not fully paid up, the transferee and the 
transferor shall be jointly and severally liable for the payment. 
(4) The share subscription – in public as well as private companies - shall be binding on the subscriber 
when the Instrument of Incorporation has been signed. The subscribers shall not be released from the 
obligation to pay up their contribution. After registration of the company, a subscriber may not claim on 
the basis of the invalidity of the share subscription, that the terms of the Instruments Incorporation of the 
company have not been fulfilled. 
Comments 
As paragraphs 1-3 concern the situation where the entire capital has not been paid up, they only apply to 
public companies. Paragraph 4 deals with both private and public companies. 
Re1) Although Directive 2012/30/EU requires a minimum capital for public companies, the full amount 
need not be paid up immediately. Article 9(1) provides that only 25 per cent of the nominal value or 
accountable par of the shares issued must be paid up at the time the company is incorporated or is authorized 
to commence business. In the majority of Member States the whole of any premium due must also be paid. 
On contributions in kind, see Section 11(2). 
Re 3) In compliance with Article 14 of Directive 2012/30/EU, Section 10(3) states that the shareholders 
may not be released from the obligation to pay up their contributions. This applies to the amount of capital 
that has to be paid at the time the company is incorporated and to the remaining capital. This requirement 
seeks to protect other shareholders and the company’s creditors. The EU Directives do not set out the 
consequences of late payment. 
Section 10(3) applies to the transfer of shares that are not fully paid up and states that both the transferee 
and the transferor shall be held liable for paying capital contributions. There is no requirement that the 
company must give its consent to the transfer or other conditions. Such requirements can, however, be 
specified in the articles of association. See Chapter 5 on transferability of shares. 
Directive 2012/30/EU includes no provisions as to when the remaining capital must be paid. The provision 
in Section 10(3) of the EMCA is similar to provisions in the company statutes in Denmark, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Spain and the UK. The problem does not exist in Member States such as Finland and 
Sweden as they require that the capital must be fully paid before registration. 
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A company is entitled to set out provisions for late payment in the articles of association or in the terms of 
allotment. Alternatively, the company could decide to rely solely on general principles of contract law. 
Re 4) Section 10(4) refers to original subscribers. The problem mainly arises where there is a period 
between the time of subscription and the time of registration of the company. As long as companies can be 
registered online (see Chapter 3, Sections 1 and 8), this problem should be eliminated. 
In contract law, the principles of invalidity involve a consideration of the relationship between the 
contracting parties. With respect to company law, there is a need to take into account the special interests 
of creditors. The consequence of this is that the rules of invalidity in contract law cannot be applied directly 
to company law. 
Section 2.11 
Contributions in Kind 
(1) Any contribution of assets other than cash - a “non-cash contribution” - shall have a value that can be 
expressed as a monetary equivalent and shall not consist of an obligation to do work or perform services. 
(2) A public company shall not allot shares as fully or partly paid up if the consideration for the allotment 
is, or includes, an undertaking which does not need to be performed until at least five years from the date 
of the allotment. If the undertaking should have been performed within five years but is not, payment in 
cash becomes due immediately. 
(3) In private companies, where all or part of the share capital is paid up by way of contributions in kind, 
the entire share capital shall be paid up. 
(4) Where shares in a public company have been paid for in kind, a statement shall be attached to the 
registration from an independent expert appointed or approved by an administrative or judicial authority 
commenting on whether the assets had a financial value to the company at least equal to the nominal value 
of the shares and any premium due.  
(5) Section 11(3) will not apply to transferable securities and money-market instruments in the 
circumstances set out in Article 11 of Directive 2012/30/EU. The obligation to draw up an expert statement 
shall not apply to considerations of: 
(a)  Assets, which are individually measured and presented in annual or consolidated financial 
statements for the preceding financial year prepared in accordance with the provisions of the EMCA 
or the international accounting standards (e.g. Regulation 1606/2002/EC on the application of 
international accounting standards, the accounting rules laid down by legislation for financial firms, or 
the rules laid down in the 4th Company Law Directive (78/660/EEC) or in the 7th Company Law 
Directive (83/349/EEC)) and fitted with an audit report; 
(b) Transferable securities or money market instruments, valued at the weighted average market price 
at which they have been traded on one or more regulated markets in the 4 weeks preceding the signing 
of the articles of association. A valuation report shall be prepared if the company’s management board 
considers that this average price is affected by exceptional circumstances or otherwise cannot be 
assumed to reflect the current value of the securities. 
(6) The company’s management board is responsible for ensuring that deposits made in accordance with 
Section 11(5) do not damage the company, its shareholders or its creditors, and it shall prepare a declaration 
containing 
(a) a description of the asset and its value, 
(b) information about the procedure used for the assessment, 
(c) a statement that the specified values are at least equivalent to the value of and, where appropriate, 
the premium on the shares to be issued as consideration, and 
(d) a statement that no new circumstances arise which are relevant to the original assessment. 
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(7) The company shall publish the declaration provided for in Section 11(6) at the Register, at the latest in 
connection with the registration or notification of the registration of the company. 
Comments 
This Section regulates contributions in kind in order to ensure that the value placed on a non- cash asset is 
not inflated. In such a case, a real risk would exist that the Instruments of Incorporation would mislead 
creditors and future shareholders as to the capital value of the company. 
Almost all Member States have provisions on contributions in kind to ensure that capital is paid up 
effectively. However, in Ireland and the UK, there are no statutory constraints for private companies, but 
directors are still bound by their duties when allotting shares for a non-cash consideration and transactions 
can be challenged on the ground that the consideration was illusory. Regarding formation, Directive 
2012/30/EU seeks to facilitate capital related measures and eliminate specific formal requirements. 
The EMCA contains rules on contribution in kind similar to the rules of Directive 2012/30/EU. 
The provisions in Section 11, following Directive 2012/30/EU, are only mandatory for public companies. 
Some Member States have chosen to implement similar provisions for private companies. This is the case 
for example in Denmark, Finland, France (where even stricter rules apply), Germany, Italy, the Netherlands 
and Sweden. On the contrary this does not apply in Ireland and the UK. In the UK, where shares are allotted 
for a non-cash consideration in a private company, the directors are subject to the constraints imposed by 
their general duties (which would require them to obtain an appropriate value for the company) and the 
ability of the court to review allotments for an illusory consideration. 
Generally, the EMCA Group considers that the provisions on contribution in kind in the EMCA shall apply 
– in accordance with the rules in the majority of Member States – to both private and public companies. If 
it follows from the articles of association that contributions may be made in kind, the Group assumes that 
there is a need to ensure that the consideration is not overvalued. 
Re 1) Section 11(1) is consistent with Article 7 of Directive 2012/30/EU which provides that the subscribed 
capital may be formed only of assets capable of economic assessment. Not all Member States apply 
minimum capital requirements for private companies and if no capital is contributed at the time of 
formation, Section 11 clearly does not apply. Therefore, the provision in Section 11(1) only applies if there 
is a contribution in kind in a private company. 
Contributions in kind may consist of any kind of assets. A question arises regarding whether claims against 
subscribers or shareholders may be included regardless of whether the claims are secured by a charge. The 
EMCA recommends that claims should be included provided that they have the value provided for in 
Section 11(1), for example if a claim is secured by mortgage. 
Re 2) Section 11(2) is consistent with Article 9(2) of Directive 2012/30/EU which provides that where 
shares are issued for a non-cash consideration at the time the company is incorporated or is authorized to 
commence business, the consideration must be transferred in full within five years of that time. A similar 
provision is set out in §36a of the German AktG and in Section 587(1) and (4) of the UK Companies Act 
2006. Article 9(2) indicates the difficulties which can stem from postponing payment of contributions in 
kind. For this reason, the Danish Companies Act 2009 requires that contributions in kind must be fully paid 
and this rule applies both to private and public companies. Similar provisions can be found in the Czech 
Republic and in the German AktG. 
Section 11(2) applies only to public companies. 
Re 3) With respect to private companies, the EMCA Group has considered whether contributions in kind 
must be fully paid up. The majority of the Group considered that Section 11(3) should also apply to private 
companies. This is justified on the basis that there is a greater potential for abuse in private companies and 
also because it prevents a lot of problems which may subsequently arise such as a change in value of the 
contributions in kind or the extinction of the object of the contribution. A minority of the Group considered 
that Section 11(3) should not apply to private companies, because it would constitute an obstacle to 
contributions in kind. 
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Re 4, 5, 6 and 7) These Subsections are consistent with Article 10 and 11 of Directive 2012/30/EU. 
Subsection 7 sets out the manner of publication provided for in Article 3 of Directive 2009/101/EC. 
Article 10(4) of Directive 2012/30/EU permits Member States to exempt the requirement to have an 
experts’ valuation report if not less than 90 per cent of the shares in the company are subscribed against 
non-cash contributions from one or several other companies and certain other requirements are met. The 
majority of Member States do not use this exemption and the EMCA Group assessed that there are no 
strong reasons to utilize the exemption in the EMCA. 
The Group considers it unnecessary to define the term “independent expert” in Section 11(4). The type of 
expert considered most appropriate varies amongst the different Member States and the EMCA should not 
thus be prescriptive. In the majority of Member States, the expert will be an approved external auditor (for 
example, in Denmark, France, Finland, Germany and Sweden) or a public notary. In Greece, for example, 
an expert Committee is appointed by the Ministry (see Greek Companies Act Article 9). The EMCA leaves 
to the Member States to determine which expert is considered appropriate. There can also be exceptions in 
the Member States to the appointment of an expert for certain types of companies and for contributions in 
kind below a certain level. 
Section 2.12 
Subscription Price 
(1) Shares with a nominal value shall not be allotted for a discount. 
(2) If a company issues shares at a premium, whether for cash or otherwise, a sum equal to the aggregate 
amount or value of the premium on those shares shall be transferred to free reserves. 
Comments 
The prohibition on issuing shares at a discount has been enforced since the 19th century. The prohibition is 
part of the capital maintenance rules designed to protect creditors. It is set out in Article 8 of Directive 
2012/30/EU which provides that shares may not be issued at amounts below their nominal value. Where a 
Member State allows the issuing of shares without nominal value (“no-par value”) such shares may be 
issued at a price lower than their “accountable value”, see Section 8(3) above. 
The issuance of shares at a discount is prohibited but of course this presents no bar to subscription at a 
premium. As shares generally trade at prices above their nominal value, the protection afforded by this 
prohibition is often limited. Nevertheless, the prohibition is thought to be of some value in Member States 
with the nominal value system and it is thus retained in the EMCA. 
Article 8 of Directive 2012/30/EU allows Member States to derogate from the prohibition to allow those 
who undertake to place shares in the exercise of their profession to pay a discounted price for the shares 
for which they subscribe in the course of this transaction. The Group has decided not to provide for such 
derogation in the EMCA. 
Section 2.13 
Substantial Acquisitions after Registration 
(1) If a public company acquires, otherwise than on the basis of a term of the Instrument of Incorporation, 
assets from a signatory of the Instrument of Incorporation within two years of the registration of the 
company, and the consideration paid by the company is no less than one tenth of the share capital at the 
time of acquisition, and if the acquisition does not fall within the normal course of the company’s business 
nor occur in the public trading of securities, the acquisition shall be submitted to the general meeting for 
approval. 
(2) The general meeting shall be presented with a report regarding the acquired asset and the consideration 
paid, as well as the statement of an approved auditor or similar independent expert on the report and on 
whether the value of the acquired asset is at least equal to the consideration paid for it. The decision of the 
general meeting shall be notified for registration within six months of the meeting. The report and statement 
referred to above shall be attached to the registration notification. 
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Comments 
Article 13 of Directive 2012/30/EU contains inter alia a rule on hidden contributions in the form of 
substantial acquisitions after registration. A number of Member States such as the Czech Republic, France, 
Finland, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovakia and Sweden have provisions on such hidden 
contribution in kind, requiring shareholder approval for transactions between the company and shareholders 
where the transactions exceed a specific amount within a set period of time. Germany has even stricter 
rules on hidden contributions in kind for the public company (AG) as well as for the private company 
(GmbH). 
Section 13 is consistent with Article 13 of Directive 2012/30/EU. Article 13 provides that if, before the 
expiry of a time limit laid down by national law of at least two years from the time the company is 
incorporated or is authorized to commence business, the company acquires any asset belonging to a 
subscriber for a consideration of not less than one-tenth of the subscribed capital, the acquisition shall be 
examined and details of it published in the manner provided for in the Directive and it shall be submitted 
for the approval of the general meeting. Furthermore, the Member States may also require these provisions 
to be applied when the assets belong to a shareholder or to any other person. It follows from Section 13(1) 
that Section 13 does not apply where the acquisition takes place on a regulated market or as part of the 
company’s day-to-day business. 
The rules in Article 13 of Directive 2012/30/EU apply only to public companies, and the EMCA Group 
considered whether they should also apply to private companies. In some Member States such as Italy, this 
is the case but other Member States including Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Sweden and 
the UK apply these rules only to public companies. In Ireland and the UK, common law rules on 
“substantial property transactions” would also apply to such transactions. 
The Group considered that the rule in Section 13 should only apply to public companies on the basis that a 
fixed two-year rule would be too inflexible and might easily be circumvented. Therefore, Section 13 should 
not apply to private companies. In private companies the problem on substantial acquisitions after 
registration is partly addressed by Chapter 9 on director’s duties and Chapter 10 on director’s liability.
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General Comments 
1. EU law 
Directive 2009/101/EC (amending the 1st Company Law Directive) includes provisions on the registration 
of companies. It requires that basic company documents should be disclosed by way of filing with a 
company registry and by the publication in the national gazette either of the full or partial text of the 
document or by reference to the document deposited in the company registry, and that such documents 
should be available for inspection. In addition, Directive 2009/101/EC specifies the minimum information 
that companies must include in their letters and order forms. The Directive also includes provisions for the 
electronic filing of documents. The provisions stated in the Directive are included in this Chapter. The 
comments to the provisions indicate when a Directive provision has been adopted by the EMCA. 
Most of the provisions of the Directive relate to both the formation of companies and the subsequent 
conduct of the affairs of the company. These matters are in general covered in this Chapter. 
The Instrument of Incorporation cannot be changed after registration. However, the articles of association 
may be changed and any change should be registered. 
Directive 2012/17/EU seeks to increase legal certainty and to improve the performance of public 
administration by promoting cooperation between business registers in Europe, setting out procedures for 
cross-border mergers, providing for seat transfers and updating the registration of foreign branches where 
cooperation mechanisms are lacking or limited. Moreover, the amendments aim to facilitate cross-border 
access to official business information by setting up an electronic network of registers and determining a 
common minimum set of up-to-date information to be made available to third parties by electronic means 
in every Member State. 
2. National law 
Article 11 of Directive 2009/101/EC states that “in all Member States whose laws do not provide for 
preventive administrative or judicial control, at the time of formation of a company, the instrument of 
constitution, the company statutes and any amendments to those documents shall be drawn up and certified 
in due legal form.” The preventive control is exercised by a Registrar or the court. In the majority of 
Member States there is also a requirement to involve a notary (see further below). 
The agency or person responsible for registration differs among Member States. In some Member States 
such as Belgium, France, and Germany, a judicial body is responsible whereas in others such as Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Malta, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK, 
responsibility lies with an administrative entity. In Spain the Registrar is a highly legal qualified person. 
In Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the UK there is no requirement to have a notary. In 
many other Member States however, such as the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain 
there is a requirement to involve a notary to advise the subscribers, to clarify the content of the articles of 
association and other documentation and to verify legal compliance. This provides legal certainty and may 
make the task of the Registrar easier. On the other hand, it may also result in additional costs due to the 
potential overlap between the role of the notary and the Registrar or the court. Such an overlap may arise 
for example with respect to the consideration of the company’s name. Article 11 mentions a “preventive 
administrative or judicial control” but it does not contain any more specific provisions on the contents of 
this control. 
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In Greece, the incorporation document is drawn up by a notary and the registration is made in a Registry 
maintained by the local chambers of commerce. In the Czech Republic and Poland, registration courts 
exercise the function of the Registrar but within their authority they only inquire whether all the formal 
requirements have been met. It is a notary, who is entrusted with the power to draw up the deed and to 
verify its legal compliance. In Poland, certain documents such as the articles of association must be 
executed in a “notarial form.” The registration court performs the content checking only in cases where a 
notary is not involved. In France and Portugal, the notary is mandatory only in the case of companies 
formed with contributions in kind. The UK allows the Registrar to accept a statement by those forming the 
company that they have complied with the registration requirements (which minimizes the need for 
checking) while making it a criminal offence to knowingly or recklessly make misleading or false or 
deceptive statements to the Registrar. The latter is a general provision applicable to all statements made to 
the Registrar. 
The EMCA Group recommends that where notaries or other independent experts are used, there should not 
be a duplication of functions. For example if there is a requirement in national law that a notary confirms 
a property valuation, the same requirement should not be imposed on the Registrar. In connection with 
online registration, notaries could be permitted to make online submission (see Section 8). 
3. Considerations 
To a certain extent, the EMCA follows the provisions in Directive 2009/101/EC and the amendments while 
taking into account the experience of the various Member States. Thus, a departure from the Directive is 
made in Section 13 (see the comments to this below). 
It should be noted that Article 11 of Directive 2009/101/EC is not applicable. Article 3 allows electronic 
filing of all documents at the Register. The EMCA Section 8 goes further and contains a provision on 
mandatory electronic registration. Even if electronic registration has the consequence that the Registrar 
does not normally check the filings, Section 1(4) allows the Registrar to check that the requirements for a 
registration have been met. 
The EMCA Section 7 is also consistent with Directive 2012/17/EU as regards the interconnection of 
central, commercial and companies registers.  
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Section 3.01 
Registration of Formation 
(1) The directors are responsible for lodging the following with the Registrar: 
(a) the required forms, 
(b) confirmation that the contributions payable in cash or in kind have been made, 
(c) a declaration by the directors that they have formed the view that the company has sufficient 
financial resources to meet obligations that are likely to arise until the end of the first financial year. 
(2) The documents referred to in paragraph 1 shall be submitted electronically. 
(3) The documents referred to in paragraph 1 shall be less than 6 months old at the time of lodgment. 
(4) If the requirements in paragraphs 1-3 are complied with, the Registrar shall register the company and 
furnish a confirmation of registration. 
Comments 
The duration of the incorporation process varies to a great extent in the different Member States from a few 
days up to a month. A long process of incorporation may cause problems for example with respect to 
liability for contracts entered into during the pre-registration period. It is therefore important to shorten the 
incorporation process and to make it less costly. 
An electronic formation procedure would constitute a solution to these problems. According to Directive 
2009/14/EC, Member States have to ensure that all the documents can be filed electronically. However, 
Member States can go further and require the companies to file all information electronically. The EMCA 
has chosen the latter option, see Sections 1(2) and 8. 
Re 1) Section 1(1) applies the obligations imposed on Member States pursuant to Article 6 of Directive 
2009/101/EC. According to Article 6, Member States may decide which persons are responsible for taking 
care of the publication formalities. Hence, Section 1(1) identifies the persons responsible for registering 
the documents. 
The required forms include a variety of information which should be filed with the Registrar. The list of 
forms and the contents of each vary substantially between Member States. In many cases, however, the 
information may be the same but the location in which the information may be found differs. In some cases, 
for example, the information is included in the notarized deed or the appended documents and in others it 
is in the application form itself. It may also be listed in an executive order, as is the case in Denmark. 
The confirmation referred to in Section 1(1)(b) should be sufficient to satisfy the Registrar that the 
appropriate contributions have been made. It may take the form, for example, of a declaration by all 
directors, a declaration by a public notary or a formal confirmation from a financial institution. In terms of 
the time period, the EMCA applies the minimum capital requirement (see Chapter 2, Section 7) at the time 
the company is incorporated, i.e. registered within the meaning of the EMCA. The reason for this is that 
few Member States require specific authorization to be granted from a third party to commence business 
after registration. These exceptions are Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, Slovakia and the UK where 
authorization is required from the Registrar, but only where a public company is formed. Applying the 
requirement at the time of incorporation is thus more logical. See the provisions on payment in Chapter 2, 
Section 10. 
Section 1(1)(c) goes further than Directive 2009/101/EC. It is inspired by Belgian law. It is part of a general 
provision which requires directors to ensure the company is solvent. 
Because of the capital requirement in connection with formation, it is important to ensure that the 
management has considered the need for capital to support the future activities of the company. The EMCA 
does not demand a certain ratio of capital to activity, but instead it seeks to ensure that management 
continuously assesses the need for capital (see further below in Chapter 9 on directors’ duties). While 
compliance by management with this obligation may become particularly important if a liability suit is 
filed in connection with bankruptcy, it can also become important for shareholders. 
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Re 2) Article 3(2) of Directive (2009/101/EC) states that companies must have the option of submitting 
documents by electronic means. Member States may even require that it is mandatory to file all or certain 
types of documents by electronic means. The EMCA (see Section 1(2)) incorporates a duty to use electronic 
means noting that the introduction of such a duty obliges Member States to provide the necessary means 
to fulfill this duty. The EMCA also includes mandatory provisions on online submissions (see Section 8). 
Section 1(2) is consistent with Section 8, dealing with online registration. 
Re 4) The function of the Registrar in determining whether to register a company is purely administrative 
(see further below in Section 11). 
The registration is conclusive evidence that the requirements of EMCA as to registration have been 
complied with and that the company is duly registered under the Act as of the date stated on the Certificate 
of Incorporation. Once the company is registered, the registration cannot be cancelled by the Registrar (see 
below in Section 13). 
Directive (2009/101/EC) Article 3 requires that, in each Member State a file shall be opened in a central 
register, commercial register or companies register, for each of the companies, both public and private, 
registered therein. The Directive does not stipulate whether a register must be carried out by a public 
authority and Member States have thus chosen different procedures. 
As an overall term for public authority the EMCA refers to “Registrar” (see Chapter 1, Section 2(12)). The 
European Commission refers to the term “business register” (see the Commission’s Green Paper on “The 
interconnection of business registers” COM (2009) 614 final and Directive 2012/17/EC as regards the 
interconnection of central, commercial and companies registers). 
Section 3.02 
Operations before Registration 
(1) Anyone who has undertaken an obligation on behalf of the company after the date on which the 
Instrument of Incorporation is signed, but before the date of registration, or who has joint responsibility in 
this respect, shall be jointly and severally liable for that obligation. 
(2) The company shall add the words “in the process of registration” to its name during the period referred 
to in paragraph (1). 
(3) Upon registration, the company acquires the rights and obligations stipulated in the Instrument of 
Incorporation or conferred on the company after the signing of the Instrument of Incorporation. 
(4) The management board may act for the company without personal liability in matters relating to the 
incorporation of the company, as well as take measures for the collection of the payment for shares. 
(5) Where a party enters into a contract subject to a condition precedent that the company be registered, 
that party may, unless it has been otherwise agreed, withdraw from the contract if the registration 
application has not been submitted within the time limit or if registration is refused. If a party contracting 
with the company does not know that the company has not been registered, it may withdraw from any 
contract purportedly entered into by the company until the registration of the company. 
Comments 
Re 1) Chapter 1, Section 4(1) provides that a company acquires legal personality upon registration. Before 
registration, the company as such cannot acquire rights or enter into obligations, nor can it appear as a party 
in court or in dealings with other authorities. This does not mean, however, that for example an individual 
enterprise which is converted to a company cannot start or continue its business activity. 
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Even though the company only acquires legal personality upon registration, it is often necessary that a 
company conducts business before registration (see also EMCA Chapter 1, comments to Section 4). Article 
8 of Directive 2009/101/EC states that “if, before a company being formed has acquired legal personality, 
action has been carried out in its name and the company does not assume the obligations arising from such 
action the persons who acted shall, without limit, be jointly and severally liable therefore, unless otherwise 
agreed.” This is in line with the US Uniform Commercial Code (UCC 2.04) which deals with liability for 
pre-incorporated contracts. 
Section 2(1) provides that, in such situations, the person acting on behalf of the company will be liable for 
any obligations incurred. 
Re 2) The provision in Section 2(2) is similar to Section 41(1) of the Danish Companies Act. 
Re 3) The provision in Article 8 of Directive 2009/101/EC must be understood as meaning that the 
Directive has two possible solutions as to transfer of liability. One is that the assumption of liability requires 
approval from the company upon incorporation and the other is that the assumption of liability is transferred 
automatically if the contracting party is aware that the deal is made with a company in the process of 
registration. Some Member States such as the Nordic countries have chosen automatic transfer of liability, 
whereas other Members States including Belgium, France and Holland have chosen subsequent approval. 
Section 2 contains a system of automatic transfer of liability, which means that at the time of registration, 
liability is automatically transferred to the company. Thus, the person acting on behalf of the company is 
no longer liable for the obligations he or she incurred. This is in line with the Danish, Finnish, and Swedish 
Companies Acts and is justified on the basis that the subscribers to the Instrument of Incorporation are 
aware of this automatic transfer and by signing agree to be bound by it when the company is registered. 
Sections 2(1) and (2) do not deal with all the situations in which promoters, subscribers or the management 
of the company may become liable. For example, in Austria and Germany, subscribers and directors will 
be liable for incomplete statements and in Slovakia, subscribers and directors will be liable for failing to 
execute a list of acts to be approved by the company. In common law jurisdictions, liability will be 
determined by applying general duties of care in tort and fiduciary duties to the company. This is also the 
case for Denmark, Finland and Sweden. This approach widens the net of potential liability to comprise 
other parties such as advisers or valuators. 
Article 4 of Directive 2012/30/EU determines that if the laws of a Member State provide that a company 
may not commence business without authorization, they shall also make provision for responsibility for 
liabilities incurred by, or on behalf of, the company during the period before such authorization is granted 
or refused. This shall not apply to liabilities under contracts concluded by the company conditionally upon 
its being granted authorization to commence business. As the EMCA anticipates a company commencing 
business following incorporation without further authorization; Article 4 does not apply. 
Re 5) A contracting party who was unaware that the company was not yet registered may withdraw from 
the contract until the company has been registered. The purpose of Section 2(3) is to protect contracting 
parties acting in good faith. The provision in Section 2(4) is similar to Section 41(3) of the Danish 
Companies Act and Section 2:27 of the Swedish Companies Act. 
In almost all Member States, it is recognized that a company can start its business prior to registration. 
Even though the company cannot acquire rights or assume obligations prior to registration, it may acquire 
a right conditional on the subsequent registration taking place. According to the national laws of Member 
States, the holder of an interest in an asset must undertake an act of perfection in order to protect his or her 
interest. The EMCA does not contain provisions on acts of perfection. Assets that have been acquired prior 
to registration are secured against creditors, provided that there is compliance with the national rules on 
safeguard procedures. However, in Ireland and the UK, a company has no existence prior to incorporation 
by registration and any acts done by a person in advance are done solely in a personal capacity. 
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Operations prior to registration may cause a number of problems leading to litigation in many Member 
States. The EMCA Group recommends that these problems should be avoided as far as possible by 
shortening or eliminating the time period of the registration procedure. Therefore, the Group recommends 
that Member States implement a mandatory electronic registration system (cf. the EMCA Section 8 below) 
and also shorten the period between the signing the instrument of incorporation and the registration (see 
Section 5 and comments hereto). 
Section 3.03 
Changes to Information Already Registered 
Any amendment to the articles of association of a limited liability company or changes to any other 
information registered with the Registrar shall be registered directly in the Registrar’s IT system or 
submitted to the Registrar for registration. 
Comments 
Section 3 implements Article 2 and 3 of Directive 2009/101/EC. This provision is to ensure that the 
registered and published information remains up-to-date so that it is possible for stakeholders to rely, make 
decisions, and act on the basis thereof. 
Section 3.04 
Other Registrable Information 
(1) All members of the management board of a limited liability company as well as the company’s auditor, 
if applicable, shall be registered in the Registrar’s IT system. 
(2) If an auditor resigns or is removed before the end of term, the registration of that information or the 
application for registration shall be accompanied by an adequate account by the management board of the 
reason for such termination of office. 
Comments 
Re 1) Section 4(1) implements the requirement stated in Directive 2009/101/EC for publicity regarding the 
management of a limited liability company. 
Re 2) Section 4(1) originates in Article 38(2) of the 8thCompany Law Directive (84/253/EEC) on statutory 
audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts (now Directive 2006/43/EC). According to Article 38, 
the company as well as the auditor must inform the appropriate authority if an auditor resigns or is removed 
before the end of term. An adequate account of the reason for such termination of office must be provided 
by the central governing body. What is implied in “adequate account” depends on the specific situation. 
The central governing body must further ensure that registration regarding the change of auditor is 
performed (see further on auditors below in Chapter 12). The trend in Europe is towards exempting small 
companies from the auditing requirement (see further on auditors below in Chapter 12). 
Section 3.05 
Time of Registration 
All information to be registered under the EMCA shall be recorded in the Registrars IT system no later 
than four weeks after the date of the operative resolution, unless otherwise provided by the EMCA. 
Comments 
It is important that the registrable information is published as quickly as possible. Thus, there should only 
be a short time-limit for registration of the registrable information, pursuant to the Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 
above. 
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Directive 2009/101/EC contains no time-limits for the registration of registrable information. However, the 
EMCA has chosen a short time-limit of four weeks as stated in this Section. The time-limit is the same 
concerning both formation and subsequent decisions about registrable matters. An example of a subsequent 
decision about a registrable matter is a decision of the general meeting regarding changes to the 
management. If such a change is not registered quickly, there is a risk that former management members 
can enter into a contract of behalf of the company (cf. the rules on representation). 
Not all decisions need to be registered within a short time-limit. For this reason, the EMCA contains longer 
time-limits regarding decisions about capital increases and decisions about divisions and mergers (cf. 
Chapters 6 and 13). 
Section 3.06 
The Register of Companies 
(1) The Registrar shall keep a register of companies registered under the EMCA. All registrations and 
publications under the EMCA shall be made in the Registrar’s IT system. 
(2) All information published in the IT system is deemed to have been communicated to third parties save 
in the case of transactions made on or before the 16th day after the date of publication where it is established 
that the third party could not have known about the published information. 
(3) Information that is required to be registered and published cannot be enforced against third parties until 
it has been published in the IT system, save in cases where it is established that the third party knew about 
the information. Third parties are not prevented from relying on information that has not yet been published. 
Comments 
Section 5 implements Article 3 of Directive 2009/101/EC. 
Re 2) As the information is registered in the IT system, third parties can no longer be in good faith as to 
the published information (cf. comments to EMCA Chapter 1, Section 4 and EMCA Chapter 3, Section 2 
on agreements on behalf of the company). If a transaction is made on or before the 16th day after the date 
of publication, it will not be deemed to have been communicated if it is established that the third party 
could not have known about the published information. The burden of proof that the third party could not 
have known about the published information rests with the third party. 
Re 3) Information, which is not duly published cannot be invoked to the detriment of the third party unless 
it is established that the third party was acting in bad faith (cf. Article 3 (5) of Directive 2009/101/EC). 
Section 3.07 
Interconnection of Companies Registers 
(1) Through the European system of interconnection of registers, the following particulars should be 
available across borders: 
(a) the name and legal form of the company; 
(b) the registered office of the company and the Member State where it is registered; 
(c) the registration number of the company; 
(d) the opening and termination of liquidation and insolvency proceedings of the company and the 
cancelling of a company from the national register; and 
(e) the completion of a cross-border merger or division 
(2) The technical requirements for the establishment of a European system of interconnection of registers 
should be established by legislation or executive orders in the individual Member States. The Member 
States can choose to make additional information available. 
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Comments 
Increasingly, Companies Act beyond national borders by establishing branches and subsidiaries and by 
engaging in cross-border mergers and divisions. Consequently, there is an increasing demand for access to 
information on companies in a cross-border context. Directive 2012/17/EC contains rules on the 
interconnection of national company registers by establishing a system of interconnection of registers, 
through which central information about the companies in the individual Member States is made available 
across borders. 
This requires that both the individual Member States as well as the EU set up the technical requirements 
for the establishment of a European system of interconnection of registers. The Directive describes the 
technical requirements further. These requirements will be different in the various Members States 
depending on the structure of the registration authorities in the Member States. Therefore, it should be left 
to the Member States to determine exactly how they wish to apply the technical requirements of the 
Directive. This is stipulated in Section 7(2). 
Section 7(1) stipulates the minimum requirements for the information, which is to be made available. 
Section 7(1) sums up the requirements enumerated in the Directive’s Article 1 concerning the amendments 
to Directive 89/666/EEC on branches, the Directive’s Article 2 concerning the amendments to Directive 
2005/56/EC on cross-border mergers, and the Directive’s Article 3 concerning amendments to Directive 
2009/101/EC on coordination of safeguards. 
Directive 2012/17/EC does not refer to cross-border divisions. This is because no directives have been 
enacted on this subject. However, EMCA Chapter 13 contains rules on cross- border divisions, and 
information on this is consequently included in the list of mandatory information (see Section 7(1)(e)). As 
already mentioned, the list of mandatory information in Section 7(1) only contains minimum requirements. 
Section 7(2) of the EMCA therefore authorizes the Member States to require additional information. 
Section 3.08 
Electronic Registration 
(1) A newly formed company shall be registered electronically. A registration that is performed 
electronically shall be carried out according to the law. 
(2) Access to electronic registration requires an authorization from the Registrar. 
(3) The Registrar may prescribe rules governing electronic registration including: 
(a) the information which the applicant can, or must, register; 
(b) the form of the documents to be filed, the requirements of the electronic systems to be used, and 
the use of electronic signatures; 
(c) the disclosure of information to the public; 
(d) fees payable for the performance of any of the Registrar’s functions and the provision by the 
Registrar of any services in connection with any of the Registrar’s functions; and 
(e) conditions for the use of, and registration in, the Registrar’s IT system. 
Comments 
Directive 2009/101/EC requires that electronic registration be possible. 
Online registration is currently feasible in the majority of Member States, other than Finland, Ireland and 
Luxembourg. In some Member States, such as Germany, Hungary and Italy, electronic registration is 
mandatory. There has been a very significant increase since 2014 in Member States which allow online 
registration. Some Member States allow cross-border online registration (e.g. Estonia, Portugal). The 2014 
proposal of directive creating the Societas Unius Personae (SUP) was especially designed to facilitate 
cross-border online registration. 
European Model Companies Act 2017 
Chapter 3 – Registration and the Role of the Registrar 
67 
In some Member States electronic registration means only that documents for registration can be filed 
electronically. The system mentioned in Section 8 of the EMCA goes further as it allows certain qualified 
users to register in the company’s register and thus constitutes real electronic registration. This of course 
saves a lot of time, but it also requires safeguards against misuse. Such safeguards are stated in Section 
8(3). National law may specify or expand the requirements in supplementary regulations to the national 
Companies Acts. 
Section 8 of the EMCA includes a mandatory electronic registration system although the EMCA Group is 
aware that not all countries currently have IT-systems which would make such a mandatory rule possible. 
Those Member States may apply a default rule until sufficient IT-systems have been employed. Section 8 
is inspired by the Companies Act in Denmark where allows electronic registration which has worked 
without problems for several years. 
Section 8 states that national law determines which persons are permitted to make electronic submissions. 
This can be restricted to professionals such as lawyers, auditors or notaries but also subscribers and others 
may be allowed to register. However, the national law should not give freedom to register and change 
documents without some guarantees being put in place. The guarantee in the Danish system is that those 
who are able to register must have a license and must fulfil the demands prescribed by the Registrar. Thus, 
an executive order includes the guarantees chosen by the Danish Registrar. The executive order also 
includes sanctions for misusing the right to register online. Non-compliance with the duties regarding 
electronic registration can entail the denial of access to electronic registration and in certain circumstances 
may lead to civil or criminal liability. 
It should be noted that any applicant registering information directly or filing an application for registration 
in the IT system of the Registrar warrants that the registration or application is lawful, including that the 
applicant is duly authorized, and that the documentation required for the registration or application is valid 
(cf. Section 11(2)). 
Electronic registration means that the Registrar does not have an opportunity to immediately verify the 
registration or application. This, however, does not preclude the Registrar from verifying the lawfulness of 
the registration or application at a later time or on a random basis. 
Section 3.09 
The Language to Be Used 
(1) The Registrar may prescribe rules stipulating the language to be used in the documentation submitted 
in connection with registrations or applications for registration by limited liability companies. 
(2) The Registrar may prescribe rules stipulating that voluntary registration and publication of company 
information may also be made in any other official language of the European Union in addition to the 
statutory publication in one of the languages permitted in paragraph 1. 
(3) If there is any inconsistency between the documents and information that are subject to compulsory 
registration and publication under paragraph (1) and any translations of such documents and information 
that have been voluntarily published under paragraph (2), the company cannot rely on the translations as 
against third parties. However, third parties may rely on the text that has been voluntarily published as 
against the company, unless it is established that the third party had knowledge of the registrable version 
published in the IT system of the Registrar. Paragraph (1) does not apply to non-mandatory documents. 
Comments 
Section 9(2) and (3) implements Article 4 of Directive 2009/101/EC. 
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Re 1) It is a matter of national law as to whether languages other than the national language may be used. 
In connection with the establishment of the interconnection of companies registers (see Directive 
2012/17/EC above) the Commission publishes the registered information in all the official languages of the 
Union (cf. the inserted Article 3(a) of Directive 2009/101/EC). To ease the implementation of the 
interconnection of companies registers, it would therefore be appropriate to require documentation 
submitted in connection with registrations and applications to be in, at least, the official languages of the 
Union. 
Re 2) Section 9(2) allows Member States to voluntarily publish registrable information also in one or more 
of the official languages of the Union. The application must, however, always satisfy the rules stipulating 
the language to be used, which are set in accordance with Section 9(1). 
By allowing Member States to publish registrable information in the official languages of the European 
Union voluntarily, this can contribute to the promotion of cross-border cooperation by removing the 
linguistic barriers regarding information searches for companies. 
Section 3.10 
The Duty to Disclose the Company’s Identity 
(1) The company’s letters, order forms and other official documents, whether they are in paper form or in 
any other medium, shall state the following particulars: 
(a) the registration number under which the company is filed in the register; and 
(b) the location of the company’s registered office and whether the company form is public or private; 
(2) Where, in the documents referred to in the first paragraph, mention is made of the capital of the 
company, the reference shall be to the capital subscribed and paid up. 
(3) If the company has a website, it shall contain at least the particulars mentioned in the first paragraph. 
Comments 
Section 10 implements Article 5 of Directive 2009/101/EC. 
During the process of formation, the company must make clear that it is not yet registered and add the 
words “in the process of registration” to its name (cf. Section 2 above). 
It should be made clear if the company has entered into liquidation, compulsory dissolution, examinership 
or bankruptcy. 
Section 3.11 
The Role of the Registrar 
(1) Information shall not be registered if it does not comply with the provisions made pursuant to the 
EMCA, or the company’s articles of association. The subject matter of any resolution shall not be registered 
if the resolution has not been passed in accordance with the provisions made pursuant to the EMCA, or the 
company’s articles of association. 
(2) Any applicant registering information directly or filing an application for registration in the IT system 
of the Registrar warrants that the registration or application is lawful, including that the applicant is duly 
authorized, and that the documentation required for the registration or application is valid. 
Comments 
Section 11 does not implement EU legislation. 
Re 1) Section 11(1) specifies that the Registrar may request proof that the registered information complies 
with the law or with the company’s articles of association. The Registrar has no general duty to determine 
whether the registered information or application is lawful. For remedy of defects see Section 12 below. 
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Re 2) The applicant or the person authorized by the applicant has a special duty to make sure that the 
information stated in the application is correct, and that the application is in accordance with the subject 
matter of any decision. The duty involves the applicant or the person authorized by the applicant ensuring 
that any decision is made in accordance with the relevant legislation, the articles of association and other 
agreements which in the given circumstances should be considered. The Registrar may carry out spot 
checks to ensure that electronic registration is lawfully made. 
Section 3.12 
Remedying of Defects 
(1) If the Registrar believes that there is an error or defect in any information that has been filed for 
registration, and the error or defect can be rectified by a resolution of the general meeting or the central 
governing body of the limited liability company, the Registrar shall set a deadline for the matter to be 
remedied. If the defect is not remedied within the time stipulated, registration shall not be made. 
(2) If registration is refused under paragraph (1), the applicant shall be notified in writing to such effect, 
including the reason for non-registration. 
(3) If the Registrar becomes aware that the legality of any registration, whether pending or completed, is 
questionable, the Registrar shall discontinue registration under paragraph (1) until the matter has been 
clarified. The applicant shall be notified in writing that registration cannot take place, including the reason 
for non-registration. The Registrar shall also publish a statement on its IT system explaining the reason for 
the decision. 
(4) For matters falling within paragraph (3), the Registrar may also register any resignations of the 
members of the board. 
Comments 
Section 12 does not implement EU legislation. 
Normally the Registrar does not check electronic registrations, but if the Registrar is made aware that there 
are errors or defects in any information that has been filed for registration, Section 12 contains rules on the 
applicant’s ability to remedy the errors. 
Re 4) Conflicts regarding ownership within the company may occur which could cause disputes about who 
is able to manage the company and to be registered as the board. In such cases, Section 12(4) makes it 
possible for the Registrar to register a resignation of members of the board in order to avoid insecurity 
concerning the right to represent the company. 
Section 3.13 
Subsequent Cancellation of Registration 
(1) If anyone asserts that the registration of a resolution passed by the general meeting or the management 
of a company is detrimental to them, the question of deregistration shall be determined by the courts. 
(2) Such legal proceedings shall be commenced against the company within six months of the date of 
publication of the registration in the Registrar’s IT system. The court shall send a transcript of the 
judgement to the Registrar for publication of the outcome of the case on the Registrar’s IT system. 
Comments 
Article 12 of Directive 2009/101/EC contains provisions on the nullity of the company. Article 12 makes 
it clear that the Registrar does not have the competence to decide whether a company can be declared void 
after registration. Only a court decision can do this (cf. Article 13(a) of the Directive). This principle is 
stated in Section 13(1). 
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Section 13(2) sets a deadline for instituting proceedings concerning nullity. Article 12(b) of Directive 
2009/101/EC contains an exhaustive enumeration of the circumstances which can cause nullity. Where a 
person believes that a registration has taken place contrary to the law or wishes to have the registration 
cancelled, they must apply to the courts who will deal with such claims. 
The registration of any given matter such as a decision by the general meeting to change the articles of 
association is not a guarantee that the matter is lawful. Legal proceedings regarding lawfulness can be taken 
by the shareholders according to the rules in Chapter 11. Such a legal proceeding does not, however, affect 
the issue regarding the validity of the company. The same should apply to part of the grounds, which 
according to Article 12(b) of the Directive can cause nullity of the company. The EMCA Group considered 
the grounds provided in Article 12(b) and it is of the opinion that most of the grounds should not give rise 
to the company’s nullity but only lead to the remedying of the defects. This applies to defects regarding the 
Instrument of Incorporation or entries in the articles of association regarding name, the size of the 
subscribed capital and other procedural defects in connection with the formation. It also applies to the 
provision in Article 12(b)(vi) concerning the number of subscribers. (This provision is not necessary, as 
Chapter 2, Section 1.02 states that only one subscriber is necessary.) 
Consequently, the EMCA contains no special provisions on situations where a company should be declared 
null and void. As a result thereof, the EMCA does not contain provisions on the effects of the nullity. 
However, it does not prevent a situation where a company post registration can be declared null by a court 
decision. Article 13 of the Directive 2009/101/EC contains rules in such a case and makes it clear inter alia 
that the nullity shall entail the winding-up of the company as may dissolution. Likewise nullity itself will 
not affect the validity of any commitments entered into by or with the company, without prejudice to the 
consequences of the company being wound up. 
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General Comments 
1. EU law 
Article 15 of Directive 2012/30/EU on capital requirements of public limited liability companies (replacing 
the former 2nd Company Law Directive 77/91/EEC) states that “pending coordination of national laws at 
a subsequent date, Member States shall adopt the measures necessary to require provision of at least the 
same safeguards as are laid down in Articles 2 to 14 in the event of the conversion of another type of 
company into a public limited liability company”. 
Directive 2012/30/EU solely deals with re-registrations from other entities to a public company. The 
Directive does not regulate re-registrations from public companies to private companies, nor re-
registrations from public companies to other entities. 
2. National law 
Chapter 4 applies to a number of different situations. 
First, the Chapter deals with the question of whether different kinds of legal entities including partnerships, 
co-operatives, mutual insurance associations and other forms of private associations as well as public 
entities may be transformed into private or public companies. The situation differs in the various Member 
States. In many Member States, transformation of partnerships and co-operatives is possible (Denmark, 
France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Poland and Spain). In other Member States, certain 
entities such as partnerships (e.g. Austria and the Netherlands) and agricultural entities (e.g. Belgium) 
cannot be converted. In the majority of Member States, transformation of certain kinds of associations or 
legal entities, are governed outside national Companies Acts. This applies, for example, to transformation 
of financial institutions/associations which are governed by other legislation. In addition, foundations by 
nature cannot be transformed to public or private companies (they do not have an owner). In all Member 
States, companies can be formed either by incorporation or by transformation of other entities other than 
public or private companies. See further below in Section 1. 
Second, the Chapter deals with re-registration of companies. Re-registration means an alteration of status 
when a private company decides to re-register as a public company and when a public company decides to 
re-register as a private company. 
3. Considerations 
The EMCA Group has decided that the EMCA should not include any limitations as to whether legal 
entities can be transformed into a private or public company. Such limitations should be found in national 
legislation governing these entities. 
National law is different regarding which entities can be transformed into a public or private company. 
Therefore, the EMCA cannot choose the same rule for all Member States. 
More Member States have rules on re-registration from public or private companies to other company 
forms, such as partnerships, cooperatives etc. The EMCA does not deal with these situations because of 
the disparity in treatment in national laws.  
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Section 4.01 
Formation by Transformation 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by national law or the entity’s articles of association, any legal entity may 
be transformed into a public or private company taking in account the relevant provisions of the EMCA on 
formation.  
(2) The transformation should be considered as an in kind payment of the share capital and as such must 
fulfil the requirements of Section 24 of the EMCA. 
Comments 
Re 2) Section 1(2) only applies to situations where a contribution in kind takes place. This is consistent 
with Article 15 of Directive 2012/30/EU on capital requirements of public limited liability companies 
which determines that “pending coordination of national laws at a subsequent date, Member States shall 
adopt the measures necessary to require provision of at least the same safeguards as are laid down in 
Articles 2 to 14 in the event of the conversion of another type of company into a public limited liability 
company.” This means that the safeguards in EMCA Chapter 2 on valuation, information and demand for 
a prospectus apply. 
Section 4.02 
General Provision 
A private company can be re-registered to a public limited company and vice versa. Re-registration of a 
company will not alter the legal personality of the company. 
Comments 
Section 2 confirms that the re-registration of a company will not alter the company’s legal personality. 
Thus, following re-registration and notwithstanding the issue of a new certificate of incorporation to reflect 
the altered circumstances, the entity continues in existence without any loss of legal continuity and with its 
rights and obligations entirely unaffected. 
Section 4.03 
Private Company Becoming a Public Company 
(1) The shareholders may, with the same majority required to amend the articles of association, resolve to 
re-register a private company into a public company. 
(2) Re-registration of a private company into a public company will be deemed to be implemented when 
the company’s articles of association have been amended to comply with the requirements for public 
companies and when the re-registration has been registered in the Registrar’s IT system. 
(3) The rules on minimum capital, contributions in kind, acquisitions after registration and other applicable 
provisions in the EMCA Chapter 2 also apply. 
Comments 
Re-registration from a private company to a public company must involve fulfilment of the requirements 
set out in Article 15 of the Directive 2012/30/EU, see above. Thus, all the safeguards in EMCA Chapter 2 
apply, including Section 11 on contribution in kind and Section 13 on acquisitions after registration. 
Further, the requirements for minimum share capital must also be fulfilled. To re-register a private company 
as a public company, all the requirements in the EMCA concerning public companies must be complied 
with and any necessary changes to the articles of association must be made. The re-registration may be 
implemented without the consent of creditors. 
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Section 4.04 
Public Company Becoming a Private Company 
(1) The general meeting may, with the same majority required to amend the articles of association, resolve 
to re-register a public limited company into a private company. The re-registration may be implemented 
without the consent of creditors. 
(2) Re-registration of a public company into a private company will be deemed implemented when the 
company’s articles of association have been amended to comply with the requirements for private 
companies and when the re-registration has been registered in the Registrar’s IT system. 
Comments 
The re-registration of a public company to a private company entails the company after the re-registration 
being subject to the requirements of the EMCA regarding private companies. In some ways, these 
requirements are more flexible than the requirements regarding public companies, for example, with respect 
to the requirement for a minimum capital. The company must make all necessary changes to the articles 
consequential on the change in the company’s status.
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General Comments43 
1. EU law  
The EU company law Directives do not contain many rules that limit the discretion of national regulators 
in respect of shares –particularly so in the case of private companies but also for public companies. 
1.1. Nominal value and accountable par 
It is sometimes argued that the 2nd Company Law Directive forces Member States only to allow for their 
public companies either nominal value shares or par value shares. This would mean that true no par value 
shares would therefore not be allowed. It seems that there was a view in the UK during the developmental 
stages of the Companies Act 2006 that true no-par value shares could not be introduced because of the 
Directive. This interpretation of the directive is almost certainly wrong. Nowhere does the Directive contain 
an explicit rule concerning nominal or par value. The argument that there is a requirement to choose 
between nominal value and par value is usually derived from the provision in Article 8 of the Directive: 
“Shares may not be issued at a price lower than their nominal value, or, where there is no nominal value, 
their accountable par.” The concept of accountable par was introduced into the Directive of 1976 because 
since 1913 Belgium had allowed shares with what Belgian legislation described as a “fractional value”. 
Whatever the original intention of the Belgian legislator, this type of shares has long since evolved into a 
true no par value share system in all but name and with some procedural complications. Since the 2nd 
Company Law Directive is based on the Belgian system, it seems fair to argue that the Directive does allow 
true no par value shares. This has in any case been the interpretation of the Finnish legislator, who 
introduced such shares, also for public companies, in the new 2006 Finnish Companies Act. 
                                                     
43 The working group on Chapter 5 was chaired by Professor Hans de Wulf (University of Gent, Belgium). 
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It may be useful to briefly illustrate the Belgian system with an example. Suppose a company has a legal 
capital of 1000 divided into 100 shares without nominal value. The par value/accountable par/“fractional 
value” of these shares is “1/100th” of capital, in this case: of a legal capital of 1000 which can also be 
expressed as 10. In a true no par value system, this “10” can change over time even while the 1/100th stays 
the same, or additional shares can be issued and each share will be deemed, as a rule, to represent 1/nth of 
the legal capital, “n” being the total number of shares that has been issued. The Belgian system is a true no 
par value system, but procedurally more complicated than systems that were true no par value systems from 
the 1st Article. Suppose our model company wants to perform a capital increase because it needs new funds 
as a result of losses, and the company has found an investor willing to provide those funds. Assume that 
the net asset value of the existing 100 shares is lower than legal capital (because of the losses), say it is 800, 
i.e. 8/share. Assume the new investor is prepared to buy 100 additional shares at a price of 8 per share. 
Under Belgian law what will happen is that the company increases its share capital through a decision of 
the general meeting to 1800, represented by 200 shares (100 old ones, 100 newly issued). For a legal second, 
the company will have two groups of shares (not considered classes in the legal sense by Belgian law): one 
group representing the original legal capital and with a fractional value of 10 and the group of newly issued 
shares with a fractional value of 8. Immediately after approving the principle of the capital increase, the 
general meeting will take a second decision, unifying both groups of shares. This will result in a legal 
capital of 1800 divided by 200 shares with an accountable par/par value/ fractional value of 9 each. Since 
each share represents an equal fraction of legal capital, they will normally have the same rights (Belgian 
law provides that in public companies, voting rights are mandatorily proportionate to fractional value; for 
profit rights this is merely the default rule). All that needs to happen for this transaction to be lawful under 
Belgian law is that (a) the general meeting, not the board using authorized capital, must take the decision 
(b) as indicated, the general meeting must explicitly decide to unify the two categories of shares (c) the 
board must present a report to the general meeting in advance of the general meeting deciding on the capital 
increase in which it explains the financial implications of the transaction for present and future 
shareholders. The only - unimportant- differences between the Belgian approach and an approach in which 
par value/ accountable par plays no role at all are that, first, under such a true no par value system, there is 
probably no need for a general meeting decision unifying the two categories of shares – but note that under 
Belgian law, too, these categories are not seen as classes and their unification therefore does not need to 
happen under the rules for unification of or changes to class rights- and second, that under a true no par 
value system, the rights attached to shares are not even theoretically linked to the par value/accountable par 
of the share but are, as a rule equal for every share (whereas in Belgium this equality theoretically takes the 
form of proportionality between rights and fractional value/accountable par, with the rule being mandatory 
for voting rights). 
It is important to note that since the Directive allows the Belgian system, and the Belgian system is a true 
no par value system in all but name, true no par value systems cannot be deemed incompatible with the 2nd 
Company Law Directive. EMCA proposes to adopt such a system. 
1.2. Equality 
The principle of equality is expressed in Article 46 of the 2nd Company Law Directive for public companies, 
and in Article 4 of the 2007/36/EC Shareholder Rights Directive for listed companies. Article 46 states: 
“For the purposes of the implementation of this Directive, the laws of the Member States shall ensure equal 
treatment to all shareholders who are in the same position.” This is essentially an anti-discrimination 
provision. It does not mean that shareholders should all have the same rights. On the contrary, the default 
rule in corporate law is that rights are proportionate to investment, leading to albeit proportionate 
inequalities. More importantly and to the point, the rule of equality in the directives does not preclude 
disproportionate shareholder rights (preferential dividends, multiple voting rights, non-voting stock). It is 
nothing more than a ban on discriminatory treatment of shareholders by the company (and hence company 
organs like the board). The European Court of Justice has ruled that EU company law does not contain a 
general principle of equal treatment of (minority) shareholders, only discrete (but important) illustrations 
limited to specific situations such as, in the 2nd Company Law Directive, capital increases and capital 
reductions.44 
                                                     
44 ECJ, 15 October 2009, case C–101/08, Audiolux and others v. GBL and others, Bertelsmann AG and others. 
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1.3. Voting rights 
There is no EU legislation regarding classes of shares. Under Internal Market Commissioner McCreevy 
(2004-2010), the Commission considered the issue of one share/one vote and for a while considered making 
this rule mandatory for listed companies. In 2007 several studies of the issue, commissioned by the EU 
Commission were published45 and based on these and the feedback from stakeholders, the Commission 
decided to drop its plan for legislation in the area. Even for listed companies, no convincing rationale could 
be found for an across the board enforcement of a one share one vote rule. EMCA therefore favors allowing 
multiple voting rights. 
1.4. Transferability of shares 
The 2nd Company Law Directive mentions restrictions to transferability. Article 3 of the Directive contains 
a provision stating that either the instrument of incorporation or the articles of association must include 
information concerning any restrictions to transferability. Article 3 also states that the instrument of 
incorporation or the articles of association should decide the form of the shares. However, there is only a 
duty to provide information on the restrictions in question and not substantive restrictions. The question of 
restrictions is thus regulated by national law. 
Directive 2004/25/EC on Takeover Bids contains rules on squeeze-out and sell-out. Article 15 and 16 
contain rules on the rights of squeeze-out and sell-out for offerors and offerees, respectively. The rules in 
Article 15 apply where the offeror holds securities representing not less than 90 % of the capital carrying 
voting rights and 90 % of the voting rights in the offeree company. According to the Directive, the rules 
apply only to companies whose shares are traded on a regulated market. 
1.5. Information on shareholders 
Regarding registration and publication of information on shareholders, the 2007/36/EC Shareholder Rights 
Directive contains provisions on the company’s register of shareholders, see Article 13. The Article 
requires inter alia a list disclosing to the company the identity of each client and the number of shares voted 
on his behalf (power of attorney). The provision deals with the shareholders’ exercise of voting rights at 
the company’s general meeting (see the EMCA Chapter 11 on general meeting.) 
Regarding shareholder identification there are two main approaches. First, there is a need to provide 
investors with information on ownership of the company. This is needed especially in listed companies in 
order to clarify the ownership structure for all involved so that creeping acquisitions of control are 
prevented and investors know what type of power structure they are buying into. Article 10 of the Takeover 
Directive is crucial in this respect as is the disclosure requirements of the Transparency Directive 
2004/109/EC. Article 12 of the latter contains provisions which force the shareholders owning major 
holdings, i.e. 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 50 and 75 % of the voting rights to notify the company of the acquisition 
or disposal of shares (cf. Article9 and the following). The Transparency Directive applies to companies 
traded on a regulated market. Therefore, the Directive is usually implemented in the Member States’ 
securities laws. 
The second approach is the company law approach. The question is whether the company and the 
shareholder need mechanisms to help issuers identify their shareholders in order to facilitate dialogue on 
corporate governance issues, and further to enhance the shareholders’ possibilities to safeguard their 
interests in relation to the company. There are currently no rules on this at EU level but the amendments to 
the Shareholder Rights Directive adopted in 2017 will introduce rules on “shareholder engagement” which 
seek to foster a long term approach by shareholders to their relationship with companies. As part of this 
approach, the Directive also will introduce in Member States law additional measures to allow companies 
to identify their shareholders, so that effective communication between company and shareholders would 
be enabled.  
                                                     
45 See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/shareholders/indexb_en.htm 
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2. National law 
Shares may have different form and contents. Shares may be registered shares (name shares) or bearer 
shares. Further, the shares may either be transferable or non-transferable. Shares may be dematerialized or 
non-dematerialized. If shares are dematerialized, they are issued through a special register and therefore 
they are not paper-based. Shares, which are not dematerialized, may be issued using a share certificate (ie 
paper-based) or without issuing certificates. In some Member States, for example Denmark, it is possible 
to issue share certificates in respect of registered shares as well as bearer shares conditioned so that they 
are not dematerialized. 
In the majority of Member States, shares in private companies are uncertificated (ie not paper- based), with 
the managing directors/board of directors generally assuming responsibility for maintaining a 
share/shareholders’ register. In Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Lithuania and Sweden, it is possible 
for company shares to be certificated (though in practice this is rarely done) whilst certification of registered 
shares is the norm in private companies in the UK and those Member States with Anglo Saxon legal roots. 
Bearer shares issued by private companies in the EU are uncommon and are possible only in a small number 
of jurisdictions. For example, bearer shares are not allowed – in private as well as public companies - in 
Sweden, the Netherlands and Belgium.  
The majority of Member States allow domestic public companies to issue either registered or bearer shares. 
However, they vary as to the certification requirements. While there are Member States providing for 
obligatory or voluntary certification, other Member States, such as France (since 1981) – or in case of a 
traded company – Sweden and the UK, oblige traded companies to have dematerialized shares. 
A large number of Member States permit shares in a private company to be transferred only by way of a 
notarial deed or in written form with signatures certified by a public notary, whilst the remaining Member 
States do not require such a level of formality and allow shares to be transferred pursuant to simple 
agreements or written declarations. It is often the case that the company must, as a minimum, be notified 
so that the relevant share/shareholders’ register can be updated (e.g. France, Germany, Greece, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia). Many Member States allow the articles to 
set out the exact mechanisms of transfer, and in some cases, to adopt a more relaxed (e.g. Czech Republic) 
or stricter (e.g. Austria, Belgium, and Italy) approach than provided by law. 
The transfer requirements regarding shares in public companies are more varied and can differ substantially 
from Member State to Member State. Probably the greatest similarity in approach lies with bearer shares, 
when they are not dematerialized, where physical delivery of the certificate will generally be sufficient to 
transfer title. In Germany, where certification is obligatory, the individual unregistered shares will normally 
be represented by a global share certificate which is held by a depository and in which case the individual 
share will be transferred by way of the assignment of a delivery claim against the depository. The transfer 
of registered shares can be effected in most Member States through endorsing the certificate (e.g. Austria, 
Czech Republic, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) whilst other Member States 
(e.g. Greece) allows transfers to be effected by way of a simple transfer document which, in contrast to the 
general position for private companies, does not need to be notarized. Dematerialized shares may be 
transferred by written agreement and, in almost all Member States the transferor or transferee must ensure 
that the share register is updated. 
The company laws in all Member States include provisions which demand the company to keep a share 
register. There are substantial differences regarding the contents of and the access to the register 
(shareholder identification). This is both related to the question of whether companies are allowed to issue 
name shares/bearer shares and who has access to the register. As mentioned above, the company may 
choose to issue either registered shares or bearer shares. If the company issues bearer shares, the identity 
of the shareholder does not appear from the register. 
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Most Member States’ Companies Acts include a provision which states that shares in principle are freely 
transferable for public companies while the transfer of shares in private companies require approval by the 
board or by the shareholders in some Member States. To some extent, all Member States also allow 
restrictions on the transferability of shares. However, there are substantial differences regarding which 
restrictions are allowed. Thus, on the one hand the Danish Companies Act (Section 48), the Dutch 
Companies Act (Section 2:195, for private companies) and the UK Companies Act allow all restrictions, 
whereas for example Finland and Sweden only allow limitations which are explicitly provided in the law 
(in Sweden post-sale purchase right, right of first refusal and consent clause). In Greece (Article 3 of the 
Companies Act) all restrictions are allowed, provided that the transfer does not become totally impossible. 
In Belgium the rules (see Article 510 Companies Act for public companies) vary depending on the kind of 
restriction and some have to be compatible with the interests of the company, others are restricted in time 
and still others are unregulated and therefore permitted). 
Generally, it is recognized in the company law Directives that there can be varying voting rights attached 
to the different kinds of shares, including non-voting shares. However, there is no actual EU regulation on 
either non-voting shares or possible limitations to the issuance of non-voting shares. Issuing non-voting 
shares as well as creating larger voting differences than 1/10 is allowed in accordance with the rules of 
most Member States. The EMCA Group is of the opinion that the EMCA should allow non-voting rights 
as well as voting differences of any kind. 
The shareholders’ exercise of voting rights at the company’s general meeting will be dealt with in Chapter 
11 on general meeting. 
The articles of association may include provisions on redemption. It is voluntary for companies to include 
provisions on redemption and in order to redeem shares, the articles of association must include provisions 
specifying the terms of redemption. There is difference between redeemable shares and rights of squeeze-
out. As noted earlier provisions on squeeze-out/sell-out give major shareholders a right to squeeze out 
minority shareholders and the minority shareholders a right to sell out their shares. Such provisions are, 
according to their nature, mandatory and should therefore be included in the EMCA. Rights on squeeze-
out and sell-out are found below in EMCA Chapter 11 and there is also a reference to them in Chapter 15 
on groups since they are part of the regime on groups. 
3. Considerations 
The EMCA grants the companies the freedom to choose the capital structure and share structure they want. 
Companies should be free to choose their financing structure and should be allowed to issue a whole range 
of financial instruments to finance themselves. The EMCA Group is of the opinion that there should be no 
numerus clausus for issuing new types of financial instrument, nor a system of state (sponsored) oversight 
of financial instruments. In other words, no permission should be needed to create new instruments; this 
should be left to the market and freedom of contract. New types of debt instruments in particular can be 
created as long as the new instrument does not contravene mandatory rules in existing (civil) law. 
The present Chapter only deals with shares, that is bundles of membership rights issued (as a rule) in 
exchange for a contribution. These rights almost always entitle the holder to a share of the profits of the 
company and often, but not necessarily always, give governance rights to the holder especially voting rights 
at the general meeting of shareholders. The Chapter does not deal with bonds or other debt instruments or 
convertible and mezzanine financial instruments. It also does not deal with what constitutes valid 
consideration for shares, nor does it contain rules on the minimum amounts to be paid up upon issuance of 
shares. This is dealt with in the Chapter on formation. 
The main questions facing someone regulating shares are 
• To what extent should companies be free to determine the rights attached to the shares and especially 
whether multiple voting rights are allowed? Should the rights be proportionate to the percentage of 
legal capital a share represents? This latter question only makes sense in an environment where at least 
limited liability companies have legal capital and where shares have a par value, which is still an 
important concept in Europe. What, in this context, is the exact meaning of the concept of “class” of 
shares and how should one deal with changes to class rights? What indeed exactly is a change to class 
rights? 
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• Should shares have a par value or are true no par value shares along the Finnish and US (Delaware) 
model allowed? 
• What forms can shares take? Is it a good idea to still allow bearer shares or should all shares be 
registered in someone’s name? Should one allow paper share certificates or even make them 
mandatory? What about book-entry shares (“dematerialized”, “electronic” shares)? 
• Are there reasons to limit the possibility of articles of association or perhaps also shareholder 
agreements to limit the free transferability of shares? Should there be mandatory statutory limitations 
to the free transfer of shares in private companies/companies that legally are considered “close(d) 
companies”? 
• Should certain countries allow either the company or the shareholder (in certain company types) to 
redeem shares in the sense that the shares will be annulled and their value will be paid out? Is it wise 
policy to provide for redeemable shares and under what circumstances? 
In addition there are of course many practically important but less fundamental questions, such as how to 
deal with cases where several persons claim to have – or legally have – voting rights based on one and the 
same share e.g. spouses or cases of beneficial ownership; what the value of the share register is in ownership 
disputes (does the register create presumptions about civil law ownership, or only about who can claim to 
be a shareholder and therefore exercise the rights attached to the share ?); and how someone can prove that 
he or she is a shareholder/ can exercise the rights attached to shares in order to attend the annual or other 
general meetings. 
When dealing with these issues, two guiding principles have animated the work of the EMCA Group: 
• Contractual freedom, that is freedom to deal with issues in the articles of the company, should be the 
starting point and the default position, and should only be limited when there are clear indications that 
the interests of stakeholders (from shareholders, managers and workers to the State and public interest 
because of for example environmental implications) need to be protected; this is especially true 
regarding the rights, including voting rights, attached to shares and their transferability 
• As a rule, Companies Acts should not deal with civil law in the sense of (primarily) contract and 
property law concerning transactions in which the company is involved; specifically, this means EMCA 
does not deal with the contractual aspects of share transfers but does, on the other hand, determine the 
conditions under which a share transfer can be relied upon against the company and clarifies that the 
share register is not an instrument to prove ownership of shares, but simply creates a presumption that 
someone registered as shareholder in that register is presumed to be the shareholder and can therefore 
exercise the rights attached to the shares 
• In addition to these guiding principles, it should be borne in mind that EMCA as a model Companies 
Act does not purport to deal with securities regulation/capital markets law, nor with all kinds of 
regulatory rules that can be seen as flanking measures of corporate law and that are often intended to 
combat abuses in the area of tax or social security or economic crime. Often these rules regulate 
economic activities, whereas the focus of Companies Acts is to be organisational law, which is an 
additional reason (in addition to maintaining legibility of Companies Acts) for not incorporating these 
rules into Companies Acts. Hence EMCA does not contain rules mimicking rules on shareholding 
transparency as set forth in the Transparency Directive, rules on transparency with a view to combating 
money laundering or rules on the organization of the (national) central securities depositary that is the 
central node in the system of transfer of book-entry (“electronic”, “dematerialized”) shares. We do 
acknowledge that some Member States take a different approach. For example, in Denmark the rules 
in Directive 2005/60/EC on money laundering have been partially implemented in the Companies Acts 
(Article 55 on notification of major share holdings). But the EMCA Group thinks it is better to deal 
with such issues outside the Companies Act and in any case it is, as indicated, not the purpose of a 
model act to deal with these issues. In the same vein, as a rule EMCA does not contain rules specific 
to listed companies, for instance rules on shareholder engagement similar to what is being proposed in 
the aforementioned amendments to the Shareholders’ Rights Directive. 
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Shareholder identification 
As noted above, there is currently a European and world-wide debate about shareholder identification and 
particularly about identifying the ultimate owner/beneficiary of shares. This has to be seen against the 
background of an increased desire to combat tax evasion, corruption, money- laundering and financial 
fraud. In June 2013 the G8 leaders agreed on a set of principles on beneficial ownership transparency. 
These were followed by FATF –Financial Action Task Force, the international anti-money-laundering 
standards body- “Guidance on Transparency and beneficial ownership (October 2014) and the “High level 
Principles on beneficial Ownership” adopted by the G20 in November 2014. More concrete and specific 
action was undertaken by the UK with its March 27 2015 ”Small Business, Enterprise and Employment 
Act 2015” which organizes a public register listing the beneficial owners also of private companies (as well 
as requiring that company directors are natural persons). Denmark has announced plans for similar 
legislation and the 4th EU Anti Money Laundering Directive of 2015, adopted the obligation for all EU 
Member States to organize a register where all corporate entities will have to file information about 
beneficial ownership (see Article 30 of directive (EU) 2015/849 of 20 May 2015). For the same reasons, 
there has been worldwide pressure on the use of bearer shares (at least in physical form), and some Member 
States have either, like Belgium, completely outlawed the use of bearer shares, or limited their use to public 
companies (where free transferability of shares, which, outside a system of book-entry shares, is easier with 
bearer than with registered shares). EMCA does not deal with administrative, regulatory rules that impact 
companies but are not part of organisational law and therefore contains no rules on ownership transparency. 
The EMCA Group considered advocating a ban on bearer shares along the Belgian model, but in the end 
refrained from doing so because in several countries a deep attachment to bearer shares exists, based 
notably on the protection of privacy, at least for certain company types. It remains to be seen whether this 
will survive the international regulatory tide. For the time being, the Group thinks a balance can be struck 
between the desire for more transparency while still allowing bearer shares by a system of mandatory 
disclosure of large (more than 3 or 5 %) shareholdings, as it has been organized for listed companies by the 
EU Transparency Directive. Such a system could be expanded to non- listed, including private companies.  
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Section 5.01 
Definition of Share 
In this Act, “Share” means an equity participation entitling the holder to be a member of the company. 
Comments 
EMCA tries to adopt a definition of “share” which is as neutral as possible without being completely devoid 
of meaning. 
The definition is neutral in that it does not define which rights a share must at a minimum entail for its 
holder. For instance, since in certain countries companies must always be for profit whereas in other 
jurisdictions companies may be non-profit entities, the definition does not refer to an entitlement to part of 
the profits generated by the company (i.e., in the first place, declared dividends) as an essential feature of 
any share. Some shares may be non- profit-sharing, others may have no voting rights. The Dutch law on 
closed companies provides that shares in such a company (“B.V.”) must at least either entitle the holder to 
a vote, or to a part of the profits. The aim of the reference to “membership” in the EMCA-definition is 
similar: it is impossible (and useless) to create shares to which no rights at all are attached. But the definition 
leaves it to national legal systems to determine what the minimum content of membership rights should be. 
Entitlement to membership of the company is the first essential feature of any share. The second is that the 
share represents equity, the claims of which on the company’s assets are subordinated to those of 
debtholders. Both in finance and accounting and in a legal context, an essential distinction is made between 
equity and debt instruments. Of course there are many securities that have features of both debt and equity, 
or that can be converted from debt into equity, or of which it is difficult to determine whether they should 
be regarded as debt or equity (“mezzanine finance”). The distinction between debt and equity is 
fundamental nevertheless. Essentially, holders of equity do not have the right to claim any assets or pay-
out of the company for which they can take the unilateral initiative. Normally, the shareholders have no 
right to receive back their contribution as long as the company exists without complying with the procedure 
of reducing the share capital or the procedure of liquidation. Certain types of preference shares with fixed 
claims and “redeemable shares” are the most important exceptions to these rules, hence debates about 
whether such shares should be regarded as debt for accounting or certain regulatory purposes. In any case, 
any claim to the company’s assets that a shareholder might have, is subordinated to that of debt- holders. 
Securities that receive a pay-out or at least claim that is not conditional on the company making an 
accounting profit are, as a rule, debt instruments. This is also the case regarding so- called profit sharing 
debt instruments, see EMCA Chapter 6, Section 16. An important legal consequence of the distinction 
between debt instruments and shares is that the issuing of shares should be decided by the general meeting 
of the company while issuing debt instruments as a rule is decided by the board of the company. 
Under certain circumstances, at least in certain legal systems, it is possible to create new shares without 
any additional contribution being made to the company, or even without an increase in its equity. That is 
why the EMCA does not define a share as a security issued in exchange for a contribution to the company’s 
equity. Nevertheless, this conforms to the usual definition of share and the most common way of creating 
shares. All shares in any case “represent” equity –and this would be the case even in a legal system without 
legal capital-in that (a) they do not represent debt and (b) they almost always entail a contingent claim on 
a part of any positive liquidation surplus that may exist when the company has been liquidated. 
Section 1 only defines “share” and does not deal with other securities that companies may issue. The EMCA 
Group is of the opinion that companies should be allowed to issue all types of equity and debt instruments 
that are not outlawed by the laws applicable to the company. In other words, there is no “numerus clausus” 
concerning securities. This Chapter only deals with shares and therefore does not contain any rules on other 
types of securities, hence also no definitions. EMCA Chapter 6, which deals with financing techniques, 
does contain some rules on debt securities (but not on straight loans that do not take the form of debt 
securities). 
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The definition in Section 1 applies the English term ”shares”, which is also applied in the UK Companies 
Act 2006 as a term for shares in both public and private companies. In a number of Member States, there 
are different terms for shares in private and public companies, respectively. Thus, for example, the German 
Companies Act uses the term “Anteil” for shares in private companies and “Aktie” for shares in public 
companies. The same is the case in Denmark, which uses the term “anpart” for shares in private companies, 
and the term “Aktie” for shares in public companies. In France, shares in private companies are called 
“Parts sociales” while shares in public companies are called “Actions”. In Greece shares in public 
companies (SAs) are called “μετοχές”, whereas shares in private companies, namely limited liability 
companies (Sarl) and the more recent “private companies” (IKE), are named “εταιρικά μερίδια”. Such 
terminological distinctions have little relevance and are mainly explained by the fact that when public 
companies in their modern form were created, in most countries, in the 19th century, the free transferability 
of their shares was a novelty. In addition, these shares were then novel forms of securities (in the sense of 
the German “Wertpapier”, French “valeur mobilière”) which incorporated the rights of the 
holder/beneficiary/owner to an extent that was not true to the holders of shares of closed companies, where 
the personal bond between shareholders was deemed more important and where the transfer of the rights 
entailed in shares was to a larger extent governed by civil law than in public companies, where the shares 
themselves fully incorporate the rights and duties associated with them. 
Belgian and Dutch companies have a practice of creating “aandelencertificaten”, literally translated “share 
certificates” but perhaps better called “share depositary receipts” (SDRs-, although they are not to be 
confused with the SDRs issued to allow non-American issuers to get exposure to investors on American 
stock exchanges without listing their actual shares there). They are securities created on a contractual basis 
when a shareholder swaps his shares for the SDRs issued by the foundation or other entity that will 
henceforth hold a stake in the company that issued the original shares. Institutional investors do not like 
these SDRs in listed companies, but they are quite often used in both private and public companies, 
including in listed companies, and can be very useful for example to deal with family succession issues. 
They are used, among other things, to split up the voting rights attached to shares and the financial rights. 
The issuer (typically a foundation) of the SDR is a shareholder in a company, and therefore its board 
determines how to vote the shares it owns. Dividends are also paid to the issuer, but the issuer has a 
contractual obligation to immediately pay them through to the receipt holders (former shareholders). The 
issuer is fiscally transparent (payments to it by the company are tax neutral as a result of Belgian and Dutch 
legislation). 
The EMCA Group has considered whether the EMCA should have a provision on SDRs, but it decided not 
to deal with SDRs as the use of SDRs would require that other national laws such as tax laws would possibly 
need to be changed. This should not be interpreted as a limitation of the practice of SDRs, which the Group 
feels should be allowed. 
Some Member States also have special kinds of non-debt instruments called, in Belgium, “winstbewijs”/ 
“Part bénéficiaire”. The same instrument exist also in Luxembourg company law, while France (where 
they were known as “Parts de fondateurs”) prohibited their issuance in 1966 because of previous abuses. 
These are “shares” which someone receives in exchange for a contribution that is not booked as capital. 
Hence the rules on capital formation do not apply when these “shares” are issued (e.g. no independent 
expert valuation of contribution) and the rights attached to these “shares” are, within the limits set by the 
Companies Act, determined by the articles, and not in relation to the share of the capital they represent 
(since they do not represent any fraction of the capital). The EMCA Group does not see the need for such 
shares especially since EMCA has opted for no-par value shares whose rights are determined in the articles 
anyway. 
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Section 5.02 
Types of Shares: Bearer and Registered 
(1) A company may issue the following types of shares: 
(a) Registered shares: shares that are registered in the company’s share register in the name of the 
shareholder. 
(b) Bearer shares: Shares not registered in a shareholder’s name in the company’s share register. 
(2) The articles of incorporation indicate which type of shares, registered or bearer, the company may 
issue. A company may simultaneously issue or have shares of two different types. 
(3) As long as a share has not been fully paid up, it must take the form of a registered share and will be 
treated as such. 
Comments 
Re 1) This Section deals with types of shares – registered or bearer – not with the form of shares, which is 
dealt with in Section 3. Both registered and bearer shares can be issued as paper certificates or as 
dematerialized shares, meaning they are book-entry securities whose existence is only apparent from a 
securities account. 
This combination will seem odd to lawyers from certain countries, where registered shares cannot, by 
definition, exist in any material form such as a paper certificate, and where dematerialized shares in the 
sense of book-entry shares are not a form but a type of share, next to bearer shares and registered shares. 
Belgium is a good example. Until a few years ago, Belgian public companies could issue two types of 
shares. The first was registered shares, whose owner is registered in the share register, that are transferred 
by changing the share register and that cannot be issued in paper form. The second form was bearer shares 
which had to take the form of paper certificates and circulated through transfer of the paper and which 
incorporated all the rights of the shareholder. Bearer shares could be “immobilized” by a system also used 
by many non-Belgian listed firms who used Euroclear as an intermediary. Under this system, one global 
paper certificate was created upon issuance of the shares, but the shares were actually held in dematerialized 
form in securities accounts. They could, however, be printed on demand. The law was then changed and 
bearer shares were abolished in order to combat money laundering and tax evasion. Simultaneously, true 
dematerialized shares were created, i.e. shares that have from the start been created in a securities account, 
without any paper global certificate, and that are transferred from one securities account to another. The 
idea that bearer shares do not exist in paper form, and especially the idea that registered shares can take the 
form of paper certificates, is not only strange but also confusing to a Belgian lawyer, since in case of 
registered shares it makes it possible to transfer the paper certificate without transferring the share, namely 
in case the share register is not adapted. Nevertheless, in view of the practice in several of the leading 
jurisdictions in Europe, the EMCA Group favors the system presented here. 
Registered shares are “nominative” shares: they are registered in the name of someone (a natural or legal 
person) in the share register. When they are transferred, the share register will have to be adapted and as a 
consequence the share transfer can be relied upon against the company and third parties. (See Section 11 
where it will be made clear that, under EMCA, the share register does not determine who is the owner of a 
share, nor is the transfer brought about by the registration: the registration’s purpose and effect is to make 
the transfer reliable against the company and third parties; and transfer of ownership is governed by the 
regular rules of civil law, not by company law). If paper certificates representing the registered share are 
issued, these certificates will mention the name of the shareholder. The certificates do not incorporate the 
share, that is, the rights and duties of the shareholder. Therefore, the transfer of the paper certificate is not 
as such a transfer of the share: the share is transferred in accordance with the rules of civil law (contract, 
donations, property law, etc.) and can be relied upon when the share register has been changed accordingly. 
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Bearer shares are not registered in anyone’s name. They are not mentioned in the share register. See Section 
14 for the rules on their transfer. If they take the form of paper certificates, the paper incorporates the rights 
that the share entails. The regular rules of civil law in the Member State determine how ownership is 
transferred, but the transfer can only be relied upon if the paper has been transferred and conversely, there 
is a rebuttable presumption in favor of the holder of the paper that he/she/it is the owner of the share. If a 
bearer share is dematerialized, there are no paper securities, just book entries. The transfer of ownership 
takes place in accordance with the regular rules of civil law. The transfer can only be relied upon if the 
transfer has been performed through the securities clearing system, i.e. when the securities account of the 
acquirer has been credited with the book-entry shares. 
EMCA allows bearer shares because the EMCA Group thought it premature to outlaw them: they are still 
part and parcel of the legal systems of many Member States. However, as indicated in the Introduction to 
this Chapter, there is a general trend towards more transparency about who a company’s shareholders are, 
also in unlisted companies. For the enforcement of various regulations, it is important to know the identity 
of the ultimate owners of company shares. This is relevant for example in the fight against money 
laundering, tax evasion or simply the enforcement of criminal law against organizations that try to hide the 
criminal nature of the controllers of certain companies. The EMCA Group would therefore in fact welcome 
the complete abolition of bearer shares, following the examples of Belgium, Sweden and certain other 
Member States. However for the reasons indicated in the Introduction to this Chapter, the EMCA Group 
deemed it too soon to actually propose this in the text of the EMCA. Some within the EMCA Group 
suggested the outlawing of bearer shares for private companies, since in private companies shares are not 
meant to be publicly traded and bearer shares would be mainly useful to allow efficient public trading on a 
stock exchange. The EMCA Group has not chosen this route because listed shares will be dematerialized 
anyway, whether they are bearer or registered shares, and it is especially in private companies that the 
anonymity that comes with bearer shares is valued. The EMCA Group considered that if one wants to do 
away with this anonymity, one should abolish bearer shares altogether, not just for private companies. 
Re 2) According to Dutch, French and German law it is possible to use a combination of bearer and 
registered shares. The EMCA Group considers that this should also be possible under the EMCA. However, 
the articles must clearly indicate what types of shares the company may issue: it is not possible for a 
company to issue e.g. bearer shares if this possibility has not been provided for in its articles. 
Re 3) When shares have not been fully paid up, it is important that the company is able to easily identify 
the debtor of this obligation. With bearer shares, which are by definition not registered in anyone’s name, 
this is often impossible and always difficult. Therefore, shares that have not been fully paid up must, 
mandatorily, take the form of registered shares. They will therefore be subject to the legal rules on 
registered shares. This rule overrules the requirement that only such shares as have been indicated in the 
articles of incorporation can be issued by a company: if shares have been issued as bearer shares but have 
not been fully paid up, they will nevertheless have to be treated as registered shares, even if the articles do 
not provide for this type of share. 
Section 5.03 
Form of Shares: Paper or Dematerialized 
(1) Both bearer shares and registered shares may take the form of paper share certificates or be 
dematerialized. Registered shares may also take the form of a registration in the name of a shareholder in 
a share register. 
(2) “Dematerialized shares” are defined as shares that are created and held in an electronic securities 
account with a financial institution. 
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Comments 
Traditionally, shares took the form of paper certificates, at least in the case of bearer shares. In the case of 
registered shares, in certain countries it is common to issue paper certificates as well, but in most countries, 
if any such certificates are issued, they do not incorporate the rights entailed in the registered share. The 
certificate in such cases only has a function similar to a bank statement indicating someone has a certain 
amount of money in a bank account: transfer of the paper certificate does not entail transfer of the registered 
share, by seizing the certificate one does not legally seize the shares etc. The registered share itself is 
therefore immaterial. Theoretically, it could be dematerialized in the sense of EMCA as well: in addition 
to the names in the share register, it would be possible to create shares in a securities account. These shares 
could then be transferred from one account to another, with the transfer only becoming reliable against 
third parties when the share register is amended accordingly. 
Dematerialized shares are shares that have been created in securities accounts and that are held in and 
transferred through such accounts. In other words, they are book entry securities. For listed companies, it 
would be impractical to have their shares transferred in any other way. For most non-listed companies, and 
certainly for the vast majority of closed companies, using dematerialized shares is too complex and too 
costly because of the fees intermediaries such as banks charge. 
In most jurisdictions that allow true dematerialized shares, there is one central clearing organization, or a 
limited number of such organizations that have been recognized by regulators to perform this function. The 
ultimate shareholder usually has a securities account with a bank or broker, which in turn has a securities 
account with the central clearing house. Sometimes, foreign clearinghouses hold accounts with the central 
clearing house in the country where the company issued its shares. More complex chains with multiple 
intermediaries are possible. 
The EMCA defines dematerialized shares and allows them both in public and private companies. It does 
no try to deal with the rules on clearing houses and intermediaries, the rules on chains of intermediaries, 
their rights against each other or the rights of the ultimate beneficial owner, the ultimate shareholder. 
EMCA Chapter 11 on General Meetings does contain, however, rules on how to participate in a general 
meeting as a holder of dematerialized shares. The ultimate shareholder will by definition not have paper 
share certificates, meaning he or she will only be able to exercise his or her rights as a shareholder through 
the cooperation of intermediaries, who could, for instance, issue a statement concerning the number of 
shares held by the ultimate owner in a certain company at a certain date. This written statement could then 
be the basis for the shareholder to vote a certain number of shares at the general meeting. 
Section 5.04 
Change of Form of Shares 
(1) A shareholder always has the right, which cannot be excluded in the articles, to exchange their bearer 
shares for registered shares. The shareholder should direct their request to do so in written form to the board 
of directors, who will amend the share registry accordingly. 
(2) A shareholder holding registered shares cannot demand of the company that they be exchanged against 
bearer shares, unless the articles expressly provide for this. In that case, the costs involved in converting 
the shares into bearer shares will be borne by the shareholder demanding the conversion, unless the articles 
provide otherwise. 
(3) The company may decide, in its articles of incorporation or by a resolution of the general meeting, that 
the shares should be dematerialized. The decision of the general meeting should be taken with the same 
majority as needed for amending the articles of association. 
(4) A company resolution to exchange dematerialized against non-dematerialized shares shall be valid only 
where parties holding security interest in the shares have given their written consent to the resolution. 
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Comments 
Re 1) A shareholder may always exchange their bearer shares for registered shares. This is a transaction 
which increases transparency about ownership, offers comfort to the shareholder who can now rest assured 
that the shares are considered theirs and no-one else’s The swap does not impose meaningful costs on the 
company. For all these reasons, a right to such an exchange may be recognized. 
Re 2/ The exchange of registered shares for bearer shares can only take place if permitted by the articles of 
association. This kind of swap decreases transparency, can contribute to an increase in ownership disputes 
and potentially imposes considerable costs on the company, since bearer shares will usually be in paper 
form and will therefore have to be printed. The costs should be borne by the shareholder. 
Re 3 and 4 The company may wish to change dematerialized shares for non-dematerialized shares, for 
example if the company delists from a stock exchange. The decision should be taken by the general meeting 
with the same majority as needed for amending the articles of association, see Chapter 11, Section 29. 
A special problem arises if the shares are pledged as security. In that case, those holding the security interest 
in the shares should be asked for permission. Paragraph 4 is inspired by the Swedish Companies Act 
Chapter 3 Section 7. 
Section 5.05 
No-par Value or Nominal Value of Shares 
(1) A company must indicate in its articles of incorporation whether it operates with shares with a nominal 
value (“nominal value shares”) or shares with no par value (“no par value shares”). No other types of share 
may be issued. A company may not operate with the two possible types of share simultaneously. 
(2) In case of nominal value shares, the nominal value will be indicated in the articles of incorporation and 
in the share register. A company may issue shares with a different nominal value. Nominal value shares 
may not be issued at a subscription price lower than their nominal value. That part of the subscription price 
that corresponds to nominal value must be booked as stated capital in the accounts of the company. The 
remainder will be booked as a restricted or unrestricted reserve, in accordance with the issuing conditions, 
the articles of association and applicable accounting rules. If it cannot be determined on the basis of issuing 
conditions, articles of association or applicable accounting rules whether the aforementioned reserve is 
restricted or unrestricted, it will be treated as unrestricted. 
(3) In case of no par value shares, the shares have no accountable par. The subscribers of the company for 
shares issued upon incorporation and the company body that, within its competences, decides to issue new 
shares after than the moment of incorporation, will determine the price for which the shares are issued and 
which part of the subscription price will be booked as stated capital in the accounts of the company. In case 
no express decision is taken by the subscribers or the competent company body, the whole amount of the 
subscription price will be booked as stated capital. In case only part of the subscription price is booked as 
stated capital, the remainder will be booked either as a restricted or as an unrestricted reserve, in accordance 
with accounting rules, the articles of association or the issuing conditions. In case it cannot be determined 
on the basis of the aforementioned criteria whether the remainder of the subscription price is restricted or 
unrestricted, it will be treated as unrestricted. 
Comments 
This Section is inspired by the Finnish true no par value system described earlier, introduced into the 
Finnish Companies Act of 2006. A “camouflaged” version of the same system has been in operation in 
Belgium, for public companies only, since 1913. As explained in Chapter 2, under such a system, the 
historical value of the contributions for which shares were issued plays no role, the rights attached to shares 
are determined without reference to the percentage of legal capital a share represents and shares may be 
issued without a contribution taking place at the same time and without legal capital being affected. The 
sections of EMCA dealing with rights attached to shares clarify that when a company opts into the no par 
value system, the default rule will be that each share has an equal claim to profits and has one vote, but 
with the possibility for the articles to deviate from these rules (thus creating classes of shares). 
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Under a no par value system, contributions will be booked either as legal capital, restricted reserves or 
unrestricted reserves, without the EMCA containing any rules from which it could be derived how the 
contribution should be distributed over those three categories. In other words, the issue is left to the 
discretion of the board and general meeting deciding on a capital increase. “Restricted reserves” are not 
available for distribution to shareholders. “Unrestricted reserves” are available for distribution to 
shareholders by decision of the general meeting. Some reserves cannot even be incorporated into capital 
because this would mean they become “distributable” in an indirect way, namely through a capital 
reduction. 
The Section does not outlaw the use of the traditional system of nominal value shares. It reiterates the rule 
that when nominal value is used, such shares may not be issued for a price lower than their stated nominal 
value. The sections of EMCA dealing with rights attached to shares will clarify that as a rule, profit and 
voting rights will be proportionate to the nominal value of the shares, but with a possibility to deviate in 
the articles of association. 
Some additional explanation concerning the difference between a nominal value and a no par value system 
is in order. 
Nominal value, accountable par (“fractional value”) and true no par value shares. 
Traditionally – and this is still the case in many European countries - companies had to issue shares with a 
nominal value and upon issuance of such shares, the subscription price could not be lower than this nominal 
value (so-called issues below par (value) were not allowed). Nominal value is expressed as a number, e.g. 
10. This means the subscriber to such a share must pay a contribution of at least 10. Of course, such a share 
may subsequently be sold for a price higher or lower than the nominal value: nominal value has nothing to 
do with market value. Nominal value should also be distinguished from book value. Book value is obtained 
simply by dividing the net assets (“own funds” which are essentially equity in the broad sense of the word, 
i.e. legal capital plus retained earnings/reserves) of the company by the number of shares. If a company has 
important reserves, the book value of its shares will be higher than their nominal value. When a company 
has incurred losses, the book value will be lower than the nominal value. Nominal value can be obtained 
by dividing legal capital by the number of shares. In other words, in a nominal value system, the total 
number of shares issued by a company times their nominal value yields the company’s stated legal capital. 
The number expressing nominal value is also called the share’s “par value”. Under traditional, “true” 
nominal value systems, this number is fixed and cannot change over time: when capital is increased, new 
shares are issued and they will have the same nominal value and therefore par value as the old shares (see 
below). The rule common to all nominal value systems that shares cannot be issued for a price lower than 
their par value is self-evident and an essential part and consequence of double-entry bookkeeping: nominal 
value times number of shares yields stated capital, meaning that if shares were issued for a contribution 
lower than their nominal value, the value of the assets contributed for legal capital at the moment of the 
creation of this legal capital and the corresponding shares would be lower than the amount of legal capital 
expressed in the accounts, meaning these accounts would be highly misleading. In this (very limited) sense, 
outlawing below par creation of shares protects corporate creditors: assets should have been contributed 
with a value at least equivalent to the nominal value of the shares. Sometimes (especially in the 19th 
century), the concept of nominal value is (was) also defended as a rule of investor protection: the nominal 
value expressed the contribution a shareholder had to pay in in order to obtain a newly issued share, so that 
the shareholder could not be “surprised” by extra calls for additional contributions: by paying in the nominal 
value, the shareholder had performed their contractual duties. 
Under a traditional system where nominal value is in principle fixed, technical issues arise when the 
company wants to issue new shares and is supposed to give them the same nominal value as the “old”, 
already existing shares, but the book value of these existing shares is substantially higher or lower than 
their nominal value. 
In case the book value of the existing shares is clearly lower than their nominal value, it is likely that 
nobody would be prepared to buy new shares for the same nominal value as the old shares. Three solutions 
are possible:  
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a) the nominal value of the existing shares is first revised downwards through a change to the 
articles of association that takes the form of a capital decrease, in order to reflect their lower book 
value; the new shares are issued at the new nominal value for a price that is equal to this new 
nominal value; 
b) the company chooses, if the law permits this, the complicated route of henceforth using two 
classes of shares with different nominal values, having different rights attached to them, 
proportional to their different nominal values; 
c) the new shares are issued at the same price as the nominal value of the existing shares, but the 
buyers of the new shares are compensated for the fact that they overpaid by preferential rights 
(profit rights, voting rights etc) compared to the “old” shares and in that sense, again two classes 
of shares are created. 
In case, conversely, the book value of the shares is substantially higher than their nominal value and the 
company wants to, or is legally required to, issue the new shares with the same nominal value as the old 
ones, a share premium can be asked, i. e. part of the subscription price, exceeding the nominal value, will 
be booked as premium instead of as legal capital, therefore not being linked to the nominal value and as a 
matter of principle not affecting the rights attached to the shares, which are, as a rule proportional to the 
nominal value of the shares. 
When the euro was introduced, nominal values had to be converted into euros as well. This led to nominal 
values that were not whole numbers, for example 10.82. This was very impractical and fortunately the 2nd 
Company law Directive also allowed “shares without nominal value”, which are called share with an 
accountable par in other places of the Directive. Since the 1930’s Belgium and Luxembourg had allowed 
such shares, and now several countries, including for example Germany, allow their companies to issue 
such shares (“Stückaktien” in German). But the difference between nominal value shares and shares without 
a nominal value in this sense, is largely formal. The accountable par is just another way of expressing 
nominal value, namely not as a whole number, but as a still fixed fraction of legal capital. Each share 
represents a part of legal capital, e.g. 1/10,000th. The value is not expressed through a number. But if a 
company has 10,000 shares without nominal value and its legal capital is one million, one might as well 
say that its shares have a nominal value of 100. If one adds the rule that this value is fixed, i.e. that future 
shares will also have to be issued for a contribution equal to 100, then the difference with a nominal value 
system is purely formal. Historical par values play a role. 
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This was not how shares without a nominal value were perceived in Belgium –together with Luxembourg 
(who usually follows Belgium), the only EU country that allowed such shares prior to the introduction of 
the euro and the reason why the 2nd Directive refers to shares without a nominal value. In Belgium, such 
shares are called “shares with a fractional value” and they are equivalent to the true no par value shares that 
have existed in the U.S. for a long time and that were introduced in 2006 in Finland. It might be worthwhile 
to illustrate the traditional Belgium system with the example of a capital increase with issuance of new 
shares in a situation where the book value of the existing shares is clearly below their “fractional value”. 
Suppose a company with a legal capital of 10 million that has issued 1 million shares, each representing 1 
millionth of legal capital and thus having an accountable par (par value) of 10. As a result of losses, the 
book value of these shares is only 8 per share, so in total 8 million. Suppose the company needs a capital 
injection in order to survive. It decides to issue 1 million additional shares. If it demands an issue price of 
10 per share, the new shareholder overpays and will only be prepared to do this if he or she gets preferential 
rights. What a Belgian company will typically do –and which it is allowed to do, whereas a German 
company could not do this in the same way- is issue one million shares for a price of (a maximum) 8 euro 
per share. After this capital increase, the company will have legal capital of 18 million, divided by 2 million 
shares. For a legal second, the newly issued shares will have an accountable par (par value) of 8, whereas 
the old shares have par value of 10. However, immediately after voting the capital increase, the same 
general meeting will vote to unify these categories of shares, determining that each represents one 
2millionth part of legal capital of 18 million, with each share consequently having the same accountable 
par of 9 and the same rights attached to them, since they represent an equal part of legal capital (they have 
the same “fractional value”). From an economic perspective, this is the same as having no par value shares 
as understood in Delaware, but with a procedure that is more cumbersome: the general meeting needs to 
“unify” two classes of shares (not applying the specific rules that apply to this under other circumstances) 
that existed for a legal second. Directors have to draw up a report explaining the implications of the 
transaction to the general meeting. 
In Finland, a “naked” or “pure” no par value system was introduced in the 2006 Companies Act. Under 
such as system, contributions will of course still be booked as equity, but they can be booked as capital, as 
a distributable or as a non-distributable equity reserve, whereby the latter need not have the accounting 
status or economic function of a share premium. It is up to the company body deciding on the share issue 
to determine how the contribution will be booked and this does not affect shareholder rights/the rights 
attached to the shares. The board will have to take its responsibility in proposing an issue price and 
suggesting (when, as usual, the general meeting needs to approve the issue of the new shares) which rights 
should be attached to the shares, in exchange for which price/contribution. Also, there is no link between 
the price shares were issued for at one stage and the rights that will be attached to future shares. In other 
words, the whole idea, never respected in practice but nevertheless lurking behind the nominal value system 
in its most traditional form, that shareholders subscribing to new shares in year a + 5 should not receive 
shareholder rights (voting power, dividend rights etc) that are larger than those received by shareholders 
who subscribed to shares in year a if both groups pay the same price for their shares, does not apply. 
Historical values of shares and the percentage of legal capital they are deemed to represent play no role. 
The whole issue is left to the fiduciary duties of directors, who will propose a certain ratio of 
rights/subscription price to the general meeting approving the issue. 
Under such a system, it is also easy to issue additional shares without a capital increase and, conversely, 
capital can be increased without new shares being issued (even if new contributions are made and we are 
not simply dealing with an incorporation of reserves). As indicated, the rights attached to shares are not 
determined in relation to the percentage of capital a share represents nor to the value of the contribution for 
which they were issued; the rights are determined in the articles of association (within the limits allowed 
by the EMCA) without reference to any accounting figure. 
Assuming vigorous enforcement of the duty of the board to inform existing shareholders and investors 
considering a purchase of newly issued shares about the financial and governance (power) implications of 
the proposed price/rights ratio for shares that the company intends to issue, the no par value system offers 
greater simplicity and flexibility without harming any stakeholder’s interests. The EMCA Group is 
therefore in favor of such a system. 
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Section 5.06 
Voting Rights Attached to Shares 
(1) Unless otherwise provided in the articles of association, each non-par value share shall carry one vote. 
Unless the articles provide otherwise, each nominal value share shall carry voting rights proportionate to 
its nominal value. In case of shares with different nominal values issued by the same company, the shares 
with the smallest nominal value shall carry one vote. The articles of association may provide for shares 
with multiple voting rights and/or for non-voting shares. 
(2) Non-voting shares shall carry all shareholder rights except voting rights. However, non- voting shares 
may vote, with one vote per share, on resolutions proposed to the general meeting concerning any 
amendment to the rights attached to these shares, including the abolition of the class of non-voting shares. 
A company must issue at least one share with voting power. 
(3) The percentage to which a share has been paid up has no influence on the exercise of the voting rights 
attached to the share, unless the articles of association provide otherwise. In particular, the articles may 
make the exercise of the voting right conditional on the full payment of the shares, or may make the exercise 
of the voting right proportional to the percentage of the nominal value that has been paid in. 
(4) However, in any case the voting right(s) attached to a share are suspended when a share has not been 
fully paid up even though it should have been paid up as a result of the provisions of this Act, a lawful 
demand made of the shareholder by the competent company body or an agreement between shareholders. 
(5) Priority shares, i.e. shares that entitle the holder or category of holders to decide certain matters within 
the competence of the general meeting on their own, irrespective of the number of votes attached to the 
shares or the category of shares, and shares that give the shareholder a right of veto against certain or all 
decisions of the general meeting, are allowed. 
Comments 
If given the choice, most companies would probably issue no par value shares with each share having equal 
rights, namely one vote and a claim to a percentage of the profits that is obtained by dividing the profits by 
the number of shares. This is the simplest, most workable option. EMCA offers this possibility, and also 
allows for a deviation from this rule. Deviations must be explicitly provided for in the articles of 
association. 
Deviations could consist in the creation of non-voting shares, shares with multiple votes, or priority shares. 
Priority shares in this context refers to shares that have special decision-making powers, either veto powers 
or powers to decide things without the cooperation of other shareholders. For instance, certain shares could 
be awarded the right to appoint a certain number of directors, irrespective of the other votes cast at the 
general meeting. Or they could offer the holders of such shares a right to block the appointment of directors, 
or certain major transactions. Such shares, which in continental Europe were probably most often used in 
the Netherlands, can create an oligarchy among the shareholders. They are therefore controversial. In 
Belgium, “priority shares” are not allowed because they are deemed to undermine the power of the general 
meeting and the fear is that they could lead to concentration of power without an equivalent investment. In 
the Polish Companies Act Article 354 and also – without a special provision – in Denmark, priority shares 
are allowed. The same is true in France (actions de préférence, Article L.228-11 of the Commercial Code). 
Priority shares are also allowed in the US. Normally, a priority right concerning vetoing appointments of 
new directors would be contained in a shareholder agreement, but the EMCA Group cannot find plausible 
arguments against allowing a provision of such a kind in the articles of association. In listed companies, 
priority shares are especially controversial and institutional shareholders have exerted pressure on 
companies to do away with them. The EMCA is not intended to replace specific rules in corporate law, 
securities regulation and listing rules that deal specifically with issues for listed companies. In closed 
companies, the EMCA Group does not see any objection against this type of arrangement, because 
shareholders are supposed to be able to fend for themselves when deciding whether to accept such shares. 
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Non-voting shares can be issued to attract equity without affecting the balance of power within the 
company. Often, the lack of voting power will be compensated with preferred dividends/profit rights, but 
the EMCA does not mandate such compensatory mechanisms. It does mandate however the rule, from 
which the articles of association should not be allowed to deviate, that non- voting stock is a separate class 
and that these shares can vote, with one vote per share, if the general meeting wants to change the rights 
attached to these shares for example to lower a preferential dividend that had initially been accorded to 
such shares. 
Something mid-way between a voting and non-voting share may also be created: shares that can vote on 
certain issues (e.g. capital increases) but not on others (e.g. directors’ appointments and dismissals). 
According to previous Finnish Companies Acts and the present Belgian Companies Act, non-voting shares 
were only possible if they were preference shares. The restriction has been abandoned in the recent Finnish 
Companies Act. The EMCA Group considers that there is no reason to limit non-voting rights to shares 
with preferential profit rights. 
The question of multiple voting rights is controversial in Europe. As mentioned in the introduction, the EU 
Commission in 2007 considered introducing a mandatory one share one vote rule, but then concluded this 
would not be efficient or at least was not necessary. Member States have different approaches. In Belgium, 
Germany, Greece, Poland and Spain, multiple voting rights are prohibited. Italy, which used to ban multiple 
votes, allowed them in 2014 in non-listed companies. Luxembourg also allowed them, although not 
explicitly, in 2016. In the UK and Ireland, they are permitted but very rare. In some Member States that 
allow multiple voting rights, there is a maximum multiplier: in Sweden there is still a 1:10 limit and in Italy 
1:3. The former Danish Companies Act had the same limitation but in the recent legislation there is no such 
limitation; the same applies to the Netherlands. Similar to the Danish Companies Act, the former Finnish 
Companies Act contained a limitation of 1:20 and shares without voting rights were only possible if they 
were preference shares. According to the recent Finnish Companies Act, these restrictions have been 
cancelled and the company has the freedom to decide the voting rights of the shares.  
The EMCA allows shares with multiple voting rights and without a mandatory multiplier. This seems the 
best option in view of the fact that EMCA allows non par value shares. This implies shares can be issued 
for any price deemed acceptable by the shareholders who decide to issue them (or the board, acting with 
due care and loyalty, to whom issuing power has been delegated) and investors who are asked to buy them. 
This means companies could charge different subscription prices to different investors whose shares have 
the same rights. This is economically equivalent to issuing multiple voting rights. An additional reason for 
not introducing a multiplier is that non-voting stock can be created. 
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From the outset, it should be stressed that a case can be made that limits to multiple voting rights in listed 
companies are desirable. Firstly, the introduction of multiple voting stock for the first time after a company 
has been listed should be outlawed, as this may completely disturb the corporate power structure and would 
defeat the legitimate expectations of investors who are outvoted when the multiple voting structure is being 
introduced. Secondly, in listed companies it is probably wise to introduce a maximum multiplier (e.g. of 
five). This dampens the one effect that is the main drawback of multiple voting stock, namely a disconnect 
between power and economic interests, meaning a shareholder with multiple votes does not fully bear the 
financial consequences of the decisions they help impose on the company, while they can often build a 
controlling stake that allows them to extract private benefits of control. Maximum multipliers have been 
introduced in most countries that in the past allowed multiple voting stock without, or with very high, 
multipliers. Also, while the potential effects of multiple voting stock on take-overs are complex, 
shareholders with control based on multiple voting stock should probably not be encouraged or allowed to 
cash in on their private benefits of control when they sell their shares. Therefore, the EMCA group is 
favorably disposed, for listed companies, to the French system (predating the recent changes through the 
2013 Loi Florange which made it the default rule) where the articles of association may provide for double 
voting rights for loyal shareholders, that is shareholders who have held their shares for an uninterrupted 
period of two years (Article L. 225-123 of the Commercial Code). These “loyalty shares” have a maximum 
multiplier of two, thus preventing a too large disconnect between financial contribution and risk on the one 
hand and power on the other, while still offering a meaningful way to subscribers, families, employees and 
other long- term investors to leverage their long-term investment. This may contribute to the goal of 
fostering long term strategic vision at companies, a goal pursued by parts of the proposed reforms to the 
EU Shareholders’ Rights Directive. At the same time, the rule that double voting power is lost when the 
shares are transferred, prevents the shareholder from cashing in on their loyalty and the heightened control 
rights that attend it. 
But EMCA does not deal with rules specific to listed companies. In unlisted companies, the EMCA Group 
sees no reason to fear abuses and therefore does not limit the use of multiple voting stock and therefore 
leaves the matter to the Articles. 
The EMCA does not contain specific provisions on loyalty shares because this would have been superfluous 
in view of the fact that the EMCA offers great flexibility concerning voting rights. Companies could 
introduce loyalty shares under the EMCA if they wanted to. As mentioned, the best known system of loyalty 
shares is the French one. The French law on public companies (Sociétés anonymes) allows loyalty shares 
and, since 2014, they are the default rule for listed companies unless a majority at the extraordinary general 
meeting votes against. They provide for a double voting right after a certain period, which cannot be less 
than two years. Loyalty shares may also provide for increased dividends (see Section 8). This is also 
permitted in France in public companies but there is a limitation on the amount of the supplementary 
dividend. In simplified public companies (Sociétés par actions simplifiées or SAS), loyalty shares which 
provide for increase votes and dividends, are also valid and their regime is organized by the articles of 
association. 
Loyalty shares are legal in some other Member States such as Denmark, but they are hardly ever used – 
perhaps because of a lack of knowledge or familiarity. The Finnish and the Swedish companies’ acts do 
not mention explicitly whether loyalty shares are allowed, however the Finnish and the Dutch Companies 
Acts are very flexible and liberal so loyalty shares could be used if stated in the articles of association. Yet, 
as in Denmark, they are hardly ever used. Italy allowed them in 2014 for listed companies, following the 
French model. In Member States such as Belgium, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Poland (after 2001) 
and Spain, loyalty shares are prohibited. 
The drawback to loyalty shares is that they complicate the assignment of control, because the transferee 
cannot be subrogated to the extra voting rights, which are only received after a given time period. The 
Directive on Takeover Bids (2004/25/EC) excludes loyalty shares from the Directive and thus from the 
optional breakthrough rule in Article 11 because Article 11 (3) only covers shares with “multiple voting 
rights”, where the rights depend on their class, i.e. they are determined in the articles of associations. The 
consequence of this is that loyalty shares keep their voting rights contrary to shares with multiple voting 
rights, which only has one vote on general meeting where defensive measures are taken. This can help to 
make these shares attractive. 
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According to the French system loyalty shares could be introduced with 2/3 majority (except in listed 
companies where they are the default rule since 2014), since it is open to all shareholders to keep their 
shares and have the benefits. 
Loyalty shares could also mean that the shareholders should have more dividends according to the duration 
of possession. If the company decides to introduce loyalty shares, the question arises whether the 
shareholder should have more dividends according to the time they possess the shares. In French law this 
is limited, but the EMCA Group considers that the use of higher dividends could be an effective means to 
foster loyalty and therefore there should be no legal limitation. 
A legislator who, contrary to EMCA, would deem it useful to introduce a provision on loyalty shares, could 
take inspiration from the following draft: 
• A voting right equivalent to twice that attributed to other shares may be attributed to fully paid shares 
which can be proved to have been registered in the name of the same shareholder for at least two 
years, depending on the proportion of the share capital they represent, by the memorandum and 
articles of association or a special shareholders’ meeting. Furthermore, in the event of an increase in 
capital by incorporation of reserve funds, profits or issue premiums, a double voting right may be 
conferred from the date of issue on registered shares allocated to a shareholder free of charge in 
proportion to any former shares for which he has the benefit of that right. 
• Any share converted into a bearer share or changing hands shall lose the right to a double vote 
attributed pursuant to paragraph 1. Nevertheless, a transfer on succession, or on the partition of 
property jointly owned by spouses, or a gift inter vivos to a spouse or a relative entitled to succeed to 
the donor’s estate shall not cause the right to be lost, nor interrupt the period of time referred to in the 
said Section. The merger or division of a company shall have no effect on double voting rights capable 
of being exercised within the beneficiary company or companies, where the memorandum and articles 
of association of the latter created it. 
At present, the laws of many Member States offer less flexibility than EMCA concerning voting rights, in 
that they prohibit multiple voting rights, or mandate shares with equal rights all over, including voting 
rights, or mandate proportionality between the par value of the share and the (voting) rights attached to it. 
The EMCA Group sees no reason to be less flexible than Delaware or the Netherlands after its introduction 
in 2012 of its “Flex-BV (flexible closed company). However, when a company has chosen to issue nominal 
value shares, consistency requires that the default rule is that rights attached to those shares are 
proportionate to the nominal value of those shares. As explained in the comments to Section 6, the idea 
behind nominal value is that it offers an easily recognizable measurement of shareholders’ duties (to pay 
an amount at least equal to nominal value for the share) and rights. This may be an obsolete idea, or an idea 
that has never been convincing, but those companies that still opt for nominal value shares without being 
forced to, should bear the consequences and accept the consistency of the system they opted into. In this 
respect, the law of some countries or US states that allow or even mandate nominal value shares without 
assuming, as at least a default rule, any relationship between this nominal value and the rights attached to 
the share, are to be criticized for depriving the concept of nominal value of any value it may have possessed. 
For this reason, Section 6.1 of EMCA creates proportionality between nominal value and voting rights 
attached to the shares. If all shares issued by a company have the same nominal value, each will have one 
vote. If shares with different nominal values (e.g. 10 and 30) have been issued –something most companies 
would want to avoid because of the complexity this brings with it - then the share with the smallest nominal 
value will have one vote and the shares with a larger nominal value will have multiple votes, whereby parts 
of multiples are neglected (e.g. the shares with a nominal value of 30 would have 3 votes; if the company 
issued shares with a nominal value of 25, having 2.5 times the nominal value of the shares with a value of 
10, the shares with a par (nominal) value of 25 would have 2 votes per share, not 2.5.). 
As the text of Section 6 makes clear, all these rules are default rules only, from which the articles of 
association may deviate. 
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Section 6 contains one rule which we think should be mandatory, in order to avoid majority shareholders 
from excluding it to their own benefit through provisions in the articles of association; It is the rule in the 
second paragraph of Section 6.3, which provides that the voting rights of a shareholder who should have 
paid in their full contribution for the shares but has not, are suspended. This is an efficient sanction of a 
breach of contractual duty committed by the shareholder, obviating the need for the company to go to court 
in order to at least put significant pressure on the shareholder to pay up. 
Section 5.07 
Profit Rights Attached to a Share 
(1) “Profit rights” mean the right to receive parts of any profit distributions including the distribution of 
dividends and of the liquidation surplus decided by a competent company body. 
(2) In case of nominal value shares, shares have profit rights proportional to their nominal value, unless 
the articles of association provide otherwise. 
(3) In case of no par value shares, each share is entitled to an equal part of any profit distribution, unless 
the articles provide otherwise. 
Comments 
Most companies are for-profit, meaning the intention is to distribute the profits, sooner or later, among 
shareholders. Of course, a decision by the board or the general meeting, depending on the relevant legal 
system, is necessary before a shareholder can claim its share of profits in the form of a dividend. 
The same philosophy as was used to determine the voting rights attached to shares is used for profits: the 
right to profits is proportionate to par value in case of nominal value shares, and is the same for each share 
(i.e. equals total profit distribution/number of shares) in case of no par value shares, but the articles are free 
to deviate from these default rules. 
Companies will often retain part of their profits or more exceptionally all of their profits. Shareholders are 
then entitled to their part of the profits when the company is wound up/dissolved. Even though the text of 
the articles do not express this, when there is a (positive) liquidation surplus, shareholders should be entitled 
to share in this on the same basis as they shared in dividends. This is on the basis that a liquidation surplus 
represents retained earnings. 
Section 5.08 
Classes of Shares 
If a company has issued shares with non-identical rights attached to them, shares with identical rights each 
form a class of shares. Only differences in the rights attached to shares, not differences in the rights 
accorded to one or more shareholders personally can give rise to the formation of a class of shares. 
Comments 
Shareholders buying shares when they are issued or on the secondary market attach at least some 
importance to the rights (governance and financial) attached to these shares when determining what price 
they are prepared to pay for the shares. Especially when not all shares that a company has issued have the 
same voting and profit rights, this will normally be reflected in price differences for the shares. 
Shareholders will therefore want some protection against changes to the rights attached to their shares, 
which is the topic of the next Section. 
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There are different definitions of the concept of “class of shares” in different Member States and indeed 
considerable uncertainty within Member States as to what exactly constitutes a “class of shares”. For 
instance, in some Member States, shares having different rights do not necessarily constitute different 
classes of shares: when one company takes the unusual step of issuing shares with different nominal values, 
but the rights are proportionate to these different values and therefore different themselves, these shares 
would not constitute separate classes. Likewise shares with the same rights attached are considered to 
belong to different classes in some Member States, namely again in the scenario where the shares have 
different nominal values/accountable par values, and despite this have the same rights attached to them. 
However, in other Member States, probably in a majority, a class is simply defined as any group of shares 
with the same rights attached, so that groups of shares with different rights attached constitute different 
classes, irrespective of whether these rights are proportionate to the share of legal capital represented by 
such shares. The EMCA has adopted this simple approach, which is also more in line than other definitions 
with a true no par value system as proposed by the EMCA. 
To our knowledge, no European country attaches importance to different nominal or accountable par values 
as such for defining a class of shares and this approach was not considered by the EMCA Group. 
By contrast, there is uncertainty in certain countries whether situations where special rights are granted to 
a shareholder, without those being attached to the shares themselves, should give rise to the rules on classes 
of shares. One might consider for example a situation where the articles of association provide that anyone 
holding 10 % of the shares may propose two candidates for board membership and that the general meeting 
must appoint at least one of its directors from among the candidates proposed by such a 10 %- shareholder. 
Here the privilege of a binding nomination of directors attaches to the fact of holding a certain number of 
shares, not to the shares themselves. According to the EMCA, there is therefore no separate class of shares. 
Therefore, this “special right” of 10 % + shareholders could be taken away by a simple amendment to the 
articles, without a vote per class of shares (since there are no classes). 
Individual contractual rights of shareholders towards the company or rights unilaterally granted to 
individual shareholders are simply that: individual rights, which therefore cannot, of course, be amended 
by the general meeting, but only in accordance with the general rules on the laws of obligations, which will 
usually entail individual consent of the affected shareholder. 
Section 5.09 
Change to the Rights of a Class 
(1) If a company has more than one class of shares, the rights attached to a certain class can only be changed 
in accordance with the rules required for changes to the articles of association, and the majorities required 
must be met within each class that is affected. 
(2) The board of directors must draw up a written report that is made available to shareholders in 
accordance with Section [see Chapter 11] at the same time as the agenda of the meeting, in which it explains 
the potential consequences of the proposed changes to class rights. Any financial data in this report must 
have been checked by an external auditor, who will draw up a report that is made available at the same time 
and in the same manner as the directors’ report, in which the auditor particularly gives his or her opinion 
on whether the financial data given in the directors’ report are fair and not misleading. 
(3) The introduction of a new class of shares in a company where there previously were no different classes 
of shares is not deemed to be a change of class rights. 
(4) The introduction of a new class of shares in a company where there previously already are different 
classes of shares is a change of class rights. 
(5) The abolition of a class of shares is considered to be a change of class rights. 
(6) Provisions may be included in the articles of association on the conditions and procedures under which 
shares can be converted from one class to another. The conversion shall be notified for registration without 
delay. The conversion shall take effect upon registration. 
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(7) If the company issues a disproportionate number of shares of one class compared to the number of 
shares issued at the same time for the other classes, this is deemed to be a change of class rights for all 
classes. 
Comments 
Shareholders need to be protected against changes to the specific rights attaching to their shares by simple 
majority. On the other hand, it should be possible for companies to change most class rights without 
unanimity among shareholders, which may be impossible to attain in companies with more than a handful 
of shareholders. Therefore the EMCA endorses the midway solution reached by most European legal 
systems, of requiring the majority required for amendments of the articles within each affected class. 
The difficult question in practice is what exactly constitutes a change to class rights. When a preferential 
dividend of a class of shares is lowered, this clearly is a change to the rights of that class. But in all 
jurisdictions there is at least some uncertainty about situations where the company does not directly change 
the rights attached to the shares of a specific class, but nevertheless takes an action which negatively affects 
the rights of a specific class. This may arise for example where the creation of a new class de facto affects 
the amount of the preferential dividend (expressed as a percentage of total profits) that a class may expect 
to receive, or the issuance of additional shares in one class but not in another thereby dilutes the interests 
of the members of the former class. Section 9 seeks to provide a clear answer to most hypotheses that are 
controversial in several jurisdictions. Specific attention may be drawn to section 5.09(5) which proposes to 
treat the complete abolition of a class as a normal change of class rights. This seems logical since 
economically a change consisting in a serious reduction of the rights of a certain class and the complete 
abolition of the class need not differ very much. Nevertheless, it seems clear that some legal systems will 
prefer to impose a requirement of unanimous shareholder consent in such cases. 
Section 5.10 
Multiple Claimants on Shares 
The articles of association or, if the articles are silent on this matter, the board of directors calling a general 
meeting, may provide that if a share is owned by several persons at the same time, the voting rights attached 
to the share will be suspended until one person has been indicated by the co-owners who will be entitled, 
as the only person, to exercise the voting right attached to the share at the general meeting. If the co-owners 
cannot agree to appoint a proxy, any co-owner can ask the court to appoint a proxy. This person may be 
one of the owners or a third party. 
Comments 
In some Member States, the issue of multiple claimants on shares seems non-existent whereas in others, it 
is very common and leads to many disputes. For instance in France and Belgium, cases about who is entitled 
to vote in cases of “usufruct” on shares are unfortunately quite common. The case of co-ownership 
(indivision) is also dealt with in the French Commercial Code. Similar issues may arise in certain 
jurisdictions when married people jointly own shares and both members of the couple could exercise the 
voting rights attached to the shares separately according to civil law rules on marital property law. The 
EMCA Group felt it would have been difficult to harmonize the rules on such issues, because of divergences 
between national civil law rules. The EMCA Group certainly did not intend to design a rule that would 
catch situations where several people have concurrent and competing claims arising out of contract on one 
and the same share, let alone situations of “empty voting”, which can for example result from share lending 
and in which the person voting has interests that potentially diverge from the legal ownership of the share 
or the person it will revert to after the share lending deal has expired. 
The EMCA does not even deal with all cases of simultaneous real rights in a share such as a result from 
usufruct and also for example from pledges on shares. 
Section 10 only deals with co-ownership in the narrow sense. In such a case, the civil law issues seem 
relatively straightforward and the EMCA Group considered that any legal system could live with the rule 
proposed here. The purpose of the rule is, of course, to prevent a situation where one and the same share 
could be voted twice or more during the vote on one issue, once by every co-owner. 
European Model Companies Act 2017 
Chapter 5 – Shares 
102 
Nothing would of course prevent a national legislator from extending the solution proposed by the EMCA 
for co-ownership to other cases of competing real rights on one and the same share. 
A word of explanation on usufruct: In civil law countries, the property right in a share can be divided into 
several rights. The main distinction is between usufruct (usufruit), also called life interest (see Article 10 
of the Transparency Directive), and bare ownership (nu propriété). The beneficiary of the usufruct may use 
the object of the usufruct and receives the “fruits” (products) of this object, but they cannot transfer 
property, which remains with the “bare owner”. As with any asset, the ownership of shares can be divided 
between a life interest and a bare ownership. Because the articles in the Code Napoleon on usufruct do not 
deal with shares and immaterial goods were unimportant at the time the Code Napoleon was drafted (1804), 
they do no resolve the issue, controversial ever since, of the distribution of voting and financial rights 
between the usufructuary and the “bare owner”. The separation between usufruct and bare ownership is 
widely used in several countries including France and Belgium in order to allow the owner of a company 
to transfer the property of the shares at a lower tax cost, while retaining the economic benefit (usufruct), or 
doing the reverse (granting the usufruct but keeping control). Nothing in the EMCA prevents such a 
separation between usufruct and bare ownership. In common law jurisdictions, share trusts can be used to 
reach similar effects. But as indicated, the EMCA Group did not think it was possible or a good idea to 
propose one uniform rule to deal with these issues. 
Section 5.11 
Share Register for Registered Shares 
(1) This Section only applies to registered shares. 
(2) A company that has issued registered shares must have a share register. The share register must be held 
in paper or electronic forms that remain accessible over time. The share register must be held at the 
company’s registered office. Several copies may be created and held in places other than the company’s 
registered office, but only where the company has an establishment or at the office of a financial institution. 
In case of discrepancies between several copies of the register, the content of the register kept at the 
company’s registered office is the only legally binding one. 
(3) The share register should state the total number of shares issued by the company. 
(4) Each transfer of shares must be registered in the share register by the parties involved. The registration 
must mention the names of transferor and transferee, their addresses or, in case of legal persons, their 
registered offices, the number of shares transferred, the date of the transfer and the date of the registration. 
The share register must also mention whether the shares have been fully paid up and, if not, what the 
amount is that remains to be paid up and who the debtor is of this obligation. 
(5) Each shareholder must receive an extract from the share register setting out at least the full name and 
registered office of the company and the number of shares for which that shareholder is registered in the 
share register. If there is a change in the number of shares held by a shareholder, they must receive a new 
certificate attesting to this new number. The extract can be used to prove shareholdership. However, in case 
of discrepancies between an extract and the share register, the register prevails. The extract does not 
incorporate the rights and duties attached to a share. Transfer of the extract does not bring about a transfer 
of the shares, and a transfer of shares remains valid even when the extract(s) have not been transferred. 
(6) Unless proof to the contrary exists, the person mentioned as shareholder in the share register is 
considered to be the owner of the shares mentioned under their name and is entitled to exercise the rights 
attached to the shares and bound to perform the duties attached to them. 
Comments 
This Section only applies to companies that have issued registered shares and to the transfer of such shares. 
Bearer shares by definition are not registered. The transfer of dematerialized shares could in theory be 
registered, but the EMCA Group sees no need for that in view of the fact that “registration” takes place in 
securities accounts and that transparency is safeguarded by transparency rules. It is only for registered 
shares that one needs a register to prove the quality of shareholder. 
European Model Companies Act 2017 
Chapter 5 – Shares 
103 
If companies issue registered shares, they must have a share register. The share register’s essential function 
is to make transfers of shares reliable against the company and in principle also other third parties. 
As expressed in paragraph 6, the person listed (registered) in the register as shareholder will be deemed to 
be the shareholder. This person will be the only one allowed to exercise the rights attached to the shares. 
Hence Chapter 11 of EMCA, on the general meeting, indicates that only the person registered in the share 
register as being the shareholder can take part in the general meeting and exercise the voting rights. 
However, the share register is not conclusive proof of ownership. It only indicates who the shareholder is, 
that is the person entitled to exercise the rights attached to the shares (of course, in case of power of attorney, 
others can exercise those rights on account of the shareholder). The question of ownership is dealt with in 
accordance with contract law and the law on real rights, not by corporate law. (See also the comments 
under Section 13 on transfer of shares.) If a person alleges to be the rightful owner of shares, but is not 
registered as such in the share register, they can try to have the share register forcibly amended through 
court action under the applicable national rules. But as long as the register has not been amended, the person 
listed in the share register will be treated as shareholder. Courts could of course treat someone as 
shareholder before the register has actually been amended, but after they have been satisfied that someone 
else other than the person registered is the real owner and therefore real shareholder. All this follows from 
the wording in Section 5.11(6), which says that the basic rule applies “unless proof to the contrary exists”. 
Share registers may be held in paper or electronic form. “Electronic form” simply means that the 
information is stored on a computer or possibly a website (server). The electronic share register kept by the 
company itself is not to be confused with the securities accounts held at a central securities depository that 
is a sort of central share register for all dematerialized shares of all companies using this central depositary. 
As already indicated, the EMCA does not deal with this central depositary, which is essentially also a 
clearing and settlement organization. 
The “extract” or certificate not entailing any rights attached to the shares of the register has the same 
function as a bank statement: just like a bank statement, an indication that one has 50.000 euro in the bank 
cannot be used to pay 50.000 euro because the statement does not constitute money. The extract is not a 
share but simply a document that the shareholder can use for administrative reasons, to keep track of how 
many shares they have in a company and to show to other persons, including the company, how many they 
have. But the entries in the register have precedence over the extract (in case of discrepancies) and transfer 
of the extract does not entail transfer of any shareholder’s rights. 
The “duties” of shareholders mentioned in the Section are mainly the duty to fully pay up the shares. 
Section 5.12 
Access to the Share Register 
(1) The register of shareholders must be kept available for inspection by public authorities. The articles of 
association must specify the place where the register of shareholders is to be kept if it is not kept at the 
company’s registered office. The register of shareholders must be kept within the EU/EEA. 
(2) The register of shareholders must be kept available for inspection by shareholders and company organs 
and the articles of association may provide that the register must also be kept available for inspection by 
the public. 
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Comments 
It has been debated in several Member States if the share register should be available for inspection by the 
company’s shareholders. Thus, for example, the Danish tradition in public companies is that shareholders 
do not have the right to access the register unless the articles of association provides for it, cf. Section 16(2). 
The share register in private companies in Denmark and the Netherlands is available for inspection by a 
shareholder. The restriction for public companies has been debated in Denmark and the other Nordic 
countries are more open. This is especially the case in Sweden where the register is completely open to 
shareholders and everyone else. In other Member States there are different rules. For example in Belgium 
the share register is open to everybody but in Germany it is restricted to the shareholders because of data 
protection and privacy concerns (AktG § 67). The UK position is that the register of members of all 
companies, public and private, is open to inspection - subject to a power introduced in the Companies Act 
2006, for the company to go to court for permission to refuse access. As information on members is also 
held by the Registrar of Companies, in practice people tend to go there to seek information on the 
membership rather than to the company’s register.  
The EMCA Group has considered different arguments for and against granting unrestricted access. 
Arguments for granting unrestricted access include the need for shareholders to know each other, the 
possibility of raising class actions, facilitating takeover bids, and improving transparency/democracy. An 
argument against granting unrestricted access may be based on privacy concerns. The EMCA Group 
considers that the share register should be open to all shareholders in public as well as private companies. 
On the other hand, the EMCA Group sees no need to force companies to open up their share register to 
everyone including non-shareholders. Whether the public has access is an issue which may be left to the 
articles of association, the default rule being that there is no access for the public in general. 
The EMCA Group has opted for a compromise solution whereby, as is already the case in several Member 
States, pubic authorities including tax authorities have access to the share register. Such a solution will 
probably be imposed on all EU companies pursuant to the 4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive, which 
obliges Member States to organize a central register of beneficial ownership for all companies. 
Section 5.13 
Transfer of Shares 
(1) Shares are freely transferable, unless otherwise provided by the articles of association in accordance 
with Section 14. 
(2) A transfer of paper bearer shares cannot be relied upon against the company as long as the transferee 
does not hold the printed share certificates embodying the transferred shares. 
(3) A transfer of dematerialized bearer shares cannot be relied upon against the company as long as the 
securities account of the transferee has not been credited. 
(4) A transfer of registered shares cannot be relied upon against the company as long as it has not been 
registered in the share register, unless the company through its board of directors has acknowledged the 
transfer of the shares. 
Comments 
Section 13 deals with two problems. First, whether shares are freely transferable and second, which 
requirements should be fulfilled in the case of transfer in order for the parties to be able to rely upon the 
transaction against the company. 
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Concerning the first issue, that of free transferability: Regarding private companies, many Member States 
have transfer restrictions based on the understanding that private companies will often be formed by a small 
group of shareholders, who wish to jointly pursue a business aim and that the ability of a shareholder to 
transfer his or her interest to an outside third party could be prejudicial to the corporate success. In a number 
of Member States, therefore, transfers of shares in a private company may require board approval or even 
shareholder approval. This is for example the case in Belgium (mandatory), France (mandatory for sale to 
non-shareholders), Germany and Italy (if stipulated in the articles), Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Poland (if stipulated in the articles). Other Member States provide for a statutory pre-emption right, 
particularly in favor of other shareholders. This is the case in Estonia, Hungary and Lithuania. 
Transfers of share in public companies are substantially less restricted, reflecting the fact that shareholders 
in public companies often participate purely as investors especially if the shares are traded on a stock 
exchange. 
The EMCA Group does not see a reason to deal with the issue of transferability through mandatory rules. 
It should certainly be possible to limit the free transferability of shares and that is what this Section allows, 
referring to Section 14. But it should be left to the articles of association to deal with the issue of 
transferability, with free transferability as the default rule in any type of company. 
The reference in this Section to the articles of association is not a ban on shareholders’ agreements outside 
the articles. Shareholders’ agreements are acknowledged in all Member States. The general approach 
regarding shareholders’ agreements in Member States is that they are binding for the shareholders involved 
but not for the company or parties acquiring the shares in good faith, without knowledge of restrictions in 
the private shareholders’ agreement. The EMCA does not include specific provisions on shareholder 
agreements but certainly would not want to prohibit them. 
Public companies are also allowed to include limitations of transferability in the articles of association. 
However, if a public company is publicly traded, securities regulation demands that the shares are freely 
transferable. 
On the issue of which formal requirements should be fulfilled in the case of transfer, a large number of 
Member States permit shares in a private company to be transferred only by way of notarial deed or in 
written form with signatures certified by a notary public, whilst the remainder do not generally require such 
a level of formality and allow shares to be transferred pursuant to simple (including oral) agreements or 
written declarations. It is often the case that the company must, as a minimum, be notified so that the 
relevant share (or shareholders’) register can be updated. This is the case in France, Germany, Greece, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Many jurisdictions allow the 
articles to set out the exact mechanism of transfer and, in some cases to adopt either a more relaxed (as in 
the Czech Republic) or stricter (as in Austria, Belgium , Hungary and Italy) approach than that provided 
by statute. 
The transfer requirements regarding shares in public companies are more varied and can differ substantially 
from Member State to Member State. Probably the greatest similarity in approach lies with bearer shares 
where physical delivery of a certificate will generally be sufficient to transfer title. In Germany, where 
certification is obligatory, the individual unregistered shares will normally be represented by a global share 
certificate which is held by a depository and in which case the individual share will be transferred by way 
of assignment of a delivery claim against the depository. 
The transfer of registered shares which are certified can be effected in most jurisdictions through endorsing 
the certificate. This is the case for example in Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia whereas other jurisdictions allow transfers to the effected by way of a simple transfer document 
which, in contrast to the general position for public companies, does not need to be notarized. 
Dematerialized shares may be transferred by written agreement and, in almost all jurisdictions, the 
transferor or transferee must ensure that the share register is updated. A number of Member States require 
the register to be updated before a transferee may exercise their rights as shareholder (for example in 
Germany, the Netherlands (private company) and Sweden) or in order to give effect to the transfer (for 
example in Lithuania and Luxembourg). Certain Member States such as France, Greece, Ireland and the 
UK require furthermore the payment of transfer or stamp taxes. 
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The EMCA Group has opted for a simple system that at the same time creates legal certainty and is 
consistent with the EMCA’s definitions of the different forms of shares. The first choice EMCA makes is 
not to require the intervention of a notary. Notaries can certainly contribute to legal certainty, but legal 
certainty can probably also be attained through the mechanism described in the Section at a much lower 
cost to parties involved. 
Secondly, the EMCA, as noted above, does not deal with the civil law (contract law, property law etc.) 
aspects of corporate transactions. How shares can be sold is essentially a topic that is and should be dealt 
with under national rules on sales of moveable property. How one validly acquires ownership of a share, is 
a matter for civil law, mainly contract law. Companies legislation, such as the EMCA, only has to deal with 
identifying the circumstances in which the acquisition of a share as a result of a transfer can be relied upon 
against the company. It is possible that as a matter of contract law, a share transfer has been fully effected 
and the buyer has become the owner of the shares, but the owner cannot as yet rely upon his ownership 
against the company, since the necessary formalities for such reliance have not yet been met. For instance, 
it often occurs that national contract law provides that ownership of a share is transferred as soon as both 
parties involved agree on the number of shares and their price. But if it is a registered share, the transfer 
cannot be relied upon against the company unless it has been registered in the share register, which 
sometimes will only happen several days or weeks after the transfer of ownership. As long as the buyer has 
not been registered as the new shareholder, they will not be able to exercise their rights as a shareholder 
vis-à-vis the company. For example, they will not be allowed to attend or vote at a general meeting. Under 
EMCA the share register is not conclusive proof of ownership, but only indicates who should be regarded 
as shareholder in the sense of being entitled to exercise the rights attaching to the shares. 
EMCA has opted for a simple system that takes into account the different forms shares may take –
differences in form that are mainly relevant for the way the share can be transferred. For registered shares, 
the share registry naturally is proof of the transfer and registration is required to make any transfer reliable 
against the company. For dematerialized shares, the securities account of the acquirer will need to have 
been credited. Finally, in the case of bearer shares incorporated in a paper certificate, the paper certificate 
needs to have been transferred and therefore needs to be in the possession of the acquirer for them to rely 
on the transfer. 
Of course, persons may prove that according to civil law, they are the rightful owner of shares, but for some 
reason or another, the transaction has not been made reliable for example because the board refuses access 
to the share register. They can then sue according to normal private law rules to have this remedied. But 
until they have succeeded with such an action, their ownership cannot be relied upon against the company. 
Section 5.14 
Limitations on Free Transferability of Shares 
(1) The articles of association may limit the free transferability of shares or a certain number of shares. 
The limitation may entail a total ban on transfers of shares for a fixed period of time or any other kind of 
limitation such as a right of first refusal and a consent clause. 
(2) Unless the articles expressly provide otherwise, the limits on free transferability will only apply to 
transfers of full property, not to the pledging of shares or the granting of limited real rights on the shares. 
(3) Any transfer in violation of the articles of association is void. 
Comments 
The EMCA assumes that shares are freely transferable, in accordance with normal civil law or common 
law, rules on transfers of property and other real rights. 
At the same time, the EMCA Group is unaware of convincing reasons for rules that would mandatorily 
limit the free transferability of shares. 
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The issue is therefore left to the articles of association, which may limit free transferability. It will be 
important to draft the articles carefully, in order to design a workable transfer limitation mechanism, and 
also to define the concept of transfer. This is a matter of contract drafting, not something to be dealt with 
in the EMCA. However, in order to save costs by clearly answering a question which has frequently arisen 
in practice in several Member States and to which national law does not always provide a clear answer, the 
EMCA states explicitly that unless the articles expressly say otherwise, limitations to transfers will only 
apply to transfers of full ownership, not to the granting of limited real rights, such as when shares are 
pledged as security. 
One issue drafters will have to take care of is whether a limit to transferability would also apply upon the 
death of a shareholder. Even though the Section contains no rule on this, the EMCA Group believes that 
the standard interpretation of “transfer” includes a transfer to heirs upon death. When, on the other hand, 
“sale” is used, the limitation will only apply to sales. However, it should be clear that company law and in 
any case the EMCA do not interfere with the law on estates/succession law. Therefore, the question who 
inherits the shares of the deceased is as a rule not affected by Section 15 or the rules on limits to free 
transferability of shares. 
For this last principle to hold perfectly, Section 14 should have provided that transfers in violation of the 
limits imposed by the articles cannot be relied upon against the company, so that the transferee would not 
be deemed to have become the new shareholder. The EMCA group considered such a solution, but in the 
end felt that a clear-cut solution would offer more legal certainty and would lead to real enforceability of 
limitations to free transferability in the articles. The EMCA therefore provides that transfers in violation of 
the articles are null and void (after having been declared null and void by a court). 
Some Member States explicitly allow shareholders to agree on limitations to free transferability of shares 
in shareholder agreements and even where Companies Acts provide nothing on this, it is presumably 
permissible in all Member States to enter into such agreements. By providing that the articles of association 
may limit free transferability, the EMCA Group certainly does not want to exclude such purely contractual 
arrangements. But it should be clear that such arrangements will only have effects among the parties 
involved. 
The exit rights awarded to shareholders in Chapter 11 of EMCA overrule limits to free transferability in 
the articles of association: if a shareholder has the right to be bought out by the company (or another 
shareholder), the limits provide in the articles should not apply. 
Section 5.15 
Redeemable Shares 
(1) If the articles of association so provide, the company may issue redeemable shares under the conditions 
set forth in this Section. Redeemable shares are shares that can be redeemed against the company. Upon 
redemption, the redeemed shares are cancelled and the redemption price is determined and becomes 
payable to the shareholder. 
(2) Only shares that have been issued as redeemable shares, before they are allotted, may be redeemed. 
After shares have been issued, they cannot be turned into redeemable shares, notwithstanding anything to 
the contrary in the articles of association or any company resolution. 
(3) Redeemable shares may be redeemable at the option of the company, of the shareholder, or by both, 
according to the provisions in the articles of association or the terms of issuance of the redeemable shares. 
(4) Redeemable shares may only be issued if the company has issued and still has non- redeemable shares. 
(5) Redemption must take place under the conditions and in the manner set forth in the articles of 
association. If the articles contain no conditions, and subject to the rules on redemption price in Paragraph 
7, a resolution of the general meeting with an ordinary majority may determine the conditions and manner 
of redemptions. The general meeting may, for a specific redemption, delegate its authority to decide on the 
conditions for and manner of redemption to the board of directors, unless the articles of association provide 
otherwise. 
(6) Shares may only be redeemed if they have been fully paid up. 
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(7) The decision to redeem shares has no effect before the redemption price is determined. The articles of 
association must determine the redemption price or contain rules to determine it. Redemption is not possible 
if the articles contain no rules to make the redemption price determinable. 
(8) The redemption price may only be paid out of distributable profits. Chapter 7, Section 2. Chapter 7, 
Section 33 applies mutatis mutandis if the redemption price has been paid out of non-distributable profits. 
(9) The redemption price must be paid within 12 months of redemption, unless the articles of association 
provide a shorter period. 
(10)  If a shareholder who is entitled to do so wants to redeem their shares, they must notify the company 
and the redemption will take place upon an ordinary board resolution. If a company that is entitled to do so 
wants to redeem shares, its board will notify the shareholders. 
(11) During the winding up of a company, and from the moment winding-up has been proposed in a 
board resolution or requested by anyone else, redemption may not take place except when the request or 
proposal to wind up the company has been rejected. 
(12) Unless all shareholders unanimously decide to waive this rule, a redemption offer by the company 
can only be made in equal measure to all holders of redeemable shares. 
Comments 
Several issues must be distinguished. All Member States allow share buy backs, whereby the company 
takes the initiative to buy back a number of its own shares from the shareholders. This is governed by the 
2nd Company law Directive. In addition, a company may acquire some of its shares through a capital 
reduction. The corresponding shares are then annulled, which is not necessarily the case when shares are 
bought back as they can be held as treasury shares. The EMCA does not deal with the relationship between 
share buy-backs and capital reductions with immediate annulment of shares. 
The above Section 15 does not deal with share buy-backs nor with capital reductions (for those two 
transactions, see the Chapter 6 on Financing of Companies). 
Nor does Section 15 deal with exit rights that take the form of a forced buy-back by the company (appraisal 
rights) or by another shareholder (along a model often used in Belgium) of a shareholder who feels 
aggrieved by fundamental changes in the company or can invoke just grounds (for example oppression of 
a minority shareholder) to have his or her shares bought by the offending shareholder. See Chapter 11 of 
EMCA for such exit rights in case of conflict/fundamental changes in the company. 
Section 15 deals with the less frequently occurring phenomenon of redeemable shares in the sense of shares 
that have been designated from the moment they were created as being eligible for redemption. Redemption 
here means that the company will pay the value of the shares to the shareholder. 
It is possible to envisage a system whereby capital is reduced through a redemption. For instance, in Belgian 
cooperative societies (which are considered to be companies and are dealt with in the Companies Act) 
shareholders have a right to exit the company by offering their shares to the company, which then must pay 
out their value, as long as legal minimum capital is not affected. This leads to an automatic reduction of 
legal capital corresponding to the number of redeemed shares, without the rules and procedures on capital 
reduction having to be respected. Hence this part of capital that can be used for such redemptions is called 
“flexible capital”. The “fixed capital” is then the amount determined as such in the articles of association - 
which in a cooperative with limited liability must be at least equal to statutory minimum legal capital- 
which can only be reduced using the procedure for capital reductions. 
However, this is not the system which is envisaged by the EMCA. Section 15 of EMCA relates to shares 
that can only be redeemed with distributable profits. The main differences with a simple system of share 
buy-backs are that (a) redeemable shares must have been thus designated at the moment they were issued; 
(b) hence, when redemption takes place, the principle of equality (equal buy-out offer to all shareholders) 
does not come into play; and (c) the EMCA allows the articles of association to make shares redeemable 
on the initiative of the shareholder, meaning the shareholder has an enforceable right towards the company 
to have their shares redeemed, whereas in a share buy-back, redemption only takes place on the initiative 
of the company, when it seems fit.
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General Comments46 
1. EU law 
Traditional means utilized to finance companies are share capital (equity) and different kinds of debt. As 
regards regular debt instruments in this context, EU law contains no general provisions. Financing by share 
capital is addressed particularly in Directive 2012/30/EU (recasting Directive 77/91/EEC (the 2nd Company 
Law Directive) as amended by Directive 2006/68/EC). 
The stated capital of a company may be increased by subscriptions for new shares, conversion of the 
company’s reserves into share capital by the issue of bonus shares, or the issuance of convertible financial 
instruments or warrants and options. New shares may not be subscribed for at a discount. Those who 
undertake to place shares in the exercise of their profession, however, can pay less than the total price of 
shares for which they subscribe in the course of the placing transaction (Article 8(2) of the 2012/30/EU 
Directive). According to article 29 of the 2012/30/EU Directive any increase in capital must be decided 
upon or authorized by the general meeting, and both this decision and the increase in the subscribed capital 
must be published in the manner laid down by the laws of each Member State. Where appropriate, the 
increase in the subscribed capital has to be decided on within the limits of the amount fixed, by the company 
body empowered to do so. 
A capital increase can be carried out in exchange for cash contributions as well as by contribution of assets 
other than cash or by conversion of debt. Conversion is the exchange of debt for equity and constitutes a 
transaction in which a lender agrees to convert a loan or a debt instrument into shares of equity. In the 
accounts, items are moved from liabilities to equity. Article 33 of the Directive provides that whenever the 
capital is increased by consideration in cash, the shares must be offered on a pre-emptive basis to 
shareholders in proportion to the capital represented by their shares. The pre-emption rights may not be 
restricted or withdrawn by the articles of association or instrument of incorporation unless the laws of a 
Member State specifically allows for this. Otherwise, a pre-emption right can be restricted only by decision 
of the general meeting. In general, in case of a capital increase in exchange for contribution in kind, one or 
more experts who are independent of the company and appointed or approved by an administrative or 
judicial authority will report on the consideration. Article 33 contains rules on priority. 
Convertible debt instruments give the holder the option to exchange the bond for a predetermined number 
of shares in the issuing company. A derivative security that gives the holder the right to subscribe for new 
shares at a specific price within a certain time frame is “a warrant”. Article 29 (1) and (4) of the Directive 
states that the authority to issue convertible debt instruments and warrants lies with the general meeting. 
The EU does not regulate the content of the resolution on the increase of share capital. 
The rules in the Directive regarding capital increases in listed companies are supplemented by the rules on 
prospectus in the Prospectus Directive 2001/34/EC as amended by 2010/73/EU and the prospectus 
regulation no. 809/2004. The rules on prospectus apply to the offer of securities on a regulated market and 
can, according to national rules, also be applied to other public offers worth less than 2.5 million Euros. 
The proposed new Prospectus Regulation (2015) will introduce inter alia changes in the minimum issuance 
thresholds where a prospectus is required. 
Directive 2012/30 only applies to public companies. 
                                                     
46 The working group on Chapter 6 was chaired by Professor Matti J. Sillanpää (Turku School of Economics, Finland) and included 
Professor Theodor Baums (Goethe University Frankfurt am Main, Germany) and Professor Paolo Giudici (Free University of 
Bozen-Bolzano, Italy). 
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2. National law 
Directive 2012/30 contains minimum requirements regarding the information, which is to be provided in 
connection with a capital increase. Regarding a contribution in kind, an account must be made by one or 
more experts who are independent of the company and appointed or approved by an administrative or 
judicial authority. As noted, the Directive does not however contain any further rules concerning the 
contents of the resolution to increase the capital. In different ways, however, all Member States require that 
investors be provided with relevant information regarding the contents and the condition for the 
subscription of capital. 
In accordance with Article 33, all Member States have rules on pre-emptive rights. The national rules follow 
Article 33 with some modifications. In most Member States, the rules on pre-emptive rights are the same 
in respect of public and in private companies. However, in some Member States, there are no pre-emptive 
rights in private companies. The EMCA Group considers that pre-emptive rights are not less important in 
private companies. 
Not all Member States have provisions on convertible bonds and warrants. Such provisions are found for 
example in Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy (covering convertible bonds only), Slovakia, 
Sweden, and the UK. In Finland there are only provisions on warrants but convertible bonds can be created 
by attaching warrants to bonds. Typically, the provisions require a resolution by the general meeting, cf. 
article 29 (4) of Directive 2012/30. The Directive does not determine the majority required for a decision, 
and the national rules vary significantly in this respect. Similarly, the Directive does not include any further 
rules on the contents of the resolution by the general meeting. In this matter the national rules are also very 
different. 
As mentioned, the Prospectus Directive and the Prospectus Regulation apply to capital increases in listed 
companies. The Directive’s prospectus rules in all Member States are implemented in the national law on 
securities regulation which in this way supplements the Company Law rules in the Member States. 
3. Considerations 
Traditional means utilized to finance companies are share capital (equity) and different kinds of debt. Some 
of the financial instruments have attributes of both categories including profit-sharing debt instruments and 
participative financial instruments (“hybrid instruments”). Others entitle the investor to exchange them for 
shares or to buy shares on fixed terms (“equity linked instruments”). Which financial solution a company 
prefers depends, inter alia, on how the company is run but also on considerations concerning choice of 
financial instrument (e.g. pricing and tax effects), risk (e.g. favorable equity ratio and bankruptcy risk) and 
the attitude towards inviting new shareholders to the company. In recent years, the concept of economic 
efficiency (corporate governance) has become increasingly important. 
The EMCA Group generally seeks to give companies the greatest possible freedom to choose the best 
suited capital structures. A part of this is to grant companies permission to develop and use the most suitable 
types of financing. These types of capital span a wide range of financial instruments – from the usual share 
capital via intermediate forms like convertible bonds, warrants and profit-sharing debt instruments, to 
different kinds of debt. 
The EMCA Group considered that the EMCA should include provisions on the types of financing that are 
covered by the articles of association’s information on the company capital, which therefore have to be 
decided by the general meeting of the company. The rules should ensure that such information is provided 
to the investors so that the investors can assess their legal position. Further, the rules should protect the 
creditors of the company by ensuring that real capital is paid in. Therefore, there should be the same 
guarantees for example regarding contribution in kind as indicated in Chapter 2 on Formation. 
The rules on different types of financing in Chapter 6 should not be interpreted in a way that excludes other 
types of financing. The competence to use such other types lies with the company’s management. 
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Further, the EMCA Group has considered whether the provisions in Chapter 6 constitute an exhaustive list 
or not. For example, the list is considered as providing only examples in Denmark and France, whereas the 
Swedish Companies Act lists the instruments and Germany lists the hybrids on which the shareholder’s 
meeting has to take a decision. The EMCA Group has decided to adopt a liberal approach which has been 
adopted in Member States such as Italy and is working well. 
The Finnish Companies Act and the German insolvency law have provisions on subordinated loans. Such 
loans may be taken out without consent of the general meeting. Therefore, the EMCA Group does not 
consider that the EMCA should contain special provisions on such loans in this Chapter. 
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PART 1 
GENERAL RULES ON INCREASE OF CAPITAL 
Section 6.01 
Increase of Capital 
(1) A company may increase its share capital by 
(a) issuing new shares against a contribution of cash or payment in kind; 
(b) issuing new share by converting reserves 
(c) converting convertible debentures. 
(2) If the company is not using the par value system, it can issue new shares against contribution of cash 
or payment in kind and by issuing new shares free of charge. In this system, the company can decide 
whether the contribution or payment goes to share capital or to the free reserves. 
Comments 
Re 1) The main purpose of Chapter 6 is to include rules on any situation where the company’s capital 
increases in such a way that the general meeting should decide upon it. However, Section 18 of Chapter 6 
also includes a provision on profit-sharing debt instruments, which also should be decided upon by the 
general meeting. 
Re 1 a) Shares may be issued for cash or for considerations in kind. Section 6 below deals with contribution 
in cash or in kind. An important question in this regard is whether debt can be used as contribution and 
whether debt should be considered as contribution in cash or in kind ? Section 5(3) below provides that 
debt contribution is considered as a cash contribution in the EMCA. 
Section 6.02 
Resolution by the General Meeting 
(1) An increase of share capital shall be decided by a resolution of the general meeting with the exception 
of the provisions in Section 5. The resolution shall be passed by the same majority of votes as it is necessary 
for changing the articles of association. 
(2) The resolution on increase of share capital shall include at least the amount of increase, the method of 
increase of capital, and the number, the type and the nominal value, if any, of shares to be issued as a result 
of increase of capital. The resolution should also include all the information necessary for shareholders and 
investors to take an informed decision. In case of an appraisal right, the time for the exercise of such right 
must not be less than two weeks. 
Comments 
Re 1) Chapter 11, Section 27 of the EMCA establishes that amendments to the articles of association require 
a two third majority. In public companies, Member States such as Belgium, France, Greece, Luxembourg 
and the Nordic countries do the same. However, some Member States make higher demands on qualified 
majority. In France for example, in the case of private companies (SARL), an alteration of the articles of 
association requires a three quarters majority if the company has been formed before 2005. If the company 
is formed after 2005, only a two third majority is required. All Member States have a provision requiring a 
resolution by the general meeting in their Companies Acts. 
Re 2) The resolution must contain the necessary information for shareholders to decide if they should sign 
for the various types of capital increase. The specific requirements for information are found in the 
following sections describing the ways to increase capital. 
For example, the information that might be provided for a resolution to increase capital by a subscription 
for new shares might include: 
• the minimum and maximum amount by which the share capital (or in the case of no- par value system 
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the number of shares) may be increased; 
• when the new shares will confer on the holders a right to receive dividends and other rights in the 
limited liability company; 
• the estimated costs of the capital increase that are to be paid by the company; 
• the share class for the new shares if different classes exist or are contemplated; 
• the pre-emption rights of the shareholders or others and any restrictions on the new shareholders’ pre-
emption rights in the event of future increases; 
• the time allowed for subscription and a time limit that allows shareholders at least two weeks from the 
date they are notified to exercise their pre-emption rights; 
• the last day of payment for the shares and, where the allotment is not left to the central governing body, 
the rules governing allotment in case of oversubscription of any shares not subscribed for by the 
exercise of a pre-emption right; 
• any restrictions on the negotiability of the new shares or any obligation on the new shareholders to 
have their shares redeemed; 
• whether the new shares are negotiable instruments;  
• whether the new shares will be registered shares or bearer shares, and 
• the subscription price of the shares. 
Section 6.03 
Subscription 
The authorization of the management to issue the new shares expires if the total amount of new capital is 
not subscribed within the time limit set by the resolution. 
Section 6.04 
Amendment to the Articles of Association 
(1) According to the rules in this Chapter, the decision of the general meeting concerning capital increase 
should be stated in the company’s articles of association. 
(2) If the general meeting fails to do so, or if the subscription procedure brings a result which is not in 
harmony with the draft modification, the articles of association shall be modified after the subscription of 
new shares. 
Comments 
On the basis of this Section, it follows that decisions on capital should be registered, see Section 17 below. 
Section 6.05 
Authorization to Increase Capital 
(1) The articles of association or the general meeting may authorize the central governing body to increase 
the capital or, in the case of non-par value system, issue new shares. Section 2 applies to the general meeting 
resolution. 
(2) The authorization described in para. 1 may contain conditions and limits, such as the maximum amount 
or the time limit. 
(3) If the capital can be increased in whole or in part by a contribution of assets other than cash, this must 
be stipulated in the articles of association. Also, any resolution made by the general meeting to depart from 
the existing shareholders’ pre-emption rights must be specified. 
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Comments 
Section 3 implements article 29(2) and (4) and article 33(5) of Directive 2012/30, and hence, most Member 
States have a similar provision in their Companies Acts. According to article 29(2) of the Directive, the 
authorization to increase capital can also be given by a resolution of the general meeting. Section 3 deals 
with both private and public companies. 
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PART 2 
INCREASE OF CAPITAL BY ISSUING NEW SHARES 
Section 6.06 
Types of Contributions 
(1) In the case of an increase of capital (or in the non-par value system, an increase in the number of shares) 
by issuing new shares, the general meeting’s resolution shall determine whether the new capital 
contributions are in cash or in kind. 
(2) The rules relating to considerations for shares in Chapter 2, sections 22-24, shall be applied. See also 
Chapter 2, Section 24(3). 
(3) In case of increase of capital, company debt owed to a creditor can be set-off against the creditor’s 
obligation arising from his subscription to the capital. 
(4) If the subscription price is paid with other assets (contribution in kind), the assets shall have a financial 
value to the company at least equal to the price thus paid. 
Comments 
There is a need to decide which type of contribution is used, since the need for protection of shareholders 
and creditors is different. The rules should be similar to the rules in the Chapter 2 on formation in order to 
avoid circumvention of the rules of formation. 
The case covered in subsection 3 concerns the situation where the company owes a debt to a creditor that 
subscribes to the share capital. Here the question arises whether the creditor must bring in their receivable 
as a contribution in kind and whether there has to be a valuation. In such cases of a debt-equity swap, the 
company is freed from an obligation at its nominal value, therefore the evaluation seems unnecessary and 
a set-off is permissible. 
Section 6.07 
Pre-emptive Rights 
(1) In the case of an increase of capital by issuing new shares for monetary contribution, the existing 
shareholders have pre-emptive rights to the newly issued shares. 
(2) The shareholders may exercise their pre-emptive right within a time limit fixed by the general meeting’s 
resolution. Such time limit cannot be shorter than 14 days of the notification of shareholders on the increase 
of capital or the making public of the increase of capital. 
(3) The notification of shareholders or a publicly available announcement on the increase of capital shall 
include the same information as the general meeting’s resolution and all other information that is necessary 
for exercising pre-emptive rights. 
(4) The general meeting can decide to derogate from the shareholders’ pre-emption right. The decision of 
the general meeting must be passed with the same majority as when amending the articles of associations, 
at least two-thirds of the votes cast as well as at least two-thirds of the share capital represented at the 
general meeting. 
(5) (a) If, within 15 days, the existing shareholders have not exercised the pre-emption right, the 
management board shall announce a second, at least two-week term for the exercise of the pre-emption 
right with respect to the remaining shares by all of the existing shareholders. After the end of both terms, 
shares which have not been subscribed according to paragraphs (2) and (5) are made available at the free 
discretion of the Board of Directors of the company at a price not lower than the price paid by the existing 
shareholders. 
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(b) In an issue resolution, it may be determined that excess bonus share rights and subscription rights 
shall be sold through the company. In conjunction with a bonus issue, the sale shall relate to each 
shareholder’s bonus share rights that do not correspond to an entire bonus share. In conjunction with 
new issues of shares, issues of warrants and issues of convertible instruments, the sale shall relate to 
each shareholder’s subscription rights which do not correspond to an entire new share, warrant or 
convertible instrument. The sale shall be carried out by a securities institution. The proceeds from the 
sale of such bonus share rights and subscription rights, less the sales costs, shall be allocated between 
the persons who would have been entitled to receive or subscribe for the new shares, warrants or 
convertible instruments. 
Comments 
Section 8 on pre-emption rights implements article 33 of the 2nd Company Law Directive. Section 8(4) 
implements art 33(4) of the Directive. 
Re 2) According to the Directive, the time limit should be at least 14 days. In the UK, the time limit is 21 
days and in Denmark, Germany, Slovakia, Sweden, the time limit is 14 days. 
Re 4) Section 4 allows for specific derogations from the pre-emption right. Even though there is a two third 
majority in favor of a derogation, the rule requires that the minority rights, including the principle of 
equality, are not violated. In that way, the derogation must either be necessary or an advantage for the 
company as a whole. 
Re 5 (a) and b) If the shareholders do not use their pre-emptive rights, the question arises what should be 
done with the excess bonus share rights and subscription rights. There are two different solutions: according 
to French /Polish/Italian law there is a second term which provides a possibility for the other shareholders 
to sign for the remaining shares (alternative (a)). The alternative solution which does not involve a second 
round is found for example in the Swedish Companies Act, chapter 11 paragraph 9. It allows the company 
to sell the bonus share rights and subscription rights. The proceeds are allocated between the persons who 
would have been entitled to receive or subscribe for the new shares, warrants or convertible instruments. 
This is also the common way to deal with the situation in Denmark, Finland and Germany. Likewise, 
Slovak law does not expect second round of call for exercising the pre-emptive rights. In Greece the matter 
depends on the articles and the resolution of the general meeting. 
Section 6.08 
Bonus Shares 
(1) The limited liability company may issue bonus shares by transferring amounts to the share capital that 
have been recorded in the company’s latest annual report, as adopted, as: 
(a) retained earnings; or 
(b) reserves 
(2) For the issue of bonus shares, the company may also use: 
(a) any profit realized in the current financial year and not distributed, spent or tied up; or 
(b) any distributable reserves accumulated or released in the current financial year ( cf. Chapter 7, 
Section 2). 
(3) Any resolution passed under paragraphs (1) and (2) must specify the amount of the share capital 
increase and the size and number of the shares. Section 6 (1), paragraphs c, f and i to k, apply with such 
changes as are necessary. 
(4) In the case of an increase of capital by converting company reserves into share capital, the company 
should issue new shares to the existing shareholders in proportion of their original participation or modify 
the par value of the shares issued. 
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Comments 
It follows from the principle of equal treatment of shareholders that bonus shares should be given to all 
shareholders. 
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PART 3 
EQUITY LINKED INSTRUMENTS 
Section 6.09 
Convertible Bonds and Warrants 
(1) The company may issue convertible bonds, which grant the holder, in whole or in part, a right to 
exchange their claim for shares in the company. 
(2) The company may issue warrants. Warrants entitle the owner to the right to subscribe for new shares 
in the company in exchange for a payment in cash. 
Comments 
Section 9 contains provisions regarding the types of financial instruments (including those mentioned in 
Section 1) whose issuance must be decided by the general meeting. The issuance of debt instruments does 
not require a decision by the general meeting and the authority for this purpose lies with the management 
of the company, according to the rules on management competence, see Chapter 8. 
Convertible bonds are financial instruments which give the owner a right but not an obligation to convert 
bonds into shares. However, they can also be issued as so-called “mandatory convertibles” which require 
the owner to convert. The rules on convertible bonds and warrants seek to ensure that the owners of the 
convertible bonds and warrants in question receive all the relevant information regarding their rights and 
duties in connection with the issuance. Further, the rules ensure that a number of pivotal questions regarding 
the owner’s legal position in connection with future developments in the company are dealt with in the 
document. Member States such as Denmark, Finland, Greece, and Sweden have provisions in their 
Companies Acts concerning warrants. 
Warrants are instruments which entitle their owners to subscribe for new shares. Of course, warrants can 
also give the right to purchase own shares (EMCA Chapter 7, sections 19 ff.) Hence, the issuance of 
warrants requires a decision by the general meeting. A company can also issue call options, which include 
a right to acquire shares already issued for a pre-specified price (exercise price). Such options are not 
regulated in the EMCA. The decision to issue options does not require a decision taken by general meeting. 
The decision as well as the specific setting of the conditions of the option can be taken by the company’s 
management. 
Section 6.10 
Decision by the General Meeting 
 
When the company issues convertible bonds or any other financial instruments convertible into newly 
issued shares or which entitles the owner of the right to subscribe for new shares in the company, the 
decisions shall be taken by a resolution of the general meeting. The resolution requires the same majority 
as necessary for amending the articles of association. 
Comments 
Issuing convertible bonds as well as warrants gives the owner or the issuer a right to convert or the holder 
a right to sign up for shares of the company, respectively. This implies that the decision should be taken by 
the general meeting because the decision will result in a change of the articles of association. Therefore, 
the decision should be taken with the same majority as other changes to the articles of association. 
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Section 6.11 
Contents of Resolutions on Convertible Instruments, Warrants and Options 
The resolution of a general meeting shall determine the maximum amount of the capital increase that may 
be converted or subscribed on the basis of the instrument, or the number of shares. The resolution must 
provide shareholders with pre-emptive rights on such an instrument, determining the conditions and time 
limit for exercising such right. The pre-emptive rights can be excluded in accordance with Section 7. 
Comments 
In the case of an issuance of convertible bonds, the general meeting shall decide the conditional increase 
of capital in an amount equal to the sum of the face values of the shares to which the owners of convertible 
bonds are entitled. If the company has non-par value shares, the number of shares to which the holders of 
the bonds are entitled to is laid down in the terms of the bonds. 
The resolution of the general meeting must specify whether the convertible bonds and warrants are 
negotiable instruments. 
All the other issues can be decided by the board or by the shareholder meeting. 
Section 6.12 
Authorization to Issue Convertible Bonds or Warrants 
(1) The general meeting may authorize the governing body to decide upon the issuing of instruments in 
the sense of Section 5 and according to Section 14 above (cf. Chapter 5, Section 1). 
(2) The resolution described in paragraph (1) shall contain a time limit for the authorisation and determine 
the maximum amount of instruments to be issued by a resolution of the governing body. 
Section 6.13 
Decision to Convert 
(1) The owner of the convertible bond or the company may request in writing to convert the bond into a 
share within the time limit determined by the resolution on the issuance of the convertible bond. 
(2) If the price at which the convertible bond was issued was lower than the face value or the price of the 
share to be issued in exchange, the difference shall be paid by the bondholder or be covered by the part of 
equity that is distributable for dividend purposes at the time of the notification of the request to convert, 
according to Chapter 2 Section 23 regarding payment in cash. 
Comments 
Section 16(2) ensures that the prohibition on subscription of shares at a discount is also complied with in 
respect of the issuance of convertible bonds. If there is a difference between the amount which has been 
paid up and the nominal value of the equity holding, which is to be converted, any remainder must be paid 
on request. Alternatively, any remainder should be able to be withheld in the amount, which can be used 
as dividend. This can also apply in cases where the market value of the shares lies below their nominal 
value. 
Section 6.14 
Convertible Bonds’ and Warrants’ Pre-emptive Rights. 
If the terms of the convertible instrument or warrants do not provide otherwise, the holders of convertible 
bonds and warrants have pre-emption rights in subscribing for new shares, within the time limit determined 
in the resolution on issuance of such convertible bonds and warrants. Section 8 applies correspondingly. 
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Comments 
As a starting point convertible bonds and warrants have pre-emption rights in connection with later capital 
increases (or in the case of the no-par value system, increases of the number of shares), if the terms of the 
issuance do not provide otherwise. 
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PART 4 
HYBRID INSTRUMENTS 
Section 6.15 
Performance Linked Instruments 
(1) The company may issue debt securities that make the consideration or the repayment of the capital 
dependent on the economic performance of the issuer. 
(2) The decision on issuing debt securities described in paragraph (1) shall be taken by the governing body. 
The governing body must inform the subsequent shareholder meeting about the terms and the reasons for 
the issuance. 
Comments 
Some Member States such as Italy have adopted a liberal approach to the issuance of financial instruments. 
Accordingly, the company can issue debt securities that are linked to the performance of the economic 
performance of the company. This choice gives companies greater financial flexibility. 
Section 6.16 
Participative and Non-participative Instruments 
The company can issue, even as consideration for work or services provided for by shareholders or third 
parties, financial instruments that include economic or administrative rights. These financial instruments 
may incorporate voting rights for specifically determined subjects, such as the appointment of one or more 
directors. The articles of association shall set the procedures and conditions for the issue, the awarded 
rights, the sanctions in case of lack of performance and the restrictions, if any, to the transfer of such 
instruments. 
Comments 
According to article 7 of Directive 2012/30/EU, an undertaking to perform work or supply services cannot 
form part of the assets that form the subscribed capital. Some Member States such as Italy have provisions 
that allow companies to issue participative financial instruments for assets or services that cannot form 
capital. These financial instruments are not equity, but give the right of participation, either in economic 
terms (e.g., the right to the benefit of economic performance) or in administrative terms (e.g., inspection 
rights, voting rights etc) or both. Thus, the holder becomes a party to the company contract. Consequently, 
the issuance of these instruments needs to be foreseen by the articles of association and their introduction 
requires a resolution of the shareholders’ meeting. They are frequently used, for example in debt 
restructuring transactions where bank debt is often swapped with participative financial instruments. 
Together with tracking shares and other types of equity issued by the company, participative and non-
participative financial instruments can offer a wide array of financial solutions to European companies. 
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PART 5 
NOTIFICATION AND REGISTRATION OF CAPITAL INCREASES AND SHARE ISSUES 
Section 6.17 
Application for Registration of a Resolution to Increase the Capital or Issue Shares 
(1) Any resolution by the general meeting or the central governing body to increase the capital or issue 
shares under this part of the EMCA must be registered directly or an application for registration must be 
filed with the Registrar within two weeks after payment for the shares has been made or the time limit for 
making such payment has expired. 
(2) Any resolution by the general meeting or the central governing body to issue convertible debt 
instruments or warrants and to amend the articles of association must be registered or be the subject of an 
application for registration with the Registrar no later than two weeks after the resolution is passed. 
(3) Any registration or application for registration of a capital increase is subject to payment of the share 
capital that is required to be paid up under Section 23 of the EMCA or the articles of association. Where a 
premium has been fixed, this must be paid up in full. 
(4) When registration is complete, the share capital is considered to have been increased by the total 
amount of the capital increase. 
Comments 
The Companies Acts of Member States such as Denmark (Section 173), Germany (AktG Section 181) and 
Poland (Article 256) contain rules on registration of a resolution to increase the capital. 
Section 6.18 
Registration of Exercise for Conversion of Convertible Bonds and Warrants 
(1) As soon as possible after the expiry of the time limit provided for conversion of convertible debt 
instruments or the exercise of warrants, the central governing body must register or apply for registration 
of the amount of convertible debt instruments or the number of warrants that have been converted into 
shares with the Registrar. 
(2) The central governing body may make any amendments to the articles of association that are necessary 
because of the capital increase. 
Section 6.19 
Revocation of a Resolution to Increase the Capital 
(1) Any resolution to increase the capital will lapse if registration is refused. 
(2) A resolution will also lapse if it has not been registered or no application for registration has been filed 
within twelve months after the date of the resolution. 
(3) If a resolution on the capital increase has not been registered, any amounts already paid must be 
refunded as soon as possible without deduction for costs, and any assets other than cash must be promptly 
returned. 
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General Comments47 
1. EU law 
The 2nd Company Law Directive (77/91/EC) as amended by Directive 92/101/EC, 2006/68/EC and 
2009/109/EC and recast by Directive 2012/30/EU contains a number of rules on the protection of the 
company’s capital in connection with formation, as well as rules on the maintenance of the company’s 
capital during its existence. The rules on formation are taken into account in Chapter 2 of the EMCA. This 
Chapter deals with the rules on capital protection which apply during the company’s existence. This 
includes the rules regarding distribution of dividends, repurchase of own shares including financial 
assistance and the reduction of share capital. Regarding redemption of a company’s own shares the 2nd 
Directive is supplemented by the Regulation on exemptions for buy-back programs and stabilization of 
financial instruments (2273/2003). Further, additional rules of relevance are found in the Directive 
2009/109/EC concerning reporting and documentation in connection with mergers and divisions. These 
rules are taken into account in Chapter 13 of the EMCA. 
Shareholder loans other than financial assistance are not regulated by EU Directives. Regulation of 
shareholder loans is left to the individual Member States. The same applies to the so-called cash pool 
arrangements which imply that affiliate companies work together to ensure an equalization of liquidity 
between the companies. 
The 2nd Company Law Directive of 1976 was somewhat liberalized with the amendment directive of 2006. 
Amongst other things, this eased the conditions for the acquisition of own shares. In addition, to a certain 
extent the Directive now allows for financial assistance. 
Directive 2012/30/EU includes only few amendments compared to the existing directives. The recent 2012 
action plan of the EU Commission (COM(2012) 740 final) does not portend any further changes to it.  
Directive 2012/30/EU concerns only public companies. Thus, Member States are free to fully or partially 
refrain from applying the same provisions to private companies. The EMCA Group emphasizes that 
Member States should carefully weigh any advantages derived from the application of the rules in the 
Directive to private companies against the clear disadvantages in applying the very same rules to private 
companies. 
2. National law 
In many respects, the provisions of Directive 2012/30/EU contain a freedom of choice. For example, it is 
not mandatory for the Member States to make use of the liberalized rules from the 2006 amendment (now 
2012/30/EU) such as the rules regarding repurchase of own shares and financial assistance. Similarly, in 
several respects it is possible for the Member States to introduce more restrictive rules than required by 
Directive 2012/30/EU. A number of Member States have not fully made use of the liberalized rules, while, 
on the other hand, there are examples of Member States that have more restrictive rules than required. In 
some Member States, for example, there are no rules prohibiting shareholder loans, whereas in other 
Member States such loans are prohibited, see further below. Likewise, some Member States have fully 
made use of the liberalization possibilities concerning repurchase of own shares, whereas others have 
maintained the existing limitations or even prohibitions. 
Regarding the application of the Directive 2012/30/EU rules to private companies, there are also significant 
differences. For example, the UK Companies Act 2006 only applies the provisions of the Directive to a 
limited degree to private companies whereas Denmark by contrast applies the same rules fully to private 
companies. 
                                                     
47 The working group on Chapter 7 was chaired by Professor Jan Andersson (Jönköping University, Sweden) and included 
Professor Hans de Wulf (University of Gent, Belgium) and Professor Professor Andres Vutt (University of Tartu, Estonia). 
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3. Considerations 
The overall concept of the EMCA is to make rules that are flexible and simple. From that starting point it 
is easy to criticize Directive 2012/30/EU for being overly complex, even after the recent liberalization. In 
recent years there has also been a discussion regarding the system of capital protection which Directive 
2012/30/EU illustrates. 
Alternative capital protection systems are found in other countries including a number of states in the U.S. 
(and in the American Model Business Corporation Act § 6.40; MBCA) and in New Zealand. At European 
level, there have also been proposals for the implementation of an alternative capital system. For example, 
the Rickford Group has proposed that the board should scrutinize whether the company after a value 
transfer has assets that equal the liabilities. If this is not the case, the company may nonetheless undertake 
a value transfer if the company’s board “when making or recommending distributions ... provide a 
certification of solvency on a going concern basis.”48 These proposals have had some impact at Member 
State level. Thus, in 2013 Netherlands changed the rules concerning distribution of profits, repurchase of 
shares and reduction of capital in close (private) companies (besloten vennootschap), and thereby 
introduced a balance sheet test (net equity must be higher than reserves which must be maintained pursuant 
to the law or the articles of association) and a solvency test in the legislation. It should be noted that the 
law reform included an abolishment of the minimum share capital. To summarize, Netherlands has 
introduced a regime for private companies similar to that in § 6.40 of the MBCA and abolished the old 
system.  
The EMCA group has discussed whether the capital protection rules of Directive 2012/30/EU is appropriate 
or whether the EMCA should introduce an alternative capital protection system on the basis that the 
Directive reflects an obsolete legal paradigm. There were basically two views in the EMCA Group. One 
view favored an abolishment of the old capital system in favor of a new system based on § 6.40 of the 
MBCA or similar. Another view favored the old system and recognized that it has some advantages, but 
not is not flawless. Those advantages, however, make up for whatever flaws the old capital system might 
possess. Against this background, and although there are different views within the EMCA Group as to 
which solution is preferable, it is notable that it is unlikely that the EU-capital protection rules will be 
changed fundamentally in the near future. Article 17 of the Directive 2012/30/EU limits the dividend 
payments on the basis of the company’s net assets as set out in the company’s annual accounts. However, 
the Directive does not prevent the Member States from supplementing this model with a solvency based 
system. This opportunity is utilized in Finland. The current trend in Europe resembles the situation in the 
US a few decades ago with a slow move from an old system to a new system. It is the opinion of the EMCA 
Group, and in particular because of Directive 2012/30/EU, that the time has not yet come to radically alter 
the legal framework based on the old capital system. Consequently, this Chapter makes use of the 
liberalized rules of Directive 2012/30/EU. In situations where it is possible to derogate from the Directive, 
the least burdensome solutions have been chosen in most cases. This approach will also allow most of the 
rules in this Chapter to be applied without difficulty to private companies. 
This Chapter contain rules on capital outflow in the form of distributions, dividends, gifts, repurchase of 
own shares, financial assistance in connection with acquisition of shares in the company and capital 
reduction. 
Regarding own shares the EMCA Group has chosen to follow the liberalization of the 2nd Company Law 
Directive in 2006. Furthermore, the Group is of the opinion that also private companies should be able to 
repurchase own shares. Similarly, the Group has chosen to make use of the liberalized rules on financial 
assistance in the 2006 amendment.  
                                                     
48 See J. Rickford (ed.), Reforming capital: Report of the interdisciplinary group on capital maintenance, European Business 
Law Review 15 (2004), pp. 919-1027. 
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There are no rules, as mentioned earlier, on ordinary shareholder loans in Directive 2012/30/EU. Therefore, 
it is up to each Member State to decide whether shareholder loans should be forbidden or restricted. Without 
any restrictions, loans to shareholders, and also loans to directors and members of the management, may 
be open to abuse either by the management at the expense of the interest of the shareholders or by a majority 
shareholder in its capacity as a shareholder or member of the board or management at the expense of the 
interest of the minority shareholders in the company. Therefore, there is a need for provisions which protect 
shareholders and in particular minority shareholders. 
Company’s legislation in the Member States have very different approaches to rules on shareholder loans 
or, for that matter, loans to directors and members of the management. Most Member States allow 
shareholder loans. This is for instance the case in the UK. However, section 197 of the UK Companies Act 
2006 and the sections that follow require approval of members for loans to directors. In some Member 
States, in particular the Nordic countries, loans to directors and shareholders are forbidden on the premise 
that such loans may cause harm to the creditors. Illustrative for this legal approach is Denmark, where 
shareholder loans are forbidden. 
The EMCA Group has considered which model should be preferred in the EMCA. Firstly, the Group has 
concluded that loans to shareholders (and the provision of security for loans which the shareholder obtain 
from someone else), directors and member of management may cause harm to the creditors. However, the 
Group has also concluded that provisions in this context usually are very complex in their nature, will cause 
excessive transaction costs compared to the level of creditor protection which they effectively provide for 
and, in the end, are usually circumvented by individuals who choose to do so. For those reasons the Group 
has not proposed any rules concerning loans (and the provision of security) extending other rules in the 
EMCA providing protection for creditors. Although the Group does not propose additional rules, it should 
be remembered that, under certain conditions, a loan (and the provision of security) to a shareholder may 
constitute a disguised distribution of profit, in which case Section 1 and 2 below applies. In addition, even 
if a loan (and the provision of security) may be legal under the rules in this and the following sections, the 
governing body must still at all times be aware of transactions which infringe their duty of care or their 
duty of loyalty. In particular, the exceptions in Section 2(5) of this Chapter, should be interpreted and 
understood with this in mind. 
Secondly, the EMCA Group has come to the conclusion that loans (and the provision of security) to 
shareholders, directors and member of management should been analyzed in the context of related party 
transactions, i.e. dealings whereby the company contracts with its directors or controlling shareholders, 
may cause prejudice to the company and its minority shareholders, as they give the related party the 
opportunity to appropriate value belonging to the company. As was stated by the European Commission in 
a communication 2012,49 adequate safeguards for the protection of shareholders’ interests are of great 
importance. 
It may be argued that loans (and the provision of security) to shareholders, directors and member of 
management should be regulated in the wider context of related party transactions. In the absence of such 
a general rule, it can be argued that at least loans (and the provision of security) to shareholders, directors 
and member of management should be the object of regulation in the context of protection for minority 
shareholders, because financial transactions of this kind might be seen as the most typical transaction 
whereby management, members of the board or majority shareholders may abuse their position. However, 
again the problem is that such rules usually are very complex in their nature, will cause excessive 
transaction costs compared with the level of shareholder protection they effectively provide and, in the end, 
are usually circumvented by individuals who choose to do so. For that reason the EMCA Group does not 
propose any rule in this regard. 
                                                     
49 Action Plan: European Company Law and Corporate Governance – A Modern Legal Framework for More Engaged Shareholders 
and Sustainable Companies (COM(2012) 740 final). 
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PART 1 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Section 7.01 
Distribution 
(1) The term “distribution” in the EMCA includes any transfer of money or money’s worth without due 
consideration directly or indirectly to a shareholder or third party in the absence of a genuine commercial 
purpose, including, but not limited to, the following: 
(a) ordinary dividends, based on the latest adopted financial statements (see Section 3); 
(b) extraordinary dividends (see Section 5); 
(c) charitable gifts according to Section 6; 
(d) payments in connection with repurchase of shares (see Section 8 to 17); 
(e) payments in connection with capital reductions (see Sections 25 to 32) or redemption of shares (see 
Chapter 5, Section 15); or 
(f) payments in connection with the dissolution of the company (see Chapter 14). 
(2) The company’s assets may only be distributed to its shareholders or third party according to the 
principles and rules in the EMCA and the articles of association. 
Comments 
Re 1) The definition of the term “distribution” in Subsection 1 basically clarifies that a distribution may 
take the form of money or money’s worth, i.e. in the form of tangible or intangible assets. The definition 
also clarifies that a “distribution” not only may be in the form of a distribution directly to a shareholder, 
but also indirectly, for instance to a legal person owned by the shareholder or a natural person such as a 
close relative. This latter principle has been inspired by the law in certain Member States most notably 
Germany and Sweden. Furthermore, it includes situations where for instance a shareholder purchases 
something for their own benefit and the purchase is reimbursed by the company at a later point. 
Article 17 (4) of Directive 2012/30/EU states that the “expression” distribution” used in paragraphs 1 and 
3 includes in particular the payment of dividends and of interest relating to shares. The EMCA Group is of 
the opinion that even if this definition might be satisfying for purpose of the Directive, and in particular 
Article 17 therein, the rules and principles in this and the following chapters require a more elaborate 
definition. It should also be noted that the definition in Article 17 (4) is illustrative rather than elaborate. 
The purpose of the definition in subsection (1) supra is therefore somewhat different than that in the 
Directive in that the intention is to provide both an illustrative and an elaborate definition. 
The EMCA Group has, thus, firstly designed the definition with the intention to provide an illustration of 
the transfers of assets from a company to shareholders which are common practice in most jurisdictions, 
which may easily be recognized by shareholders, members of the governing board, auditors and other 
interested parties, and which explicitly have been regulated in the EMCA. Dividends, extraordinary 
dividends, payments in connection with repurchase of shares, payments in connection with capital 
reductions and payments in connection dissolution of the company are all familiar concepts to shareholders, 
stakeholders and even the public in general. In addition, in some jurisdiction gifts from a company for 
charitable purposes to third party are also regulated and have therefore been included in EMCA. 
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But the definition also has another purpose. The EMCA Group has, secondly, designed the definition in an 
elaborate manner, where the intention is to clarify that the rules concerning capital outflow should be 
applied to any disguised distribution to shareholders, for instance the sale of an asset below market value 
to shareholder or the purchase of an asset from a shareholder above the market value. For practical 
purposes, only the rules on dividends, and no other rules concerning capital outflow, should be applied 
mutatis mutandis on disguised distributions since the amount available for dividends may be distributed in 
any case to the shareholders. From the definition, it follows that a disguised distribution is not present if 
either a) the consideration from the shareholder equals the market value of the assets transferred by the 
company or b) if there are other commercial benefits in either short or long term for the company despite 
a discrepancy between the market value of the asset transferred by the company and the market value of 
the asset received by the company. 
The EMCA Group has considered a number of different legal approaches to disguised distributions in 
various jurisdictions, and more specifically when various transactions between a company and its 
shareholders should be considered as such. A common problem in most jurisdictions is the fact that there 
is no clear definition in statute as to what constitutes a disguised distribution. In many cases the judiciary 
therefore is left with a situation where it is open to debate amongst academics and practitioners as to how 
a disguised distribution should be defined. This of course leads to legal uncertainty with an additional 
transaction cost ex ante, and in some cases even increased transaction costs ex post, a particular transaction. 
Against this background the EMCA Group came to the conclusion that a legal definition of the term 
“distribution to shareholders” should be elaborate enough to include disguised distributions, and, in 
addition, should be precise enough to filter out such transactions which are commercially sound and those 
which are not. Firstly, the definition is based on the view that a transaction, which is concluded at market 
value, never can be regarded as a disguised distribution because a distribution implies a transfer of value 
from the company. Secondly, even if a transfer of value from the company is present in a particular 
transaction, for instance sale of company assets below market value to a shareholder, there might be sound 
commercial reasons for the company to do so. The company might for instance purchase another asset from 
the shareholder at a lower price, expect a future, successful business relation with the shareholder in his or 
her capacity as a supplier or customer or the transaction might be necessary to immediately enhance the 
liquidity of the company in order to avoid a potential bankruptcy. 
However, the EMCA Group wants to stress that even if a particular transaction does not constitute a 
disguised distribution because condition a) or b) in the definition are not met and, thus, the rules concerning 
capital outflow do not apply to it, this does not mean that transaction for other reasons might not be invalid. 
A transaction, for example, might be unfairly prejudicial to minority shareholders because of the 
circumstances in the particular case viewed together with the terms of the transaction. In other words the 
transaction might be unreasonably beneficial to a majority shareholder such as a holding company at the 
same time as it is disadvantageous to the minority shareholders (cf. Chapter 8, Section 25). 
Re 2) Section 1(2) states that the company’s assets may only be distributed to its shareholders according to 
the principles and rules in the EMCA and the articles of association. Basically, this means that any 
distribution of the company´s assets to its shareholders presupposes that the distribution is in accordance 
with the principles and explicit rules in the EMCA and the articles of association. Other ways of retrieving 
capital is not permitted. 
A particular problem which the EMCA Group has addressed is the legality of disguised distributions as 
such regardless of the rules concerning capital outflow. One legislative approach is to make such 
distributions illegal even if the company has distributable reserves available for it, i.e. any distributions not 
following the formal and material rules in the EMCA concerning the particular distribution - here 
“dividend” – would make it illegal (cf. § 57 in the German AktG). Another legal approach is to make 
disguised distributions legal as long as all shareholders agree to them and assuming the rules in the EMCA 
concerning creditor protection are respected (cf. § 30 in the German GmbHG). However, even with this 
latter, more liberal approach, a disguised distribution may be illegal if not all shareholders agree to it on 
the basis that the disguised distribution is contrary to the principle of equality between shareholders or that 
it entails a transaction which the particular organ or person could not legally enter into on behalf of the 
company (because it requires either consent from all the shareholders or a decision by the shareholders 
meeting). 
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The EMCA Group is of the opinion that the better solution for practical reasons is the latter one. For public 
companies with one or few shareholders, but also private companies in general where the number of 
shareholders is typically limited, there is no practical reason to uphold a strict legal regime which would 
render every type of disguised distribution illegal even if the shareholders has agreed to it. Such a regime 
does not serve any meaningful purpose and would, furthermore, just be an incentive for unnecessary 
litigation and, in the end, higher transaction costs without any substantial benefit in terms of protection for 
creditors and, for that matter, shareholders. 
As stated above, any distribution of assets from the company to its shareholders presupposes that the 
distribution is in accordance with the principles and explicit rules in the EMCA and the articles of 
association. However, since the EMCA Group is of the opinion that disguised distributions should be 
considered legal as long as all shareholders agree to them and assuming the rules in the EMCA concerning 
creditor protection are respected, this may be considered as an “exception”. But the Group wants to stress 
that this is not an “exception” in the strict sense of the word since the principles of the EMCA recognizes 
the merits of an consent by all shareholders to a particular legal act. In other words, the EMCA recognizes 
that if all shareholders agree to a disguised distribution such distribution is valid conditional that the rules 
concerning creditor protection in the Act are respected. See Section 2, Subsection 5. 
The EMCA Group has also considered the rule in article 17(5) of Directive 2012/30/EU which allow 
interim dividends under certain conditions. The view of the Group is that there presently is a limited 
practical need for a rule on interim dividends, and for that reason no rule concerning interim dividends has 
been included in the EMCA. However, this view might be subject to review at a later stage if, and when, a 
practical demand can be identified. 
Section 7.02 
Distribution and Creditor Protection 
(1) Any type of distribution to shareholders or a third party according to Section 1, Subsection 1, must be 
legal according to Subsection (2)-(4) in this Section, unless the legality of the particular type of distribution 
is regulated differently in this Act. 
(2) Distribution may only be made out of distributable reserves, which are amounts stated as retained 
earnings in the company´s annual report for the last financial period approved by the general shareholder’s 
meeting, and reserves that are distributable by law or the company’s articles of association, less retained 
losses. 
(3) Distribution may not be made if the company after the distribution would not be able to pay its debts 
as they become due in the usual course of business. 
(4) The company’s central governing body is responsible for ensuring that distributions do not exceed a 
reasonable amount having regard to the company’s financial position and, for parent companies, the 
group’s financial position, and that no distribution is made to the detriment of the company or its creditors 
according to the duties of the governing body laid down in Chapter 9 Section 2. 
(5) Even if all shareholders agree to a distribution to one or all of them or third party in contravention of 
subsection (1)-(4), such agreement is invalid. 
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Comments 
Re 1) From the title of Section 2, it follows that the protection of a company´s creditors is a purpose which 
requires mandatory norms in the EMCA in the context of distributions to shareholders. In particular the 
wording of Section 1, Subsection 1, clarifies those mandatory norms through the reference to subsection 
(2)-(4). Subsection (2)-(4) may be described as general rules expressing general principles of company law 
as those principles are understood in the EMCA. As follows, most types of distributions to shareholders 
must be legal under Subsection (2) to (4) such as ordinary or extraordinary dividends as well as disguised 
distributions even if all shareholders agree to it. However, some distributions to shareholders are 
specifically regulated differently in the Act because of their character and nature. This is for instance the 
case with a reduction of share capital. Subsection (1) clarifies this by stating that Subsections (2)-(4) apply 
to most types of distribution to shareholders, but not if the particular type of distribution is regulated 
differently, and then expressly so, in the Act. 
Admittedly, § 6.40 of the US MBCA is a superior legislative model to that in Section 2, subsection 1, of 
the EMCA in technical terms in that all types of distribution to shareholders must meet the same, simple 
standard test without any exceptions. And this is true regardless of which opinion one holds on the merits 
of the solution chosen in § 6.40 MBCA from a material point of view, i.e. basically a test based on 
insolvency in the bankruptcy and equity sense. The EMCA Group has not chosen the material rule in § 
6.40 of the MBCA for reasons stated earlier and because of this, there is no other alternative than to regulate 
distribution to shareholders in the simplest way available, which is a general rule with exceptions to it. 
Re 2) In Article 17 (1) of Directive 2012/30/EU, it is stated that except for cases of reductions of subscribed 
capital, no distribution to shareholders may be made when on the closing date of the last financial year the 
net assets as set out in the company’s annual accounts are, or following such a distribution would become, 
lower than the amount of the subscribed capital plus those reserves which may not be distributed under the 
law or the statutes. This rule is further strengthened by the rule in Article 17 (3), according to which the 
amount of a distribution to shareholders may not exceed the amount of the profits at the end of the last 
financial year plus any profits brought forward and sums drawn from reserves available for this purpose, 
less any losses brought forward and sums placed to reserve in accordance with the law or the statutes. The 
end result is a codification of the capital maintenance doctrine with the specification that only retained, 
earned profits may be used for distribution to shareholders, but with the exception that also capital reserves 
available for the same purpose may be used. 
The EMCA Group has in Section 2.1 rewritten Article 17 (1) and 17 (3) with the intention to make it more 
comprehensible, but without any change as to its content. Since it is a rule common to all Member States 
and follows a long legal tradition, it should not cause any practical problems. In any case the rule in Section 
2.1 must be read and understood against Article 17 (1) and 17 (3) of the Directive. 
It should be noted that the reference to the fact that any distribution must be made on the basis of the annual 
accounts for the last financial period approved by the ordinary general meeting, against the background of 
Section 2, Subsection (2) and Article 17 (1) and 17 (3) of the Directive, is mandatory for the protection of 
the creditors of the company. 
Section 2 does not contain any rules on “legal reserves”. The EMCA Group has considered whether the 
companies should be obliged to place certain amounts at a legal reserve. According to the German AktG 
Section 233, dividends may not be paid for as long as the legal reserve and the capital reserve in aggregate 
do not amount to 10 per cent of the share capital. Also other Member States have provisions on legal 
reserves. This is for example the case in France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Portugal as 
well as previously so in Denmark and Sweden. A stronger argument for a legal reserve might arise in 
private companies where the minimum capital is only 1 Euro, see above under consideration. However, the 
Group considers that the provision in Section 2(2), which includes a solvency test, is sufficient to protect 
the creditors and does so in a more efficient manner. The porposal of Directive of 2014 on single-member 
private limited liability companies and creating a Societas Unius Personae (SUP) also adopts this approach. 
In addition, the EMCA Section 2(4) stresses that the company’s central governing body is responsible for 
ensuring that distributions do not exceed a reasonable amount having regard to the company’s financial 
position. Thus, the EMCA does not contain any rules on legal reserves. 
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Re 3) The merits of the capital maintenance doctrine have been questioned by many scholars. A more 
modern approach, and indeed already in existence in many U.S. states and other jurisdictions including 
some EU Member States, is to replace the doctrine altogether with a solvency test similar to the one in § 
6.40 of the Model Business Corporation Act. The EMCA Group did indeed consider this as an alternative, 
more realistic form of restricting distribution to shareholders other than the capital maintenance doctrine. 
For reasons already stated, and in particular Article 17 Directive 2012/30/EU, the Group instead chose to 
keep the well-established solution already in existence and favored by the EU.  
However, the merits of a solvency test cannot be denied. In addition, a solvency test fulfil the purpose of 
being a necessary barrier to a distribution of a company´s assets to its shareholders (or a third party) at a 
time when the company cannot either meet its liabilities as they become due or will not be able to do so in 
the foreseeable future. For that reason, and the fact that the capital maintenance doctrine cannot hinder such 
distributions, the EMCA Group is of the opinion that an additional rule based on a solvency test is necessary 
as an additional protection for creditors. Indeed, some Member States have already included such rule in 
their legislation. 
Section 2 (3) stipulates that a distribution may not be made if the company after the distribution would not 
be able to pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of business. Any distribution of ordinary 
dividends – whether a dividend in cash or other assets of the company - must meet ex ante the criteria of 
solvency of the company ex post the very same distribution. The measurement should not only be if the 
company is unable to continue paying its due debts immediately after the distribution, but also if the 
company in the foreseeable future after the distribution – in most cases a few months and seldom longer 
than half a year – is unable to continue paying its due debts. It should be noted that the wording of the 
Section does not mean that there is a requirement of logical causality between the distribution and the fact 
that the company is unable to continue paying its debts after it. Instead, it is a measurement of the economics 
consequences of that distribution, and the critical question is if a distribution is more likely to lead to a 
situation immediately after, or in in the foreseeable future after, the distribution where it is more likely that 
the company will be unable to continue paying its due debts than not. The relevant time to measure whether 
the distribution meets the solvency test or not is immediately before the distribution is to be decided by the 
shareholders meeting or, as the case might be, the general governing body of the company, or at least as 
close in time as practically possible to the decision. 
It should be emphasized that the solvency test does not prevent a distribution in other assets than cash, even 
if the asset in question is of such a nature that it can be converted easily into cash, conditional that such a 
distribution does not directly or indirectly lead to situation immediately after or in in the foreseeable future 
after the distribution where it is more likely that the company will be unable to continue paying its due 
debts than not. 
In most cases a company´s board of directors, management board as well as the managing director will 
have financial information such as recent cash flow analysis available to themselves or prepared by others 
to measure ex ante whether the company as a going concern in the normal course of business will be able 
to pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of business immediately ex post a particular 
distribution and, in addition, in the foreseeable future after the distribution. In the absence of such 
information it is, however, necessary for the company´s board of directors, management board and 
managing director to obtain such information and instruct officers of the company or – as the case may be 
in a SME – a third party to prepare such information necessary to validate if the solvency criteria will be 
met immediately and in the foreseeable future after the distribution. 
When the circumstances indicate that the company is encountering difficulties or is in an uncertain position 
concerning its business, for instance in the aftermath of a financial crisis in the economy, the liquidity of 
the company either should be preserved for such reasons for operational use in the business for the 
forthcoming months or at least should not be used for any distribution to shareholders or a third party until 
the company´s future as a going concern including its business operations becomes more clear to the 
company´s board of directors, management board and managing director. 
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In determining whether the solvency requirement is met immediately and in the foreseeable future after the 
distribution, the company´s board of directors, management board and managing director may as a rule of 
thumb rely on certain assumptions as to the future course of the company´s business, absent direct or 
indirect indications to the contrary. As a rule of thumb, and absent direct or indirect indications to the 
contrary, the company´s board of directors, management board and managing director may assume (a) that 
based on existing and genuinely in good faith anticipated future demand for the company´s products and 
services, it will be able to generate funds over a longer period of time – up to the forthcoming 12 months 
and regardless of the distribution - sufficient to satisfy its existing and reasonably anticipated obligations 
as they mature with a marginal surplus and (b) that indebtedness which mature in the near-term – up to the 
forthcoming 12 months and regardless of the distribution - will be refinanced where, on the basis of the 
company´s financial condition and future prospects and the general availability of credit to businesses 
similarly situated, it is reasonable for them to assume in good faith that such refinancing may be 
accomplished. However, if direct or indirect indications to the contrary exist as to (a) or (b), the company´s 
board of directors, management board and managing director is under an obligation to ascertain on financial 
information available and obtainable, if a distribution is more likely to lead to situation immediately after, 
or in in the foreseeable future after, the distribution - typically a few months and rarely longer than half a 
year - where it is more likely that the company will be unable to continue paying its due debts than not. 
If a company may be subject to asserted or unasserted contingent liabilities, the assessment ex ante the 
distribution should include an evaluation as to the likelihood, amount, and time of any recovery against the 
company, after giving due consideration to the extent to which the company is insured or otherwise 
protected against loss. 
In any event, the ex-ante judgement of the hypothetical distribution must be based on financial information 
available and obtainable for that purpose, and members of the company´s board of directors or management 
board as well as its managing director must never be held responsible as a matter of hindsight for unseen 
developments, if they have acted in good faith on such financial information available and obtainable. 
Re 4) A decision by the general meeting is required for the distribution of the company’s capital. However, 
subsection 3 contains a specific and additional protection as it is specified that the central governing body 
of the company has a responsibility to ensure that the distribution of capital is sound and does not harm the 
company or its creditors. This follows from the general rule of duty of care in Chapter 9, Section 2. The 
central governing body is in addition, also of course, responsible for insuring that reserves as specified by 
statute or the company’s articles of association are covered. Such reserves include the minimum capital of 
the company, see Chapter 2, Section 20. This is also in accordance with article 38 of Directive 2012/30/EU. 
Furthermore, Section 3, subsection (1), of the EMCA determines that a decision to distribute dividends 
must be approved by the company’s central governing body. See also Section 5, subsection (2). 
Re 5) Subsection (5) clarifies what has been expressed earlier, namely that all shareholders consent to a 
particular distribution is not valid unless the distribution in question is legal according to the general rules 
concerning creditor protection in subsection (2)-(4) or, as the case might be, the special rules which apply 
to the particular distribution to shareholders. 
If a charitable gift or otherwise a distribution of the company´s assets take place to a third party, the 
distribution must be legal according to the very same general rules concerning creditor protection in Section 
2, subsection (2)-(4) or, as the case might be, the special rules which apply to the particular distribution. 
The motive for this restriction is that from a creditor’s point of view and, hence, instrumental to the intended 
creditor protection in the EMCA, it does not matter who receives the company´s assets as a distribution. 
What matters is if a distribution from the company takes place. As indicated earlier, a distribution to a third 
party might occasionally be in substance an indirect distribution to a shareholder, for instance if the 
distribution is made to a legal person owned by the shareholder or a natural person such as a close relative.
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PART 2 
ORDINARY AND EXTRAORDINARY DIVIDENDS 
Section 7.03 
Distribution of Ordinary Dividends 
(1) The general meeting must decide how to distribute, by dividend, the amount available for distribution 
according to the approved annual report for the last financial period. The general meeting cannot decide to 
distribute dividends of a higher amount than that proposed or accepted by the company’s central governing 
body. 
In case of a distribution according to Subsection 2, the company´s central governing body can only refuse 
a demand to this effect, if either the distribution would be illegal according to Section 2 or, in the opinion 
of the company´s central governing body, a distribution of more than one half of the profits would be 
adverse to the company´s financial position. 
(2) At least one half of the profits of the last financial period, less the amounts not to be distributed under 
the articles of association, shall be distributed as dividend to all shareholders, if a demand to this effect is 
made at the ordinary general meeting by shareholders representing at least one tenth (1/10) of all shares 
before the decision on the use of the profit for the last financial period has been made. However, 
shareholders representing at least one tenth (1/10) of all shares cannot demand the distribution of profits in 
excess of ten per cent (10 %) of the aggregate of restricted and non-restricted reserves including the share 
capital of the company and the profit for the last financial period (equity), and may in any case never exceed 
what is available for distribution according to Section 2. Past distributions of profits of retained earnings 
less any losses during the financial period and before the ordinary general meeting shall be subtracted from 
the amount so calculated. 
(3) Provisions on minority dividend different from those in subsection (2) may be included in the articles 
of association, if such provisions are more beneficial for the minority. 
Comments 
Re 1) Shareholders have an intrinsic right to share the company’s profits. Usually the company takes the 
decision on the distribution of profits at the ordinary meeting. The decision to distribute profits is in most 
Member States taken by the general meeting. The decision requires a simple majority according to the 
EMCA Chapter 11, Section 12. 
Section 3, paragraph 1 also requires that the decision regarding the dividend must be either proposed or 
approved by the general governing body of the company. A similar rule is found in Member States 
including Denmark, Finland and Sweden. The rationale behind the rule is that the general governing body 
of the company rather than the shareholders meeting, who decides in France for instance, have the 
knowledge and understanding of the company’s financial position and future prospects as well as the task 
of ensuring the legality of distribution according to Section 2. Therefore, the general governing body should 
also have the right to propose or, if the shareholders meeting decides to distribute a higher amount to the 
shareholders than proposed by the general governing body of the company, accept or reject this higher 
amount. 
Re 2) In most Member States, the minority has no right to receive dividends even though the company’s 
economic situation allows for this. Thus, there exists a problem of so-called dividend starvation. In some 
countries this minority problem may be solved through general principles of minority protection. This is 
for example the case in Denmark according to the so-called general clause on minority protection. 
However, in other countries such as Finland and Sweden, there is a special provision in the Companies 
Acts, Chapter 18, Sections 11-12 and Chapter 13, Section 7 respectively, according to which, a minority of 
at least 1/10 may demand that a certain amount of a company’s net profits are paid out as dividend. A 
somewhat reversed rule is found in Portugal, where the general meeting may decide not to distribute more 
than one half of the annual profits only by a resolution approved by super majority of 75 % of voting 
capital; see Article 294 of the Portuguese Companies Act. 
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The EMCA Group is of the opinion that minority shareholders should be protected in a more specific 
manner as regards their right to receive dividends from the company rather the protection afforded by the 
general principles of minority protection. Legal standards or general clauses fulfil an important purpose in 
company legislation, in particular as regards minority protection. However, even well drafted standards or 
general clauses cannot conceal the fact that they require a substantial amount of judicial review to become 
effective as a devise to protect minority shareholders. Besides, such standards or general clauses might be 
effective as a legal instrument for judicial review of individual transactions or arrangements in that it 
provides the judiciary with an instrument to reverse them, but are far less effective as an instrument to give 
minority shareholders a specific right to for instance dividend. For those reasons the EMCA Group has 
concluded that the EMCA should include a detailed rule which provides the minority with a specific right 
to dividend from the company. 
The rule on minority dividend in Subsection 2 has been inspired by similar rules in the aforementioned 
countries. 
Re 3) According to Subsection 2 at least one half of the profits of the last financial period, less the amounts 
not to be distributed under the articles of association, must be distributed as dividend to all shareholders, if 
a demand to this effect is made at the ordinary general meeting by shareholders representing at least one 
tenth of all shares before the decision on the use of the profit for the last financial period has been made. 
The right to demand a distribution of dividend according to this subsection (minority dividend) belongs to 
all shareholders irrespective of voting rights (whether they have shares with no voting rights at all or shares 
with less voting rights than other shares), irrespective of the nominal value or par-value of the shares and 
irrespective of the existence of preferential rights or not to profits. However, shares which have no dividend 
right at the particular general shareholders meeting which the demand could be made may not be invoked 
by minority shareholders to receive a dividend contrary to this absence of dividend right. The phrase 
shareholders representing at least one tenth of all shares refers to the number of shares and not their voting 
rights. 
One or several minority shareholders cannot demand the distribution of profits in excess of ten per cent of 
the aggregate of restricted and non-restricted reserves including the share capital of the company and the 
profit for the last financial period (equity), and may in any case never exceed what is available for 
distribution according to Section 2. Section 2 is essential for the protection of the company’s creditors and, 
hence, can under no circumstances be dispensed with by the shareholders; even if all shareholders agree to 
a distribution contrary to it. 
The amount which shareholders representing at least one tenth of all shares may demand to be distributed 
at the general shareholders meeting is the profit for the last financial period, i.e. usually the last calendar 
year. The minority may demand that at least half of the profits for that financial period be distributed. The 
majority can at the general shareholders meeting either accept the demand or refuse it. In the former case, 
the general shareholders meeting may decide to distribute at least half of the profits for the last financial 
period or a higher amount. In the latter case, were the general shareholders meeting refuses the demand, 
the minority shareholders may institute legal proceedings against the company on the ground that the 
resolution whereby the majority refused the demand was contrary to the EMCA; see Chapter 11, Section 
28. A court may in such case reverse the decision. 
There are three legal restrictions which apply to a demand by minority shareholders at the general 
shareholders meeting. Firstly, the aforementioned creditor rules in Section 2 are mandatory. Secondly, 
shareholders representing at least one tenth of all shares cannot demand the distribution of profits in excess 
of ten per cent of the aggregate of restricted and non-restricted reserves including the share capital of the 
company and the profit for the last financial period (equity). Admittedly, this restriction is arbitrary in its 
nature, but similar rules are found in the Nordic legislation and, more importantly, there has to be some 
reasonable relationship between, on the one hand, the amount which minority shareholders may demand to 
be distributed out of the profits for the last financial period and, on the other hand, the aggregate of the 
equity in the company, i.e. restricted and non-restricted reserves including the share capital of the company 
and the profit for the last financial period. Ultimately, the financial stability of the company should be 
viewed as more important than a minority shareholders request for distribution of profits, and to that end 
the aggregate of the restricted and non-restricted reserves including the share capital of the company and 
the profit for the last financial period after a distribution matters. 
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The third legal restriction is found in subsection (1) according to which the company´s central governing 
body can only refuse a demand by minority shareholders, if in the opinion of the company´s central 
governing body a distribution of more than one half of the profits would be adverse to the company´s 
financial position. As follows, the company´s central governing body can never refuse a minority dividend 
of exactly half of the profits for the last financial period unless the aforementioned two legal restrictions 
apply. But the company´s central governing body may refuse a minority dividend of more than half of the 
profits for the last financial period, if the distribution demanded by the minority would be adverse to the 
company´s financial position. 
In calculating the amount available for distribution as dividend, past distributions of profits of retained 
earnings less any losses during the financial period and before the ordinary general meeting must be 
subtracted. 
Re 4) As a device to protect minority shareholders from “dividend starvation”, subsection 2 is a mandatory 
rule which the shareholders may not deviate from in the articles of association unless all shareholders decide 
otherwise in a particular situation were the consent is only valid for that situation. On the other hand, and 
as the case might be, shareholders might have good reason for inserting rules in the articles of association 
which provide for a more beneficial right to a dividend. The EMCA Group is of the opinion that such rules 
in the articles of association may have a practical use. Subsection 3 makes it clear that the shareholders 
may insert more beneficial rules in the articles of association. In determining whether a rule is more 
beneficial to minority shareholders and therefore valid, or less beneficial and therefore invalid as contrary 
to subsection (2), an assessment has to be made on basis of its material structure and content as well as its 
economic consequences with the minority perspective as a reference point. Again, the EMCA Group 
emphasizes that, with or without any rules of this nature in the articles of association, any distribution of 
profits may never exceed what is available according to the creditor rules in Section 2. 
Section 7.04 
Distribution in Kind 
(1) Distribution to shareholders may be made by the company in assets other than cash, if the asset in 
question is of such nature that it easily can be converted into cash. 
(2) If non-cash assets are distributed as dividends, a valuation report must be prepared (see Chapter 2, 
Section 11). The report must state that the amount of the dividend available for distribution corresponds to 
at least the value of the non-cash assets distributed. The company must publish the declaration in the 
Registrar’s IT system no later than two weeks after the date of the resolution on the distribution (see Chapter 
3, Section 5). 
(3) Subsection (1) applies unless the articles of association provide otherwise or all the shareholders in the 
particular case agree to a distribution of assets of any nature other than cash. 
Comments 
Re 1) The payment of dividend typically occurs by payment of cash, but can also occur by payment of 
other assets. Historically, it was sometimes the case, even for short periods as it was unpopular (See. the 
Dutch “Verenigde Oostinidsche Compagnie” or VOC established in 1602). For minority shareholders, a 
dividend in assets other than cash can pose a problem. For instance it is possible that majority shareholder 
may decide that the company will distribute property which for the majority shareholder is of substantial 
use in his or her business, but for minority shareholders is of no value or almost no value at all. In addition, 
even if assets so distributed proportional to majority and minority shareholders alike may formally be 
compatible with the principle of equality between shareholders, a majority shareholder may be in the 
position to convert the distributed non-cash assets easily into cash while this opportunity may not at all, or 
only with difficulty and additional transaction cost attached, be available to the minority shareholder. 
Therefore, the principle of equality between shareholders would not as a matter of fact be respected in those 
and similar situations. To avoid this, and other practical problems related to distributions in kind, 
distribution may be made in assets other than cash only if the asset in question is of such nature that it easily 
can be converted into cash, which for instance is the case with shares or commodities which are traded in 
a regulated market. 
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Re 2) Distributions in kind may also pose a problem in relation to creditors of the company. In particular, 
there is a need to protect the company's creditors if the valuation of the assets to be distributed is incorrect. 
A similar problem may occur if the minority shareholders agree to a distribution in kind to the majority 
shareholder while the minority shareholders are satisfied with a cash distribution, but then on the basis of 
a valuation which is incorrect. To ensure a proper valuation, Section 3 contains a requirement for a 
valuation report in the same way as for contributions in kind in connection with the formation of companies. 
The EU rules do not require a valuation report in connection with the distribution of values, and rules in 
this regard do not seem to occur in other Member States. For the purpose of protecting creditors and 
minority shareholders alike, a valuation must be made in accordance with Subsection (2). 
A practical problem not uncommon in some Member States, and which the EMCA Group has considered, 
is the legality test of distributions in kind according to Section 2, Subsection (2). If the market value of an 
asset being the object of a distribution in kind is higher than the book value of the very same asset, one 
problem is if the market value or the book value of it should be compared and reduce the distributable 
reserves in the balance sheet. For practical reasons, and also against the legislative background that the 
creditor protection within the Directive 2012/30/EU is based on the balance sheet and the book value of 
assets therein, the EMCA Group is of the opinion that it is the book value which should be used for the 
legality test under Section 2, Subsection (2) (cf. § 30 in the German GmbHG). 
But it must be stressed that the value of the distribution as such according to Section 1, Subsection 1, is the 
market value of the asset – never anything else. This means that even if the book value of an asset used for 
distribution to shareholders is used according to Section 2, Subsection 2, when the legality of the 
distribution is established ex ante according to the same Subsection, the value of the distribution for other 
purposes in the EMCA is the market value of the asset, for instance in relation to the principle of equality 
between shareholders. Thus, if for example one shareholder A receives a distribution in kind in return for 
dividend in cash to another shareholder B and with the consent of that other shareholder B, the principle of 
equality between shareholders requires that the dividend in cash to shareholder B must equal the market 
value, and not a lower book value, of the distribution in kind to shareholder A, unless shareholder A and B 
agrees to an unequal distribution applying the principle that all or some shareholders may consent to an act 
contrary to their interest. However, even if dividend in cash to shareholder B must equal the market value, 
and not a lower book value, of the distribution in kind to shareholder A according to the principle of equality 
between shareholders, the legality of the distribution under Section 2, Subsection (2), is to be tested against 
the book value of the aforementioned distribution in kind together with the value of the cash dividend. 
Re 3) The EMCA Group is of the opinion that the shareholders may regulate distributions in kind in the 
articles of association. Even if this is not the case, the shareholders may, if all agree, make a distribution in 
kind of any kind of asset. But even in this latter case, a valuation report must be made as stated in Subsection 
(2). 
Section 7.05 
Distribution of Extraordinary Dividend 
(1) An extraordinary general meeting may at any time decide to distribute dividends, but only after the 
company has approved at an ordinary general meeting an annual report for the last financial period 
(“extraordinary dividends”). However, an extraordinary general meeting may not decide to distribute 
dividends later than before the next ordinary general meeting at which the annual report for the next 
financial period is to be approved. 
(2) The general meeting cannot decide to distribute extraordinary dividends of a higher amount than that 
proposed or accepted by the company’s central governing body. 
(3) The general meeting may authorize the central governing body to resolve to distribute extraordinary 
dividends. The authority may be subject to financial restrictions and time constraints. 
(4) Extraordinary dividends under Subsection (1) and (2) may only be made up of the amounts referred to 
in Section 2, Subsection (2) less past distributions of profits of retained earnings less any losses during the 
financial period after the ordinary general shareholders meeting at which the last annual accounts were 
approved. Extraordinary dividends may not be made contrary to Section 2, Subsection (3)-(4). 
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(5) Section 4 applies mutatis mutandis to extraordinary dividends. 
Comments 
Re 1) To a varying degree companies may have a need to pay out dividends more than once during the 
year. Section 5 allows for the distribution of dividends at an extraordinary general meeting. Extraordinary 
general meetings convened in order to pay dividends may be convened in accordance with the rules in the 
EMCA Chapter 11. The legislations of the Member States contain various models which are designed to 
allow the companies to disburse funds during the year. Some Member States, such as the Danish Companies 
Act (s. 182), the Swedish Companies Act (17:4) and the Dutch Companies Act (Section 2:105/216) allow 
definitive extraordinary dividends and France, Greece, Italy, Lithuania and the UK allow for interim 
dividends. Many other Member States such as Finland have no provisions on interim dividends or 
extraordinary dividends.  
The EMCA Group has understood that companies need to pay out dividends more than once during the 
year as primarily a need to distribute available profit from the last financial year as ascertained in the annual 
accounts approved by the last general shareholders meeting. Section 5 makes it possible for a company to 
do so. Extraordinary dividends may be paid out once or several times after the general shareholders 
meeting. 
However, an extraordinary general meeting may not decide to distribute dividends later than before the 
next ordinary general meeting at which the annual report for the next financial period is to be approved. In 
practice this means that a company may at any time between the ordinary general meeting where the annual 
report for the last financial period was approved and the next ordinary general meeting at which the annual 
report for the next financial period is to be approved decide to distribute extraordinary dividends one or 
several times. The same applies if all the shareholders in the particular case agree to an extraordinary 
dividend during the same period. 
The time restraint that extra ordinary dividends can only be made from the moment the company has 
approved at an ordinary general meeting an annual report for the last financial period until the moment 
before the company at the next ordinary general meeting at which the annual report for the next financial 
period is to be approved is a restriction which not can be dispersed with even if all shareholders agree to 
do so. The reference to the fact that any distribution must be made on the basis of the annual accounts for 
the last financial period approved by the ordinary general meeting is, against the background of Section 2, 
Subsection (2) and Article 17 (1) and 17 (3) of Directive 2012/30/EU and as previously stated, mandatory 
for the protection of the creditors of the company. 
Re 2) The EMCA Group has, as previously mentioned, considered the rule in Article 17 (5) of Directive 
2012/30/EU, according to which interim dividends under certain conditions are allowed. The view of the 
Group, however, is that there presently is a limited practical need for such a rule on interim dividends, and 
for that reason no rule concerning interim dividends has been included in the EMCA. 
Re 3) Payment of extraordinary dividends requires the consent of the central governing body. It is also 
possible for the shareholders meeting to authorize the central governing body to decide if, and when, 
extraordinary dividends may be paid by the company to its shareholders. An authorization to the central 
governing body may be subject to financial restrictions and time constraints of any sort the ordinary or 
extraordinary shareholders meeting consider necessary. 
Regardless if the shareholders meeting or the central governing body is the deciding organ for extraordinary 
dividends, there must be adherence to the creditor rules in Section 2. This is expressly stated in Subsection 
4 of Section 5. 
Re 4) An extraordinary dividend may be paid in other assets than cash. The cross reference to Section 4 in 
Subsection (5) clarifies that such distributions are legal under the same conditions as an ordinary dividend 
may be paid in other assets than cash. 
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PART 3 
GIFTS 
Section 7.06 
Charitable Gifts 
(1) The general meeting may only resolve to give gifts for charitable or similar purposes out of the 
company’s funds if it is reasonable, having regard to the purpose of the gift, the company’s financial 
position and the circumstances in general. For the purposes referred to in the previous sentence, the central 
governing body may give gifts out of the company’s funds that are insignificant taking into account the 
company’s financial position. 
(2) Even if all shareholders agree to a gift from a company in contravention of Subsection (2), such an 
agreement is invalid. 
Comments 
Re 1) The provision in Section 6 is not based on EU law. The provision is similar to the Danish Companies 
Act Section 195 and the Swedish Companies Act Chapter 17, Section 5. The EMCA Group has considered 
whether a provision on charitable gifts should be included in the EMCA. The Group is of the opinion that 
such a rule fulfils a practical purpose, especially in the view that many Member States do not regulate 
charitable gifts in their Companies Act (eg France and Italy). 
According to Section 195 of the Danish Companies Act, the general meeting may resolve to give gifts for 
charitable or similar purposes out of the company’s funds if this is deemed reasonable, with regard to the 
purpose of the gift, the company’s financial position and the circumstances in general. For the purposes 
referred to in this provision, the central governing body may also give gifts out of the company’s funds that 
are insignificant in the context of the company’s financial position. 
Gifts may be given for social, cultural, scientific or humanitarian purposes. They may also be given for 
political reasons assuming the gift is not a donation for a particular political party or the like aligned with 
a majority of the shareholders, but rather is for a political goal closely related to the company’s business 
such as a donation for lobbying. Admittedly, in the latter case, it may be more difficult to access when such 
donations can be considered reasonable compared to donations given for a more generally accepted ‘good 
cause’. But given full disclosure to shareholders at the shareholders meeting concerning the nature of the 
gift either ex ante the decision by the same company organ or ex post a gift decided by the governing body 
of the company, it should be possible to establish whether it is a legal gift or not. The EMCA Group is of 
the opinion that Section 6 never may be used for political donations to a particular political party or the like 
without the consent of all shareholders. 
Social arrangements for the company’s employees and the granting of special bonuses and gifts for special 
occasions are a legal and common activity of a company and are usually outside the scope of this paragraph. 
The same may be said for a retirement benefit plan, job search assistance, etc., which are common activities 
in connection with for example. the restructuring of the company. Also other kind of benefits or payments 
such as donations for cultural or sports events including sponsorships is usually outside the scope of this 
paragraph, if commercially justifiable (cf. Section 1). Excluded however are golden handshakes where a 
company offers a compensation package to a member of the management leaving company in 
circumstances where the company is not obliged to do so or there are no legitimate commercial reasons for 
doing so. 
Re 2) Subsection (2) clarifies what has been expressed earlier, namely that all shareholders’ consent to a 
particular distribution – in this case a gift from the company - is not valid unless the distribution in question 
is legal according to the general rules concerning creditor protection in subsection (2)–(4). 
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PART 4 
OWN SHARES 
Section 7.07 
Subscription for Own Shares 
(1) The shares of a company may not be subscribed for by the company itself. 
(2) If the shares of a company have been subscribed for by a person acting in his or her own name, but on 
behalf of the company or to that effect, the subscriber shall be deemed to have subscribed for them for his 
or her own account. 
(3) Shares subscribed for in the company’s name in contravention of Subsection (1) are deemed to be 
subscribed for by the promoters or, in case of a capital increase, by the members of the company’s 
governing body at their own expense, and they will be jointly and severally liable for the subscription value. 
However, this does not apply to promoters or members of the company’s governing body who can establish 
that they neither realized nor ought to have realized that the subscription for the shares was illegal. 
(4) Subsection (1) applies, with such changes as are necessary, to a company’s subscription for shares in 
its parent company. The shares in the parent company will be deemed to be subscribed for by the members 
of the governing body of the subsidiary (see Subsection (3)). 
Comments 
Section 28 substantially implements articles 20 and 28 of Directive 2012/30/EU with minor technical 
adjustments. 
Section 7.08 
Acquisition of Own Shares in Ownership or as Pledge 
(1) The company may only make a decision to acquire its own shares for consideration, or enter into a 
transaction to that effect, in accordance with the rules in the EMCA. 
(2) The company may only acquire its own shares if they are fully paid up. 
(3) The company may only acquire its own shares for consideration in ownership. 
(4) If a company acquires its own shares as security, either by the company itself or through a third party 
acting in his or her own name, but on the company´s behalf or to that effect, the acquisition shall be treated 
as an acquisition of its own shares in ownership. 
Comments 
Re 1) Articles 21-24 and 27 of Directive 2012/30/EU contains provisions on acquisition of own shares. As 
mentioned earlier in considerations, the rules on own shares was liberalized in 2006. Directive 2012/30/EU 
applies only to public companies. There are also great differences between the Member States’ regarding 
rules on own shares in private companies. In some Member States such as France, Poland and Sweden, 
private companies are not allowed to purchase their own shares. In Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece 
and the Netherlands, private companies are allowed to purchase own shares, but then with different 
restrictions attached to such purchase. A common restriction is that the purchase may not exceed 
distributable profits. In the Netherlands, a buyback of shares is allowed with the most important limitation 
being a solvency test (Companies Act 2:207). 
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The EMCA Group has considered the rules on own shares. As mentioned above, it is of the opinion that 
the legislation should be as flexible as possible and flexible enough to allow for capital outflow in the form 
the companies consider in their best interest, including distributions in the form of ordinary and 
extraordinary dividends, gifts, repurchase of own shares, financial assistance in connection with acquisition 
of shares in the company and capital reduction. Acquisition or disposal of own shares represent a less 
bureaucratic way to regulate the company capital compared with implementing capital reductions and 
capital increases according to the rules in this regard, respectively. Furthermore, and more importantly, 
repurchase of a company´s own shares is in economic terms viewed by the market – although perhaps 
misguidedly so and sometimes for the wrong reasons - as an alternative to distribution of profits in the form 
of dividends. 
The opinion of the EMCA Group is that even if the purchase of own shares is most common in public 
companies, especially those whose shares are traded on a regulated market, there is also a need to allow for 
purchase of own shares in private companies, for instance for succession purposes in a family company.  
Against this background, the Group has reached the conclusion that the rules on own shares in the EMCA 
should allow both public and private companies to purchase its own shares. And further, the rules in 
Directive 2012/30/EU should be used as a model for the rules in this Chapter, but at the same time the very 
same rules should be made as simple as possible. 
Section 8, Subsection (1) determines that the acquisition of own shares for consideration is allowed in 
principle in both public and private companies. Technically Subsection (1) has been phrased so as to include 
not only repurchase of shares for consideration in the traditionally way but also repurchase of shares 
through independent intermediaries such as banks and set-ups including swap-agreements. Thus, a 
company may acquire its own shares for consideration or enter into a transaction to that effect. But both 
types of repurchase of shares most follow the same rules in the EMCA. 
Directive 2012/30/EU does not contain rules on how a repurchase or later sale of own shares shall take 
place, i.e. to whom, when and in what way the repurchase or later sale may be done. However, Article 46 
of Directive 2012/30/EU contains a principle of equal treatment of shareholders who are in the same 
position. Many Member States contain explicit provisions on the acquisition or sale of own shares in their 
Companies Acts and in all cases, there must be compliance with this general principle of equality as a 
safeguard for minority shareholders’ rights cf. the rules in the Swedish Companies Act Chapter 19, Section 
14. 
The EMCA Group has considered whether the EMCA should contain rules on acquisitions and sales of 
own shares. Even though the Group recognizes that explicit rules on acquisitions and sales of own shares 
have some advantages, such rules are also difficult to formulate and must be subject to a list of different 
exceptions with the result that the legislation becomes lengthy and technically complicating without, 
perhaps, adding much in substance to the intended purpose of protecting minority shareholders. For this 
reason the Group has decided not to include any rules on acquisitions and sales of own shares in the EMCA. 
Re 2) Subsection (2) is an implementation of article 21 (1) of Directive 2012/30/EU. 
Re3). Repurchase of shares for consideration may according to EMCA only be made in ownership. Any 
other type of “acquisition” of own shares such as legally and formalistically a “loan” or “renting” of shares 
for any form of consideration is illegal according to EMCA with the exception of acceptance of the 
company´s own shares as security according to subsection (4). This follows from subsection (3). 
Re 4) The EMCA Group has considered the possibility for a company to receive its own shares as security 
for consideration. One alternative is to prohibit such transactions altogether. Another alternative is to treat 
the acceptance of the company´s own shares as security as an acquisition of own shares, which is the rule 
in article 27 of Directive 2012/30/EU. Since the Group is of the opinion that there might be situations when 
a company should have the option to accept its own shares as security, the second alternative is 
recommended in subsection (4). 
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Section 7.09 
Funds Available for Acquisition of Own Shares 
(1) A company may only acquire its own shares for consideration out of funds available for distribution 
under Section 2. 
(2) If a company has acquired its own shares for consideration out of funds available for distribution under 
Section 2, either the shares are not to be included among the assets shown in the balance sheet of the 
company or, if the shares are included among the assets shown in the balance sheet of the company, a 
reserve of the same amount, unavailable for distribution, shall be included among the liabilities. 
(3) A company’s holding of its own shares shall include shares acquired by a third party in its own name, 
but at the company’s expense or to that effect. 
Comments 
Re 1) It follows from Section 9, Subsection (1), that the limitation regarding the acquisition of own shares 
only applies to acquisitions for consideration. 
The rules on acquisition of own shares differ from one Member State to another. A number of Member 
States including Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain still have a 10 % limitation for 
public companies as it appeared in the 2nd Company Law Directive before the amendment in 2006. In 
Sweden, the acquisition of own shares are generally forbidden, however, a public company whose shares 
are traded on a regulated market may acquire its own shares. In that case the company may acquire 10 % 
of the companies’ shares. In Poland, repurchase of own shares are generally prohibited with some 
exceptions in which case the total nominal value must not exceed 10 % of the share capital of the company. 
On the other hand, a number of Member States have made use of the liberalized 2nd Company Law 
Directive. Thus, in the Danish, Finnish, Italian, Ireland and UK Companies Acts, purchase of own shares 
is allowed with profits available for distribution. 
The EMCA Group considered the 10 % limit in Directive 2012/30/EU. It is not convinced there is any need 
for such or any similar restriction. In addition, the Group considers it an advantage if the rules in the EMCA 
can be made as simple as possible without unnecessary exceptions. Therefore the Group is of the opinion 
that a restriction will suffice which limits repurchase of shares for consideration out of funds available for 
distribution under Section 2 and which is generally applicable to both private and public companies. 
Re 2) A company may only purchase its own shares for the amount available for distribution on basis of 
the company´s annual report for the last financial period approved by the general shareholder’s meeting. 
This rule is partly based on the provision in articles 21 (1) cf. article 17 (1) of Directive 2012/30/EU. In 
addition, the cross reference in Subsection (2) to Section 2 means that a company is further restricted by 
Subsection (3) and (4) in this latter Section with regard to the solvency test and the reasonable test 
respectively. 
One consequence of Section 9, Subsection (1), is that the company cannot acquire its own shares if the 
company solely has the required minimum capital, cf. EMCA Chapter 2 Section 7 (on minimum capital). 
There are no voting rights attached to company’s own shares. See Chapter 11, Section 10. 
Re 3) Section 9, Subsection (2), is a partial implementation of article 24 (1) of Directive 2012/30/EU, but 
with the addition that Member States may instead apply the alternative rule that, if a company has acquired 
its own shares for consideration out of funds available for distribution under Section 2, the shares are not 
to be included among the assets shown in the balance sheet of the company. It should be noted that this 
latter solution is the preferred one in international accounting standards, See IAS 32 and the IFRS for Small 
and Medium-Sized Entities (IFRS for SMEs), Section 22.16. 
Re 4) Section 9, Subsection 3, corresponds to article 21 (1) of Directive 2012/30/EU, but with an 
amendment to the effect that it also includes repurchase of shares through independent intermediaries such 
as banks and set-ups such as swap-agreements (cf. phrase “to that effect”). 
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Section 7.10 
Authorizations for the Acquisition of Own Shares 
 
(1) An acquisition of a company’s own shares for consideration cannot proceed without the central 
governing body of the company obtaining authority from the general meeting, unless the conditions in 
Section 12 are met. 
(2) The authorization may be decided by a simple majority of the shareholders at an ordinary or 
extraordinary shareholder meeting. 
(3) The authority from the general meeting must be given for a specified time, which shall not exceed five 
years. 
(4) The authority must specify 
(a) the maximum number of company’s own shares which may be acquired; and 
(b) the minimum and maximum amount that may be paid by the company as consideration for the 
shares. 
Comments 
Re 1) For practical purposes the central governing body of the company is the company organ which 
decides when, how, to what extent and for how much a repurchase of shares for consideration is to be made. 
However, as stated previously, a repurchase of shares is in economic terms often seen as an alternative to 
distribution of profits through ordinary or extraordinary dividends. Therefore, it is consequential that the 
decision to repurchase shares must be vested with the shareholders meeting. Hence, Section 10, Subsection 
(1), stipulates that an acquisition of a company’s own shares for consideration cannot proceed without the 
central governing body of the company obtaining authority from the general meeting. 
Member States has different majority requirements. Countries such as Finland and Sweden, for example, 
require a qualified majority of 2/3, whilst others such as Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK 
only require only a simple majority. 
The EMCA Group is of the opinion that since repurchase of shares in economic terms is viewed by the 
market as an alternative to a distribution of profits in the form of dividends, a repurchase of shares should 
be able to be decided by the same majority of shareholders which may decide to distribute the company´s 
profits in the form of an ordinary or extraordinary dividend. From the wording of Subsection (1), second 
paragraph it is, however, intended that the articles of association of the company may require a higher 
majority such as 2/3 or 3/4 of the shareholders present and votes cast. 
Re 2) The provision on the authorization period is consistent with article 21 (1) of Directive 2012/30/EU. 
Nevertheless, such a lengthy authorization period is questionable and – of course – arbitrarily set. 
Previously, the authorization period in the Directive was set to a maximum of 18 months, which, on the 
other hand, might be considered too short and – of course – was equally as arbitrary. That said, Section 
5(2) of the Finnish Companies Act and Article 320 (1) (b) of the Portuguese Companies Act still retain a 
maximum 18 months authorization period. 
With Directive 2012/30/EU, it is now possible to extend the authorization (but subject to more restrictive 
provisions in national law) to a maximum of 5 years. The EMCA Group has considered if there should be 
a more restrictive time limit in the EMCA, but has not presently identified any purpose which would justify 
such a restriction. Given the time limit of 5 years in Directive 2012/30/EU, the Group has chosen the same 
time limit in Subsection (3). From the wording of Subsection (3), it follows that a shareholders meeting, 
for instance, may instead choose to authorize the central governing body each year at the annual general 
meeting - a common practice before the amendment of the 2nd Company Law Directive. 
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In addition, the shareholders may condition the authorization in such a way that the governing body of the 
company does not have complete freedom in other ways. Particularly in listed companies, a conflict may 
arise between; on the one hand, an authorization by the general meeting to repurchase shares and, on the 
other hand, the principle in the Takeovers Directive concerning the general meeting’s approval of defensive 
measures against hostile takeovers. In some corporate governance codes, such as the Danish Code, it is 
recommended that any authorization to purchase own shares may not be exercised when a takeover bid is 
made. Such a reservation could be an example of a condition inserted by shareholders in connection with 
the central governing body of the company obtaining authority from the general meeting. 
Re 3) Subsection (4) contains only the minimum conditions which are set out in article 21 of Directive 
2012/30/EU which the authorization from the general meeting to the governing body must specify. Some 
Member States such as Finland, stipulate further conditions which must be specified in the authorization, 
and to that end also information to the shareholders. 
Again the EMCA Group considered whether to add further conditions which must be specified in the 
authorization from the general meeting to the governing body of the company, and again the Group has 
taken the minimalistic approach in formulating the rules as regards capital outflow. The authorization may 
be given without any further limitations then those set out in Subsection (4) i.e. the maximum number of 
company’s own shares which may be acquired and the minimum and maximum amount that may be paid 
by the company as consideration for the shares. Nevertheless, the general meeting may set whatever 
limitations the shareholders consider appropriate, for example regarding the purpose for which the 
acquisition of own shares are made. The articles of association may also include limitations and conditions 
concerning the repurchase of shares. 
Section 7.11 
General Exception 
(1) Notwithstanding Sections 8 to 10, companies may, directly or indirectly, acquire their own shares for 
or not for consideration 
(a) in connection with a reduction of the share capital (see Sections 25 to 32) or redemption of shares 
(see Chapter 5, Section 15) ; 
(b) in connection with a transfer of assets by merger, division or any other universal succession; 
(c) as a gift from a shareholder or otherwise free of charge or by banks and other financial institutions 
as purchasing commission; 
(d) in satisfaction of a statutory takeover obligation of the company or a statutory exit right in particular 
circumstances for minority shareholders in the company or associated companies; 
(e) in connection with the purchase of fully paid-up shares in a forced sale for the satisfaction of a 
claim held by the company; 
(f) from a shareholder in the event of failure to pay them up. 
Comments 
Section 11 substantially implements article 22 (1) of Directive 2012/30/EU. 
Re 1 (f)). This exception must be understood against the requirement that only 25 per cent of the nominal 
value of the company capital or in the absence of a nominal value, their accountable par and any premium, 
must be paid before registration. See Chapter 2, Section 10. 
European Model Companies Act 2017 
Chapter 7 – Capital of Companies 
151 
Section 7.12 
Exception from Authorization 
(1) When it is necessary in order to avoid significant and imminent harm to the company, the central 
governing body may acquire the company’s own shares on behalf of the company for consideration under 
Section 10, without the authority of the general meeting. 
(2) If the company has acquired its own shares under paragraph (1), the central governing body must notify 
the next general meeting of: 
(a) the reason for and the purpose of the acquisition; 
(b) the number of the shares acquired; 
(c) the nominal value or, in the absence of a nominal value, the accountable par, of the shares acquired; 
(d) and the proportion of the subscribed capital which they represent; and 
(e) the value of the consideration paid for the acquired shares. 
Comments 
Re 1) Section 12 implements article 21 (2) of Directive 2012/30/EU. 
The exception solely concerns the authorization requirement in Section 10. The remaining provisions on 
acquisition of own shares for consideration must therefore be fulfilled in a situation covered by Section 12. 
The derogation has in practice become less significant after the general access to acquiring own shares has 
been extended pursuant to rules similar to sections 8-10 supra and on basis of Directive 2012/30/EU. The 
most likely situation where Section 12 could be used is probably in an expected hostile takeover situation 
(but see Article 9 of the Takeovers Directive 2004/25/EC). 
Section 7.13 
Subsidiaries’ Acquisition of Shares in Parent Companies 
Sections 8-10 apply, with such modifications as necessary, to a subsidiary’s acquisition of shares in its 
parent company in ownership or as security. 
Comments 
Section 13 implements article 28 of Directive 2012/30/EU. 
Section 7.14 
Disposal of Legally Acquired Own Shares 
(1) Shares acquired in accordance with Section 12, Paragraphs b) to f), must be disposed of as soon as 
possible without causing harm to the company, but no later than within the time limit in Subsection (2). 
(2) Shares acquired in accordance with Section 12, Paragraphs b) to f), must be disposed of no later than 
three years after the acquisition. 
Comments 
Re 1) Section 14 regulates the situation where own shares are acquired legally according to the rule on 
general exceptions in Section 12 and is basically an implementation of article 22(2) Directive 2012/30/EU. 
Section 7.15 
Disposal of Illegally Acquired Own Shares 
(1) Shares acquired in, or treated as acquired in, ownership in contravention of Section 8 to 13 must be 
disposed of as soon as possible and no later than one year after the acquisition of the shares. 
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(2) Any transaction which includes an acquisition of shares in, or is treated as an acquisition in, ownership 
in contravention of Section 8 to 13 and which has not been executed is invalid. 
Comments 
Re 1) Section 15 implements article 23 of Directive 2012/30/EU. 
The Directive contains a time limit of 1 year. In certain countries the time limit is shorter. This is the case 
for example in Denmark and Sweden where it is 6 months. The EMCA Group is of the opinion that there 
is no need for a time limit of less than 1 year. 
Re 2) The EMCA Group has concluded that even if the rule in Subsection (1) is an adequate and efficient 
sanction once shares has been illegally acquired in, or treated as acquired in, ownership in contravention 
of Section 8 to 13 by a company, there will exist situations where the transaction has not yet been executed, 
for instance by way of exchange of shares for consideration. It is the opinion of the Group that such 
transactions should be treated as invalid and, thus, should not be legally enforceable. Although this problem 
might be solved in national law either explicitly or implicit through applying general principles of civil law 
(cf. 134 § BGB in German law), there is no guarantee that this will be case. The Group is of the opinion 
that the EMCA should include an explicit rule stating that illegal acquisition is not legally enforceable. 
Section 7.16 
Cancellation of Acquired Shares 
If any shares have not been duly disposed of as provided by Sections 15-16, the central governing body of 
the company must ensure that such shares are cancelled and that the cancellation results in a corresponding 
reduction of the subscribed capital. 
Comments 
Section 16 implements Article 22 (3) of Directive 2012/30/EU. 
Section 7.17 
Consequences of Holding Own Shares 
Voting rights may not be exercised by a company where they attach to shares held by a company itself, or 
to shares in a parent company that are held by a subsidiary. Such shares are to be excluded where the 
validity of any resolution or the exercise of any power is subject to the consent of all shareholders or to a 
certain majority of votes of either the shares represented at the general meeting or of the entire share capital 
of the company. 
Comments 
Re 1) Section 17 implements Article 24 (1) (a) of Directive 2012/30/EU. Some Member States such as 
Denmark (Companies Act Section 85), France (Article L. 225-210 of the Commercial Code) Greece 
(Companies Act Article 16 (8)), Italy (Article 2357-ter of the Civil Code) Lithuania (Companies Act Article 
54 Part 7), the Netherlands (Companies Act Section 2:118 (7) and 228 (6)), Poland (Companies Act Article 
363 § 4) and Portugal (Companies Act Article 324 (1) (a)) explicitly state that voting rights may not be 
exercised in respect of own shares. Section 17 is similar to Section 85 of the Danish Companies Act. 
Art 24 (2) of Directive 2012/30/EU requires the company’s annual report to contain information regarding 
acquisitions of own shares. Such requirements are found for instance in Section 76 of the Danish Financial 
Statements Act. The EMCA Group assumes that national legislators implement this rule as appropriate in 
national legislation and see no need for it in the EMCA. 
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PART 5 
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
Section 7.18 
Financing of Purchase of Own Shares 
(1) A company may directly or indirectly advance funds, make loans or provide security for a third party’s 
acquisition of the company’s shares or shares in its parent company in accordance with the provisions in 
Subsection (2)-(3). 
(2) The company may directly or indirectly advance funds, make loans or provide security according to 
paragraph 1 if the following requirements are fulfilled: 
(a) approval by the general meeting (cf. Section 19); 
(b) reasonableness of the resolution (cf. Section 20); 
(c) report by the central governing body (cf. Section 21); and 
(d) fair market conditions (cf. Section 22). 
(3) The company’s central governing body must ensure that any third party receiving financial assistance 
is credit worthy or, in the case of multiparty transactions, each party involved in the transaction is credit 
worthy. The credit worthiness must be based on a thorough economic due diligence (cf. Section 22). 
Comments 
Re 1) The original 2nd Company Law Directive contained a prohibition against self-financing. However, 
Article 25 of Directive 2012/30/EU allows a company to, either directly or indirectly, advance funds or 
make loans or provide security, with a view to the acquisition of its shares by a third party. The conditions 
under which such transactions are allowed are set out in Article 25 (2)-(5).  
The EMCA Group has contemplated not including rules in the EMCA on financial assistance. One 
argument against such rules is that it is not clear if the rules in reality provide any protection for the 
company´s creditors and shareholders. Another argument is that they add complexity to the law, at an 
additional and substantial transaction cost, which may nevertheless be circumvented by an individual who 
is determined to do so. For this reasoning, the Netherlands abolished rules on financial assistance for private 
companies in 2012 and the UK did so a few years earlier. However, and with hesitation, the Group decided 
to include rules on financial assistance in the EMCA based on Article 25 of Directive 2012/30/EU for no 
reason other than that the Directive stipulates financial assistance rules for public companies. But the Group 
does not recommend that Member States include such rules in their legislation for private companies. 
According to certain minimum conditions, Section 18 allows for self-financing. The conditions are found 
in the following Sections 19 to 22 of the EMCA. Section 18-22 must be interpreted on the basis of Article 
25 of Directive 2012/30/EU. In particular such interpretation must be made with due regard to the purposes 
of the rules on financial assistance, and does not mean, as it sometimes is understood by practicing lawyers 
in Member States, that financial assistance provided 1, 3 or 6 months after the purchase is legal. The critical 
question is whether the purpose of financial assistance is, or was, to directly or indirectly facilitate a third 
party’s acquisition of the company’s shares or shares in its parent company. 
Article 25 of Directive 2012/30/EU regulates direct and indirect financial assistance. Section 18 also 
includes financial assistance to a third party by a subsidiary for the purpose of acquiring shares in the parent 
company, which does not follow from Article 25. The EMCA Group added this rule since Article 25 could 
otherwise easily be circumvented and, furthermore, because creditors face the same risk regardless whether 
a company offers financial assistance to acquire shares in that company or its parent company. 
Re 2) Subsection (3) is a partial implementation of Article 25 (2) of Directive 2012/30/EU. Cf. also Section 
22. 
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Section 7.19 
Approval by the General Meeting 
(1) Financial assistance under Section 18 is subject to approval by the general meeting. As a condition for 
an affirmative resolution by the general meeting, the company’s central governing body must in advance 
present a written report to the general meeting, including information about: 
(a) the reason for, and the nature of, the proposed financial assistance; 
(b) the company’s interest in entering into the transaction; 
(c) the conditions on which the transaction is entered into; 
(d) the consequences of the transaction, including the risk, for the company’s liquidity and solvency; 
and 
(e) the price at which the third party is to acquire the shares. 
(2) The general meeting must pass the resolution required to approve the financial assistance under 
paragraph (1) by a majority of no less than two-thirds of the votes of the shares present and cast at the 
general meeting.  
(3) The report to be presented under subsection (1) must be received by the Registrar for the purpose of 
publication under Chapter 3, Section 5 within four weeks after the date of approval by the general meeting 
Comments 
Section 19 implements Article 25 (3) of Directive 2012/30/EU. 
Section 7.20 
Extent of Financial Assistance 
(1) The aggregate of financial assistance granted by the company to third parties under Section 19 may at 
no time exceed what is available for distribution according to Section 2, and taking into account any 
reduction of the net assets of the company that may have occurred through the acquisition, by the company, 
or on behalf of the company, of its own shares in accordance with Section 9 to 17. 
(2) The company shall include, among the liabilities in the balance sheet, a reserve, unavailable for 
distribution, of the amount of the aggregate financial assistance. 
Comments 
Section 20 is an implementation of Article 25 (4) of Directive 2012/30/EU but with the additional protection 
for creditors provided by Section 2 of the EMCA concerning distributions. 
Section 7.21 
Fair Market Conditions 
Where a third party acquires shares in the company with the financial assistance of a company, such 
assistance must be granted at arm’s length and at fair market conditions, including, but not limited to, the 
interest received by the company and with regard to the security provided the company for the loans and 
advances. The same applies if a third party subscribes for shares in connection with an increase in the 
subscribed capital. 
Comments 
Section 21 implements Article 25 (2) and 25 (5) of Directive 2012/30/EU. 
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Section 21 implies that it is the responsibility of the company’s central governing body to ensure financial 
assistance is only provided at arm’s length and at fair market conditions. At arm’s length and at fair market 
conditions includes, but is not limited to, the interest received by the company and the security provided to 
the company for the loans and advances. At arm’s length and fair market conditions also relates to the credit 
worthiness of the third party or the parties involved, but this already follows from Section 18, Subsection 
(3). Even without Section 21, the same principle would follow from the duty of care and the duty of loyalty 
which is owed to the company by the members of the company’s central governing body. Thus, failure to 
comply with this standard by any such member may result in a liability for damages for that member. 
Section 7.22 
Exception for Banks and Other Financial Institutions 
Sections 18 to 21 do not apply to transactions concluded by banks and other financial institutions in the 
normal course of business. 
Comments 
Section 22 implements Article 25 (6) of Directive 2012/30/EU. 
Section 7.23 
Exception for Employees 
(1) Sections 18 to 21 do not apply to transactions effected with a view to the acquisition of shares by or 
for the company´s employees or employees of an associate company. 
(2) Minutes of meetings held by the central governing body must include information on any transaction 
falling within Subsection (1). 
(3) Transactions falling within Subsection (1) may only be made if the value of the transaction does not 
exceed what is available for distribution according to Section 2. 
Comments 
Section 23 also implements Article 25 (6) of Directive 2012/30/EU, but within the framework of the 
improved creditor protection provided by EMCA, Section 2. 
Section 7.24 
Consequences of Illegal Financial Assistance 
(1) Any transaction which includes financial assistance in contravention of Sections 18 to 21 and which 
has not been executed is invalid. 
(2) Any transaction which includes financial assistance in contravention of Sections 18 to 21 and which 
has been executed must immediately be reversed. Any financial assistance so granted in the form of direct 
or indirect advancement of funds or loans must immediately be returned to the company together with 
interest that accrues annually at the rate specified in national law with the addition of 2 %. 
(3) Any transaction which includes financial assistance in the form of direct or indirect security in 
contravention of Sections 18 to 21 is only binding for the company, if the contracting party did not know, 
or ought not have known, that the transaction constituted illegal financial assistance. 
(4) If a transaction which includes financial assistance cannot be immediately reversed or financial 
assistance cannot be immediately returned, members of the company’s central governing body who have 
agreed to or allowed any transactions in contravention of Sections 18 to 21 will be liable for any deficiency 
as a result of unsuccessful restitution according to Subsection (2)-(3). 
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Comments 
Re 1). Section 24 does not implement any EU rules. The value of the rules on financial assistance in 
Directive 2012/30/EU is debatable. However, assuming that such rules fulfil a necessary purpose in 
protecting creditors and shareholders, there is a need for an effective sanction. On that basis, the EMCA 
Group has concluded that the EMCA should contain an additional rule which concerns the consequences 
of illegal financial assistance. Section 24 is to some extent inspired by provisions in the Danish Companies 
Act (Section 215) and the Swedish Companies Act (Chapter 21, Section 11). 
Re 2) Subsection (1) states the first main principle that a promise by a company of financial assistance in 
contravention of Sections 18 to 21 cannot be legally be enforced with the exception of financial assistance 
in the form of security, if the contracting party was acting in good faith about the illegality of the 
transaction; see Subsection (3). 
Re 3) If, and only if, a transaction which includes financial assistance in contravention of Sections 18 to 
21, has been wholly or partially executed, the second main principle applies, which is that the transaction 
must be reversed immediately on the basis that it is illegal and invalid. The first sentence relates to all forms 
of direct or indirect financial assistance regardless of whether it has taken place in the form of direct or 
indirect advancement of funds, loans or security. The second sentence in Subsection (2) specifies the 
consequences of reversing the transaction if the financial assistance has been granted in the form of direct 
or indirect advancement of funds or loans. In those two cases, and assuming the financial assistance has 
been provided in money, it must be returned to the company together with interest that accrues annually at 
the rate specified in national law with the addition of 2 %. 
Re 4) Financial assistance in the form of direct or indirect security in contravention of sections 18 to 21 
may be provided to a financial institution or other third party who is not aware of the illegality of the 
transaction. Therefore, and in order to avoid unnecessary transaction cost for third party as well as unwanted 
consequences, Subsection (3) provides protection for a third party who did not know, or ought not have 
known, that the transaction constituted illegal financial assistance. 
Re 5) As an additional safeguard in ensuring that the rules on financial assistance is adhered to, Subsection 
(4) states that if a transaction which includes financial assistance cannot be immediately reversed or 
financial assistance cannot be immediately returned, members of the company’s central governing body 
who have agreed to, or allowed, any transactions in contravention of Sections 18 to 21 will be liable for 
any deficiency as a result of unsuccessful restitution according to Subsection (2)–(3). 
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PART 6 
REDUCTION OF CAPITAL 
Section 7.25 
Methods of Reduction of Capital 
(1) Reduction of capital in the EMCA may be affected with or without a distribution of assets to 
shareholders.  
(2) Reduction of capital by way of distribution to shareholders may be in the form of: 
(a) reducing the nominal value or accountable par, and/or 
(b) reducing the number of shares. 
(3) Reduction of capital without a distribution to shareholders may be in the form of: 
(a) setting off losses against the capital, and/or 
(b) setting off capital to distributable or non-distributable reserves. 
Comments 
Re 1) In Section 1 the term “distribution” includes any transfer of money or money’s worth without due 
consideration directly or indirectly to a shareholder or third party in the absence of a genuine commercial 
purpose such as, for example payments in connection with capital reductions. Section 25, Subsection 1, 
follows this definition, but clarifies that a capital reduction may or may not include a transfer of money or 
money´s worth to a shareholder. 
Article 34 (2) of Directive 2012/30/EU requires that the notice convening the meeting must specify at least 
the purpose of the reduction and the way in which it is to be carried out. The companies’ acts in some 
Member States such as Poland (Companies Act article 455) merely restate Article 34 (2). In other Member 
States, the purposes the reduction must be further specified. Subsection 2-3 specifies the purposes for which 
a reduction of capital with or without distribution to shareholders may be made. 
Re 2) Technically, the reduction of share capital by way of distribution to shareholders may be made in 
two different forms, which are specified in Subsection (2). Those are: reducing the nominal value or 
accountable par; and/or reducing the number of shares. A reduction of the number of shares may be in the 
form of redemption of shares following the rules in Chapter 5, Section 15. The words “and/or” are used to 
clarify that a company may do either of the described methods or combine them. 
Re 3) Redemption of capital without a distribution to shareholders is in practice typically done to set of 
losses against the capital. However, depending on the circumstances, a company may set off capital for 
other reasons. Whenever a company sets off capital, the amount by which the capital is reduced must be 
transferred to distributable reserves or non- distributable reserves. Again the words “and/or” are used to 
clarify that a company may do either of the described methods or combine them. The EMCA Group also 
notes that there is nothing to prevent a company from combining a reduction of capital with only a partial 
distribution of assets to shareholders. See Subsection (3). 
Section 7.26 
Resolutions on Capital Reductions 
(1) Any resolution reducing the share capital must be passed by the general meeting by a majority of no 
less than two-thirds of the votes of the shares present and cast at the meeting unless the reduction of capital 
is ordered by a court. 
Where there are several classes of shares, the decision by the general meeting concerning a reduction of 
the subscribed capital shall be subject to a separate vote, at least for each class of shareholders whose rights 
are affected by the reduction of capital. 
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(2) The provisions of Chapter 6 Section 2 on the procedure to be followed in connection with resolutions 
on capital increases apply, with such changes as are necessary, to resolutions on capital reductions. The 
notice of the meeting must in particular specify at least the purpose of the reduction and the way in which 
it is to be carried out. 
Comments 
Re 1) Article 34 and the following articles of Directive 2012/30/EU contain a number of provisions on 
capital reduction.  
Re 2) According to Chapter 11, Section 29, changes to the articles of association requires a two third 
majority of the votes of the shares present and cast at the meeting. A number of Member States require a 
larger majority when changing the articles and reducing the share capital. For example in Germany, Poland, 
Ireland and the UK a three quarters majority is required. The EMCA Group is of the opinion that a 
requirement of a two third majority is enough in the balance between majority and minority shareholders, 
which is the minimum rule found in article 44 of Directive 2012/30/EU. 
The second sentence of Subsection (1) is an implementation of Article 35 of Directive 2012/30/EU. 
Re 3) Section 26, Subsection (2), is not based on EU law. Chapter 6, Section 2 provides that the resolution 
should include all the information necessary for shareholders and investors to take an informed decision. 
Section 26, Subsection (2), provides that equivalent information must be disclosed in connection with a 
capital reduction. It is possible to deviate from the duty to disclose the documents if all shareholders agree 
to this. This could in particular be the case in companies with only a few shareholders. 
Subsection (2), second sentence, is an implementation of article 34 of Directive 2012/30/EU. 
Section 7.27 
Authorization of Capital Reduction to the Central Governing Body in Private Companies 
In private companies, the general meeting may, by way of either a provision in the articles of association 
or a decision of the meeting, authorize the central governing body to reduce the capital to a specified 
amount. In that case, the time limit prescribed in Section 31 runs from the date of the resolution to exercise 
the authority. 
Comments 
Re 1) Directive 2012/30/EU applies only to public companies. According to EMCA’s Chapter 6, Section 
5, it is possible to authorize the management to carry out capital increases. A logical step is to allow for 
authorization to the central governing body for capital reductions although this is not possible for public 
companies because of the rule in Article 34 of Directive 2012/30/EU. Article 34 states that the decision 
must be taken by the general meeting. By contrast, an authorization rule can be implemented with regard 
to private companies. Such authorization rule is set out in Section 27. 
Section 7.28 
Approval of the Central Governing Body to a Decision to Reduce Capital 
The general meeting of a company may only pass a resolution for the purpose of reducing the capital by 
way of distribution of assets to shareholders or setting off capital to distributable reserves or non-
distributable reserves, if the central governing body proposes or accepts a resolution to that effect. 
Comments 
Re 1) The provision is not based on EU law. 
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Disbursing the capital reduction amount for distribution to the shareholders or setting off capital to 
distributable or non-distributable reserves, which later would be available for distribution, poses a risk to 
the company’s creditors. Therefore, and based on the assumption that capital provides some kind of 
protection for creditors, there is a need to secure the creditors interests if and when a reduction of a 
company´s capital is made. Obviously, the central governing body of the company has far more knowledge 
of and insight into the financial status of the company than most, if not all, shareholders. 
Against this background, Section 28 requires that the central governing body of the company either 
proposes or approves a proposal for a resolution for the purpose of reducing the capital by way of 
distribution of assets to shareholders or setting off capital to distributable or non- distributable reserves. 
Section 7.29 
Distribution in Kind 
(1) Distribution to shareholders may be made by the company in assets other than cash, if the asset in 
question is of such nature that it easily can be converted into cash. 
(2) If non-cash assets are distributed in a capital reduction, a valuation report must be prepared (see Chapter 
2, Section 11). The report must state that the amount of the capital reduction plus any premium corresponds 
to at least the value of the non-cash assets distributed. The company must publish the declaration in the 
Registrar's IT system no later than two weeks after the date of the resolution on the distribution (see Section 
Chapter 3, Section 5). 
(3) Subsection (1) applies unless the articles of association provide otherwise or all the shareholders in the 
particular case agree to a distribution of asset of any nature other than cash. 
Comments 
Re 1). Section 29 is not based on any EU law. Section 29 is a parallel to Section 4 regarding distribution of 
dividends of non-cash assets. See in extenso the commentary to Section 4, supra. 
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PART 7 
REDUCTION OF CAPITAL AND CREDITOR PROTECTION 
Section 7.30 
Request to Creditors and Creditor Protection 
(1) If the amount of the reduction is to be used, in whole or in part, for the purpose of: 
(a) distribution to the shareholders; or 
(b) setting off capital to distributable reserves or non-distributable reserves 
the company’s central governing body must make a request for the purpose of publication in the national 
Registrar’s IT system after a decision to that effect (cf. Section 31). The company’s central governing body 
must give immediate notice of the reduction to creditors of the company whose claims antedate the 
publication of the decision on the reduction, but which have not fallen due by the date of that publication. 
(2) No notice to creditors needs to be made under subsection (1) if at the same time the capital is increased 
by the same amount as the amount of the reduction. Neither is a notice to creditors required if a written 
declaration from an auditor is available, stating that the reduction does not entail any risk to the creditors 
of the company. 
(3) With the exceptions listed in Subsection (2), creditors whose claims antedate the publication of the 
decision on the reduction, but which have not fallen due by the date of that publication, have the right to 
either obtain payment in full or security from the company for their claims. Creditors who wish to obtain 
payment in full or security from the company must exercise this right within 4 weeks of the publication in 
the national Registrar’s IT system. 
(4) Creditors may apply to a court or other authority as defined in national law for adequate safeguards 
provided that they can credibly demonstrate that due to the reduction in the subscribed capital, the 
satisfaction of their claims is at stake, and that no adequate safeguards have been obtained from the 
company. 
(5) No reduction, in whole or in part, for the purpose of: 
(a) distribution to the shareholders; or 
(b) setting off capital to distributable reserves or non-distributable reserves 
may be made unless the requirements in Section 2, Subsection (3)-(4) are met. 
(6) A reduction according to Subsection (1) may not be made, and any such reduction is invalid as well as 
a decision to that effect being void, unless creditors have obtained satisfaction or no such satisfaction is 
required or a court or other authority has decided that the creditor’s application should not be acceded to. 
Comments 
Section 30 implements Articles 36, 37 and 38 of Directive 2012/30/EU. Section 30 contains the main 
protection of creditors in connection with a capital reduction, if a reduction is to be used, in whole or in 
part, for the purpose of a distribution to the shareholders or setting off capital to distributable reserves or 
non-distributable reserves. The creditors must be given the opportunity to either payment in full or security 
for their claim. Section 30 does not apply if the purpose of the reduction is to offset losses incurred by the 
company. 
Re 1) Both the publication and notification requirement in Subsection (1) follows from Articles 34 and 36 
of Directive 2012/30/EU Cf. Section 31. 
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Re 2) The first sentence of Subsection (2) is a logical conclusion based on the legislative-theological idea 
that the share capital provides protection for the company´s creditors. If the share capital de facto is not 
reduced after two successive decisions – one to reduce the share capital and one to increase it with the same 
amount as the preceding reduction – the creditors of the company are not in any way negatively affected, 
not even hypothetically. Therefore, there is no need to require any notice to the creditors (cf. article 38 of 
Directive 2012/30/EU). 
The second sentence of Subsection (2) is am implementation of Article 36 (1) of Directive 2012/30/EU 
which requires Member States to safeguard the rights of the creditors. However, such safeguards are not 
necessary if - despite the reduction - the assets of the company can satisfy the claims of the creditors. In 
some Member States this is implemented as no notice to creditors is required if a written declaration from 
an auditor is available stating that the reduction does not entail any risk to the creditors of the company 
because of the remaining assets of the company after the reduction is satisfactory. The EMCA Group is of 
the opinion that the EMCA should include a similar rule to facilitate reductions of capital which in no way 
entail any practically quantifiable risk for the company´s creditors. 
Re 4) Subsection (4) is also an implementation of Article 36 (1) of Directive 2012/30/EU. The general 
principle when a reduction is made for the aforementioned purposes is that creditors whose claims antedate 
the publication of the decision on the reduction, but which have not fallen due by the date of that 
publication, have the right to obtain either payment in full or security from the company for their claims. 
But it should be noted that this rule does not apply if the conditions in Subsection (2) are met. 
The second paragraph of Subsection (3) too is an implementation of Article 36 (1) of Directive 2012/30/EU 
and is a protection for creditors in as much as they may apply to a court or other authority as defined in 
national law for adequate safeguards provided that they can credibly demonstrate that due to the reduction 
in the subscribed capital the satisfaction of their claims is at stake, and that no adequate safeguards have 
been obtained from the company. 
Re 5) Subsection (5) is a logical extension of the creditor protection in Section 2, Subsection (3)-(4).  
Re 6) Subsection (6) is an implementation of Article 36 (2) of Directive 2012/30/EU. 
Section 7.31 
Registration of Capital Reductions 
(1) An application for registration must be filed no later than four weeks after the date of the resolution 
(see Chapter 3, Section 5). 
(2) Resolutions on capital reductions must be registered immediately. 
(3) The resolution to reduce the share capital is invalid if no application for registration is filed with the 
Registrar within four weeks after the date of the resolution or no registration is made directly thereafter.  
Comments 
Re 1) According to Article 34 of Directive 2012/30/EU, the decision to reduce the subscribed capital must 
be published in accordance with the rules of the 1st Company Law Directive (2009/101/EU). Section 31, 
Subsection (1)-(2) is an implementation of this requirement. 
Re 2) Section 31, Subsection (3) is inspired by Section 191 of the Danish Companies Act. Further, it is 
similar to provisions in the Finnish Companies Act (Chapter 14 Section) and the Swedish Companies Act 
(Chapter 20, Section 22). According to the Nordic Companies Acts, the resolution is invalid if no 
registration or application for registration is filed with the Registrar within the time limit. This is contrary 
to section 644(6) of the UK Companies Act, according to which a failure to deliver the required documents 
to the Registrar within the time limit does not affect the validity of a resolution concerning reduction of 
share capital. In all Member States, there is a duty to file the decision on capital reduction, but the 
consequences of failure to register vary. The EMCA Group prefers to follow the Nordic solution. 
If the capital reduction cannot be implemented, a registration must still take place, see Section 32 below. 
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Section 7.32 
Implementation of Capital Reductions 
(1) Capital reductions are deemed to be finally implemented after the expiry of the time limit of four weeks 
for the filing of claims against the company under Section 30, Subsection (3), unless creditors have applied 
to a court or other authority as defined in national law for adequate safeguards. The first sentence does not 
apply to capital reductions in connection with redemption of shares (Chapter 5, Section 15). 
(2) The company’s central governing body must, before the expiry of the time limit in Subsection (1), 
notify the Registrar if the capital reduction cannot be implemented on the basis that the resolution has been 
withdrawn or changed. 
(3) If a private limited company has decided to authorize its central governing body to reduce the capital 
up to a certain amount (see Section 27), the capital reduction will only be deemed to be finally implemented 
when it has been registered that such authority has been exercised. 
Comments 
Re 1) If a request to the creditors is to be issued in accordance with Section 30, and if the creditors file 
claims, the company may decide not to go through with the capital reduction. In that case and other cases 
were the decision to reduce capital is withdrawn or changed, a registration to that effect must take place. 
See Subsection (2). This is also the case if any claims by creditors have not been paid in full or adequate 
security has not been provided for them. See Section 30, Subsection (3)-(4). However, in most cases the 
decision to reduce capital is implemented as initially decided. Section 32, Subsection (1) therefore 
determines that the capital reduction is considered final after the expiry of the time limit of four weeks for 
the filing of claims against the company under Section 30, Subsection (3). 
Re 2) Subsection (2) is a logical consequence of Section 27. 
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PART 8 
GENERAL PROVISION ON ILLEGAL DISTRIBUTION AND RESTITUTION AND 
LIABILITY FOR MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNING BODY 
Section 7.33 
Restitution of illegal distribution and Liability for Members of the Central Governing Body 
(1) If any distribution to shareholders or other persons has been made in contravention of the principles 
and rules of the EMCA, the articles of association of the company or a decision by the shareholders meeting, 
such distribution must be restituted to the company. However, distribution of an ordinary dividend or 
extraordinary dividend, distribution in the form of gifts and distribution to shareholders in connection with 
a reduction of capital need only be restituted if the shareholder or third party realized or ought to have 
realized that the distribution was illegal. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the consequence of the particular type of illegal distribution is regulated 
differently in the EMCA. 
(3) Any member of the company’s central governing body who have agreed to or allowed a distribution in 
contravention of the principles and rules of this Act, the articles of association of the company or a decision 
by the shareholders meeting shall be liable for any deficiency as a result of an unsuccessful restitution 
according to Subsection (1). 
Comments 
Re 1) Section 33 is partially an implementation of Article 18 of Directive 2012/30/EU but with a wider 
scope in its application as regards both the different types of illegal distribution which it applies to and the 
protection provided for a shareholder or third party who receives an illegal distribution. Provisions on 
restitution or repayment are generally found in national company law legislation, for example, in the Danish 
Companies Act (Section 194), the French Companies Act (Article L. 223-40 of the Commercial Code), the 
German Companies Act (§ 62) and the Swedish Companies Act (Chapter 17, Section 6). The EMCA Group 
emphasizes that the EMCA does not protect a shareholder or third party who has received an illegal 
disguised distribution. 
Re 2) Subsection (2) is not based on any EU legislation. However, similar rules are common in national 
European legislation and can even be found in the MBCA, § 8.33. The company’s central governing body 
has a fundamental role in being a guardian ensuring that the principles and rules in EMCA on capital 
outflow are respected and followed, in particular the intended creditor protection in Section 2, but also for 
example the principle of equality between shareholders (cf. Articles 17 and 46 of Directive 2012/30/EU). 
For that reason, the EMCA includes a rule on liability of members of the company’s central governing 
body. Any member of the company’s central governing body who have agreed to or allowed a distribution 
in contravention of the principles and rules of this Act, the articles of association of the company or a 
decision by the shareholders meeting shall be liable for any deficiency as a result of unsuccessful restitution 
according to Subsection (1).
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General Comments50 
1. EU law 
EU law contains no binding rules on the management structure of public companies. In 1972, the 
Commission proposed a 5th Company Law Directive (OJ L 73, 27.3.1972) concerning the structure of 
public companies. The recommendations suggested a choice for companies between one-tier or two-tier 
board structures. However, the draft was eventually withdrawn by the Commission.  
The SE (Societas Europaea) Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) 2157/2001) allows for both one-tier and 
two-tier structures. Articles 43-45 of the SE Regulation contain a description of the one-tier board system 
and Articles 39-42 provide for a description of the two-tier board system. According to Article 38(b), the 
SE Regulation only allows for these two systems, although both systems can be accommodated to suit 
corporate structures that do not fit this dichotomy. Common rules applying to both systems are stated in 
Articles 46-51 of the SE Regulation. 
Management structures of private companies are not regulated in the EU. The Draft Directive of 2014 on 
single-member private limited liability companies only proposes that a Societas Unius Personae (SUP) 
should have a management body (composed of a single director or several directors) but leaves it to the 
Member States to provide for a SUP to have a supervisory board.51 
The Commission’s 2003 Action Plan recommended offering additional organisational freedom to listed 
companies.52 
In the Commission’s 2012 Action Plan,53 the Commission acknowledged the coexistence of these different 
board structures, which are often deeply rooted in the country’s overall economic governance system, and 
signalled no intention to challenge or modify these arrangements. This reflects the view expressed in the 
2011 report of the Reflection Group on the Future of EU Company Law that different corporate governance 
systems and structures should be seen as a treasure-trove of time-tested solutions to be used by business.54 
Further, the 2012 Action Plan stressed that there is a need to improve the effective oversight of executive 
directors and management boards by non-executive directors and supervisory boards. 
The Commission opined also that (supervisory) boards should give broader consideration to the entire range 
of risks faced by their companies. Extending the reporting requirements with regard to non-financial 
parameters would help in establishing a more comprehensive risk profile of the company, enabling a more 
effective design of strategies to address those risks. 
This additional focus on non-financial aspects would encourage companies to adopt a sustainable and long-
term strategic approach to their business. 
In order to encourage companies to enhance board diversity and give greater consideration to non-financial 
risks, in 2014 a directive was adopted to strengthen disclosure requirements with regard to board diversity 
policy and risk management through amendments to the Accounting Directive (Directive 2013/34/EU).55 
                                                     
50 The working group o Chapter 8 was chaired by Professor Harm-Jan de Kluiver (University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands) 
and Professor Joti Roest (University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands). 
51 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on single-member private limited liability companies 
(COM(2014) 212 final), Article 22 (version dated 21 May 2015, 8811/5). 
52 Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union – A Plan to Move Forward 
(COM(2003) 284 final), pp. 15-16. 
53 COM(2012) 740 final, pp. 5-6. 
54 Report of the Reflection Group on the Future of EU Company Law, Brussels 5 April 2011, p. 11-12. 
55 Directive 2014/95/EU Of The European Parliament And Of The Council of 22 October 2014 amending Directive 2013/34/EU 
as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups, OJ L 330, 15.11.2014, 
p. 1. 
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On 9 April 2014, the Commission presented a proposal for the revision of the Shareholders’ Rights 
Directive (2007/36/EC)56 and Directive 2013/34/ EU.57 On the same date the Commission presented a 
Recommendation to improve the quality of corporate governance reports, and in particular the quality of 
explanations provided by companies when they depart from requirements of the relevant corporate 
governance code.58 
2. National law 
Originally, supervision of management was in most companies left to the annual general meeting of 
shareholders. However, the understanding of the need to monitor management continuously provided for 
certain jurisdictions to allow for establishment of permanent supervisory bodies most often comprised by 
shareholders. In the late 19th century, Germany introduced a two-tier structure based on a clear separation 
of supervision and management, each function allocated to a separate company body: the supervisory board 
(Aufsichtsrat) and a management board (Vorstand). The division was strict and no double mandates were 
allowed. In the Nordic system, non-executives serve a dual function: to make the overall strategic decisions 
and to supervise the daily management carried out by the executives. Consequently, the notion of a two-
tier system is based upon a clear separation of supervision and management, often reinforced by ensuring 
that the supervisory body cannot engage in management decisions or usurp management decisions and a 
prohibition against double mandates whereby a person can serve on both organs. Many systems differ in 
the degree to which they place importance on supervision. They can be viewed as modified one-tier systems 
to the extent that they view management as divided between strategic and daily tactical management and 
they allow double mandates. 
Thus, at present two basic corporate governance concepts can be found in the EU Member States: the one-
tier and the two-tier system. As concerns the legal regulation of governance structures, only a one-tier 
system exists (except for the Societas Europaea) in Member States such as Belgium, Greece, Ireland and 
the UK, while in other Member States, such as Austria and Germany, a two-tier system is mandatory. In 
addition, at least for public companies, there are Member States such as France (since 1966), Italy (since 
2003), the Netherlands (since 2013) and Luxembourg (since 2006) that allow shareholders to decide 
whether to adopt a one or two-tier system, according to the articles of incorporation. Finally, there are 
Member States, which have introduced systems in between such as the Nordic countries with their modified 
version of a one-tier system. 
2.1. One-tier system 
The UK is normally used as the typical example of a one-tier system. In the UK, both private and public 
companies have a single tier board of directors. The board has actual authority to manage the company as 
determined by the articles. The shareholders exercise control over the company at the general meeting and 
decide on those matters for which they have responsibility either under the articles or the Companies Act 
2006. 
For public and private companies, the appointment of non-executive directors (NEDs) on the board of the 
company is optional. As far as listed companies are concerned, the UK Corporate Governance Code 
requires that the board includes executive and NEDs. Executive board members carry on the business and 
monitor the execution and performance of the company’s activities. NEDs, also called “outside directors”, 
have the dual function of developing strategy, and monitoring the execution of the business. NEDs 
scrutinize the performance of management in meeting agreed goals and objectives and they monitor the 
reporting of performance. Thus, the division between supervisory and managing directors is created within 
a single tier board. 
                                                     
56 On 9 December 2016, the EU presidency and the EU Parliament agreed on the final version of the new Shareholders Rights 
Directive. 
57 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the 
encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards certain elements of the corporate 
governance statement, COM(2014) 213 final, amended by the European Parliament 8 July 2015. 
58 Commission Recommendation of 9 April 2014 on the quality of corporate governance reporting (‘comply or explain’) 
(2014/208/EU) OJ L 109/43, 12.4.2014. 
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2.2. Two-tier system 
Germany is normally used as the typical example of a two-tier system (in public companies). 
Public companies 
In Germany, the control of a public company is divided into two tiers: the management board (Vorstand) 
is entrusted with the task of managing the company, while the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) has only a 
controlling function. The German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz) calls for a clear separation of duties 
between management and supervisory functions and therefore prohibits simultaneous membership on both 
boards. 
According to the German Corporate Governance Code (as amended in 2015): 
Section 3.1: “The Management Board and Supervisory Board cooperate closely to the benefit of 
the enterprise”. 
Section 3.2: “The Management Board coordinates the enterprise’s strategic approach with the 
Supervisory Board and discusses the current state of strategy implementation with the Supervisory 
Board in regular intervals”. 
Section 5.1.1: “The task of the Supervisory Board is to advise and supervise the Management 
Board in the management of the enterprise. It must be involved in decisions of fundamental 
importance to the enterprise”. 
Section 5.4.4: “Management Board members may not become members of the Supervisory Board 
of the company within two years after the end of their appointment unless they are appointed upon 
a motion presented by shareholders holding more than 25 % of the voting rights in the company. 
In the latter case appointment to the chairmanship of the Supervisory Board shall be an exception 
to be justified to the General Meeting”. 
According to the German two-tier system, the supervisory board and the management board interact 
intensively. 
The management board is entrusted with full responsibility for managing the company. The board can 
consist of one or more persons. If the management board consists of more than one member, all the 
members will have to act jointly when representing the company, unless otherwise stipulated in the articles 
of association. The managers are required to report their activities to the supervisory board on a regular 
basis. 
German law requires the management board to take appropriate action in order to detect detrimental 
developments which might endanger the survival of the company. In particular, the management board is 
obliged to establish a risk management system (§ 91(2) German Stock Corporation Act). The management 
board is required to inform the supervisory board on all issues important to the company with regard to 
corporate planning. 
The main functions of the supervisory board are the appointment and dismissal of the members of the 
management board, the supervision of the management board and the approval of the accounts and other 
transactions, as set out in the articles of association. 
The supervisory board is required to monitor and assess the established risk management system. This 
ensures that members of the supervisory board become more sensitive to, and aware of, the need to monitor 
risky business decisions and to make a contribution to risk precaution. 
The supply of information strengthens the advisory function of the supervisory board, because a better‐
informed supervisory board is significantly more capable to advise the management board on fundamental 
issues of corporate strategy. Knowledge of corporate planning data provides the supervisory board with an 
insight into the prospective business policy of the company, and it improves its competence to promptly 
detect and prevent corporate malfeasance. 
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According to Section 110(3) of the German Stock Corporation Act, the supervisory board is required to 
meet twice in a semi-annual period. Section 171(2) provides for an “incentive rule”, requiring the 
supervisory board to inform the general meeting which committees it has established and how often the 
supervisory board and its committees have actually met. This requirement makes the monitoring process 
of the supervisory board more transparent. Moreover, the provision aims to incentivize the supervisory 
board to establish an appropriate number of committees since it is accountable to the general meeting. 
Which committees the supervisory board establishes and how often it and its committees actually meet, 
depends on the size, structure etc. of a given company, as well as on the size and structure of the supervisory 
board. 
Several provisions of the German Stock Corporation Act require that the supervisory board receive 
adequate accounting- and auditing‐related information from the auditor(s). It is responsible for making the 
audit assignment which improves the independence of the auditor vis-à-vis the management board. 
Section 5.4.2 of the German Corporate Governance Code requires the supervisory board to consist of “an 
adequate number of independent members.” It is assumed that conflicts of interests that may interfere with 
the supervisory board members’ monitoring duty vis-á-vis the management board are avoided when 
independent supervisory board members monitor the business decisions of the management board. 
The members of the supervisory board are appointed by the shareholders at the general meeting. In 
codetermined companies, special rules apply to the representatives of the employees on the supervisory 
board. The rights and duties of the supervisory board apply equally to all its members. See below Part 4, 
Section 31 on employee representation. 
Private companies 
In Germany, the legal framework for private companies is not as strict as that for public companies and it 
permits a high degree of flexibility in the drafting of the articles of association. Only two compulsory 
corporate bodies are required: the managing directors and the shareholders’ meeting. Further, the 
companies may determine whether to establish advisory boards or shareholder committees. The duties of 
such committees are to be defined in the articles of association. The managing directors (one or more) are 
responsible for managing the company. The shareholders’ meeting has overall competence on all matters 
related to the company on which it wishes to decide. However, in the event that the company has more than 
500 employees in Germany, the two-tier board structure is mandatory and a supervisory board must be 
established. 
2.3. Systems in between/Modified systems 
As noted earlier, some countries, such as the Nordic countries, have systems that fall in between the one-
tier and two-tier systems. In other words, within the aforementioned two systems mentioned, modifications 
are possible. In Denmark, for example, companies have been allowed to choose between different 
governance systems since 2009. Every limited liability company must have an executive board (direction) 
that is responsible for the day-to-day management of the company. Public companies may choose between 
the traditional Nordic model, which is described as a modified one-tier structure, where a board of directors 
(bestyrelse) performs the dual function of making strategic decisions and supervising the executive board, 
or an alternative management structure inspired by the German two-tier structure where all executive 
powers are vested with the management board and supervision is left to a supervisory board. In the former 
one-tier system, double mandates are allowed, whereas in the latter two-tier system, they are not. 
The traditional Nordic governance system is generally characterized as a modified one-tier system. It 
consists of a board structure with an executive board and a board of directors. While the board of directors 
is the superior executive body of the company, the executive board is in charge of its day-to-day 
management and is subject to the instructions of the board of directors. Compared to the German two-tier 
system, there is no clear allocation of rights and duties between the different company organs and the 
system is very flexible. The executive board is responsible for the daily management of the company but 
the executive board may not, such as the German management board (Vorstand) does, claim exclusive 
rights over individual tasks. The board of directors, as the upper level of management, maintains 
responsibility for the overall strategic management and control function. 
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Private companies in the Nordic countries do not have to have an executive board but can rely on the board 
of directors as the single management body. They may, however, choose the same systems as public 
companies and introduce an executive board to handle day-to-day management, in which case the board of 
directors will assume the dual function of overall strategic management and supervision. If employee 
representation exists, a private company must have the latter system, because employee representatives 
must be directors in the upper management body, the board of directors. In Finland, public companies enjoy 
the same right as private companies to choose whether to have one management, the board of directors and 
an executive board, or just on single management body, the board of directors. 
Like the Nordic system, the Italian and Portuguese systems are based on an optional approach. The 
shareholders can choose one of three different systems: (1) the traditional system with a management board 
and a board of statutory auditors (which has a similar role as a supervisory board) ; (2) a German style two-
tier system; or (3) an Anglo-Saxon style one-tier system in which non-executive directors are appointed. 
The establishment of a supervisory board is discretionary in France, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Portugal. 
In the Netherlands a so-called ‘large company regime’ exists. This regime applies both to private and public 
companies in which the equity exceeds EUR 16 Million and the total number of employees in the company 
(and its subsidiaries) is 100 or more while a works council has been established. Such large companies may 
choose between either a two-tier regime or a one-tier system in which non-executive directors are 
mandatory. One third of the members of the supervisory board or the non-executive directors may be 
nominated by the works council. The supervisory board or the non-executive directors do have special 
powers apart from supervising and advising the management board/executive directors. The supervisory 
board (or the non-executives in a one-tier structure) appoints (and dismisses) the members of the 
management board (or the executive directors in a one-tier structure) unless an exemption applies which 
may be the case in international groups (Sections 2:152-164a/262- 274a Dutch Companies Act). 
The decision whether to choose a pure one- or two-tier-system or a modified one- or two-tier system should 
be made either in the national Companies Acts or otherwise the Companies Acts should authorize the 
companies to make the decision. 
Regarding the role of the general meeting (and the division of responsibilities between shareholders and 
management), the positions in national law are very different. In a number of Member States the 
management board is exclusively responsible for the administration of the company’s affairs. This is the 
case for example in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary and Italy (for the public company). In 
Ireland and the UK, the role of the general meeting in principle is a matter of the company’s constitution. 
In the Nordic countries, the general meeting has the ultimate power in the company and since dominant 
ownership is widespread even in publicly traded companies, shareholders can and do exercise considerable 
influence on the management. 
A characteristic of the typical two-tier system is that it is not possible for the same person to have a dual 
role (i.e. be represented in both the management board and supervisory board). This is for example the case 
in Bulgaria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Slovakia. In systems 
like the Danish and the Swedish ones, it is possible to be represented on both boards. 
Chapter 8 contains rules on board composition and function of the board. All Member States have rules on 
these matters but the rules differ in detail, see further in the comments to various sections in Chapter 8. 
Director’s duties and director’s conflicts of interest are dealt with in Chapter 9. Chapter 10 contains the 
rules on directors’ liability. 
A major difference between the Member States’ is that some countries include provisions on employee 
representation in their Companies Acts. This is the case for example in Austria, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden. In other 
continental Europen countries, provisions on employee representation are to be found in the labour code 
(France, Luxembourg). Also, in Ireland, Lithuania and the UK, the question of employee influence on the 
company’s affairs is a part of labour law and hence in most companies it has no direct influence on the 
corporate structure. 
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Even if there is employee representation on the company’s boards, there are major differences in detail. 
The most extensive system is found in Germany where half of the members of the supervisory board in 
large companies (more than 2000 employees) must be employee representatives. 
3. Considerations 
According to Section 3 of Chapter 1 of the EMCA, a company may be public or private. Section 3 states 
that “the shares of a private company may not be offered to the public.” A private company is thus any 
company that is not a public company. 
Public companies, although there are far fewer of these than private companies, are very significant from 
an economic perspective. These companies are designed for larger enterprises which have access to all the 
capital markets for raising finance, both in terms of equity capital from shareholders and loan capital from 
bondholders. However, public companies are sometimes employed for the purpose of family businesses 
that may not seek access to the capital markets. Public companies may have a large number of shareholders 
but this is not necessarily the case. 
Public companies are subject to far greater controls in such areas as mergers and creditor protection. In 
legal terms, the common characteristics of public companies include the free transferability of shares and 
securities, a detailed system of control and minority shareholder protection, control measures on raising 
and maintaining equity capital, the necessity to disclose information to members and to the public, and 
detailed rules regarding auditing and accounting. Because of the enactment of EU Directives, there is 
significant degree of similarity between the laws governing public companies in the various Member States 
of the EU. 
According to the EMCA, a traded company is defined as a publicly traded company whose securities are 
listed or traded on a regulated market or a multilateral trading facility, cf. Section 2 of Chapter 1. Traded 
companies are not only subject to company law but also to securities regulation, which to some extent 
overlaps with company law. They tend to have dispersed ownership, or at least dispersed minority 
shareholders, and the markets on which their shares are traded provide an external disciplinary mechanism. 
Private companies are usually thought to be suitable for small and medium-sized enterprises, which do not 
require access to public funding. Financing comes usually from contributions by the members themselves 
or alternatively by bank finance. However, private companies may be used for other purposes, especially 
as holding companies and subsidiaries. Often, large companies take the form of a private company. Private 
companies are subject less to the provisions of EU Directives than are public companies. 
The EMCA Group agrees – in accordance with the Commission’s Action Plan (2012) - that the Member 
States should be free to choose between different board structures according to the need of the company 
and national traditions. However, in practice, there is something of a convergence between the two basic 
systems. Thus, the UK one-tier system is divided in a way that some directors have executive functions and 
the others are acting on a non-executive basis, thereby having stronger supervisory positions. Thus, Chapter 
8 is divided into four parts: Part 1 deals with the one-tier systems and Part 2 deals with two-tier systems 
and Part 3 contains rules common to all systems. The same structure can be found, as mentioned above, in 
the SE Regulation. 
The rules on the company’s management are in various ways different regarding private and public 
companies. Thus, Chapters 8 and 9 contain special provisions regarding private and public companies 
including publicly traded companies (see the EMCA Chapter 1, Section 2). 
Regarding employee representation, which is found in Part 4, the national traditions on employee 
representation are very strong and the EMCA Group considers that it is not possible to develop a common 
rule in this area, see further in Section 31.  
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Section 8.01 
The Company’s Corporate Governance Structure 
(1) The company’s corporate governance structure shall comprise of: 
(a) The general meeting of shareholders, and 
(b) The company’s management structure. 
(2) The company’s management structure should be determined in the articles of association. A company 
can choose between the following management structures: 
(a) A one-tier system according to the provisions in Part 1 of this Chapter. 
(b) A two-tier system according to the provisions in Part 2 of this Chapter. 
(c) Systems in between according to the provisions in this Chapter. 
Comments 
The majority of Member States apply the two-tier system in public companies. In private companies, on 
the contrary, Member States do not generally have rules compelling the companies to use the two-tier 
management structure. An exception is the Dutch large company regime that, as described above, contains 
mandatory rules for both public and private companies. In some Member States private companies can 
choose between a one-tier and a two-tier system, this is for example the case in Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. The typical structure of the one-tier system is described above. 
Most companies in Europe are small private companies and there are many fewer public companies. Thus, 
the regulatory approach concerning the (EU) distinction between public and private companies suggests 
that private companies are companies with few(er) shareholders and less capital. Therefore, such companies 
need simpler and more flexible management structures. 
However, as mentioned before, private companies are not necessarily small companies. The distinction 
between private and public companies is that only public companies can offer shares to the public, see 
Chapter 1, Section 3. 
Traded companies can offer shares to the public either on regulated markets or on an alternative market. In 
both cases the consequence is a division between a (large) number of shareholders and the management of 
the company. 
Large private companies face many of the same management problems as large, public companies 
including: principle/agent problems; a need for a specialized management/supervision structure; and a need 
for regulation regarding decisions taken by company organs. Consequently, private companies may choose 
the same management structure as public companies. 
The EMCA allows companies to choose between different board structures, including a one-tier system, a 
two-tier system and a system in between. This is in line with the trend that can be observed in the different 
Member States. In addition, there is no evidence that one system is better than the other. 
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PART 1 
ONE-TIER SYSTEMS 
Section 8.02 
Appointment of the Board of Directors 
(1) Directors shall be appointed by the general meeting. The articles of association may stipulate that one 
or more members of the board of directors shall be appointed by specific shareholders or third parties. 
(2) The number of board members shall be determined in the articles of association. In a public company, 
the board of directors shall comprise of no fewer than three members. A private company shall have at least 
one director. 
(3) In public companies, the majority of the board of directors shall be appointed by the general meeting 
unless national law provides otherwise. 
(4) In a public company, prior to an appointment to the board, the candidates shall provide the general 
meeting with information regarding their positions in other companies as well as any other fact that may 
cause a potential conflict of interest. 
Comments 
The shareholder meeting elects the board of directors with a simple majority, according to Chapter 11, 
Section 26. This means that the majority can elect the whole board. However, the articles of association 
may provide that minority shareholders have a right to be represented on the board. The latter is in line 
with the Companies Acts in Member States such as Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy (in listed 
companies), Greece, Spain and Portugal. 
Re 1) Member States may enact specific provisions, for example regarding state-owned companies, which 
provide that the national government may directly appoint directors. In such cases, the articles of 
association of course should be consistent with such provisions. Also, in relation to the appointment of 
directors in Section 2(1) and (3,) national laws may have enacted specific provisions for example on co-
determination, see below Part 4. 
All board members should be natural persons, see Section 18. 
Re 2) In various national corporate governance codes, it is stressed that the number of board members 
should not be incompatible with the efficient working of the board. This should be considered as good 
practice in all companies, but the EMCA Group does not consider that the EMCA should contain a 
regulation on the maximum of board members. 
Re 3) Appointment of the board in private companies should be decided by the shareholders in accordance 
with the articles of association. According to a principle of flexibility in private companies, there should 
be no limitations regarding appointment of the board. However, in public companies the EMCA Group 
considers that it is important that the appointment of the board is a matter for the shareholders. The number 
of board members to be appointed other than by the general shareholders’ meeting should hence be fewer 
than half of all members. The EMCA Group considers that in public companies, keeping with the principle 
of shareholders’ democracty (Chapter 1, Section 1.12), decision rights on all-important matters relating to 
the company should always be reserved for the shareholders. Hence, on each matter, the shareholders 
should be able to reassess the company’s focus and management by appointing a new board majority. This 
is the reason for Section 2 (3). A similar rule is found in the Danish Companies Act Section 120(1) and the 
Swedish Companies Act Chapter 8, Section 47.  
Re 4) Section 2(4) intends to give the shareholders an opportunity to consider whether a candidate to the 
board is able to fulfil his or her duties in the company taking into account any existing or potential conflicts 
of interest. See further on directors’ conflicts of interest in Chapter 9, Part 2. 
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The EMCA Group has considered whether the duty to inform the shareholders of other positions should be 
limited to publicly traded companies, or whether it should apply to all public companies. Since there are a 
substantial number of public companies of a size or structure similar to publicly traded companies, the 
Group considers that paragraph 4 should apply to all public companies. 
Section 8.03 
Chairman of the Board of Directors 
(1) The board of directors selects a chairman, unless otherwise stated in the articles of association. 
(2) The chairman is responsible for the leadership of the board and ensuring its effectiveness in all aspects 
of its role. 
(3) In traded companies, the roles of chairman and chief executive should not be exercised by the same 
individual. The division of responsibilities between the chairman and chief executive should be clearly 
established, and agreed by the board. 
Comments 
Re 1) Private companies with a one-tier system must have at least one director, see for example the Danish 
Companies Act, the German GmbH-Gesetz, and the UK Companies Act. However, private companies may 
also choose to have more directors. According to the UK Companies Act, the board in public companies 
must have at least two directors. In other Member States there is no minimum number of board members. 
Of course, the question of a chairman of the board is only relevant if there are more board members. A 
larger board is especially relevant in large companies, especially publicly traded companies. 
The chairman’s position may be described further in the articles of association or in the board rules on 
procedure. 
Re 2) This provision is taken from the UK Corporate Governance Code (2014), Main Principle, A.3. 
Re 3) In many companies, it would be suitable to have a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the 
company between the running of the board and the executive responsibility for the running of the 
company’s business. This principle is expressly stated in the UK Corporate Governance Code (2014), as 
mentioned above, which applies to traded companies. 
One of the main issues in corporate governance is the separation of the roles of a chairman and executive 
directors. Even if the company has a one-tier system, it is important that there is a division of responsibilities 
between the chairman and the (other) board members. In the UK system, it is common to divide the board 
members in executive and non- executive directors (see below in Section 4). The UK Corporate Governance 
Code (2014) under A.2. states the main principle regarding division of responsibilities as follows: “There 
should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the company between the running of the board 
and the executive responsibility for the running of the company’s business. No one individual should have 
unfettered powers of decision.” The Danish Companies Act Section 114 expresses a similar view. 
In the UK Corporate Governance Code, Main Principle A.3, the chairman’s role is described as follows: 
“the chairman is responsible for leadership of the board and ensuring its effectiveness on all aspects of its 
role” while the main principle of the non-executive directors (A.4) is described as follows: “as part of their 
role as members of a unitary board, non-executive directors should constructively challenge and help 
develop proposals on strategy”. 
Most Member States do not have a provision akin to Section 2(3). However, the EMCA Group is of the 
opinion that it is useful to accept a principle of division of responsibilities. 
Section 8.04 
Executive and Non-executive Directors 
In traded companies, the board structure shall be divided into executive and non-executive directors. The 
number of executive and non-executive directors should be stated in the rules of procedure, according to 
Section 7 below. 
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Comments 
As mentioned in the General Comments under national law, the board in a one-tier system should exercise 
all management tasks, which in the two-tier system are assigned to the supervisory board and the 
management board. Therefore, the division is mandatory according to Section 4 for publicly traded 
companies, see below. However, the principle is also recommended for adoption by other companies but it 
is not mandatory due to the very different structures of these other companies. Therefore, national law may 
introduce a similar rule as a default rule. 
This Section also deals with the corporate governance question of the separation of functions between 
management and supervisors as well as problems concerning conflicts of interest. 
As noted earlier, in the UK-system, the boards of medium-sized and larger companies typically comprises 
both executive directors involved in the day-to-day management of the company, and non- executive 
directors (NEDs) supervising the former. Thus, the division between executive and non-executive 
corresponds to the division between the responsibility for the running of the company’s business and the 
supervisory function of the supervisory board in the two-tier system. 
Further details on the function of the executive/non-executive directors should be stated in company’s rules 
on procedure, see below in Section 7. 
Section 4 is in line with the Commission’s Recommendation 2005/162/EC on the role of non- executive or 
supervisory directors of listed companies and on the committees of the (supervisory) board. 
The UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) Section B.1. states that “The board should include an 
appropriate combination of executive and non-executive directors (and, in particular, independent non-
executive directors) such that no individual or small group of individuals can dominate the board’s decision 
taking.” The UK Corporate Governance Code distinguishes between large and smaller companies. 
The EMCA Group considered if there should be a fixed percentage of executive/non-executive directors 
(according to the UK model at least half must be independent non-executives). The Group agrees that there 
might be differences between large and small companies. However, the definition of large and small 
companies varies between Member States. Therefore, it is not possible to determine a fixed balance 
between executive and non-executive directors in the EMCA. Instead, the EMCA clarifies that the balance 
should be determined in the rules of procedure. 
The Recommendation 2005/162/EC on the role of non-executive or supervisory directors of listed 
companies and on the committees of the (supervisory) board, the UK Corporate Governance Code as well 
as other national corporate governance codes further demand that a sufficient number of non- executive 
board members are independent, see Section 5. 
Section 8.05 
Independent Directors 
(1) In traded companies, the board should comprise an appropriate balance of independent non-executive 
directors. The number of independent non-executive directors should be stated in the rules of procedure, 
see below in Section 7. 
(2) A director should be considered to be independent only if he or she is free of any business, family or 
other relationship with the company, its controlling shareholder or the management that creates a conflict 
of interest such as to impair his or her judgement. 
Comments 
Section 5 follows the Commission’s Recommendation 2005/162/EC Section II 3(1) according to which 
there should be “an appropriate balance of executive/managing and non- executive/supervisory directors 
such that no individual or small group of individuals can dominate decision-making on the part of these 
bodies”. 
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The EMCA Section 5 does not define an “appropriate balance” of independent non-executive directors. 
According to the UK Corporate Governance Code at least half must be independent non-executive 
directors. According to provision B.1.2. “except for smaller companies, at least half the board, excluding 
the chairman, should comprise non-executive directors determined by the board to be independent. A 
smaller company should have at least two independent non-executive directors.” (A smaller company is 
one that is below the FTSE 350 throughout the year immediately prior to the reporting year.) 
For the same reasons as mentioned in the comments to Section 4, company laws of the Member States 
contain different rules based on the size of the company, and therefore the EMCA Section 7 prescribes that 
the rules of procedure specify the balance of non- executive/executive board members. 
Section 5(2) follows the Commission’s Recommendation 2005/162/EC in Section III (13)(1). According 
to Section III 13(3)(2), the criteria for independence should be laid down in national corporate governance 
codes, see for example the Danish Corporate Governance Code (point 5.4), the Lithuanian Corporate 
Governance Code (point 3.7) and the UK Corporate Governance Code (under B.1.1). The EMCA Group 
agrees that the more detailed definition of independence should be left to national corporate governance 
codes. 
Employee representatives are not independent in the sense of the definitions in Section 5(2). Therefore, the 
claim for independence in Section 5(1) only applies regarding board members elected by the shareholders. 
Section 8.06 
Resignation and Dismissal of Members of the Board of Directors 
(1) A member of the board of directors may resign from the board of directors at any time. 
(2) A member of the board of directors may be dismissed at any time without cause by those who have 
appointed the member. 
(3) A member of the board of directors who is not elected by the general meeting may be dismissed at any 
time by the general meeting for a good cause. 
(4) If there is no alternate member available to replace the former member, the other members of the board 
shall take measures necessary to appoint a new member of the board. The new member shall hold office 
until the next general meeting where his or her appointment must be confirmed by those entitled to appoint 
the member. The election may be deferred until the next annual meeting, provided that the board of 
directors is quorate with the remaining members and alternate members. 
Comments 
Re 2) A simple majority is sufficient for a dismissal according to the general rule in Chapter 11. This is so 
without prejudice to any rights to compensation or damages (abusive dismissal, lack of respect of defense 
rights… ) payable in respect of the termination of their appointment as director. See for example the UK 
COMPANIES ACT(2006) Section 168. 
National law may contain the provision that a director is entitled to be heard on the resolution to dismiss 
him or her. See for example Section 2:117(4)/227(7) Dutch Companies Act and the UK Companies Act 
Section 169 (2). French case law adopts the same view. 
Specific provisions in national law on co-determination may provide for alternatives regarding dismissal 
of employee board members. See also below in Part 4. 
Re 3) A “good cause” is a violation of directors’ duties according to Chapter 9. For example, this could be 
disloyal behavior like a breach of contract, breach of duty of care, or simply diverging views on the 
management of the company. The director can be asked to leave but the courts may determine whether the 
dismissal is legitimate. See correspondingly above in comments to Section 2. 
A dismissal could give rise to a claim for compensation (but not reinstatement) if the court considers that 
there was no good cause for the dismissal. 
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Re 2) and 3) A dismissal could also result in an obligation to pay compensation based on labour law. Such 
labour law aspects are not regulated in the EMCA and are left to national law. 
Re 4) On alternate directors, see below, Section 15. 
Greek Companies Act Article 18 provides that the remaining members may continue to form a valid board, 
if the articles of association so provide. Section 6(4) of EMCA goes further making it unnecessary to 
include such a provision in the articles of association. Thus, the other members do not need to take measures 
to appoint new members of the board for the remaining part of the term. 
German law makes a distinction between private and public companies with regard to the possibility to 
dismiss directors. Private companies usually apply a one-tier system. The shareholders are appointing the 
directors and have the right to dismiss them at any time without cause (Sec. 38 German GmbH-Gesetz). In 
public companies, the two-tier system applies, see Section 13 below. 
Section 8.07 
Rules of Procedure 
(1) The board of directors shall adopt written rules of procedure. The rules of procedures should address 
the division of tasks among the members of the board of directors, including: the number of executive/non-
executive directors; the role of the chairman; the frequency and form of meetings of the board of directors; 
how alternate members shall participate in the board of directors; supervision of the day-to-day business, 
and where relevant, monitoring the day-to-day business; reviewing the accounts; and securing the necessary 
foundations for auditing. 
(2) The provisions of the first paragraph shall not apply where the board of directors only comprises a sole 
member, cf. Section 2. 
(3) The board shall, in written instructions, state the allocation of the tasks between the board and sub-
committees or other special committees established by the board. 
Comments 
Re 1) Section 7 is not based on EU law. Section 7 is inspired by the Swedish Companies Act Section 8:46a. 
A similar provision is found in the Danish Companies Act Section 130. The Danish provision, however, is 
more flexible both compared to the Swedish Companies Act and especially compared to the previous 
provision in the Danish Companies Act, which included 10 mandatory items to be included in the rules of 
procedure. Following the Danish provision, Section 7(1) has no mandatory minimum requirements, but 
instead it recommends some items which should be considered by the board. Other countries, like Germany, 
at least provide for a basic rule that the board may adopt rules on procedure in order to set a stable 
framework for its cooperation in day-to-day business (see Sec. 77(2) German Stock Corporation Act and 
the Lithuanian Companies Act Article 34 Part 15). Other Member States are silent on the issue of written 
rules of procedure but do not prohibit them, so that they are certainly possible (e.g. France and Italy). 
The reason for implementing the provision on rules of procedure in Denmark and Sweden is that there has 
been a number of cases where the management has not met its obligations. The Danish and Swedish 
Companies Acts have general provisions describing the directors’ duties, which is also the case according 
to the EMCA Chapter 9, Part 1. The provisions on rules of procedure in the Danish and Swedish Companies 
Acts are intended to specify the board’s duties, and in that way facilitate holding the board liable in cases 
of omission or neglect to comply with directors’ duties. 
The EMCA Group considered whether the EMCA should include a provision on rules of procedure or such 
a rule should be left to national corporate governance codes. Looking at the existing national corporate 
governance codes, there are great differences regarding precise recommendations on how the board works. 
Therefore, the Group considers that it is appropriate for a model act to include a provision such as Section 
7 (and 12). 
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The Companies Acts and the articles of association contain general provisions on how the board of directors 
functions. The rules of procedure are a supplement to the articles of association but created by the board, 
and the board can also change them. There are a number of topics, which may be worth considering when 
drawing up rules of procedure, depending of course on the nature and requirements of the individual 
company. Small (private) companies usually do not need comprehensive rules of procedure. The purpose 
of the rules of procedure is, among other things, to ensure that the duties of the board are discharged in an 
appropriate manner. If there are any discrepancies between the rules of procedure and the articles of 
association, the articles of association always prevail, and the rules of procedure cannot attribute to the 
members of the management board or the supervisory board new powers and rights which they have not 
been granted by the articles of association. 
If the rules of procedure are changed, the company’s nature and purpose must be taken into account. 
The board shall consider – taking into account the actual needs of the company – whether and to what 
extent the rules of procedure should contain provisions on the constitution, the division of labour, the 
function of executive/non-executive directors, including the supervision of the daily management, 
accounting, the requirement to take minutes, the holding meetings, the duty of confidentiality, alternates, 
monitoring the accounts, signing the auditors’ records, and safeguarding the necessary basis for auditing. 
Re 2) According to Section 2, a private company may have only director. Therefore, many private 
companies do not need to make written rules of procedure. 
Re 3) Section 20 includes provisions on board committees. Further regulation of board committees can be 
made in the articles of association or in the rules of procedure. 
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PART 2 
TWO-TIER SYSTEMS 
Section 8.08 
Management Board and Supervisory Board 
(1) In a two-tier system, the management system includes a management board and a supervisory board. 
The management board shall be responsible for managing the company. The supervisory board shall 
supervise the management board. The supervisory board may not itself exercise the power to manage the 
company. The management board and the supervisory board shall have the duties and responsibilities stated 
in this Section and Chapter 9, Section 2. 
(2) The articles of association may determine that specific, important transactions may be entered into only 
with the approval of the supervisory board. The articles of association may also state that the supervisory 
board shall determine the company’s business policy. 
Comments 
The two-tier system is particularly applied in public companies. However, a number of Member States’ 
Companies Act’s also allow private companies to use a two-tier system. This is for example the case in 
Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Poland.  
Part 2 contains rules for Member States that choose a two-tier system. It includes provisions referring to 
“pure” two-tier systems, such as provided for in the Austrian, French, German and Polish legislation, but 
it also includes modified two-tier systems, such as the Dutch two-tier system. The decision whether to 
choose a pure two-system or a modified two-tier system should either be made in the national Companies 
Acts or otherwise the Companies Acts should authorize the companies to make the decision. 
Part 2 gives a high degree of freedom to organize the two-tier system but at the same time, Part 2 contains 
an extensive regulation which may be of greater help than regulation with a large discretionary content. 
Re 1)This provision defines the basic idea of a two-tier system which consists in a separation of the 
functions of management and supervision to be vested in two different organs. The basic definition of the 
different functions can be found in Section 8, which is similar to the definition in the Regulation on the 
Societas Europea (SE Regulation). Article 39 of the SE-Regulation states that “the management organ shall 
be responsible for managing the SE” and Article 40 of the SE- Regulation states that “the supervisory organ 
shall supervise the work of the management organ. It may not itself exercise the power to manage the SE”. 
Re 2) This provision makes it possible to strengthen the role of the supervisory board and at the same time 
enhance its responsibility. There is a comparable rule in Germany, allowing the articles or even the 
supervisory board itself to determine the types of transactions that require the prior approval of the 
supervisory board (Section 111 (4) German Stock Corporation Act). German law, however, does not allow 
the supervisory board to determine the company’s business policy since, from a German point of view, this 
would blur the division of powers and responsibilities between the management and the supervisory board. 
French law follows the same approach. 
According to Section 8(2), members of the management board can be required to provide large and 
extraordinary transactions to the supervisory board for approval. The articles of association may specify 
the circumstances in which the approval of the supervisory board is required, as well as the rules of 
procedure. The supervisory board may also decide on it by means of an ad hoc decision. 
According to Section 8(2), the articles of association may also decide that the management board must also 
receive the approval of the supervisory board before entering transactions involving higher risks. 
According to Section 12 the supervisory board must adopt written rules of procedure. 
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Section 8.09 
Overlap of Functions 
(1) A member of the management board shall not at the same time be a member of the supervisory board. 
(2) In companies with a modified two-tier system, the articles of association may determine that managing 
directors may be elected also as members of the supervisory board. The majority of members of the 
supervisory board shall not be members of the management board. 
Comments 
Re 1) This is the system in “pure” two-tier systems such as Austria, France, Germany and Poland. 
Re 2) For companies in modified two-tier systems, the articles of association may permit a limited overlap 
of personnel in the management system. However, to secure a division of tasks as well as an effective 
supervision, the majority of members of the supervisory board should not be members of the management 
board. 
Section 8.10 
Appointment of the Management Board/Supervisory Board 
(1) The supervisory board appoints the members of the management board unless the articles of association 
provide that the management board is appointed by the shareholder meeting. 
(2) Members of the supervisory board shall be appointed by the general meeting. The articles of association 
may stipulate that one or more members of the supervisory board shall be appointed in another manner. 
(3) In public companies, the majority of the supervisory board shall be appointed by the general meeting 
unless national law provides otherwise. 
(4) In a public company, prior to an appointment to the board, the candidates shall provide the general 
meeting with information regarding their positions in other companies as well as any other fact that may 
cause a potential conflict of interest. 
(5) The number of board members of the management board as well of the supervisory board shall be 
determined in the articles of association. The supervisory board shall comprise of no fewer than three 
members. The articles of association may limit the numbers of members of the managing board or the 
supervisory board of a company. 
(6) Section 10 (1)-(5) does not apply when national law provides otherwise. 
Comments 
Paragraphs 3 and 4 applies to public companies, whereas paragraphs 1, 2 and 5 applies to both public and 
private companies that employ a two-tier system, 
Re 1) Section 10(1) is in line with the Companies Acts in most Member States, for example the Polish 
Commercial Companies Code Article 368 for public companies. In Germany, the supervisory board 
appoints the members of the management board in public companies (Sec. 84 German Stock Corporation 
Act), but there is no possibility for the articles to deviate from this provision. French law, which was 
inspired by Germany, follows the same approach (Article L. 225-59 of the Commercial Code). 
Re 2) The main rule in those Member States which allow two-tier systems is that the supervisory board is 
appointed by the general meeting, cf. for example the Dutch Companies Act (Article 2:142/252), the French 
Commercial code (Article L. 225-75), the German Stock Corporation Act (Section 101) and the Polish 
Commercial Companies Code (Article 215 for private companies and Article 385 for public companies). 
Those provisions usually, with the exception of Germany, also allow for an alternative procedure for 
appointing members of the supervisory board. 
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Re 3) The purpose of Section 10(3) is to ensure that the shareholders have the decisive influence in the 
company. In Germany, the rules on employee co-determination in very large companies require that half 
of the members of the supervisory board must be employee representatives. Apart from that, it is possible 
to grant particular shareholders the right to appoint members to the supervisory board of a public company. 
This right may be granted only with respect to a maximum of one third of the supervisory board members 
(Section 101 (2) German Stock Corporation Act). In the Netherlands, according to the large company 
regime, the number of employee representatives is limited to one third (Sec. 2:158/268 (6) Dutch 
Companies Act). 
Re 4) Section 10(4) determines that the duty to inform the company regarding the candidate’s other 
positions is limited to the positions in the management board and the supervisory board. National Corporate 
Governance Codes should contain specific rules in order to reveal other position such as in foundations, 
cooperatives and associations. 
Re 5) Section 10(5) states that the articles of association must include the number of the members of the 
management board and of the members of the supervisory board. In some Member States there are upper 
and lower limits to the number of members. In France, for example, the maximum number of members of 
the management board (directoire) is 5 and, for listed companies, 7 (Article L. 225-58 of the Commercial 
Code). The German Stock Corporation Act Section 95 maximizes the number of members of the 
supervisory board according to the size of company’s share capital to 21. 
Re 6) Section 10(6) will be relevant if national law provides for specific rules on the appointment of 
directors as discussed in Section 2 of this Chapter (co- determination of employees). 
Section 8.11 
Chairman of the Supervisory Board 
(1) The supervisory board selects a chairman, unless otherwise stated in national law or in the articles of 
association. 
(2) The chairman shall preside over the work of the supervisory board and monitor the performance by the 
board of its duties as set forth in Chapter 9. 
(3) The chairman may not be a member of the management board. 
(4) In traded companies, the chairman of the supervisory should not exercise the same tasks as the 
managing directors. The division of responsibilities between the chairman and managing directors should 
be clearly established, and agreed by the board. 
Comments 
Re (1): The supervisory board should have a chairman, see for example the Danish Companies Act Section 
122, the French Commercial Code (Article L. 225-81), the German AktG Section 107, the Lithuanian 
Companies Act Article 31 Part 1 and the Swedish Companies Act Chapter 8 Section 17. However, the 
articles of association may provide otherwise.  
The articles of association may require, 
• that a chairman is not appointed, 
• that a specific person, who is a member of the supervisory board, may be appointed as chairman, 
• that a certain group of persons may not be appointed as chairman. 
Special laws on, especially on co-determination, may provide for rules on the chairman, see Part 4. 
Re 3 and 4) The chairman does not constitute a company organ but is characterized as the primus of the 
institution. The chairman of the supervisory board may not be a member of the management board and may 
not act as if he or she was a member of the management board. In the pure two-tier system, this prohibition 
is clear from the separation and specification of the responsibilities of the supervisory board, cf. Section 
9(1). For modified two-tier systems, a division of functions is underlined by Section 11(4). 
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The chairman’s role may be specified in the rules of procedure, see below, Section 12. 
Section 8.12 
Rules of Procedure 
(1) The supervisory board shall adopt written rules of procedure which may include the division of tasks 
among the members of the board of directors, the role of the chairman, the frequency and form of meetings 
of the board, whether alternate members shall participate in the board of directors, supervision of the day-
today business, and where relevant, monitoring the day-to-day business, reviewing the accounts, and 
securing the necessary foundations for auditing. 
(2) The provisions of the first paragraph shall not apply where the supervisory board only comprises a sole 
member, cf. Section 2. 
(3) The board may, in written instructions, further specify the allocation of tasks between the board and 
sub-committees or other special committees established by the board. 
Comments 
The supervisory board shall adopt its own rules of procedure, for example the number of meetings, 
electronic meetings, duty of confidentiality, alternate members etc. 
See further comments to Section 7. 
The rules of procedure may also describe the division of tasks between the supervisory board and the 
management board and between the board and possible committees. See on committees below, Section 20. 
National corporate governance codes, national legislation on auditors, regulation of financial institutions 
etc. contain further rules on sub-committees, such as nomination committees, remuneration committees, 
and audit committees. Thus, most Member States have implemented the Commission’s Recommendation 
(2005/162/EEC) in their national corporate governance codes. The Rules of procedure may be based on the 
corporate governance codes. 
Section 8.13 
Resignation and Dismissal of Members of the Management Board/Supervisory Board 
(1) A member of the management board / supervisory board may resign from the management board / 
supervisory board at any time. 
(2) A member of the management board / supervisory board may be dismissed at any time without cause 
by those who have appointed the member unless otherwise provided in the articles of association. 
(3) A member of the supervisory board not elected by the general meeting may be dismissed at any time 
for a good cause by the general meeting. 
(4) If there is no alternate member available to replace the former member, the other members of the board 
shall take measures to appoint a new member of the board. The new member shall hold office until the next 
general meeting where his or her appointment must be confirmed by those entitled to appoint the member. 
The election may be deferred until the next meeting, provided that the board is quorate with the remaining 
members and alternate members. 
Comments 
Re 2) dismissal of the supervisory board. 
The elected members of the supervisory board who have been elected by the general meeting can be 
dismissed at any time by the general meeting. This means, according to the general rule in Chapter 11, that 
a decision by a simple majority is sufficient. This is in line with the principle of shareholders’ democracy 
(Chapter 1, Section 1.12). 
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The provision deviates from the rule applicable under German law. According to Section 103 (1) German 
Stock Corporation Act, members of the supervisory board can be dismissed by the shareholder meeting 
only by super majority of three quarters of the votes cast. This relates to the intention of the German 
legislation to create stability within the management system of a public company (see already comments 
to Section 6). 
Re 2 and 3) According to Section 10, the articles of association may stipulate that one or more members of 
the supervisory board shall be appointed in another manner. The articles of association may also provide 
that such members may not be dismissed. However, subparagraph 3 indicates that such members can be 
dismissed by the general meeting for good cause, for example, in the case of a breach of contract or where 
a member misuses his or her position in the company. 
Section 13 (2) also includes rules on the dismissal of (members of) the management board. The 
management board is appointed by the supervisory board unless the articles of association provide that the 
management board is appointed by the general meeting, cf. Section 10(1). In case the articles of association 
provide that the management board is appointed by the general meeting, the general meeting has the power 
to dismiss a member of the management board. So, unless the articles of association contain a provision to 
the contrary, members of the management board are dismissed by the supervisory board. 
In case the supervisory board has the power to dismiss members of the management board, the general 
meeting has no power to dismiss a member of the management board directly. The general meeting may, 
however, instruct the supervisory board to dismiss a member of the management board. 
Dismissal of a member of the management board could result in an obligation to pay compensation, see the 
comments to Section 6. 
German law makes a distinction between private and public companies as regards the possibility of 
dismissing directors. In private companies, directors are appointed by the shareholders and the general 
meeting has the right to dismiss them at any time without cause (Sec. 38 German GmbH-Gesetz). In public 
companies, members of the management board can only be dismissed by the supervisory board for a good 
cause (Sec. 84 German Stock Corporation Act). One reason for this distinction lies in the different 
shareholder structure of private and public companies. In private companies, the shareholders usually are 
closely related to the business and are carefully monitoring the directors; they therefore will have the 
ultimate power to dismiss the directors at any time. In public companies, shareholders may be dispersed 
and may not have the time and the capability to monitor the management – which in the two-tier system is 
the duty of the supervisory board – and therefore are less reliable to take a well-founded decision when 
dismissing the management. Given the fact that only a minority of shareholders attend shareholder meetings 
at all, a power to dismiss the management without any reason could lead to arbitrary decisions and thereby 
be a disincentive for management to follow long-term management strategies. The supervisory board may, 
however, take into account a vote of no confidence (Vertrauensentzug) of the shareholder meeting as a 
reason to dismiss the management board (Sec. 84(3) German Stock Corporation Act). 
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PART 3 
RULES COMMON TO ALL SYSTEMS 
Section 8.14 
Term of Directors 
(1) In a public company, members of the board of directors (one-tier systems) or members of the 
management board / supervisory board (two-tier systems) are appointed for the period determined in the 
articles of association. However, the period should not exceed four years. 
(2) In a private company, the term can be indefinite. 
Comments 
Re 1) This provision is intended to ensure a continuous renewal of the company’s management. The period 
of tenure is determined by the provisions in the articles of association. There is no prohibition against re-
election. A number of Member States have a maximum term for board members. For example, in the Czech 
Republic (5 years), France (6 years), Germany (6 years), Greece (6 years), Italy (3 years), Denmark (4 
years), Poland (5 years) and Sweden (4 years). 
The EMCA Group considers that the EMCA should strive towards a balance between continuity and 
shareholder influence on the composition of the board. On one hand, the period should allow board 
members to acquaint themselves with the company’s matters and obtain sufficient experience, on the other 
hand, the period should not be so long that the shareholders lose their control over the management. A more 
reduced term than in several Member States, as seen above, is in line with the principle of shareholders’ 
democracy which the EMCA Group supports (Chapter 1, Section 1.12). This balance should also be seen 
in the light of the recent discussion regarding short-termism. A number of corporate governance codes 
regarding traded companies recommend that the board members elected by the general meeting stand for 
re-election every year at the annual general meeting, see for example the Danish Corporate Governance 
Code 2013, Section 3.1.5. 
The UK Companies Act 2006 has no time limit but the UK Corporate Governance Code Section B.7. 
expresses as a main principle that “all directors should be submitted for re-election at regular intervals 
subject to continued satisfactory performance”. It also requires that, for FTSE 350 companies, all directors 
should be subject to annual election by the shareholders. All other directors should be subject to election 
by shareholders at the first annual general meeting after their appointment, and the re-election thereafter at 
intervals of no more than three years. Non-executive directors who have served longer than nine years 
should be subject to annual re-election. 
The EMCA Group is of the opinion that the corporate governance principles expressed in the UK and 
Danish Corporate Governance Code are sound. The national corporate governance code may – like the UK 
Corporate Governance Code – have more strict limitations for large traded companies but also in other 
public companies the shareholders should have the opportunity to elect directors regularly. 
Section 8.15 
Alternate Directors 
(1) Alternates may be appointed as substitute board members in accordance with the articles of association. 
(2) The provisions of the EMCA regarding members of the board of directors shall apply when relevant 
also to alternate members. 
(3) If a board member cannot participate in a board meeting because of a conflict of interest or for some 
other temporary reason, an alternate may attend. 
(4) In the case of a temporary absence, a board member can grant a proxy to another member of the board. 
The same obligations will apply to the proxy as to the member represented. 
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Comments 
Re 1) The articles of association will determine if an alternate for a board member may be appointed. Thus, 
it is not mandatory for companies to appoint alternates. This is in line with the situation in most Member 
States. An exception is the Swedish Companies Act Chapter 8, Section 3, which states that where a board 
of directors has less than three members, there shall be at least one alternate. It may be decided whether 
there should be an alternate for each board member or more alternates for the whole board. A number of 
Member States have no provisions on alternates in their Companies Acts. This is for example the case in 
Poland and Czech Republic. 
As mentioned, it is up to the company to decide whether there should be alternates. In the UK, the Model 
Articles for public companies clarify the alternate’s position. The Model Articles for private companies 
make no provision for alternates in order to discourage the use of alternates in private companies. 
The UK position shows that the company should consider if there is a real need for alternates or if alternates 
merely pose an unnecessary complication for the company. 
The alternate may be selected as a substitute for a specific board member or for any member of the board. 
The articles of association should decide whether the former or the latter should be the case. The first option 
is particularly relevant if individual board members have been appointed in a way to represent particular 
interests. 
The alternate enters the board if the concerned board member resigns from the board before the expiry of 
the election period, cf. Section 13(4) of this chapter. In this way it will not be necessary to hold an election. 
The alternate has the right to temporarily enter into the board in case of a member’s absence. By absence 
is not only meant permanent absence but also cases where a director is only prevented from appearing at a 
single or a few meetings. It is not necessary to call an alternate merely because a board member is prevented 
from attending a single or a few meetings. In isolated cases, a board member can give the power of attorney 
to another board member instead of a calling an alternate, if this is adequate in respect of the subject of the 
discussion. The rules of procedure of the board may lay down rules on the general practice which is 
followed in the company. 
As to the situation where there is no alternate and one or more directors are dismissed, see Section 6(4). 
Re 2) This is in line with the Danish Companies Act (Section 111 (4)), Greece (without express provision) 
and the Swedish Companies Act (Chapter 8, Section 3). In the UK, the Model Articles for public companies 
provide that, except the articles specify otherwise, alternate directors ‘are deemed for all purposes to be 
directors’ (Section 26(2)(a)). 
Re 3) In case of temporary absence, the board as well as the alternate can demand the alternate be present. 
Re 4) This scheme is in accordance with Austrian, Danish, French, German and Lithuanian company law. 
Section 15 does not include rules on alternates for employee representatives, see further on employee 
representation below in Section 30. 
Section 8.16 
Meetings of Directors 
(1) The chairman of the board shall ensure that meetings are held when necessary. Notice of board 
meetings must be given to all directors. 
(2) Meetings of the board shall always be called where requested by a board member, or the company’s 
auditor. Notably, when a board member calls a meeting of the board of directors, the meeting shall be held 
within two weeks from the date of which notice thereof has been given. If any such request made by two 
or more board members should not be complied with, such members may themselves call a meeting of the 
board of directors upon stating these facts. 
(3) A managing director, even if he is not a member of the supervisory board, has the right to be present 
and to speak at the supervisory board meetings, unless otherwise decided by the supervisory board. 
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Comments 
Re 1) A chairman of the board is selected according to articles of association, see Section 3 and 11. 
According to those sections, the chairman is responsible for the leadership of the board. Therefore, one of 
their tasks is to ensure that meetings are held when necessary. There is no provision regarding the number 
of meetings in the EMCA. The rules of procedure may state how often meetings are to be held. National 
corporate governance codes also often include more specific provisions on the number of meetings. 
Of course formal meetings of the board of directors need not be held where the board consists of only a 
single member, as is often the case in private companies. The supervisory board, however, should always 
consist of more members. It might sometimes be regarded as necessary to hold formal meetings in a 
company with only or a small number of shareholders. Decisions may already have been taken through 
private contact between the members. It should, however, be emphasized that decision must also be 
recorded in minutes, so that it is subsequently possible to determine what was decided. On minutes, see 
Section 19. 
Re 2) The auditor mentioned in Section 16(2) is the auditor elected by the company’s general meeting, see 
below in Chapter 12. According to Chapter 12, not all companies have a duty to elect an auditor, for 
example small companies. However, such companies may choose to elect an auditor. 
Re 3) For practical reasons, it is important that a managing director is present at the supervisory board’s 
meetings as he or she is usually best acquainted with the company. This is of pivotal importance in pure 
two-tier systems, where the managing director cannot be a member of the supervisory board. German law 
expressly stipulates reporting obligations of the management board to the supervisory board (see Sec. 90 
German Stock Corporation Act). 
Subparagraph 3 is inspired by the Swedish Companies Act Section 8:19 and, similarly, the Danish 
Companies Act Section 123. 
The board of directors/supervisory board can decide to invite persons other than members of the board to 
attend a board meeting. 
Minutes from the meeting must be kept, see below Section 19. 
Section 8.17 
Decision Making in the Board 
(1) The board is quorate where more than one-half of the total members of the board or a higher number 
as stated in the articles of association participate in the meeting. 
(2) Unless the articles of association prescribe a specific voting majority resolution of the board, decisions 
shall be adopted by simple majority of the members participating in the resolution. In the event of a tied 
vote, the chairman shall have the casting vote, unless prescribed otherwise in the articles of association. 
(3) Resolutions of the board of directors can be passed electronically and in writing in so as far as the 
articles of association do not provide otherwise. A written resolution shall be sent to all members of the 
board. However, a board member may demand an oral discussion. 
(4) Resolutions may not be adopted in a matter unless all board members, where possible, have been 
afforded the opportunity to participate in the decision making process and have received satisfactory 
information in order to reach a decision in the matter. 
Comments 
Re 1) Section 17(1) contains a demand for quorum. The articles of association can prescribe stricter voting 
rules. If the demand for quorum has not been met, the decision is invalid. If a member is prevented from 
appearing, an alternate can be called up, see Section 15. If the member is only absent at a single or a few 
meetings, a board member can give a power of attorney to another board member instead of a calling an 
alternate, see comments to Section 15. 
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Re 2) In case of a tied vote, the chairman of the management board should have the casting vote. Provided 
that the demand for quorum according to subparagraph 1 is met, a decision is made by the attending 
members of the board. 
Subparagraph 2 contains a default rule concerning the situation of a tied vote. A similar rule is found in the 
Danish Companies Act Section 124, the French Commercial Code (Article L. 225-37), the Lithuanian 
Companies Act Article 35 Part 3 and the Swedish Companies Act Section 8:22. 
Re 3) Generally, the EMCA supports the use of information technology at both board meetings and at 
general meetings. However, the use of information technology solutions is not fully developed in all 
Member States. Therefore, subparagraph 3 mentions both written and electronic solutions. While, as 
mentioned above, the starting point is that decisions are made at actual meetings, it is often suitable or 
necessary for decisions to be made in another manner. In order to ensure that the board member keeps in 
touch with the job and the associated responsibility, a board member can demand that an oral discussion 
takes place. Oral means that the participants are able to communicate directly. This could be in a physical 
meeting or a video conference, etc… Hence, it is not necessary to demand an actual meeting. It is the 
opportunity to interact freely and verbally, which is of vital importance, not the means by which it occurs. 
This provision is inspired by the Danish Companies Act Section 125 and the Portuguese Companies Act, 
Article 410(8). German law contains a similar provision: Resolutions of the supervisory board may be taken 
without an actual meeting unless a member of the board disagrees with this procedure (Section 108 (4) 
German Stock Corporation Act). 
Re 4) Section 17(4) is inspired by the Swedish Companies Act Section 9:21, and partially also the Danish 
Companies Act Section 124. It must be decided in each individual case whether defects regarding 
compliance with paragraph 4 may cause invalidity. As indicated, it may be necessary to make quick 
decisions and thereby deviate from the provision in paragraph 4. 
Section 8.18 
Disqualifications from Serving as Directors 
Legal persons, minors, persons under guardianship and bankrupts may not serve as members of a board, 
unless national law provides otherwise. 
Comments 
Having taken due account of the diversity of companies, the EMCA Group does not consider it possible to 
draw up precise qualifications for the position of director. The EMCA does not contain thus positive 
demands for qualification in the sense of minimum skill requirements etc. However, some people are 
disqualified by virtue of their status – as minors, bankrupts etc.  
The Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC Sections III (11) and (12) demands qualifications and 
commitment of the board. National corporate governance codes include provisions on these issues but these 
only apply to traded companies. The EMCA Group considered whether the EMCA should contain rules on 
qualification of directors for traded companies as well as for other companies but took the view that the 
best means for developing the qualification demands for traded companies is corporate governance codes. 
For all companies, the provisions describing the liability rules and the duties of directors set some minimum 
standards for directors’ qualification. 
In many Member States, no residency requirements apply to directors. For example, since 2004, in 
Denmark, there has been no residence requirement for members of the board and this has not given rise to 
any problems. The 2014 proposal of directive on the single-member private limited liability company, 
creating the Societas Unius Personae (SUP) also provides that there should not be a residency 
requirement.59 The EMCA follows the same approach. 
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Section 18 sets out a number of circumstances in which directors are disqualified from serving as directors. 
Section 18 applies to the members of the supervisory board and the members of the management board; 
the two-tier system as well as members of the board of directors in the one-tier system. 
There are provisions on disqualification of directors in some Member States, but not all. Provisions on 
disqualification are found for example in France, Germany, Portugal, Ireland, UK, Italy, Sweden and 
Denmark. In the Netherlands a bill on directors’ disqualification was submitted to parliament in 2014 and 
entered into force in 2016. There are no rules in Austria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary and Poland. 
Only natural persons can be members of the board. The company laws of the Member States may provide 
otherwise. According to Dutch company law for example, a legal person can be a member (or the only 
member) of the management board. Only natural persons can serve as members of the supervisory board 
(Sec. 2: 140/250 Dutch Companies Act). The term “bankrupt” refers to the term used in the Member State’s 
national Insolvency Acts. Such acts may contain provisions, which would actually allow continuing as a 
director. The consequence of a director’s bankruptcy is that he or she must either automatically deregister 
as a director, or he or she must obtain court permission to continue to act as a director. The former is chosen 
by the Swedish Companies Act and the latter is chosen in the UK Directors’ Disqualification Act. Section 
11 of the latter disqualifies a director if he or she is an “undischarged bankrupt”. A third ground for 
disqualification which is chosen in Denmark and a number other Member States, arises where the court 
under certain circumstances may decide to disqualify a director – for example in case of criminal offences 
where there is a danger that the director will abuse his position as a director. Such rules are also included 
in the UK Company Directors’ Disqualification Act. 
Section 8.19 
Minutes of the Meetings 
(1) Minutes shall be taken of all proceedings at meetings of the board. Minutes shall be signed by all board 
members present. 
(2) The members of the board present at the meeting are entitled to have dissenting opinions recorded in 
the minutes. 
Comments 
Re 1) Section 19 determines that all proceedings must be evident from the minutes. Thus, the minutes must 
state the place and date of the meeting, the persons attending, the items on the agenda, the essential nature 
of the proceedings and the resolutions of the board, cf. for example the German Stock Corporation Act 
Section 107 (2). This is necessary in order to document the discussions. The contents of the minutes can 
also become important for subsequent liability in matters where managerial responsibilities are asserted. 
In some Member States, it is considered sufficient that the minutes are signed by the chairman. This is 
considered as standard practice which need not be stated in the Act. However, case law from Denmark, for 
example, shows that fraud can go undetected because board members have not seen the minutes. Therefore, 
the EMCA Group considers that all board members present should sign the minutes. Similar rules are found 
in the Danish Companies Act Section 128 and the Swedish Companies Act Section 8:24. 
Minutes must be taken not only in formal meetings but also regarding decisions taken outside a formal 
meeting, see comments to Section 16 above. 
Re 2) The opportunity to enter a dissenting opinion in the record of the meeting may provide individual 
members with an opportunity to release themselves from any joint responsibility for decisions made. 
If a member has not participated in a meeting, he or she is not completely exempted from liability arising 
from the management’s decisions at a later stage. 
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Section 8.20 
Board Committees 
(1) The board can appoint committees that may hold meetings and may make recommendations to the 
board on certain issues. 
(2) The articles of association may provide for the committees and the articles of association or the rules 
of procedure may define the tasks that such committees may perform. 
Comments 
The Companies Acts in most Member States do not include provisions on board committees. However, the 
establishment of committees is commonplace. The UK Model Articles Section 5 and 6 for private and 
public companies include provisions on directors’ delegation of power and on committees. 
German law allows sub-committees with different functions. One function is to prepare particular decisions 
of the supervisory board. Particular powers may be delegated to committees and the committee may be 
allowed to take the final decisions. However, there is a provision setting out particular powers (e.g. the 
power to appoint the management board), which may not be delegated to a sub-committee, leaving to the 
committee only the function of preparing such decisions (cf. German Stock Corporation Act Section 107 
(3)). 
Certain committees are mandatory by law, for example audit committees for listed companies (See. Article 
39, Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts). The EMCA 
Group considered the right to delegate and to use committees. The Group considered that the board of 
directors can delegate duties to one or more board members or to a non- member. The board cannot, 
however, through such delegation relieve itself of the ultimate responsibility for the company’s 
organization and management or the responsibility to ensure satisfactory control of the company’s 
accounting, funds management and finances. 
The EU Commission‘s Recommendation of 2005/162/EC on the role of (independent) non- executive or 
supervisory directors of listed companies and the committees of the (supervisory) board has been 
implemented in the corporate governance codes of several Member States. As stated above, an audit 
committee is mandatory for listed companies in line with Directive 2006/43/EC. Other committees such as 
nomination committees and remuneration committees are only recommended in corporate governance 
codes. The EMCA recommends the use of committees in large companies even though they are not traded 
companies. 
As mentioned, national corporate governance codes include details regarding the composition of the 
committees, the tasks of the committees etc. For traded companies, provisions in the corporate governance 
codes supplement the rules in Section 20. 
Re 1) Section 20 makes clear that the board may appoint committees and define the role of the committees 
as limited to preparing meetings and making recommendations to the board. Thus, the committees may not 
be used to circumvent the rules which provide that it is the management that is responsible for managing 
the company or the supervisory board for supervising the management. This ensures that members of the 
board – including employee representatives – have continued influence. In Germany, for example, this is 
established by Supreme Court decisions and it is also mentioned in the legal literature in other countries, 
like Denmark. 
Re 2) Committees may be standing committees as mentioned in the EU-Recommendation and ad hoc 
committees. 
Section 8.21 
Duty of Confidentiality 
Directors must not make unauthorized disclosure of confidential information acquired in the course of 
holding the office of director. A duty of confidentiality should also extend to members of board committees 
and their alternates. 
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Comments 
Some Member States’ Companies Acts have provisions on directors’ duty of confidentiality, for example 
the Danish Companies Act Section 132, the German Stock Corporation Act Sections 93 and 116, the 
Lithuanian Civil Code Article 2.87 Part 2 and the Greek Companies Act Article 22a (3)60. In the Portuguese 
Companies Act Article 444-A, the duty of confidentiality is only expressly provided for the members of 
the supervisory board. In the UK and Ireland, a duty of confidentiality arises as a matter of common law, 
but most executive directors will in any event be bound by express contractual obligations of 
confidentiality. 
The duty of confidentiality also includes alternate directors; see above Section 15(2). 
The duty of confidentiality is a consequence of the duty of loyalty, which rests with the company’s 
directors. Hence, the duty of loyalty must be used as a benchmark when deciding whether the disclosure of 
information is legitimate in specific cases. By default, the board of directors/management/supervisory 
board can decide that certain information is subject to the duty of confidentiality. Regarding the question 
of securities regulation, the duty of confidentiality is of great importance in determining whether 
information is inside information. The company law consequence of the decision in the EC case C-384/02, 
Grøngaard & Bang is to allow employee representations to disclose information to the labour unions if it 
is necessary to fulfil their tasks as members of the supervisory board. It is necessary to be informed and to 
be advised of the relevant law. 
Section 8.22 
Competence to Determine Remuneration 
(1) In a company with a one-tier board, a remuneration committee shall be set up in order to determine the 
remuneration for the executive directors. 
(2) In a company with a two-tier board, the supervisory board (or a remuneration committee formed by the 
supervisory board) shall fulfill this function with regard to the remuneration of the management board. 
(3) The remuneration of the supervisory board shall be determined by the articles of association or set by 
the shareholders’ meeting. 
(4) The general meeting shall decide on a remuneration policy of directors. 
Comments 
Particularly after the financial crises the discussion of the remuneration of the management has become a 
key issue in the debate on company law. The discussion revolves around issues such as who has the 
authority to determine the remuneration as well as form of and limits for the remuneration. The EMCA 
includes three provisions concerning remuneration: Section 22 concerns the authority to determine 
remuneration, Section 23 stipulates, in general, the form of and limits for remuneration, and Section 24 
includes specific provisions on incentive schemes in traded companies. 
According to the Commission’s 2012 Action Plan, effective and sustainable shareholder engagement is one 
of the cornerstones of listed companies’ corporate governance model. Well-functioning remuneration 
policies stimulate longer-term value creation and genuinely link pay to performance, whereas poor 
remuneration policies and/or incentive structures lead to unjustified transfers of value from companies, 
their shareholders and other stakeholders to executives. Therefore, and taking into account existing 
oversight possibilities, shareholders should be enabled to exercise better oversight of remuneration policies 
applying to directors of listed companies and the implementation of those policies. 
                                                     
60 This provision was inadvertently abrogated, but there is no doubt that the confidentiality has to be observed. 
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The Commission has enacted two Recommendations on remuneration policies in the financial services 
sector (2009/384) and the regime for the remuneration of directors in listed companies (2009/385). The 
latter supplements two recommendations from 2004 and 2005 (2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC). Except 
that the recommendation regarding the financial services sector is subject to special regulation and 
supervision, the fundamental ideas in the two recommendations are the same. In general, the 
Recommendations are implemented in the Member States’ national corporate governance codes. Even 
though the financial crisis has revealed weaknesses regarding remuneration in traded companies, the 
EMCA Group considers that it is also important to secure the shareholders’ insight into, and influence on, 
the management’s remuneration in non-traded companies. Hence, the Group encourages companies and 
directors to avoid misuse and excessive remuneration and encourages long-term thinking. 
According to the 2014 Proposal of the Commission to amend the Shareholders Rights directive,61 Article 
9a (1) (as amended by the European Parliament), Member States shall ensure that companies establish a 
remuneration policy as regards directors and submit it to a binding vote of the general meeting of 
shareholders. This Article also states that [a]ny change to the policy shall be voted on at the general 
meeting of shareholders and the policy shall be submitted in any case for approval by the general meeting 
at least every three years. 
Member States may, however, provide that the votes by the general meeting on the remuneration policy 
are advisory. 
Currently, not all Member States give shareholders the right to vote on remuneration policy and/or the 
remuneration report, and information disclosed by companies in different Member States is not easily 
comparable. This is also due to the fact that the management systems in the Member States vary 
considerably between one-tier systems, two-systems and in-between systems, cf. above. Some of the 
Member States which have taken action to promote shareholder voting with regard to remuneration issues 
are Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovakia and the UK. 
Generally, the competence to determine the remuneration of a supervisory board should be left to the 
general meeting. This is the case under German law. According to Section 113 German Stock Corporation 
Act, the remuneration of the supervisory board is determined by the articles or by the general meeting. 
Similar provisions can be found in the Danish Companies Act’s rules and the Swedish Companies Act in 
Section 23a. Otherwise, determining the remuneration of the supervisory board would be a self-dealing 
transaction. Regarding executive directors (German Vorstand)/managing directors, the competence to 
decide on remuneration is left to the supervisory board, if such a board exists. In private companies with 
only one director, the remuneration must be decided by the general meeting. 
The remuneration should be decided at the annual general meeting. 
From experience, it is clear that incentive schemes, especially in traded companies, have caused unjustified 
transfer of values to executives as pointed out in the Commission’s Action Plan 2012. Such misuse has 
been seen in respect of both the supervisory board and the management board. Therefore, there is a special 
need for such schemes to be transparent for the shareholders in order for them to decide on the merits of 
the schemes. Hence, Section 24 below includes a special rule regarding incentive schemes in traded 
companies. The directors of UK traded (quoted) companies are required to draw up a detailed directors’ 
remuneration report. According to the UK Companies Act 2006 Section 439 and 439A, the remuneration 
report must be submitted to the annual general meeting for shareholder approval. 
In the UK, directors’ remuneration is a matter for the board to determine and this is the case for both 
directors’ fees and payments for services. Special rules on mandatory shareholder approval were introduced 
in 2013 for traded companies, see below, Section 24. 
Inspired by Dutch law on public companies (Section 2:135 Dutch Companies Act), the EMCA requires the 
company to have a policy for the remuneration of the board of directors. The policy should be decided on 
by the general meeting. 
                                                     
61 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the 
encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards certain elements of the corporate 
governance statement, COM(2014) 213 final, amended by the European Parliament 8 July 2015. 
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Section 8.23 
Remuneration Limits 
(1) Directors may receive remuneration for their services. The fees and compensation received may not 
exceed the amount that is justifiable by the company. The remuneration shall bear a reasonable relationship 
to the duties of the members of the board and to the condition of the company. 
(2) The remuneration may be fixed or include variable components. The structure of directors’ 
remuneration should promote the long-term sustainability of the company and ensure that remuneration is 
based on performance. 
(3) If the situation of the company deteriorates so that a continued payment of remuneration would be 
unreasonable for the company, the competent body or, in case of instituted insolvency proceedings, the 
court, shall reduce remuneration to a reasonable level. 
(4) If insolvency proceedings have been instituted over the company’s assets and the liquidator has 
terminated the employment contract of a director, such director may claim compensation of damages 
arising as a result of such termination only for the period of two years following termination of the 
employment, notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in the contract of employment. 
Comments 
Section 23 contains the general rule on director’s remuneration. Section 24 below contains special rules 
regarding the use of incentive schemes in traded companies. Section 23 applies to all companies, not only 
to traded or public companies. More detailed regulations are usually found in national corporate governance 
codes and the listing rules of stock exchanges. 
Information on directors’ remuneration may be found in the national Financial Statement Acts, for example, 
the Danish Financial Statement Act Section 98 b. 
Re 3 and 4) Subparagraph 3 and 4 are inspired by the German Stock Corporation Act Section 87. 
If a company becomes insolvent and a director’s employment as a consequence is terminated, the director’s 
contract may include a claim for compensation (golden parachutes including prolonged terms of notice 
etc.). Section 23(4) limits the period for which the director may claim compensation. Thus, Section 23(4) 
supplements rules that may be included in the Member States’ Bankruptcy Acts. 
Section 8.24 
Incentive Schemes in Traded Companies 
(1) In a traded company, the directors or the remuneration committee shall set general guidelines for the 
director’s incentive-based remuneration. The guidelines shall be considered and adopted by the general 
meeting. 
(2) Specific agreements for incentive-based remuneration under Subsection (1) shall be entered into after 
publication of the guidelines, as adopted, on the company’s website, and not before. When entering into 
specific incentive agreements, the existing guidelines, as adopted, must be observed. 
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Comments 
The EU Recommendation 2009/385/EC on remuneration of directors of traded companies, is partly 
implemented in the various Member States. In Denmark, for example, the recommendation is found in the 
Companies Act Section 139, and in Germany there is a right for shareholders to vote on the remuneration 
policy on a non- binding basis (“Say on Pay”, Stock Corporation Act § 120(4)). Another model is found in 
the UK where, for listed UK companies, remuneration is a matter for a remuneration committee composed 
of independent non-executive directors (UK Corporate Governance Code, Section D). The company has to 
provide a directors’ remuneration report for the annual meeting (Companies Act 2006, Section 420) and 
shareholders are entitled to a vote on the report (Companies Act 2006, Sections 439 and 439A). Since 2013, 
UK shareholders in traded UK companies have a binding vote (previously only advisory) on whether to 
accept the remuneration policy of the company as set out in the remuneration report; if the shareholders 
reject the policy, any payments made under the rejected policy are invalid and may be reclaimed by the 
company. The contents of the remuneration report are prescribed in great detail in the regulations and, in 
particular, the remuneration must contain a single total remuneration figure for each director and it must 
give a detailed explanation of payments made to any director for loss of office. In Member States such as 
Finland and Ireland rules on remuneration are found in the corporate governance codes. 
A way to ensure independence is to form a remuneration committee, cf. Article 3 of Directive 2009/385/EC. 
The EU Recommendation only applies to traded companies. 
The EMCA Group notes that the Commission’s Proposal to amend the Shareholders Directive (COM(2014) 
213 final) contains detailed rules on both the remuneration policy and the remuneration report. As noted 
above, a final text for the amendment was agreed by the EU Presidency and the Parliament in December 
2016. 
Article 9a(2) contains a provision that the remuneration policy must be clear, understandable and in line 
with the business values and long-term interests of the company and must incorporate measures to avoid 
conflicts of interests. 
According to Article 9a(3) the policy shall set clear criteria for the award of fixed and flexible remuneration, 
including all bonuses and all benefits (in whatever form). It shall indicate the appropriate relative proportion 
of the different components of fixed and variable remuneration. The policy shall explain how the pay and 
employment conditions of employees of the company were taken in to account when setting the policy or 
directors’ remuneration. For variable remuneration, the policy shall indicate the financial and non-financial 
performance criteria. According to an amendment of the European Parliament, the Member States shall 
ensure that the value of shares does not play a dominant role in the financial performance criteria. The 
policy shall indicate the main terms of the directors’ contracts including duration, notice periods, payments 
linked to termination (golden parachutes) and (included by amendment of the European Parliament) the 
characteristics of supplementary pension or early retirement schemes. Also to amendment by the European 
Parliament, the policy shall specify the company’s procedures for the determination of the remuneration of 
directors, including the role and functioning of the remuneration committee. 
Article 9b contains provisions on the remuneration report. Member States must ensure that the company 
draws up a clear and understandable remuneration report, providing a comprehensive overview of the 
remuneration, including all benefits in whatever form granted in according with the remuneration policy, 
to individual directors. Article 9b(1) sub a – f contain specific elements that should be included in the 
report. According to Article 9b (3), Member States must ensure that shareholders have the right to hold an 
advisory vote on the remuneration report of the past financial year during the annual general meeting. 
Currently, not all Member States give shareholders the right to vote on remuneration policy and/or the 
report, and information disclosed by companies in different Member States is not easily comparable. The 
Commission’s Action Plan (2012) Section 3.1 states that the shareholders should have better oversight of 
remuneration policy. Thus, shareholders should be able to express their views on the matter, through a 
mandatory shareholder vote on the company’s remuneration policy and the remuneration report, providing 
an overview of the manner in which the remuneration policy has been implemented, see the comments to 
Section 22 and above. 
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The EMCA Group discussed whether the issue of remuneration should be regulated by law (in the EMCA) 
or in national corporate governance codes. The Group is of the opinion that the EMCA should ensure that 
the main principles of directors´ incentive schemes should be agreed upon by the shareholders. In principle 
there are two possible approaches; 
• Require shareholder approval in advance (“Say on Pay” as in Denmark and Germany). 
• A mandatory remuneration report for the annual meeting (as in the previous UK model). 
From experience, it seems the previous UK-model was not satisfactory, hence it was changed to a strong 
version on “say on pay”, see above. Therefore, the EMCA Group prefers the first solution. According to 
Section 24 the general meeting must approve the guidelines on incentive schemes. However, the final 
amount to be granted to the directors is decided according to the rule in Section 22. According to Section 
24(2), specific agreements cannot be entered into until the guidelines have been approved by the general 
meeting. 
The guidelines, which should be approved, should contain specific information that can be understood by 
the shareholders. 
Section 8.25 
General Clause 
Members of the board shall not enter into any transaction that is clearly capable of providing certain 
shareholders or others with an undue advantage over other shareholders or the company. Members of the 
board must not comply with any resolution passed by the general meeting or any other governing body if 
that resolution is invalid or contravenes the law or the company’s articles of association. 
Comments 
Chapter 11 on general meetings contains a general clause on minority protection, see Section 30. A similar 
general clause is contained in Section 25. The reason for this is that abuse of minority rights may not only 
take place by decisions at the general meeting but it may be even more likely to take place by directors’ 
decisions or actions. 
Section 25 does not implement EU law, but the provision is inspired by provisions in the Nordic Companies 
Acts. 
Section 8.26 
Agreements with Sole Shareholder 
Save for agreements made on usual terms in the ordinary course of business, agreements entered into 
between a sole shareholder and a limited liability company are valid only if drafted in a manner that can 
subsequently be verified. 
Comments 
Section 26 is inspired by Article 5 of the 12th Company Law Directive (2009/102/EEC). The 12th Company 
Law Directive merely concerns private companies, but according to article 6 of the Directive, it can also 
be applied where Member States allows public companies to be a one- man company. The EMCA 
presupposes that public companies may be owned by a sole shareholder. Therefore, Section 26 also applies 
to public companies. 
It is not necessary that agreements with sole shareholders are in writing. It is sufficient if they can be 
documented, for example by electronic means. 
Agreements “on usual terms” mean agreements on arm’s length terms. 
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Section 8.27 
Right of Representation and Power to Bind the Company 
(1) Members of the board of directors have the power to represent the company in relation to third parties. 
(2) The company is bound by agreements made on behalf of the company by the entire board of directors 
or by a single board member. Members of the supervisory board have no power to bind the company. 
(3) The power of each member of the board of directors to bind the company may be restricted by the 
articles of association so that it can only be exercised by members acting jointly or by one or more specific 
members acting jointly or alone. No other restrictions on the power to bind the company may be registered. 
Comments 
The provisions of Section 27-29 apply to private as well as public companies. 
Article 2(d)(i) of the 1st Company Law Directive62 demands publication of the identity of persons 
authorized to represent the company in dealings with third parties and in legal proceedings. This 
authorization is established in the company’s articles of association. The reason for this is that it is important 
for third parties to be able to see who has the power to represent the company. 
Article 9 and 10 of the 1st Company Law Directive (Directive 2009/101/EC) contain rules on 
representation. Section 27 distinguishes between the right of representation and the power to bind the 
company. 
Publication regarding completion of the formalities of disclosure of the particulars concerning the persons 
who, as an organ of the company, are authorized to represent it shall constitute a bar to any irregularity in 
their appointment being relied upon as against third parties unless the company proves that such third 
parties had knowledge thereof, see below in Section 30. 
Section 27 distinguishes between the power to represent the company and the power to bind the company. 
The power to represent the company legitimizes the members of the management to act on the behalf of 
the company in relation to third parties, but it does not legitimize the members to enter into legal 
transactions. The power to represent the company which, as opposed to the power to bind the company, 
cannot be limited, is especially relevant in connection with court proceedings. For instance, a subpoena can 
be served on any member of the management just as any member of the management can appear in court 
on behalf of the company. 
Re 1) Subparagraph 1 concerns the right of representation It provides the board of directors with the right 
to represent the company in relation to third parties, but not to bind the company in legal transactions. The 
right to represent the company implies that directors have the authority to represent the company in every 
situation with third parties.  
This authority is general and cannot be limited or be denied from the person concerned by the articles of 
association. 
The rights to represent the company according to Section 8 only applies to members of the board, registered 
as such in the Company Register, according to the rules in Directive 1st Directive, cf. EMCA Chapter 2, 
Section 17. 
Re 2) Subparagraph 2 concerns the power to bind the company. It deals with the authority to bind the 
company in legal transactions. The provision determines that the entire board of directors, as well as a 
single member of the board of directors, can bind the company. 
Section 27(2) provides for the model of collective representation. While it is assumed that the representation 
of the company is generally exercised by all board members jointly, the articles of association may include 
deviating provisions. In case a declaratory act, such as a declaration of intent or a claim, is given to the 
company, Section 27(2) states that it is sufficient if only one member of the management board is 
representing the company. 
                                                     
62 Replaced by Directive 2009/101 EC, OJ L 285/11 of 1.10.2009. 
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Re 3) Subparagraph 3 determines that the authority to bind the company in legal transactions which is 
vested in the individual members of the board of directors can be subject to restrictions according to the 
articles of association. In case of a company having more than one director, the directors’ authority to bind 
the company in legal transactions could be limited in so far that a director may only sign documents together 
with one or more members of the board of directors, or so that only a certain director, may bind the company 
in legal transactions alone. However, the authority of the board of directors to bind the company in legal 
transactions jointly may not be restricted. Section 27(3) is consistent with Article 10(3) of the 1st Company 
Law Directive, which states that the legislation in the Member States can decide how deviations from the 
power to bind the company can take place. 
The provision in Article 10(3) states that “the authority to represent a company may, in derogation from 
the legal rules governing the subject, be conferred by the statutes on a single person or on several persons 
acting jointly”. This authorization has been exercised differently in the Member States. For private 
companies, legislation in Member States such as Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands 
stipulate that each manager, or two or more managers acting together, may enter into binding transactions 
on behalf of the company. In Sweden and Poland (Section 272 and 273), there must be at least two 
managers. Spanish legislation stipulates that if there are several directors acting jointly, the power of 
representation is exercised jointly by at least two of them, in accordance with the provisions of the articles. 
If there is a board of directors, it acts as a single body. For public companies, Belgian, German and Spanish 
legislations provide that directors are empowered to represent the company in respect of all activities that 
fall within the company’s objects. 
Section 27(3) follows the provision in the Danish Companies Act Section 135(3).  
Only registered directors may be authorized by the articles of association to carry out the general right to 
bind the company in legal transactions. Individuals outside the board of directors may not be assigned with 
the general right to sign documents by the articles of association. Whether the acts of such persons bind the 
company is a matter for national Contracts Acts/Agency laws. National laws, including contract law, 
usually contain rules on authorization, including procuration. 
It is important that the right to bind the company in legal transactions is clearly stated in the articles of 
association and that the individuals concerned are clearly identified in the articles of association, see 
Chapter 2, Section 17. 
Authorization as referred to in Section 27 or a revocation of such authorization shall be effective from the 
date by which the Registrar has received the notification or revocation, or such later date as stated in the 
authorization or the decision regarding revocation. 
Section 8.28 
Right of Representation and Power to Bind the Company 
(1) Any agreement or commitment that is made on behalf of the company by persons authorized to bind 
the company will be binding on the company, unless: 
(a) the persons authorized to bind the company have not acted within the limitations of their powers 
as provided by the EMCA; 
(b) the agreement or commitment does not fall within the objects of the company, and the company 
proves that the third party knew or could not in view of the circumstances have been unaware of it; or 
(c) the person authorized to bind the company has exceeded his authority or has seriously failed to act 
in the company’s interests, and the third party knew or should have known this. 
(2) It will not be sufficient evidence under subparagraph 1(b), of this provision that the company has 
published a statement of its objects, as provided by the articles of association, in the Registrar’s information 
technology system. 
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Comments 
Section 28 is inspired by Article 10(1) and (2) of the 1st Company Law Directive (Directive 2009/101/EC). 
Thus, once an agreement is entered into with a third party, the company is bound with respect to third 
parties, even in the case of an action falling outside of the objectives of the company or in the case of the 
director exceeding the limitations placed on his or her power by the articles of association or by the general 
meeting. The starting point is that the company is bound by any agreement by persons authorized to bind 
the company, see Section 27. 
Re 1) Section 28(1)(a) provides that if the company law includes limitation on the powers of the authorized 
persons, the company is not bound. This for instance is the case regarding decisions that legally are required 
to be taken or approved by the general meeting or decisions which are unlawful. Since the law should be 
known by all, the third person cannot be said to be acting in good faith. 
Section 28(1)(b) deals with situations where the articles of association include a provision on the objects 
of the company. The Companies Acts in most Member States include a provision according to which the 
articles of association should contain the objects of the company, see similarly Chapter 2, Section 17(e). 
The limitation in subparagraph 1(b) implements Article 10(1), second sentence of the Directive. This 
limitation originates in the former UK Companies Act. However, the recent UK Companies Act (2006) no 
longer requires the companies’ objects to be stated. Thus, a company’s objects may be unrestricted, see UK 
Companies Act Section 31(1). A similar change was made to the Irish Companies Act 2014 in respect of 
private companies limited by shares. If it becomes common for other Member States Companies Act’s not 
to have an object clause, the provision in Section 30(1)(b) should be reviewed. 
Section 28(1)(c) states - in line with general contract law – that the company is not bound if the person 
authorized to bind the company has overstepped his or her authority or significantly disregarded the 
interests of the company and if the third party knew or should have known about this. In case C-104/96, 
Rabobank v. Minderhoud , the European Court of Justice established that the provisions in Article 7-9 of 
the 1st Company Law Directive are not exhaustive as regards cases where the company can plead that an 
agreement, which has been entered into by a member with the power to bind the company, is void. Hence, 
national law may introduce supplementary provisions. Thus, Section 28(1)(c) specifies that common 
contractual rules can apply. The provision is inspired by the Danish Companies Act Section 136(1)(3). 
Similarly applies according the Swedish Companies Act Chapter 8, Section 20. Ad 28(2). This provision 
is an exception to the common principle that all information published in the Registrar’s information 
technology system is deemed to have been communicated to third parties, see thus Chapter 3, Section 6. 
Section 8.29 
Right of Representation and Power to Bind the Company 
Where an election or appointment of members of the management of a company has been published in the 
Registrar’s IT system in accordance with Chapter 3 Section 6, no defect in the election or appointment may 
be relied upon against any third party, unless the company proves that the third party had knowledge of 
that defect. 
Comments 
Section 29 is inspired by Article 9 of the 1st Company Law Directive (Directive 2009/101/EC). 
According to this provision, the burden of proof regarding the third party’s bad faith (knowledge) rests with 
the company. 
The dismissal of board members must be registered. From the time the dismissal is published in the 
Registrar’s information technology system, the dismissal should be considered to have been communicated 
to third parties. 
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Section 8.30 
Capital Loss 
If it is established that the equity of a company represents less than half of the subscribed capital, or in the 
case of negative net assets, the management of the company must ensure that a general meeting is held 
within six months. At the general meeting, the board must report the financial position of the company and, 
if necessary, submit a proposal for measures that should be taken, including a proposal for dissolution of 
the company. 
Comments 
Section 30 is based on Article 19 of the 2nd Company Law Directive.63 The Directive only applies to public 
companies but the EMCA Group considered that a similar rule is also needed in private companies. 
Most Member States stipulate the requirement that the shareholder’s meeting has to be called by the 
management if a certain portion of the registered share capital – usually 50 % - is lost. The shareholders’ 
meeting will have to decide on the appropriate measures to be taken. In Italy, the management will be 
obliged to call the shareholders’ meeting after a loss of 1/3 of the share capital. Under current Swedish law 
(Sections 25:13 - 25:20) the company may be forced to go into liquidation due to a capital deficiency. The 
Swedish Companies Act has a specific and comprehensive procedure in these cases. The former Finnish 
and Danish Companies Acts also contained a rule on involuntary liquidation in case of capital loss but since 
their amendment, there is only a duty to call a general meeting to decide what should be done. 
The EMCA Group considered in line with the majority of Member States that there should only be a duty 
to call a general meeting without specifying a duty to liquidate the company. The consequence of not 
meeting the requirements in Section 30 may be that the management could be liable if the conditions for 
liability are met, see below in Chapter 10.  
                                                     
63 Replaced by Directive 2012/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 OJ L 315/74 of 
14.11.2012. 
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PART 4 
EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION 
Section 8.31 
Employee Representation 
(1) The company shall be subject to the rules on employee representation on the board of the company, if 
any, to the extent they are laid down by national law. 
(2) In the case of the transfer of the registered office of a company, Chapter 13 shall apply. 
(3) In the case of a cross-border merger of a company with another company registered in another Member 
State, the provisions of the laws of the Member States implementing Directive 2005/56/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council shall apply. 
Comments 
The participation of employees in a company has to be considered from two different angles. On the one 
hand, employees may participate in certain operational decisions – e.g. arising from consultation 
requirements in case of dismissals and restructurings – through union, work councils (Betriebsrat, Comité 
d’entreprise…), etc. These aspects traditionally form part of the labour law and have no direct influence on 
the corporate structure. On the other hand, a considerable number of Member States also provide for 
employee participation at the level of corporate bodies of companies. In these countries, a number of 
employee representatives are granted membership at (management or supervisory) board level with all 
duties and liabilities of an ordinary board member, thereby giving the employees a considerable degree of 
influence on the corporate decision making process. 
Employee representation on corporate boards of private companies is alien to Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, 
France (for private companies only), Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, 
Spain and the UK. The countries which provide for employee representation in corporate boards are 
Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France (in public companies since 2014) Germany, 
Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovakia (with regard to stock corporations only), Slovenia and 
Sweden. The board members representing the employees are usually either directly appointed by the 
employees or nominated by them and formally appointed by the shareholders. Whilst the aforementioned 
countries all have in common the aspect of employee representation in companies, they differ considerably 
as to the applicable thresholds triggering the requirement and as to the level of influence given to the 
employee representative. 
It is not possible to formulate common rules in the EMCA on employee representation. Hence, in this area 
it is necessary to refer to national rules on employee representation. 
The general principle, derived from the Directive on cross-border mergers (2005/56/EC), is that the 
company is subject to the rules concerning employees’ representation on the supervisory or management 
board of the Member State where it has its registered office. Accordingly, a company established under a 
national law modelled according to EMCA will, as regards employee participation, be no more and no less 
attractive than comparable national companies. 
Cross-border mergers involving a company are governed by the Directive on cross-border mergers. 
Special rules are required in the case of the transfer of the registered office of a company; cf. Chapter 13.
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General Comments64 
1. EU law 
This Chapter consists of two parts. Part I on general provisions contains the main principles of directors’ 
duties including a general description on the duties of the board, the principle of duty of care and the duty 
of loyalty. Part II contains provisions on conflicts of interest. 
According to the general principles expressed in Chapter 1, Section 11, a director of a company has a duty 
of care and a duty of loyalty. 
There is no specific EU regulation defining the general duties of directors. However, the Commission has 
devoted significant time to corporate governance issues in recent years. Among other things, the 
Commission published in 2011 a Green Paper on the EU Corporate Governance Framework (COM(2011) 
164 Final). Based on the Green Paper and the report from the Reflection Group on the Future of EU 
Company Law and the Action Plan 2012, the Commission intends to modernize the company law and 
corporate governance framework. The Action Plan stresses, “Effective corporate governance is of crucial 
importance, because well-run companies are likely to be more competitive and more sustainable in the long 
run”. The Action Plan further stresses that the “effective oversight of the executive directors or the 
management board by the non-executive directors or supervisory boards leads to successful governance of 
the company.” The Commission believes also that (supervisory) boards should give broader consideration 
to the entire range of risks faced by their companies. Extending the reporting requirements with regard to 
non-financial parameters would help in establishing a more comprehensive risk profile of the company, 
enabling more effective design of strategies to address those risks. The additional focus on non-financial 
aspects would encourage companies to adopt a sustainable and long-term strategic approach to their 
businesses. 
Specific rules on directors’ duties may be found in national corporate governance codes. All Member States 
have such codes. The contents of the codes vary considerably. Until now the Commission has not tried to 
develop a common EU Corporate Governance Code. However, the Commission has considered national 
corporate governance codes and especially the way these national codes apply the “comply or explain” 
principle. The Commission has indicated it will take an initiative, possibly in the form of a 
recommendation, to improve the quality of corporate governance reports, and in particular, the quality of 
explanations to be provided by companies that depart from the corporate governance codes. 
With regard to Part 2 of the Chapter on conflicts of interest, there is no specific EU company law. An 
attempt was made in 1983 to amend the proposal for a 5th Company Law Directive, which dealt with 
conflicts of interest, among other things. However for several reasons, especially the question of employee 
representation, the Commission was unable to reach an agreement on the Directive. Hence, various EU 
company law Directives and recommendations deal with different aspects of conflicts of interest, and EU 
securities regulations contain rules on shareholder transparency, which have a preventive effect. 
The Takeover Bids Directive (2004/25/EC) provides for a particular situation in which a conflict of interest 
may occur and must be avoided. In a takeover situation, the directors of a target company are obliged to 
advise the company’s shareholders as to whether or not to accept a takeover bid. The directors have a duty 
to make a statement setting out their views on the bid and providing certain other key information. See 
further EMCA Chapter 13 on re-organization. 
The Market Abuse Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 596/2014) governs companies whose securities are 
traded on a regulated market. It includes rules on the notification of transactions relating to a company’s 
shares by persons with managerial responsibilities in the company. The Market Abuse Directive 
(2003/6/EC) which preceded it led to the implementation of similar rules in Member States including in 
Section 28a of the Danish Law on securities trading. Section 37(1) of the same Law requires companies 
whose shares are traded on a regulated market to draw up internal rules on their management members’ 
dealing in the company’s shares. The general prohibition of insider trading and market manipulation also 
applies to the company’s management. 
                                                     
64 The working group on Chapter 9 included Professor Brenda Hannigan (University of Southampton, UK) and Professor José 
Engrácia Antunes, (Catholic University of Portugal, Porto, Portugal). 
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It has been said that compensating directors by giving them stocks and stock options is a conspicuous 
encouragement of conflicts of interest. The EU Commission is certainly aware of this. Commission 
Recommendation 2009/385/EC concerns the remuneration of directors of listed companies. Recital 6 of 
the Recommendation says that the structure of directors’ remuneration should promote the long-term 
sustainability of the company and ensure that remuneration is based on performance. The Recommendation 
contains various recommendations for avoiding conflicts of interest. These include the establishment of 
remuneration committees (cf. Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC), and recommendations to 
ensure that the shareholders control the remuneration policy and individual compensation through 
shareholder approval (say-on-pay). Recommendation 2009/385/EC says that the establishment of 
remuneration committees plays an important role in preventing conflicts of interest by designing a 
company’s remuneration policy, and it recommends that directors who hold shares in the company should 
be obliged to retain a part of their shares until the end of their mandates in order to prevent conflicts of 
interest. Remuneration committees are further considered in Section II (6.1.) in Recommendation 
2005/162/EC. See more on remuneration and say on pay in Chapter 8. 
There has been a strong movement for independent directors to be appointed to company boards. This 
movement started in the UK and was taken up by the Commission in Recommendation 2005/162/EC which 
recommends that a ‘sufficient number’ of independent directors be elected to the board. Preventing conflict 
of interests is one of the justifications for having independent directors. Also, the introduction of 
independent directors seeks to outweigh the voting power of shareholders with large blocks or even the 
majority of shares. A director is only considered to be independent if they are free of any family, business 
or other relationships with the company, its controlling shareholder or the management that creates a 
conflict of interest such as to impair their judgement. The EU has not developed a common corporate 
governance code, but in most Member States the issue of independent directors is dealt with in corporate 
governance codes, for example in the Danish Corporate Governance Code, Section 3.2., and the German 
Corporate Governance Code, Sec. 5.4.2. Both the Commission’s 2011 Green Paper and its 2012 Action 
Plan point to conflicts of interest as an area where regulation should be improved, both regarding directors 
and proxy advisors, when proxy advisors also act as corporate governance consultants to investee 
companies. This latter area has been addressed in the proposed amendment of the Shareholders’ Rights 
Directive agreed with the Parliament in December 2016. 
2. National company law 
2.1. Directors’ duties 
In all Member States, there is a wide range of duties with which the board must comply. As a common 
basis, however, the directors have to act with reasonable care, skill and diligence. Whereas the primary 
duties on an abstract level are all very similar throughout the EU, there are significant national differences 
when considering the specific duties, the applicable standards for measuring compliance, as well as the 
extent of any potential liability. 
All Member States’ Companies Acts have a provision which imposes on the board the ability, but also, the 
obligation to decide on the management of the company, the administration of its assets and the pursuance 
of the company’s objects in general, see for example the German AktG Section 76, the Greek Companies 
Act Section 22, the Polish Commercial Companies Code Section 368 (regarding management board) and 
Section 382 (regarding supervisory board), the Portuguese Companies Act Section 405 (1), and the Spanish 
Companies Act Section 209. The Polish Commercial Companies Code states very concisely that “the 
management board shall manage the affairs of the company and represent the company/the supervisory 
shall exercise permanent supervision over all areas of the activities of the company”. This is also the 
approach in the Netherlands, with the explicit provision that the management board and the supervisory 
board have to act in the best interest of the company and all its stakeholders (Companies Act Sections 
2:129/239(5) and 2:140/250 (2)). The most comprehensive statement of directors’ general duties is found 
in the UK’s Companies Act 2006 Sections 171-177. 
According to the provisions in EMCA Chapter 11 on general meetings, the general meeting makes 
decisions on company matters. The directors execute the decisions of the general meeting, see further below 
in Chapter 11. 
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2.2. Conflicts of interest 
National law in the Member States has no common definition of conflicts of interest. However, under the 
generally accepted principle of the duty of loyalty, the management must act in good faith. This primarily 
means that the management must act in the company’s best interests when taking management decisions. 
This includes the duty to avoid conflicts of interest. 
There are substantial differences as to how the EU Member States regulate directors’ conflict of interest. 
In some Member States, there are general rules on conflicts of interest, as in Greece, the Netherlands, 
Poland (in the Corporate Governance Code), Slovakia, Spain, Ireland and the UK. In other Member States, 
a similar result seems to be achieved by referring to the general duty of loyalty, as in Denmark, Germany 
and Portugal. 
Excluding persons from becoming directors on grounds of conflicts of interest 
The appointment of executive directors is made by the supervisory board in companies with a supervisory 
board. In private companies with only a director, the appointment is made by the shareholders. In both 
cases, the supervisory board and the shareholders, respectively, should consider whether an appointment 
may give rise to a conflict of interest. Being a member of the executive board is normally a fulltime job. 
The contract of employment, if any, will normally include provisions requiring the director to devote all of 
his or her working time to the company. The contract will also usually contain provisions governing 
competing positions. 
The supervisory board is appointed by the general meeting. Thus, the question is in which way the general 
meeting should consider whether members of the supervisory board are in positions of conflict or potential 
conflict. 
No national rules exclude persons from becoming directors on the grounds of a conflict of interest. 
However, in France, no more than one third of the members of the board of directors can have a contract 
of employment with the company (this rules does not apply to the supervisory board). This only applies to 
companies with a one-tier system. In Portugal, no member of the board of directors may have a contract of 
employment with the company or with an affiliated company. 
Generally, it is up to the supervisory board and the shareholders, who appoint the managing directors and 
the supervisory board respectively, to assess whether the candidates’ business or personal relations may 
lead to a conflict of interest. Several Member States require the disclosure of information about the 
candidates’ business or personal relations with the company which could cause a conflict of interests. This 
applies, for example, in France, Germany (for listed companies), and Greece. In the Netherlands, this 
applies to members of the supervisory board. Where the supervisory board appoints the managing director, 
it should not only assess the director’s managerial qualities but also whether situations could arise where 
there could be a conflict of interest, and the contract of employment may include provisions regulating such 
issues. 
In some Member States, such as Austria, Denmark, Lithuania (both management board and supervisory 
board) and the Netherlands, there is a duty to disclose to the general meeting information about the positions 
of the members of the supervisory board in other companies. This is obviously to give the shareholders the 
opportunity to consider whether there might be a potential conflict of interest and, if so, to decline to elect 
the member. See for example Section 120(3) of the Danish Companies Act. 
In most of the Member States a director can be dismissed without cause at any time by those who have 
appointed them. This means that a director can be removed if they fail to avoid a conflict of interest. In 
Germany, this is true for private companies (see Limited Liability Corporation Act § 38), whereas in a 
public company members of the management board may only be removed by the supervisory board for 
good cause (Stock Corporation Act § 84). A vote of no-confidence by the shareholders meeting may 
constitute good cause for the supervisory board to dismiss members of the management board. 
If executive directors, with a contract of employment, fail to avoid conflict of interest, they may be in 
breach of their contract. In this case, the director may be liable under the rules on liability. 
Duty to avoid conflicts of interest 
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As mentioned, the UK Companies Act 2006 states that a director has a duty to avoid conflicts of interest. 
A failure to avoid a conflict of interest does not necessarily mean that a decision is contrary to the interest 
of the company, only that there is a risk of it being so. Section 175(1) of the UK Companies Act 2006 states 
that ‘a director of a company must avoid a situation in which he has, or can have, a direct interest that 
conflicts, or possibly may conflict, with the interest of the company’. This Section states the general 
principle, and in the succeeding sections it is supplemented by provisions on typical situations of conflicts 
of interest. The Section covers both actual and potential conflicts. 
Directors have a general and enduring duty to consider whether there may be a conflict of interest, and 
examples of such situations are given in the special provisions. If a director considers there is a possible 
conflict of interest, he or she must inform the other directors or the shareholders. 
There are different ways to avoid a conflict of interest. According to Section 175 of the UK Companies 
Act, directors must always consider whether they are in a situation where a conflict of interest may occur. 
If so, they must disclose the risk of conflict and transfer the decision to the next level, either from 
management to the supervisory board, or from interested directors to disinterested directors, or from 
directors to the general meeting – depending on the board structure of the company. 
Having considered whether there is a conflict of interest and having disclosed a conflict of interest to the 
other directors, a director will have satisfied his or her obligations. The decision then becomes a matter for 
the other directors or the general meeting, depending on the structure of the company’s governance system. 
For example, if a private company only has a director and a general meeting, approval should be given by 
the general meeting. 
Duty to disclose conflicts of interest 
Several Member States have rules which require any conflict of interest relating to the company to be 
reported to the board or the general meeting : for example Section 22a(3)(b) of Greece’s Companies Act, 
or Section 229(3) of the Spanish Companies Act. Section 171(2) of the German AktG requires the 
supervisory board to examine the company’s annual report and report to the shareholders at the general 
meeting on how it has examined the management of the company which includes reporting if any conflicts 
of interest occurred and how they have been handled. The Dutch Corporate Governance Code which applies 
to listed companies also requires that conflicts of interest are reported (Chapter II.3 (management board) 
and III.6 (supervisory board)). 
A number of Member States explicitly state that a director has a duty to disclose any conflict of interests 
to the other members of the management. This is the case in France (in certain situations), Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Spain and the UK. 
According to Sections 177(1) and 182(1) of the UK Companies Act, directors have a duty to disclose an 
interest in a proposed transactions or arrangements with the company. This catches situations such as where 
a newly appointed director has interests in the company’s existing transactions or arrangements, for 
example because they are a shareholder in one of the company’s suppliers. 
According to Section 177 of the UK Companies Act, a director who has an interest in a proposed or existing 
transaction or arrangement with the company must declare the ‘nature and extent’ of that interest to the 
other directors before the company enters into the transaction or arrangement. 
The conflict of interest can be direct or indirect. In an indirect transaction, the director need not be a party 
to the transaction; it is enough that they are a shareholder of a company or a member of a partnership that 
is a party to the transaction. 
Section 177 of the UK Companies Act requires prior disclosure to the other directors where the transaction 
is with the company and the director has a direct or indirect conflict of interest. However, certain specific 
transactions require shareholder approval in addition to disclosure to the other directors. In Member States 
such as Denmark, Finland and Sweden, there are no specific rules on prior disclosure to the other directors 
but there are rules on prior authorization for special transactions between the company and the directors; 
see further below. 
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Competition with the company 
The duty of loyalty sets limits as to how, or to what extent, a director may compete with their company. 
This problem arises both while a director is in office and after they have resigned. For executive directors, 
it is common to have a “non-compete clause” in the director’s contract of employment. For non-executive 
directors and members of supervisory boards, it is up to the shareholders who elect them, or company law 
to decide the matter. 
Several Member States have special rules that prohibit members of the management engaging in any trade 
or entering into any transaction in competition with the company. This is the case in the Czech Republic, 
Germany (AktG/Corporate Governance Code), Greece, Italy, Poland (Corporate Governance Code), 
Portugal, Slovakia and Spain (in the latter case, unless explicit authorization from the general meeting 
pursuant Section 230). Other Member States, such as Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the 
UK, deal with this under the general duty of loyalty. Alternatively, or additionally, there can be a rule 
requiring the disclosure of directors’ other managerial posts prior to election to the supervisory board; see 
Section 120(3) of the Danish Companies Act and below. Such a rule is particularly relevant for public 
limited companies. 
Corporate opportunities 
Several Member States have special rules prohibiting directors from taking advantage of the company’s 
corporate opportunities. In the UK, Section 175(2) of the Companies Act prohibits the ‘exploitation of any 
property, information or opportunity (regardless of whether the company could take advantage of the 
property, information or opportunity’. In Spain, Section 229(1)(d) of the Spanish Companies Act also 
prohibits directors to take advantage of corporate opportunities. A specific rule on corporate opportunities 
applies to Italian public companies as well. In other Member States such a prohibition is covered by the 
general duty of loyalty. This is the case in France, the Netherlands, Poland (Corporate Governance Code), 
Portugal and Slovakia. In Germany, corporate opportunities are also dealt with in the corporate governance 
code. In some important respects, the UK Companies Act extends liability to former directors (see Section 
170(2)(a)). 
The UK Companies Act has no definition of a corporate opportunity. The corporate opportunity doctrine 
was developed in US case law. The American Law Institute (ALI) Principles of corporate governance § 
5.05(b) contains the following definition: 
“(1) Any opportunity to engage in a business activity of which a director or senior executive 
becomes aware, either, In connection with the performance of functions as a director or senior 
executive, or under circumstances that should reasonable lead the director or senior executive to 
believe that the person offering the opportunity expects it to be offered to the corporation; or 
Through the use of corporate information or property, if the resulting opportunity is one that the 
director or senior executive should reasonably be expected to believe would be of interest to the 
corporation; or 
(2) Any opportunity to engage in a business activity of which a senior executive becomes aware, 
and knows is closely related to a business in which the corporation is engaged or expects to 
engage.” 
3. Considerations 
3.1. Directors’ duties 
As mentioned above, the UK Companies Act contains the most comprehensive regulation on the general 
duties of the directors. This is the following: 
• Duty to act within their powers (Section 171) 
• Duty to promote the success of the company (Section 172) 
• Duty to exercise independent judgement (Section 173) 
• Duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence (Section 174) 
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All the duties, other than the duty of care, skill and diligence in Section 174, are so-called fiduciary duties 
which reflects the common law of negligence. 
The EMCA Group is of the opinion that the duties enumerated above are, and should be, accepted in EU 
Member States. Therefore, Part I is widely inspired by UK regulation. The statement of duties in Chapter 
9, Part I is not exhaustive. It merely sets out the general duties. However, directors are subject to various 
other duties including duties with respect to specific conflicts of interest governed by Chapter 9, Part II, 
statutory duties (such as the duty to maintain accounting records and prepare accounts governed by 
accounting rules), and duties under the general law such as employment law or health and safety legislation. 
The director’s duties, as described in Chapters 8 and 9, are the fundamental basis for deciding director’s 
liability. 
3.2. Conflicts of interest 
There is a link between directors’ duties and directors’ conflict of interest. The closest link is the relation 
between the general principle of directors´ loyalty and directors´ conflict of interest. Thus, according to 
Section 175 of the UK Companies Act 2006, directors are under a fiduciary duty not to place themselves 
in a position in which there might be a conflict between personal interest and their duty to the company. 
This rule is said to apply to any exploitation of any property, information or opportunity. It is immaterial 
whether the company could take advantage of the property, information or opportunity. 
It is possible to deduce more specific rules on conflict of interest or develop case law from the principle of 
directors´ loyalty. However, the EMCA Group has found it useful for the EMCA to include provisions on 
typical examples of conflict of interest. 
The following considerations only concern the directors’ conflict of interest. See Chapter 11 on 
shareholders’ conflict of interest. The EMCA Group is of the opinion that the EMCA should have some 
general rules on conflict of interest supplemented by a limited number of more specific rules. 
The EMCA Group has discussed the choice between disclosure rules and substantive rules such as a 
prohibition on a director attending or voting at a board meeting where transactions between him or her and 
the company are discussed. Generally, the Group considers that directors should have a duty to disclose 
potential conflicts of interest to other (independent) members of the board in order to ensure unbiased 
decisions. Thus, the Group decided to include such a provision in the EMCA (Section 5 of this Chapter). 
In connection with appointment and removal of directors, there should be a rule requiring proposed 
directors to disclose to the shareholders whether they hold other posts, thus giving the shareholders a 
possibility to assess whether there will be a conflict of interest now or in the future. See further in EMCA 
Chapter 8, Sections 2 and 6 on appointment and removal of directors and EMCA Chapter 10 on directors’ 
liability. 
The EMCA Group discussed the choice between a general provision limiting directors in voting in certain 
circumstances and specific rules which demand that certain types of decisions should be taken by the 
shareholders. On the one hand, it is simpler if a general provision on a limitation of voting can cover 
situations which may cause conflicts of interest. On the other hand, there is also a need to ensure that 
shareholders decide on important matters. 
The balance between the above mentioned two provisions should, according to the EMCA Group, be 
achieved by a combination of a general rule on limitation of voting and a limited number of provisions 
requiring shareholder approval. The rule on limitation of voting is thus found in Section 9. The rules on 
shareholder approval are covered either by Section 9 or by special provisions on shareholder approval on 
Sections 5-7 and in Chapter 11 of the EMCA. 
An example of a specific provision is the requirement to obtain shareholder approval regarding principles 
of directors’ remuneration, see above. 
The EMCA Group discussed whether the EMCA should include a specific rule on competition or whether 
rules on limitation of voting etc. in connection with the appointment of directors is enough. The Group 
decided to apply a special rule on competition specifying that shareholder approval is necessary, see Section 
7. 
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From the principle of duty of loyalty follows the requirement that directors must not exploit the company’s 
corporate opportunities. The EMCA Group also discussed the need for a special provision on corporate 
opportunities. Corporate opportunities may be protected either by case law applying the general duty of 
loyalty or by special provisions. As noted above, there is no legislative definition of corporate opportunities 
such as that given in the ALI Principles. It is difficult to give a legal definition of corporate opportunities 
which is both precise and not too comprehensive. In particular, it is difficult to determine when an 
opportunity is a ‘corporate opportunity’ and who might authorize a director to exploit such opportunity. 
The inclusion of provisions on corporate opportunities in companies’ legislation may cause problems of 
interpretation and application, but it seems even more difficult to develop consistent and precise case law 
on this issue. However, in the light of the overall aim of fostering European convergence, the EMCA Group 
was of the opinion that rules on corporate opportunities should be included in the EMCA, see Section 6. 
Even if the company law literature and the case law in the Member States consider benefits a breach of 
duty, the EMCA Group was of the opinion that it is preferable to create a common European rule on 
benefits. In the UK, the issue of benefits was separated from the main prohibition in Section 175 of the 
Companies Act 2006 presumably, to ensure that disinterested director authorization is not possible. A 
similar rule is found in the EMCA Section 8. 
Regarding independent directors, the EMCA Group was of the opinion that this is an issue which should 
be regulated in the national corporate governance code, which is also the case in the majority of the Member 
States. 
The EMCA Group considered the need for a special rule on conflict of interest regarding the duty to advise 
shareholders about a takeover bid. This issue is dealt with in Chapter 13. 
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PART 1 
DIRECTORS’ DUTIES 
Section 9.01 
General Duties 
(1) The company’s directors are responsible for the management of the company’s affairs. 
(2) The court may identify as a director a person that acts as such while not having been formally appointed 
(a “de facto director”) or a person in accordance with which instructions the board is accustomed to act 
(“shadow director”). 
(3) The duties of directors shall be owed to the company. 
Comments 
Re 1) The duty to manage the affairs of the company appears often to be regulated in Member States’ 
national company laws not as a matter of directors’ duties but as a matter of legal powers or competence 
of directors via-à-vis the general meeting of shareholders. 
Re 2) Paragraph 2 allows the courts to impose the duties of directors also on persons who, though not 
appointed as directors, purport to act as such. The importance of this arises mainly in relation to the question 
of liability. Thus, for example, shareholders who act as directors may be liable if they breach the duty of 
directors, see further below in Chapter 10 on de facto and shadow directors. 
The concepts of de facto directors and shadow directors are recognized in a number Member States but the 
UK (Section 251 of Companies Act) and Ireland (Section 221(1) Companies Act 2014) have specific 
provisions in the on shadow directors The Dutch Companies Act applies the same concept specifically in 
case of liability of directors in case of bankruptcy and unlawful distributions (Companies Act Sections 
2:138/248 (7), 2:216 Companies Act (distributions, private companies)). 
A question arises as to whether a parent company, who directs its subsidiaries, should be considered as a 
shadow director. The parent company might be a shadow director if it exercises real influence in the conduct 
of the subsidiary’s company’s affairs beyond a certain level, see further on this question below in Chapter 
15 on groups. 
Re 3) In the UK Companies Act Sections 170 and 172, directors’ duties are “owed to the company”. The 
importance of paragraph 3 arises mainly in relation to enforcement of director’s duties. It means that the 
duties are not owed to individual persons but to the company. Thus, it is the company which can enforce 
the duties. If the company does not want to do so, however, the EMCA includes a “derivative action”, see 
below in Chapter 11, Section 38. Paragraph 3 does not deal with the question as to whether the interests of 
stakeholders are recognized. However, it is broadly recognized in European company law that the interests 
of stakeholders should be taken into account, see further in the comments to Section 4. Thus, for example, 
directors may be liable to creditors for fraudulent and wrongful trading, see further below in Chapter 10. 
On this discussion, see also Chapter 1, comments to Section 6. Generally, the breach of duties included in 
this Chapter has consequences for the question of directors’ liability, see further below in Chapter 10, 
Section 1 and following. 
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Section 9.02 
Duties of the Board 
(1) In companies which are run by a board of directors consisting of managing director(s) and a supervising 
body - real two-tier systems, the duties of the bodies are as follows: 
(a) The supervisory board: 
(i) supervises the administration of the company, which is the responsibility of the managing 
director(s); 
(ii) shall regularly assess the company’s financial position, taking into account whether the 
company has adequate capital and liquidity; 
(iii) shall ensure that the company’s governance arrangements are such as to ensure the proper 
monitoring of the company’s financial statements and positions; 
(iv) shall ensure that sufficient procedures for risk management and internal control are established, 
and that the supervisory board receives all necessary information for the performance of duties 
from the management body. 
(b) The management board: 
(i) is responsible for the executive management of the company; 
(ii) shall manage the company’s financial situation, taking into account whether the company has 
adequate capital and liquidity; 
(iii) shall ensure that the company´s governance arrangements are such as to ensure the proper 
monitoring of the company’s financial statements and positions; 
(iv) shall ensure that sufficient procedures for risk management and internal control are established 
and that the management body provides the supervisory body with all information needed for the 
performance of the duties of the supervisory body. 
(2) In public companies with a one-tier system, the company shall ensure that there is a division of 
functions between supervisory and managing functions similar to the functions in the two-tier system. This 
can be done by separation between executive and non-executive directors, cf. Chapter 1, Section 4, or 
otherwise. 
(3) In mixed systems, the articles of association may specify the division of duties between the 
management board and the supervisory board according to Chapter 8. 
(4) In private companies which have only one director, the director undertakes the management of the 
company as described above under (1) a) and b). 
Comments 
Section 2(1)(a) and (b) applies to public companies as well as to private companies which have chosen a 
two-tier system. The EMCA Group especially wants to underline two elements of the duties of the board. 
Firstly, both the supervisory board and the management board have a duty to take care of, or consider, the 
company’s financial position. This is a general duty which supplements, for example, the duties regarding 
dividend and capital reduction in Chapter 7, Section X, according to which, the directors must agree on 
paying out dividends or decisions on capital reduction. Also, this duty should be taken into account when 
deciding questions of directors’ liability towards creditors, see Chapter 10. Secondly, the Group intends to 
underline that the company should have a comprehensive risk profile. This is in line with the Commission’s 
Action Plan 2012 (COM (2012)740 final), no. 2(1). 
Risk management may be supervised by a risk management committee. The EMCA does not include a 
provision on a mandatory risk committee. As a rule, board committees are not mandatory, see above in 
Chapter 8, Section 23. 
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Risk management committees have risk management responsibilities that are often defined by corporate 
governance codes, which set out best practices and guidelines. If the company chooses to have a risk 
management committee, the company should define the task of the committee. The Risk Committee should 
assist the boards in assessing the different types of risk to which the organization is exposed. The 
management board is responsible for executing the organization’s risk management policy. The risk 
committee should exercise oversight. The members of the committee should have direct access to, and 
receive regular reports from management. 
Section 9.03 
Duty of Care 
A director of a company must exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence. 
This means the care, skill and diligence that would be exercised by a reasonably diligent person with— 
(a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person carrying 
out the functions carried out by the director in relation to the company, and 
(b) the general knowledge, skill and experience that the director has.  
Comments 
In most EU Member States, the Companies Acts (e.g. Article 20a of the Greek Companies Act, Article 64 
(1) (a) of the Portuguese Companies Act, Article 225 of the Spanish Companies Act and section 228 of the 
Irish Companies Act) or general principles of company law (Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, the 
Netherlands, Poland and Sweden) contain general rules on the duty to demonstrate reasonable care with 
regard to running the company’s affairs. Section 31(1) of the proposal for the SPE Statute describes the 
duty in a way, which would probably apply in most countries. The proposal states that: “A director shall 
have a duty to act…. with the care and skill that can reasonably be required in the conduct of business”. 
The Finnish Companies Act Chapter 1, Section 8 states concisely that “the management of the company 
shall act with care…”. According to the Spanish Companies Act, Section 225, the directors shall perform 
their duties with “the diligence of an orderly business person, taking into account the nature of the role 
and the duties inherent in each one”. The duty of care principle in Section 3 is inspired by the UK principle 
in Section 174 of the Companies Act on the “duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence.” Even if 
there are slight differences in the manner in which the duty is expressed, the core meaning is that the rule 
includes a normative standard, which may be developed by the courts. 
Section 9.04 
Duty of Loyalty 
Directors must act in the way they consider, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of 
the company for the benefit of its members as a whole. In doing so the director should have regard to a 
range of factors such as the long-term interests of the company, the interests of the company’s employees, 
the interest of company’s creditors and the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the 
environment. 
Comments 
The duty of loyalty is often expressed in a way that the directors have a duty to act in the interest of the 
company. The requirement that directors act in the interest of the company is an underlying tenet of much 
EU company legislation, although it often remains unspoken. An exception is Section 3(1)(c) of the 
Directive on Takeover Bids (2004/25/EC) which obliges Member States to ensure that the board of a target 
company “acts in the interests of the company as a whole” during the course of a takeover. The duty to 
promote the interest of the company is a part of the directors’ duty of loyalty to the company. 
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National law, for example the Finnish Companies Act Chapter 1, Section 8, expresses the duty of loyalty 
as the management’s duty “to promote the interest of the company”. Similarly, the UK common law duty 
of loyalty was typically formulated as one, which required the directors to act in good faith in what they 
believed to be “the best interest of the company”. This principle is also expressly laid down in Sections 
2:129/239, 140/250 Dutch Companies Act. In other cases, this duty is more extensively formulated: this is 
the case of Portugal, where the law requires managers to observe “duties of loyalty, in the interest of the 
company, taking into account the long-term interests of shareholders and concerning the interests of other 
stakeholders relevant to the sustainability of the company, such as their employees, clients and creditors” 
(CA Article 64 (1) (b)). 
The duty of loyalty expressed as “in the interest of the company” leaves open to discussion as to what “the 
interest of the company” is. A rather open interpretation of “the interest of the company” has been adopted 
in many Member States. It generally includes the interests of shareholders, employees and other 
stakeholders. A more detailed description can now be found in Section 172 of the UK Companies Act 2006 
which replaces the common law duty of a director to act “in the best interests of the company” with a duty 
to act in the way the director considers, in good faith, would be most likely to “promote the success of the 
company for the benefit of its members as a whole”. This reference to members is to the collective body 
and not just to the majority shareholders or to any particular section of shareholders. However, equally 
significantly it is ‘for the benefit of the members’ alone and not any other class of stakeholders. This is the 
case despite the fact that the Section continues by providing that, in so acting, the director must have regard 
(amongst other matters) to six specified factors: the likely consequences of any decision in the long term; 
the interests of the company’s employees; the need to foster the company’s business relationships with 
suppliers, customers, creditors and others; the impact of the company’s operations on the community and 
the environment; the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business 
conduct and the need to act fairly. 
It is now widely accepted that claims of other stakeholders – creditors, customers, suppliers, and even the 
general society – may deserve recognition in Companies Acts. The UK Companies Act Section 172 has 
been described as an “enlightened shareholder value” approach by adding that “in doing so (the directors 
also) have regard to employees, suppliers, environment, etc.” The enlightened shareholder approach is 
based on the idea that maximizing shareholder value is in principle the best means of securing overall 
prosperity.65 Thus, the UK Company Law Review (CLR) rejected the so-called “pluralist approach”, 
which is based on the idea that a company should serve a wider range of interests, not subordinate to, or as 
a means of achieving, shareholder value, but as valid in their own right. This would means that the interest 
of a number of groups should be advanced without the interest of a single group such as shareholders 
prevailing.66 Using the words “have regard to” indicates that the mentioned requirement is subordinate to 
the overriding duty to promote the success of the company. The pluralist approach would enable, and indeed 
require, the directors to overwrite shareholders’ interests in circumstances where this would be in the 
interest of the company, as widely defined by these stakeholders. This approach however is firmly 
established in other countries like the Netherlands. The Dutch Companies Act explicitly provides that both 
the management and the supervisory board should take into account the interest of all stakeholders 
(2:129/239 and 2:140/250 CA). In Germany, the law is ambiguous and legal scholars are divided on the 
issue, but the Corporate Governance Code acknowledges a stakeholder approach. France has a similar 
approach to Germany. Also in Italy the issue is controversial. 
The EMCA Group agrees that the term “success of the company” should be understood in line with UK 
CLR’s understanding and Section 172 of the UK Companies Act. 
Section 4 uses the wording “promote the success of the company”. The word “success” is a more general 
word than for example “value”. However, the word “success” is used because not all companies are aimed 
at maximizing the financial interests of their members. In such cases, maximizing the value of the company 
is not the primary objective of its members and perhaps not even an objective at all. Section 172(2) of the 
UK Companies Act makes this clear but the EMCA Group considered that it was not necessary to have 
specific provision on this. 
                                                     
65 UK Company Law Review, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The Strategic Framework (1999), para. 5.1.11. 
66 Ibid., para. 5.1.12 – 5.1.13. 
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In terms of timing, the EMCA Group shared the view of the Reflection Group on the Future of EU Company 
Law of 2011, the view of the Green Paper on Corporate Governance and the Commission’s Action Plan 
(2012) that the interests of the company in the medium to long term should be the focus of the directors’ 
attention. 
Section 4 clearly does not specify all the duties and rules to which directors are subject. Specific duties, 
such as the duty to prepare accounts, the duty to avoid conflicts of interest or the duty to creditors on 
insolvency are set out in Chapters 9, 10 and 12 of the EMCA. Furthermore, directors are subject to a duty 
to act in accordance with a company’s instrument of incorporation and articles of association and to use 
powers for a proper purpose.
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PART 2 
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Section 9.05 
Duty to Disclose Conflicts of Interest 
(1) Directors shall inform the board of directors or, in the absence thereof, the other directors or, in the 
event of a sole director, the general meeting, of any situation that may involve a conflict of interest between 
their own and the company’s interest. Directors in such a situation shall refrain from taking part in the 
agreements or decisions relative to the operation/transaction around which the conflict has arisen. 
(2) This duty to inform in paragraph 1 is not breached if the matter has been authorized by the disinterested 
directors or the general meeting. 
Comments 
Section 5 contains the core general principle and it is supplemented by provisions on typical cases of 
conflicts of interests in the following sections. Further, it is supplemented by the Section 9 on limitation of 
voting. 
The provision in Section 5 covers actual conflicts as well as potential conflicts. 
Re 1) Directors have a general and ongoing duty to consider if there might be a conflict of interest. Typical 
examples are mentioned in the special provisions below. If the director considers that there is a possible 
conflict of interest, the next step is to disclose the possible conflict of interest to the other directors or to 
the shareholders. 
There are different possible ways to avoid a conflict of interest. From Section 5 it follows that a director 
must always consider if he or she is in a situation where a conflict of interest may occur. In such cases, he 
or she must disclose the conflict and as a consequence may transfer the decision to the next “level”, meaning 
from management directors to supervisory board or from a director to the general meeting – depending on 
the board structure of the company. 
Re 2) Having fulfilled his or her duties to consider if there is a conflict of interest and to disclose the conflict 
of interest to the other directors, the director’s duties are satisfied. If the matter has to be decided by the 
directors, the member of the board is disqualified from voting on the matter, see Section 9 below. Then, 
the decision on the matter may be taken by other directors or the general meeting, depending on the 
structure of the company’s governance system. Thus, for example, if a private company has only a director 
and a general meeting, the approval should be given by the general meeting. 
SPECIAL PROVISIONS 
Section 9.06 
Corporate Opportunities 
When a director is in a situation where there is a conflict of interest, the director may not personally or on 
behalf of third parties exploit a corporate opportunity unless he or she has received the approval of the 
disinterested directors or the general meeting. 
Comments 
A major example of the duty of loyalty problem is when directors take for themselves business 
opportunities which could be of use to their company. 
Some Member States have specific rules on corporate opportunities, whilst other Member States seek to 
protect the company’s corporate opportunities through the director’s duty of loyalty, see above in the 
paragraph on national law. 
European Model Companies Act 2017 
Chapter 9 – Directors’ Duties 
216 
Section 6 is inspired by Section 175(2) of the UK Companies Act. The latter does not define a corporate 
opportunity. Section 228 of the Spanish Companies Act also includes a prohibition on taking advantage of 
business opportunities stating that: 
“Directors may not invest, for their own benefit or the benefit of affiliates, in any operations relating to 
company assets of which they may become aware by reason of their position, when such investment or 
transaction/operation has been offered to the company or the company has an interest therein, unless the 
company has ruled out the investment or operation in a decision not influenced by the directors.“ 
The corporate opportunity doctrine is developed in US case law. The ALI Principles of corporate 
governance § 5.05(b) sets out the following definition of such an opportunity: 
“(1) Any opportunity to engage in a business activity of which a director or senior executive becomes 
aware, either,  
In connection with the performance of functions as a director or senior executive, or under circumstances 
that should reasonable lead the director or senior executive to believe that the person offering the 
opportunity expects it to be offered to the corporation; or 
Through the use of corporate information or property, if the resulting opportunity is one that the director 
or senior executive should reasonably be expected to believe would be of interest to the corporation; or 
(2) Any opportunity to engage in a business activity of which a senior executive becomes aware, and knows 
is closely related to a business in which the corporation is engaged or expects to engage.” 
The thinking behind the US law is that the company’s business opportunities – in the same way as the 
company’s “ordinary” capital – belongs to the company and therefore should not be appropriated by others 
or undermined by the management’s actions. The US courts use different tests to decide the specific 
contents of the corporate opportunity doctrine. Thus, many courts use a two folded test, firstly a “line of 
business test” and secondly a “fairness test”. The idea of the former is to decide how closely related the 
opportunity in question is to the type of business in which the company is engaged. The closer related they 
are, the more likely it is that a corporate opportunity exists. If this decision is positive, it is left to be 
considered whether it is fair that the management utilizes the opportunity. 
The EMCA does not contain a specific definition of corporate opportunity. Neither does it set out the test 
to be applied. This should be decided by the national courts. 
Section 9.07 
Competition with the Company 
A director may not carry on a competing activity or be a manager or director of a competing company 
without prior approval of the disinterested directors or the general meeting. 
Comments 
The duty of loyalty limits the manner in which, or the extent to which, a director may compete with the 
company. This problem arises both while the director is a director and after the director ceases to be a 
director. Regarding executive directors, it is common to have provisions on non-competition in the 
director’s contract with the company. Regarding non-executive directors and members of supervisory 
boards, it is up to company law to decide on the matter. 
The EMCA Group considered whether it should be left to national courts to set the boundaries in order to 
deal with the variety of specific situations which occur. The “case law solution” is preferred in many 
Member States such as the UK, the Netherlands, and the Nordic countries. Special provision on competition 
is for example found in Germany (§ 88 AktG) and Greece (Companies Act Section 23). 
Section 7 is inspired by Section 23 of the Greek Companies Act., see further in Chapter 8, Section 2 on the 
appointment of directors. This requires the directors to disclose their positions in other companies, in which 
case the general meeting has the opportunity to consider whether there should be a possible conflicts of 
interest in the future. 
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Section 7 does not deal with the problem whether a director, who is going to resign, prepares for a 
competing activity after resigning. 
Section 9.08 
Benefits from Third Parties 
(1) A director of a company may not without consent of the disinterested directors or the shareholders 
accept a benefit from a third party conferred by reason of his or her being a director, or his or her doing, or 
not doing, anything as a director. 
(2) This duty is not infringed if the acceptance of the benefit cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to 
give rise to a conflict of interest. 
Comments 
Section 8 is inspired by the UK Companies Act Sections 176. 
Re 1) A prohibition on the acceptance of benefits from third parties may be considered as a part of the 
general duty of loyalty. The risk of such benefits distorting the proper performance of a director’s duties is 
so high that it is right to require authorization from the general meeting. 
Accepting benefits is - under further conditions – also a criminal offence in some Member States. In 
Denmark this is characterized as a “breach of trust” according to the Danish Criminal Code Section 280e. 
Similarly German Criminal Law contains further provisions for this aspect of the acceptance of benefits 
from third parties, including the acceptance of bribes.  
Re 2) Paragraph 2 is a general exception meaning that benefits of minor significance, which could not 
influence the director, should not be prohibited. The limit for minor benefits should be decided by national 
custom. 
Section 8 uses the word “benefit”. Benefits could be “bribes” but could also include something else. Thus, 
there is no need to show that the giver of a benefit acts with a corrupt motive or that the director’s mind 
was actually affected by the benefit. The issue of bribery is generally a matter of criminal law, but, as noted, 
it is also covered by Section 8 as part of the breach of duty of loyalty. 
Section 9.09 
Limitation of Voting 
A director shall be disqualified from voting at a board meeting on a matter pertaining to an agreement 
between the director and the company. A director shall likewise be disqualified from voting on a matter 
pertaining to a contract between the company and a third party, if the director is to derive an essential 
benefit in the matter and that benefit is contrary to the interests of the company. The limitation of voting 
applies correspondingly to court proceedings. 
Comments 
According to Chapter 8 Section 20, the board makes decisions on the basis of a simple majority of the 
members participating in the resolution. Section 9 provides that if a director has a conflict of interest as 
described in this Section, he or she is not allowed to vote on the matter. 
The consequence of limitation of voting of a member of the board of directors is that other members of the 
board may decide. If all members of the board are disqualified, the decision must be taken by the next level 
meaning either a supervisory board or general meeting depending on the management structure of the 
company. 
According to Section 9, not all conflicts of interest exclude the director from voting. The key word in 
Section 9 is “contract” and “court proceedings”. 
Section 9 is inspired by the Nordic Companies Acts, especially Section 131 of the Danish Companies Act. 
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Court proceedings include any kinds of court proceeding such as a petition for bankruptcy or proceedings 
before any kind of court. 
The EMCA Group considered whether Section 9 should also limit the directors’ right to attend board 
meetings and to take part in discussions, or if only the right to vote should be limited. The Group decided 
that only the right to vote should be limited because there might be a need for the board to ask the conflicted 
directors questions etc. 
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General Comments 
1. EU law 
The proposed, but never passed, 5th Directive was concerned with directors’ liability but the draft was 
eventually withdrawn by the Commission. However, Article 6 of the Prospectus Directive (2003/71/EC)67, 
which is in the process of being turned into a regulation, is relevant as it refers to some extent to the issue 
of directors’ liability. The Directive states that any Member State should have rules on liability that apply 
to those persons responsible for the information given in a prospectus. 
2. National Law 
On a general level, the rules on the duties and liabilities of directors are very similar in the different Member 
States. However, taking a closer look reveals some differences, as shown for instance by a 2013 study of 
the London School of Economics (LSE) for the Commission.68 There are many explanations for the great 
similarity between the Member States. One explanation is that the influence of American corporate law, 
such as the design of the Business Judgment Rule and the duty of loyalty of directors, is fairly significant. 
Common to all Member States is the liability of directors based on the principle of fault, which is derived 
from civil law. Further, directors have different tasks and responsibilities in the company, which must be 
reflected in the diligence assessment. 
In order to make an assessment of diligence, objective standards are used, in particular based on rules that 
can be found in the Companies Act and in the articles of association. The assessment must also consider 
the circumstances relating to the party causing the damage. 
3. Considerations 
When assessing liability, insufficient personal qualifications do not disqualify or reduce the responsibility 
of directors. Because Chapter 10 applies to companies of different sizes and different industries, it is 
difficult to find an acceptable minimum standard for such an assessment. However, national corporate 
governance codes demand that directors should have appropriate qualifications and commitment. Such 
demands may be taken into consideration. Since a person has taken up the position as a director voluntarily, 
it is reasonable to require that he or she leaves the business when it becomes clear that the personal 
qualifications are not sufficient. 
US law includes the term “an ordinary prudent person”. It means that a person need not have expertise or 
specific knowledge to sit on the Board but they must be a person “who has the capacity to perform a given 
corporate assignment”. A similar standard may be used in the EMCA as a basis for assessing liability.  
A rule that seems to apply, explicitly or implicitly, in most legal systems is the “Business Judgment Rule”. 
This requirement is also reflected in Section 1(2). The “Business Judgment Rule” should be formulated in 
such a way, that a director or managing director will not be deemed liable for their actions in cases where 
it is clear that they had a justifiable basis for making a decision and that they had an overview of the 
company’s financial position. 
U.S. law has influenced the content of the “Business Judgment Rule” in most legal systems in Europe. For 
example, in German law, liability may apply in cases where a harmful action is carried out which is not 
based on a sufficiently comprehensive, accurate and fundament decision, cf. Chapter 9, Section 2, 
according to which the supervisory board must receive all necessary information for the performance of 
their duties. 
                                                     
67 Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the prospectus to be published 
when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and amending Directive 2001/34/EC. 
68 See Study on Directors’ Duties and Liability, prepared for the European Commission DG Markt by: C. Gerner-Beuerle, P. Paech 
and E. P. Schuster (Department of Law, London School of Economics), London, April 2013. The study is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/board/2013-study-analysis_en.pdf. 
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A principle that applies in most European legal systems is that the burden of proof lies with the injured 
party to show that an injury has resulted from negligence. One of the few exceptions to this principle can 
be found in German law under AktG § 93 (2) where the burden of proof for alleged negligence lies with 
the member of the management board or supervisory board. However, this position is not taken in the 
GmbH-Gesetz. In this regard, Spanish Companies Act (sect. 236.1) also provides that “When the act is 
contrary to the law or the company-bylaws, guilt shall be presumed, until proven otherwise” (i.e. proven 
by directors). 
In those legal systems where the Companies Act provides for a hierarchical organization and where the 
general meeting may give binding instructions to the board, it is held that liability does not apply if the 
director has followed such an instruction or gathered the general meeting’s consent to perform the action. 
The exemption from liability should not be effective if the instructions of the general meeting are not in 
conformity with applicable rules or regulations in the statutes.  
In Poland and Spain, however, the exemption from liability applies regardless of whether the instructions 
are in conformity with law or the statutes or not. Contrary to the exemption based on consent from the 
general meeting, an approval from the supervisory board will not exclude liability. 
On the contrary, in France and in Italy a vote of the general meeting cannot exempt the directors from their 
liability. 
The company’s claims for damages against directors must be passed by the general meeting according to 
EMCA Chapter 11, Section 38. Section 38 contains a rule on discharge regulating situations where the 
shareholders have not been provided with correct or complete information. Further, Chapter 11, Section 39 
contains a rule on shareholders’ derivative suits regarding liability for directors as well as shareholders.  
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Section 10.01 
Directors’ Liability 
(1) A director has a duty to the company to perform the functions, according to his or her duties and 
according to this Act and the articles of association. 
(2) A director, managing director or a member of the supervisory board, who in the performance of his or 
her duties according to this Act, the applicable annual reports legislation or the articles of association, 
intentionally or negligently causes damage to a shareholder or other person, shall compensate such damage. 
(3) A director who makes a business judgement in good faith fulfils the duty under this Section if he or 
she: 
(a) is not interested in the subject of the business judgement; 
(b) is informed with respect to the subject of the business judgement to the extent that the director or 
managing director reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circumstances; 
(c) rationally believes that the business judgement is in the best interests of the company 
(4) A person challenging the conduct of a director under this Section has, in a damage action, the burden 
of proving a breach of the duty of care, including the inapplicability of the business judgement rule as it is 
explained under Subsection (2), and that the breach was the legal cause of damage suffered by the company. 
(5) A director shall not be liable for damages against the company if the action was taken on the basis of a 
lawful resolution of the general meeting. The fact that a supervisory board has approved the action shall 
not exclude liability. 
Comments 
Section 1(1) decides that directors are liable to the company as well as other persons affected by their 
activities in the company. Such persons may be individual shareholders, creditors or other parties. 
Liability towards the company may for example occur if minority interests are violated, for example if the 
directors act outside their competence and the company suffers losses from such actions. 
Liability towards individual shareholders might arise in situations where shareholders have acted on the 
basis of information from the company’s annual accounts or information given in a prospectus. 
Liability towards creditors may occur where creditors have been motivated to extend credit to the company 
based on incorrect facts as to the company’s financial situation for example showing misleading financial 
reports, or if the directors have ignored their duty to realize the financial situation was dire and not taken 
the appropriate actions. Thus the legal basis for liability towards creditors is the provisions in the 
Companies Act (EMCA) which protect the interest of creditors. 
The principle of fault applies in the same way to the members of the supervisory board as to managing 
directors. The extent of liability depends on the specific duties that apply to members of a supervisory 
board depending on the different role of supervisory boards in the various systems, cf. EMCA Chapter 9 
above. 
According to UK law, the interest of creditors are mainly protected through the Insolvency Act, especially 
Section 214 on wrongful trading. As mentioned below, a similar rule is recognized in the laws of other 
Member States and in the EMCA (See Section 4 and EMCA Chapter 15, Section 17 on Parent liability). 
The German AktG § 93 only provides for liability towards the company. However, liability towards third 
parties may be based on BGB § 823(2). 
European Model Companies Act 2017 
Chapter 10 – Directors’ Liability 
224 
In the case of liability against creditors, legal provisions differ quite considerably within the EU. In the UK, 
for example, a liability rule on wrongful trading is set out in Section 214 of the Insolvency Act to the effect 
that the director may be held liable to the creditor if the company continues in business at a time when there 
is no reasonable prospect that the company could avoid going into insolvent liquidation, unless the director 
has taken any steps with a view to minimizing the potential loss to the company’s creditors. A similar 
approach is taken by the EMCA. Danish and Swedish laws, in turn, also include other rules with a creditor 
perspective, namely that a director has a responsibility to ensure that the company has an adequate capital 
base in order to carry on business. 
Section 1 builds on the premise that the EMCA include rules designed to protect creditors interests by 
ensuring that the company has an adequate capital base or, as in the case of wrongful trading, by imposing 
a duty on the directors to act to satisfy the creditors’ interests. 
Several Member States instruct directors of limited liability companies to file for bankruptcy. This is 
particularly the case under French and German company law. This duty applies if a company is unable to 
pay its debts or if its assets in the balance sheet do not cover its debt. In other Member States such as the 
Nordic Countries no such duty exists. It is up to the creditors to file for bankruptcy, but as mentioned above, 
the directors may be liable if they continue to do business when they could have foreseen that the company 
would not be able to pay the creditors. A duty to file for bankruptcy might hinder an attempt to reconstruct 
a company. Therefore, the EMCA does not include a provision containing a mandatory rule on bankruptcy. 
Section 10.02 
Joint and Several Liability 
(1) Where several directors are liable for the same damage, they shall be jointly and severally liable. 
Reimbursement of damages paid by any of them may be sought through recourse to the other parties in 
accordance with what is reasonable in the circumstances. 
(2) Members of the management board or the supervisory board shall not be liable to the company for 
damages if their acts were based on a lawful resolution adopted by the general meeting. The fact that the 
supervisory board has approved the action shall not mean that liability for damages is excluded. 
Comments 
In the majority of Member States, the directors are held to be jointly liable for the damage caused because 
of breaches of their duties. In some Member States, the principle of joint and several liability also applies 
to a director who has not breached his or her duties to a company. According to Section 4 – and consistent 
with most Member States – such as Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Poland, Britain and Sweden - joint 
and several liability is only imposed on those who neglected their duties. Whether a director is considered 
to be liable is dependent on an individual assessment. However, a director who claims not to be liable will 
need to prove that he or she has acted diligently for example by ensuring that any objections they made to 
the decisions taken by the board are documented in the minutes. 
Section 10.03 
Adjustment of Damages 
Where any person is liable in damages pursuant to Sections 1-3, the damages may be adjusted in accordance 
with what is reasonable taking into consideration the nature of the act, the extent of the damage and the 
circumstances in general. 
Comments 
This Section is a manifestation of general tort law. However, the possibility of adjustment in terms of 
responsibility for the director and managing director is larger than in general tort law. The reason is that 
damages in these circumstances may be very large. 
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Section 10.04 
Wrongful Trading 
Directors may be liable if the company continues its business at a time when the directors knew or ought 
to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect of the company being able to pay its creditors. 
Comments 
Section 4 is inspired by Section 214 of the UK Insolvency Act and by Nordic company case law. In the 
UK, wrongful trading may be viewed as a breach of duty to take care of the creditor’s interests. In some 
Member States, provisions on wrongful trading may appear in tort law. Section 4 does not exclude any 
national tort law provisions on wrongful trading. 
A special Section on parent liability, which is close to the concept of wrongful trading, in regards to Groups 
is found in Chapter 15, Section 17. 
Section 10.05 
Time for Announcement of Proceedings 
Claims regarding damages to the company shall become time-barred after three years. 
Comments 
If a claim regarding damages to the company is time-barred, then it is stopped on the basis that it has been 
filed too late according to Section 5. The time period available to claim liability to the company varies in 
general between three and five years between the various Member States. A five-year limitation period is 
common. In France and Ireland, a period of three years applies. 
Section 10.06 
Insurance 
A company may purchase and maintain insurance on behalf of an individual director or managing director 
of the company or a person who, while a director or managing director of the company, serves at the 
company’s request as a director or managing director of another domestic or foreign company, against 
liability asserted against him or her in that capacity. 
Comments 
One possibility for the company to obtain compensation for an injury that a director or managing director 
has caused is to sign liability insurance. Such insurance is permitted in all Member States, although it is 
not always stated in the Companies Act. The premium is generally paid by the Company.
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General Comments 
1. EU law 
There is an on-going international debate on the role of shareholders in companies. One of the main aims 
of the European Commission’s 2003 Action Plan (COM (2003) 284 final) was to strengthen the position 
of shareholders in the company.69 Following this aim, Directive 2007/36/EC on the exercise of certain 
rights of shareholders in listed companies (i.e. companies whose shares are admitted to trading on a 
regulated market), the ‘Shareholder Rights Directive’, has been adopted and implemented in Member 
States. In addition, in 2012 the Commission published a new Action Plan (COM (2012) 740 final) on the 
EU Corporate Governance Framework which stipulates that shareholders should be encouraged to be more 
active on corporate governance issues. Among others, shareholders should be offered more possibilities to 
oversee remuneration policy and related party transactions, and shareholder cooperation to this end should 
be made easier. The Directives highlight a number of measures in order to ensure that shareholders are able 
to play an active role in the company’s decision-process as well as being able to hold the management 
accountable for running the company. 
Generally, Chapter 11 of the EMCA is in line with the Shareholder Rights Directive and the thoughts of 
the Commission’s 2012 Action Plan. 
The Shareholder Rights Directive of 2007 takes the view that there is a need to enhance shareholder rights 
in listed companies. It follows an international trend to foster active shareholders. Generally, the preamble 
stresses “effective shareholder control is a pre-requisite to sound corporate governance and should 
therefore be facilitated and encouraged.” Thus, the Directive includes provisions on shareholder voting 
rights, including proxy voting rights and cross-border voting rights, on shareholders’ rights to put items on 
the agenda of the general meeting, to ask questions and, for companies, the right to use electronic means to 
communicate with the shareholders and to enable electronic voting at the general meeting. As mentioned 
before, certain provisions are also applicable to non-listed companies, but other provisions should only 
apply to listed companies because of the special need to inform and protect shareholders in companies with 
shares admitted to trading on the market. 
In 2014, the Commission published a proposal for a new Directive amending the Shareholder Rights 
Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement and Directive 
2013/34/EC as regards certain elements of the Corporate Government Statement (COM (2014) 213 final). 
The amending directive has been adopted in 2017 (but not yet published in the EU Official Journal at the 
time of publication of the EMCA). 
The 2017 directive for the amended Shareholder Rights Directive encourages shareholders to engage more 
in the companies in which they invest, and to take a longer perspective of their investment. 
The proposal identifies five specific objectives: 
• Increase the level and quality of engagement of asset owners and asset managers with their investee 
companies 
• Create a better link between pay and performance of company directors 
• Enhance transparency and shareholder oversight of related party transactions 
• Ensure reliability and quality of advice of proxy advisors 
• Facilitate transmission of cross-border information (including voting) across the investment chain in 
particular through shareholder identification. 
From a company law perspective, it should be noted that not all of the mentioned objectives require 
company law regulation. Thus the directive (Article 3 f-3 h) increases the transparency of institutional 
investors and asset managers. The articles mention that ‘Member States shall ensure that institutional 
investors develop an “engagement policy” (Article 3 f), “Investment Strategy” (Article 3 q) etc.’. 
                                                     
69 K. Hopt, European Company Law and Corporate Governance: Where Does the Action Plan of the European Commission Lead?, 
ECGI Working Paper- No. 52/2005, p.3 
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The relevant regulation is not company law, but the (different) national law regulating institutional 
investors and asset managers. 
The directive’s Article 9 a and 9 b require listed companies to publish detailed and user-friendly information 
on the remuneration policy and on the individual remuneration of directors. The articles give shareholders 
the right to approve the remuneration policy and to vote on the remuneration report. Therefore, the report 
facilitates the exercise of shareholders rights and ensures the accountability of directors. This is clearly a 
matter for company law regulation, see further below. 
The directive’s Article 9 c requires listed companies to submit material transactions with related parties’ 
transactions to the approval of the general meeting or the administrative or supervisory body. This is also a matter 
for company law regulation, see further below. 
The directive’s Article 3 i requires proxy advisors to adopt and implement adequate measures to guarantee 
that their voting recommendations are accurate and reliable. The relevant regulation is not company law 
but national regulation concerning proxy advisors. 
The directive’s Article 3 a-3 e include rules on identification of shareholders, transmission of information 
and facilitation of exercise of shareholders rights. 
Article 3 a-3 e affect a number of company law issues as well as regulations regarding institutional investors 
and proxy advisors, see further below. 
The Commission has put forward in 2014 a proposal for a Directive on single-member private limited 
liability companies, creating the Societas Unius Personae or SUP (see EMCA Introduction, Point 7). The 
proposal aims to make it easier and less costly to set up companies across the EU. In particular, it aims to 
encourage SMEs including individual entrepreneurs to carry out their activities in other Member States. It 
should also benefit groups by allowing them to set up single-member subsidiaries according to the same 
main requirements across the EU. The proposal aims to address some of the obstacles that SMEs face by 
facilitating the setting up of companies with a single shareholder across the EU (in light of the 
Commission’s withdrawal of the SPE proposal in its REFIT exercise (IP/13/891).The Juri Committee of 
the European Parliament has been split over the proposal despite amendments to take into account concerns. 
Thus an agreement on the proposal seems far in the future, but not impossible. 
The formal requirements applying to the holding of general meetings and especially the rules on minority 
protection are based on the assumption that a majority of shareholders is present at the general meeting. 
There is no EU regulation on the shareholders position and general meetings in private companies or non-
listed public companies. However, most of the fundamental principles regarding shareholders’ rights in 
listed companies are also applicable in non-listed companies. 
2. National law 
Chapter 11 is divided into three parts. 
Part I comprises the rules on general meetings, including the competence of the general meeting, how 
general meetings are conducted, and the rules on shareholders’ rights at general meetings. 
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There are different positions in the Member States as to the competence to take business decisions. The 
situation is also different in public and private companies. Generally, there are two opposite positions 
regarding public companies: In Czech, German and Polish law the management board has the exclusive 
competencies with respect to the administration of the company and neither the general meeting nor the 
supervisory board may pass resolutions regarding the management of the company. In Germany, the 
general meeting may only take business decisions at the request of the management board (Vorstand) (cf. 
German Stock Corporation Act §§ 11 and 119). According to the Polish Commercial Companies Code, the 
general meeting is prohibited from giving instructions to the board (cf. Section 375). In the Nordic countries 
the opposite is the case: Neither the supervisory board nor the management board has exclusive 
competence. This is a consequence of the conception of the company as being a strong shareholders’ 
democracy and also belonging to shareholders which should therefore be able to exercice direct power. The 
balance struck in the UK in all companies is that all powers of management are vested in the board, subject 
to the statute and the articles which can reserve matters to the general meeting, and subject to any directions 
given by the general meeting to the directors but that requires a 75 % vote. Overall then, most powers reside 
with the board, some are withheld by statute or the articles to the shareholders, and the option is there for 
the shareholders, on an ad hoc basis, if they can reach a 75 % vote, to instruct the board as to how to 
proceed. Equally, since a simple majority can dismiss the directors without cause, in practice, the board 
will not seek to exercise a power contrary to the wishes of a majority of the shareholders, so it is rare for a 
75 % direction to be given. 
The situation in private companies is different in the Member States, as there is usually a controlling 
shareholder. Therefore, the distinction between shareholders and management is reduced and this affects 
the legal organisation. Generally, there is a freedom to organize the competence between the general 
meeting and the board. The competence of the general meeting is unrestricted and the general meeting may 
take business decisions. 
 
A modified model between the two positions can be found in Dutch Law. The Dutch rule regarding 
instructions reads as follows (cf. Section 2:239(4) of the Dutch Civil Code (Book 2)): 
“The articles of association may stipulate that the management board has to follow the instructions 
of another body of the company. The management board has to follow these instructions, unless 
these are in conflict with the interests of the company or the enterprise connected with it.” 
Section 9 of EMCA Chapter 15 on Groups also recognises the right of the shareholders, subject to certain 
conditions and limitations, to give binding instructions, to the management body of a company.  
Following this approach, article 23 (Shareholder’s instructions) of the 2014 proposal of directive on the 
single-member private limited liability company, creating the SUP, established a right of the single 
shareholder to issue instructions : 
« 1. The single-member shall have the right to give instructions to the management body. 
2. Instructions given by the single-member shall not be binding for any director insofar as they violate the 
articles of association or the applicable national law. » 
 
Part II includes the different minority rights which are divided into five areas; 
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Firstly, there are provisions which demand that a super majority is reached in order to make different 
decisions. Provisions on super majority, or even unanimity, of course secure the interests of the minority 
or even a single shareholder (minority protection/individual rights). Provisions on super majority are found 
in various chapters of the EMCA, for example the chapters on capital increase and decrease, merger and 
divisions and liquidation. In this Chapter on general meetings, the EMCA includes the very important 
provision on alteration of the articles of association. All Member States have provisions on alteration of 
the articles of associations demanding super majority. The majority requirement in public companies, 
however, is different with the main distinction being between a 75 % or a 2/3 majority. For example, in 
Germany (AktG § 179) and the UK (Companies Act 2006 Section 21(1), cf. 283(1)) the majority must not 
be less than 75 %, in Denmark (Section 106), France (Article L. 225-96 of the Commercial Code), Finland 
(Companies Act, Chapter 5, Section 30) and Sweden (Chapter 7, Section 42) a 2/3 majority of both the 
votes cast and represented at the meeting is required. Unanimity is sometimes required in exceptional 
circumstances (e.g. change of nationality, increasing the obligations of shareholders, etc...). 
Secondly, Part II contains provisions on shareholder exit. In traded companies minority shareholders or 
individual shareholders are, in principle, always able to leave the company by selling their shares if they 
feel oppressed by the majority. Even the threat of leaving the company (“vote with one’s feet”) may force 
the majority not to misuse their position. Thus, in traded companies, exit is a powerful means to protect 
shareholders against misconduct by majorities. In non-traded companies and even more significantly in 
private companies (and closed companies which are public) exit rights are also effective regarding 
protection of minorities. Exit rights may oblige the company to redeem the shareholders’ shares or require 
other shareholders (the majority) to redeem the shareholders’ shares. 
Provisions which force the majority shareholders to redeem shares of the minority in case of abuse are 
found, for example, in Denmark (Companies Act Section 362 (2)), Finland (Chapter 18) and Sweden 
(Chapter 29, Section 4). On the other hand, there are also provisions which force an abusive shareholder to 
sell his shares to the other shareholders or to the company. Such a provision is found, for example, in the 
Danish Companies Act Section 362(3). 
A number of Member States’ Companies Acts also include general provisions on squeeze-out/sell-out 
rights which are not conditional on abusive conduct. Thus, for example, the Danish Companies Act Section 
69-73 contain provisions according to which shareholders who own more than 90 % of the capital and the 
votes may demand the other shareholders to let their shares be purchased/sold by that shareholder. The 
minority has a corresponding right. Similar provisions are found in Finland (Chapter 18) and in Sweden 
(Chapter 22, Section 1 and the following Sections). Even if the purpose of squeeze-out/sell out rights also 
goes further than minority protection - for example to facilitate restructuring of companies – squeeze-
out/sell-out rights may also be seen as a part of minority protection. Other Member States, such as France 
and Italy, do not recognize such right and allow only damages or nullification of a decision to protect 
minority shareholders. The EMCA Group considers that sell-out right is a modern and powerful protection 
tool for minority shareholders in closed companies. Therefore, in the EMCA, a minority may use the sell-
out right for protection without having to prove actual misuse by the majority. Therefore, the provisions on 
squeeze-out/sell-out rights are included in Chapter 11. The sell-out right is also part of the regulation of 
groups (See Chapter 15). 
 
The rules on squeeze-out/sell-out rights regarding takeovers, which are found in Article 15 and 16 of the 
Takeover Directive are in most Member States implemented by securities regulation. However, a number 
of Member States have also implemented rules on squeeze out/sell out in the Companies Acts in connection 
with traded companies, e.g. the Danish Companies Act Section 70 and following sections. Several Member 
States apply the squeeze-out/sell-out right to public as well as private companies. Thus, squeeze-out can be 
performed by a shareholder, who holds securities representing at least 90 % of the capital carrying voting 
rights of a company and 90 % of the voting rights in the offeree company. This is the case in a number of 
Member States, among them Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the UK. In other Member States like Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, the required majority is 95 % of the capital carrying voting 
rights of a company. In Belgium, France and Italy, the rules on squeeze out apply only to listed companies. 
In most Member States, also the minority has a right to sell out. However, this is not possible in Germany 
and the Netherlands. To sum up, the national rules on squeeze out/sell out rights vary substantially. 
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Thirdly, there are in the EMCA provisions on shareholders’ derivative suits. It is up to the general meeting 
to decide on a director’s possible liability towards the company. Often, the general meeting decides on 
discharge, meaning that the general meeting considers that there is no reason for director’s liability. 
However, the minority may disagree. A number of Member States’ Companies Acts contain provisions on 
derivative suits which allow a minority of shareholders to sue the directors on behalf of the company. 
Derivative suits are thus included in the Companies Act, for example in Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg (since 2016), Sweden and in the UK. Also the US Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) 
has provisions on derivative suits in Chapter 7, Subchapter D. 
Fourthly, provisions on special examiners, which are a powerful protection tool for minority shareholders, 
are found in a number of Member States’ Companies Acts, such as the Danish Companies Act Section 150, 
the Finnish Companies Act Chapter 7, Section 7 and the Swedish Companies Act Chapter 10, Sections 21-
23. 
Finally, provisions on dissolution in connection with misuse of majority power are found in Part II. 
Dissolution is an ultimate sanction in case of majority misconduct. The provision on dissolution is however 
included in Chapter 14 on liquidation. 
Part III contains provisions on shareholder liability. 
3. Considerations 
1. Generally the EMCA Group shares the view that company law, including the Chapter on general 
meetings, should encourage the shareholders to be active and improve their possibilities to act as the 
company’s highest decision-making body. This is also stated in the EMCA in the general principle of 
shareholder democracy, in Chapter 1, Section 12. The approach of the EMCA is that the general meeting 
must take important decisions which concern the company. This is expressed by mandatory provisions in 
the Chapter on general meeting as well as in other chapters of the EMCA. Further, the articles of association 
may decide that certain decisions may only be taken by the general meeting. Shareholders should have the 
right to set any other issues on the agenda of extraordinary meetings. 
The EMCA does not intend to challenge the governance system of those Member States which follow the 
German-oriented system whereby the competence of the general meeting is limited in that the general 
meeting cannot give instructions to the management board in public companies or deal with management 
decisions not required by the management board; see further below. 
In order for shareholders to play an active role in the company, they must have the opportunity to participate 
in the general meeting. Older Companies Acts assumed that shareholders would be physically present. By 
means of an increased internationalization of ownership, this precondition is almost non-existent any more 
in large companies. Incentives are needed to ensure and facilitate that shareholders participate actively at 
the general meetings. Improvements should be made by the EMCA to ensure that shareholders have and 
take the opportunity to attend and vote at the meetings by allowing for electronic general meetings, use of 
proxies, etc. 
Especially in large companies with many shareholders there is the risk of opportunistic behaviors from the 
board, such as undeserved golden-parachutes. The 2008 financial crisis has demonstrated that shareholders 
have not been able to hinder opportunistic behavior, especially related to directors’ pay (remuneration). 
This situation demonstrates that there is a need to provide shareholders with the opportunity to comment 
or approve on directors’ pay. The amended Shareholder Rights Directive, Article 9a-9b, introduces “say 
on pay” rules. A “say on pay” rule is already found in the EMCA, Chapter 8, Section 25. 
In recent years there has been a big discussion about the role of institutional investors. Institutional investors 
are often the most powerful group of shareholders. They exercise their power at the general meeting. It has 
been discussed if the institutional investors should be obliged to use their votes and if the institutional 
investors’ voting policy should be transparent. New editions of a number of national corporate governance 
codes, among them the UK Stewardship Code and the Dutch Eumedion best practices, recommend 
institutional investors to be transparent about the way they exercise their ownership/stewardship 
responsibilities, which in particular includes information about voting and engagement. 
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The Group has considered which way should be the most appropriate to enhance investors’ role as active 
shareholders. According to the proposed amendments to the Shareholder Rights Directive there is clear 
evidence that the current level of monitoring of investee companies and engagement by institutional 
investors is sub-optimal. Therefore, the proposal encourages the institutional investors to be more active 
and long-term investors. 
In that respect the EMCA Group has considered whether Chapter 11 on general meetings should include 
provisions especially on the role of institutional investors. Among other things, mandatory rules necessitate 
a precise definition of “institutional investors”. On a European level this is extremely difficult. A way 
forward might be provisions in the legislation (law or other regulation) which applies to the institutional 
investors demanding them to disclose their voting policy etc. on comply or explain basis. According to the 
EU proposal above amending the Shareholder Rights Directive, articles 3 f(1) and 3 g(1) Member States 
shall ensure that institutional investors develop an engagement policy and disclose their investment 
strategy. The EMCA Group considers that these duties should be implemented in national law by special 
regulation regarding institutional investors. The impact on company law is, however, that the duties to be 
active shareholders presuppose that the shareholder’s position at the general meeting makes it possible. 
2. Typically, there are substantial differences between the governance systems in private, public and traded 
companies. In private companies and public companies where the shareholders are engaged in running the 
company, the general meeting (shareholders) is much more involved in the company’s business than 
shareholders typically are in traded companies. There is a need for private companies (and some public 
companies) for shareholders to be able to act in the daily business, and also to be able to take decisions 
without a large formal and bureaucratic system. In traded companies there is a need for more formal 
regulation which secures the interests of shareholders, at least allowing them to take decisions of great 
importance for the company and be informed of the company’s affairs. The rules in Chapter 11 on general 
meeting comprise private, public as well as traded companies but the rules should be adjusted to the need 
in each of the mentioned categories of companies. Especially, it should be mentioned that the Shareholder 
Rights Directive only applies to companies whose shares are traded on a regulated market. However, the 
EMCA Group considers that the special provisions on traded companies should also apply to companies 
with shares admitted to trading on alternative markets (e.g. AIM London, Nasdaq OMX…). 
3. In some Member States the Companies Acts include special provisions on public companies with only 
one shareholder. This is for example the case in Poland. There are a number of special issues regarding 
general meeting in such companies. The formal requirements on general meetings including notice, agenda, 
conduct of the meeting etc. are obviously of no importance. The Group has considered whether the EMCA 
should contain special provisions regarding companies with only shareholder ? The Group is of the opinion 
that such provisions are not needed in general. Most of the provisions in the EMCA Chapter on general 
meetings do not apply to companies with only one shareholder. Especially regarding the proposal on the 
SUP company the EMCA Group is of the opinion that time has not come to implement special provisions 
on single-member companies in the EMCA. 
4. As mentioned under national law there are different positions in the Member States regarding the 
competence of the general meeting in private, public and traded companies. En brief, according to the 
Companies Acts in some Member States, the position in public companies is that the general meeting may 
take any decisions and may also give instructions to the board. The opposite position is that the general 
meeting may not interfere with the boards’ business decisions and may not give instructions to the board. 
Further, in some Member States (for example in the German AktG § 122(2)) there are restrictions regarding 
the shareholders’ access to set issues on the agenda of the general meeting. In practice, however, the 
difference between the two positions has minimized in so far as the shareholders may dismiss the board at 
any time. The latter is the position of the EMCA; see above, Chapter 8, Sections 6 and 14. 
In private companies, however, there is no similar distinction regarding the competence of the general 
meeting. Thus, for example, the German GmbHG § 46 includes a catalogue of decisions which should be 
taken by the general meeting unless the articles decide otherwise. However, the catalogue is not exhaustive. 
The general meeting has a fundamental competence to decide on all company matters. 
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Generally, the EMCA Group is of the opinion that for more reasons in public companies there should be a 
division of work between the general meeting and the company organs running the company’s business. 
This is especially important in large (traded) companies. However, in the light of the recent developments, 
including the considerations in the Commission’s Action Plan of 2012 and the amended Shareholder Rights 
Directive, there is a need to improve the shareholders’ position versus the board – without eliminating the 
board’s duties to run the company. However, the two positions – if pushed to extremes – are quite 
incommensurable. Therefore, Section 1 below contains alternative provisions. 
Since the EMCA Chapter 11 comprises general meetings in all companies, i.e. private, public as well as 
traded companies, the rules are made flexible in order to secure shareholders’ interest in formal general 
meetings and at the same time allow shareholders to decide on company matters without unnecessary 
bureaucracy. One of the most important means is to allow general meetings to take place without complying 
with the requirements of form and notice, see below in Section 2. 
5. General meetings are a forum for shareholders’ decisions but also for the company’s (the board’s) 
dialogue with the shareholders. Many companies with a large number of shareholders regularly invite their 
shareholders to attend “shareholder meetings” for information purposes only. Such meetings may be useful 
for the necessary dialogue with the shareholders, but the meetings are not a forum where decisions are 
taken. There may also be other types of shareholder meetings. For example, the German AktG § 127a 
contains a provisions on “shareholder’s forum” which is a forum where shareholders or shareholders’ 
associations invite other shareholders for the purpose of exercising their voting rights at a shareholders’ 
meeting. 
The need for dialogue with the shareholders is stressed in many Corporate Governance Codes. The EMCA 
Group agrees that shareholder meetings or shareholder meetings called by the company or the shareholders 
are useful means for dialogue. However, the Group is of the opinion that recommendations on such 
meetings should be left to the national Corporate Governance Codes. Besides, it is up to the company to 
decide, if a shareholder meeting – which is not a general meeting – should be established or the company 
for example prefers to communicate with the shareholders on the company’s website; see below in Section 
22. 
6. The Group has considered which means for minority protection should be included in the EMCA. 
Chapter 11 part II should include provisions on decisions which should be taken with a super majority or 
even unanimously, see below in sections 27-29. A special problem in this regard arises because of the 
difference between systems. In one system the shareholders may demand that any item should be included 
on the agenda of the general meeting, and the general meeting may take any decision on company matters. 
This is the case, for example, in Nordic company law. In other systems, individual shareholders have no 
right to add items to the agenda and the general meeting is limited regarding which decisions the general 
meeting may take. See for example the German AktG §§ 122(2) and 119(2). An example of the 
consequences of this difference is the discussion whether there should be a provision defining certain 
important decisions which always should be made by the general meeting. This problem is illustrated by 
the well-known German Holzmüller-case, according to which, a decision on transferring business to a 
subsidiary should be taken by the general meeting. In some Member States the Holzmüller-case has 
initiated a discussion as to whether there should be a principle stating that extraordinary decisions, e.i. 
decisions which are not mentioned in the company law as situations where a decision by the general 
meeting is mandatory, must be made by the general meeting. The Group considers that it is important to 
secure the shareholders’ influence, as mentioned. However, the Group is of the opinion that it should be as 
clear as possible when it is mandatory for the general meeting to make the decision. The balance may be 
obtained by a provision defining the meaning of very important decisions, see Section 29 below. 
Further, the Group considers that the EMCA should include squeeze-out/sell-out rights, not only related to 
securities regulation but also to general provisions, see below in sections 35 and 36. The EMCA Group 
considers that squeeze out/sell out rights which are not contingent on proved misuse of the power of the 
majority represent useful tools to protect the minority. 
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A number of Member States have provisions on derivative suits. This is for example the case for Italy, for 
public companies in France (Article L. 225-252 of the Commercial Code), Germany (AktG § 148), 
Lithuania (Companies Act Article 16 Part 1 Item 5), the Nordic countries (Danish Companies Act § 364(3) 
and Sweden (Chapter 29, Section 9), Poland (CA Article 295), and the UK (CA Sections 260 and the 
following). The experiences in Member States, whose Companies Acts have provisions on derivative suits, 
vary. There are different explanations for this. The Group is of the opinion that an assessment of the rules 
should consider both the more and less complicated structure of the rules on derivative suits and the number 
of court cases. The Group has chosen to include simple rules on derivative suits – also taking into account 
that such rules should not only be judged upon the number of court cases but also upon the preventive effect 
of the rules. 
The EMCA Group also stresses the protective effects of a rule which allow minority shareholders to ask 
for special examiners and in extreme situations a right of dissolution or liquidation. Therefore, the EMCA 
includes such provisions; see below Section 32. 
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PART 1 
GENERAL MEETING 
Section 11.01 
Competences of the General Meeting 
(1) The shareholders shall exercise their rights with respect to the company at the general meeting unless 
this Act provides otherwise. 
(2) National Law may provide that the general meeting in public companies may decide on matters 
concerning the management of the company only when required to do so by the management board or the 
board of directors. 
(3) It may be provided in the articles of association of public companies that the general meeting decides 
matters that fall within the general competence of the managing director/ the board of directors. 
(4) In private companies the general meeting has competence in all company matters, except where the 
articles of association otherwise provide. The general meeting may give direct instructions to the managing 
director/the board of directors. 
Comments 
The wording of Section 1(1) is similar to the German AktG § 118. Similar provisions are also found in the 
Danish Companies Act Section 76(1), the Finish CA Section 5(2) and the Swedish Companies Act Chapter 
7 Section 1.  
The provision states that the general meeting is the forum where the shareholders decide on company 
matters, but the provision does not decide in detail which decisions may or must be taken by the 
shareholders. 
There are two problems regarding the competence of the general meeting which, however, also are closely 
connected. The First problem is the general meeting’s competence vis-à-vis the directors (board of 
management). This is only a problem regarding public companies. In Denmark for example, the general 
meeting is in principle regarded as omnipotent (in public as well as in private companies). The opposite is 
the case in Germany (in public companies). The German AktG § 119 (2) thus decides that “The 
shareholders meeting may decide on matters concerning the management of the company only if required 
by the management board.” The corresponding AktG § 76 (1) states that “The management board shall 
have direct responsibility for the management of the company.” Some Member States have provisions with 
a compromise, thus for example the Finish CA Section 5 (2), which states that “It may be provided in the 
articles of association that the general meeting decides matters that fall within the general competence of 
the managing director and the board of directors.” Other Member States deal with this in public companies 
through case law and take a general restrictive view on modifications to the organisation of power 
established by the legislator. This is the case for instance in France (Cour de cassation (civ.), Sté de 
teinturerie c/ Motte, S 1947, 1, p. 153, note Barbry; JCP 1947, II, n° 3518, note Bastian) except for the 
simplified public limited liability company (Société par actions simplifiée or SAS) where large freedom is 
granted to the articles of associations. 
As decided in the EMCA, Chapter 8 on management, the EMCA recognizes that there are different 
governance systems in the Member States. As a consequence, the provisions in Chapter 11 should also 
recognize that there are different positions regarding the question whether the general meeting may give 
binding instructions regarding the competence of the general meeting. 
In practice the difference between the systems is diminished because of the possibility of dismissing the 
directors, see the EMCA Chapter 8 Sections 6 and 14. 
Given a wish to allow a flexible governance system, Section 1 (2) and 1 (3) includes two alternatives 
regarding the question of the competence in public companies. 
If none of the alternatives are used in national law, Section 1 (1) such be interpreted in such a way that the 
general meeting is omnipotent. 
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The second problem is to which extent it should be decided by mandatory provisions that certain decisions 
should be taken by the general meeting. Generally, the general meeting may not decide on management 
issues given the exclusive management competence of the board of directors. Technically, there are two 
ways to go.  
One is to provide examples of decisions which are considered so important that they need to be decided by 
the shareholders. Further the company may choose to give more examples in the articles of association.  
Another is to try to make a complete list of matters, which should be decided on or approved by the general 
meeting. Thus, for example, the German AktG § 119 (1) states that “The shareholder meeting shall resolve 
on all matters expressively stated in this act, in particular with respect to… (1-8).” The list in § 119 (1) is 
supplemented by some specific provisions in the AktG. Further, the articles of association may decide that 
certain decisions should be taken by the general meeting. 
Similarly, in the UK there must be a positive decision via the articles to subject a power to shareholder 
control, otherwise the power vests in the directors. However, some matters are reserved for the shareholders 
by statute for example to alter the Articles (UK Companies Act Section 21) or to increase or reduce the 
share capital. 
The shareholders are the ultimate decision takers in companies. However, the principle does not decide in 
detail the balance between the general meeting and the board of directors which has to take business 
decisions. 
Especially, in large companies there must be a practical division of the work between shareholders and the 
management. Generally, shareholders take decisions at the general meeting and the directors implements 
the decisions taken at the general meeting. 
It should be kept in mind that the size and shareholder structure of public companies, both in each Member 
State and between Member States, vary. There are small public companies which are comparable to typical 
private companies, but also large (listed) companies with thousands of shareholders. In listed companies 
there are Member States with dispersed ownership and Member States with concentrated ownership. It is 
more likely that large shareholders – for example large family owners, foundations or institutional investors 
– wish to, and are able to, decide on company matters than small private shareholders. Conversely, the 
shareholders in companies with dispersed ownership cannot run the company. This fact has led to a stronger 
position of the board, for example in in Germany and the UK. 
In Member States where the competence of the general meeting is not restricted it is possible for the 
shareholders to be active – if they wish. However, following the experience from the financial crisis and 
the intentions behind the amended Shareholder Rights Directive, it seems necessary to decide by law that 
more decisions should be made by the general meeting and, in general, make it possible for the individual 
companies, by means of provisions in the articles of association, to enhance the competence of the general 
meeting. 
It may be useful, or necessary, to decide by law that more decisions should be made by the general meeting. 
An example is the “say on pay” discussion. Article 9a in the amended Shareholder Rights Directive 
introduces a European “say on pay” provision. Such a provision seems necessary in Member States where 
the competence of the general meeting is limited according to Section 1(2), but is also appropriate even if 
the competence of the general meeting in principle is unlimited. 
The EMCA Chapter 8 imposes upon the directors a right as well as a duty to run the company’s business. 
A number of provisions in the EMCA, however, demand the approval of shareholders regarding important 
issues, such as capital changes, changes of a company’s structure by mergers and divisions, the purchase 
of own shares etc. Further, the articles of associations always may demand shareholder approval for specific 
decisions. Moreover, the directors prepare the agenda of the general meeting and directors may call 
extraordinary general meetings. Therefore, the directors always have the possibility to ask for the 
shareholders’ consent regarding any decisions. Since the directors may be dismissed without cause – see 
EMCA Chapter 8, Sections 6 and 14 – the board will not seek to exercise a power contrary to the wishes 
of the majority of shareholders. 
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There is a wide acceptance in Europe that the company has other stakeholders than shareholders. The 
EMCA does not take the view that the interests of other stakeholders should not be considered by the 
company, quite to the contrary (See Chapter 9, Section 9.04 Duty of loyalty). However, it is (only) for the 
general meeting to decide on the company’s fundamental business profile – including the balance between 
a stakeholder or a shareholder value orientation. 
Section 11.02 
Taking Shareholders’ Resolution 
(1) Shareholders may decide matters, without complying with the rules governing the conduct of general 
meetings, provided all shareholders agree. 
(2) This rule does not apply to companies whose shares are traded on regulated or alternative markets. 
Comments 
Section 2(1) allows “general meetings” without being physically present, e.g. in the way that the company’s 
lawyer sends out a written paper about the decisions which is signed by all shareholders. If all shareholders 
are present they may also decide to deviate from the rules on form and notice regarding decisions at the 
general meeting. 
Section 2(1) also permits general meetings, where all shareholders are present or agree, to take decisions 
on matters which are not on the agenda of the general meeting. Under same condition a “written general 
meeting” or a meeting by use of conference call is allowed. 
The need to depart from formal general meetings or other formal requirements is especially acute in private 
companies. In the UK Companies Act 2006 Section 336 the default rule is that private companies are not 
required to hold an annual general meeting unless such requirement is included in the articles. The EMCA 
acknowledges the need for simplification of the decision process in private companies but considers that it 
should also be possible for public companies (which could have an owner structure similar to private 
companies) to deviate from the mandatory rules on form and notice regarding general meetings. 
Section 2(1) applies also to one-shareholder companies. In such companies the shareholders exercise the 
powers otherwise preserved to the general meeting, cf. Article 4(1) of the 12th Company Law Directive. 
According to Article 4(2) of the Directive the decisions which are made by the sole shareholder must be 
recorded in minutes or drawn up in writing; see below in Section 22. 
Section 2(1) is in line with the thinking behind the Companies Acts of a number of Member States; for 
example, Section 76 of the Danish Companies Act and Section 121(6) of the German AktG and the UK 
COMPANIES ACT2006 Section 336. 
Section 2(1) applies to private as well as to public companies, however not to companies whose shares are 
admitted for trading at a regulated or alternative market. For the latter it is important for the shareholders 
as well as for the market that formal general meetings are conducted. The reason for the provision in Section 
2(2) is, among other things, that the rules concerning public companies which have shares traded on a 
regulated market are based on absolute Directive requirements, for example in Directive 2007/36/EC on 
the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies. A similar rule is found in the UK 
Companies Act 2006 Section 336. In some Member States (e.g. Denmark) it is also stated that deviation 
from the requirements to hold general meetings are not allowed for companies where the press has access. 
In Denmark this is the case for traded companies. 
Section 11.03 
Provision on Single Member Companies 
(1) A sole member shall exercise the powers of the general meeting of the company. 
(2) Decisions taken by the sole member in the field referred to in Section 3(1) shall be recorded in minutes 
or in drawn up in writing. 
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Comments 
Section 3 implements Directive 2009/102/EC (the former 12th Council Company Law Directive 
89/667/EEC) Article 4. 
Section 11.04 
The Place of General Meeting 
Unless otherwise provided in the articles of association, the general meeting shall take place at the 
company’s registered office. 
Comments 
The general meeting must be held in the locality in which the company has its registered office, which is 
specified in the articles of association. 
The articles of association may, however, provide that the general meetings may or must be held elsewhere 
in the Member State than where the company has its registered office. The articles may also stipulate that 
the general meeting may be held abroad. Certain requirements apply regarding how the place of the general 
meeting should be specified. It is for example not enough to state in “country X”, whereas a statement of 
the country and a particular municipality meets the requirement. 
The general meeting must be held at such a place that interested shareholders are able to attend in person 
or through proxy without any great difficulty. 
It is also possible to arrange the general meeting so that certain shareholders participate from a distance, 
e.g. via a TV link from premises designated by the company or via the Internet, see also Section 5. 
It follows from Section 1 above that the general meeting can take place at any location, if all shareholders 
agree. 
In some Member States the Companies Acts include a provision according to which the general meeting 
under certain circumstances in isolated cases may be held elsewhere, see for example the Danish 
Companies Act Section 87 and the Swedish Companies Act Chapter 7, Section 15. Such circumstances 
refer to traditional force majeure situations, such as natural disasters, outbreak of war etc. The Group is of 
the opinion that an exception from the mentioned extraordinary circumstances follows from ordinary 
principles in civil law and therefore a special exception is not needed to be specified in Section 3. However, 
if the board decides to move the general meeting to another place, the courts may examine whether this 
decision is justified. 
Some Member States are even more flexible. For instance, in the Netherlands, the articles of association in 
a Flex BV may explicitly state a place outside the Netherlands. 
Section 11.05 
Electronic Participation 
(1) The management board or the board of directors may decide that the shareholders, in addition to or 
instead of the right to attend a general meeting physically, may exercise all or some rights in the general 
meeting using electronic means of communication. The notice of the general meeting shall explain in 
sufficient detail the manner of exercising shareholders rights in the meeting and the conduct thereof. 
(2) The articles of association may provide for general meetings to be held by electronic means only. 
(3) The articles of association must specify the conditions for taking part in the general meeting by 
electronic means. 
Comments 
The chairman of the general meeting shall assure effective exercise of the shareholders rights and the 
possibility of verification of the shareholders exercising their rights, as well as the results of the votes cast. 
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Section 5 allows “general meetings” without being physical present. Section 5 is in line with Article 8 of 
the Shareholder Rights Directive, allowing Member States to permit companies to offer to their 
shareholders any form of participation in the general meeting by electronic means, and generally the efforts 
engage shareholders in the general meeting’s decision process. This is especially important regarding the 
growing number of international investors. The provision of the Directive is compelling. However, Section 
5 goes further, allowing completely electronic meetings, see below. The articles of association may provide 
for a right for minority shareholders to request a physical meeting. 
Electronic participation is especially useful in large companies, mostly traded companies, but the Group 
considers that all companies should be allowed to make use of electronic general meetings. 
Especially in (small) companies with few shareholders “written general meetings” (résolutions 
circulaires”) is often used. Written general meetings are allowed in the EMCA according to Section 2 
above. 
Most Member States allow electronic participation general meetings, see for example Germany (Section 
118 AktG), the UK (Companies Act 2006 Section 360a and Model Articles for private companies Article 
37 and for public companies art 29, respectively), Spain (Companies Act Section 182) and Denmark 
(Companies Act Section 77). The Danish Companies Act goes further, allowing completely electronic 
general meetings. 
According to Section 5(1) any or all of the following forms of participation should be available: 
• real-time transmission of the general meeting. 
• real-time two-way communication from another place. 
• a mechanism for casting votes without appointing a proxy holder who is physically present at the 
meeting. 
• a general meeting without any physical presence (completely electronic general meeting). 
Section 5 solely dispenses with the way whereupon general meetings are being held. The remaining 
provisions regarding the shareholders’ right to participate in, vote and ask questions at the general meeting 
also apply in case of electronic general meetings with the deviations which are necessary given the use of 
electronic means. 
Section 11.06 
Rights of Shareholders at General Meeting 
(1) All shareholders may participate at the general meeting and make use of their rights according to the 
provisions of this Chapter. 
(2) The articles of association may provide that holders of designated security interests in the shares may 
be entitled to exercise all or some shareholder rights at the general meeting. 
(3) A shareholder may vote all of his shares, unless otherwise specified in this Act or the articles of 
association. 
Comments 
Chapter 11 of the EMCA gives shareholders some fundamental rights. 
Section 6(1) secures that all shareholders may participate in general meetings. This includes the right to 
speak, to vote, to make proposals, and to ask questions etc. 
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Section 11.07 
Proxies 
(1) A shareholder may exercise his rights at general meeting by proxy. 
(2) The proxy document shall be executed in writing and dated under the sanction of nullity. Proxy 
appointments may be revoked at any time. 
(3) The articles of association may limit the number of proxies appointed by a shareholder. 
(4) The articles of association of a public company may not prescribe that the management board may 
collect proxies, except pursuant to the requirements of Subsection (8). Members of the board may not be 
appointed as proxies. 
(5) Where a proxy holder holds proxies from several shareholders, the proxy holder may cast votes for a 
certain shareholder differently from votes cast for another shareholder. 
(6) Proxies providing that a shareholder shall vote in accordance with instructions of the management 
board or supervisory board of a company shall be null and void. 
(7) In public companies whose shares are admitted to trading at the regulated or multilateral trading 
facilities the management board may, in connection with a notice to attend the general meeting, provide 
the shareholders with a proxy form. The form shall contain instructions as to the exercise of the 
shareholder’s right to vote, and as to how to revoke the proxy, as well as the alternative answers “Yes”, 
“No” and “Abstention from voting”. The form shall state that the shareholder may not instruct the proxy in 
any manner other than by marking one of the stated answer alternatives and that the answer may not be 
conditional. 
(8) A public company whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market or on an alternative 
market shall make hard copy or electronic proxy forms available to all shareholders entitled to vote at a 
general meeting and shall offer the shareholders at least one method of notifying the company of electronic 
proxy appointments. The appointment of a proxy, the notice of the appointment to the public company, and 
the issue of the voting instructions to the proxy may only be made subject to such formal requirements as 
are necessary and reasonable for the purpose of identifying the shareholder and the proxy, as well as 
verifying the contents of the voting instructions. This also applies to the revocation of proxy appointments. 
Comments 
Article 10 of the Shareholder Rights Directive states in Subparagraph 1 that every shareholder shall have 
the right to appoint any natural or legal person as a proxy holder to attend and vote at a general meeting in 
his name. The proxy holder shall enjoy the same rights to speak and ask questions in the general meeting, 
as those to which the shareholder thus represented would be entitled. Article 11 of the Directive includes 
formalities applying to proxy holder’s appointment and notification. The Shareholder Rights Directive only 
applies to companies with shares traded on a regulated market. 
The Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC) contains rules on proxies regarding companies with shares 
traded on a regulated market. 
Most of the rules of the Shareholder Rights Directive should also apply in private companies and non-listed 
public companies. However, Section 7 contains provisions which only apply to publicly traded companies. 
Most Member States’ Companies Acts have provisions on proxies or at least acknowledge the use of 
proxies at general meetings. Supplementary rules on proxies are common in the national corporate 
governance codes for traded companies. The practical use of proxies and the need for special regulation is 
most obvious in traded companies. 
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Proxy may be given to other shareholders or other persons, without specific requirements. Special problems 
arise when large financial shareholders (institutional investors) make use of so-called proxy advisors – 
banks, credit institutions or other professionals to vote for them. The German AktG § 135 has a 
comprehensive provision which regulate the exercise of voting by credit institutions and professional 
agents. The Greek Companies Act Article 30b has a short provision allowing banks to vote shares not 
owned by them if they are authorized to do so in writing. The authorization is freely revocable and may not 
be given for a period exceeding 15 months. Most Member States have no provisions on this issue in their 
Companies Acts. 
The Commission’s Action Plan (2012) point 3.3. mentions the problems regarding proxy advisors. The 
amended Shareholder Rights Directive, Article 3i contains a provision on transparency of proxy advisors 
according to which Member States shall ensure that proxy advisors adapt and guarantee that their voting 
recommendations are accurate and reliable. 
The EMCA Group has decided not to formulate provisions on proxy advisors – at least not for the moment. 
The chairman of the general meeting, according to Section 21, has the duty and right to examine the proxy 
document and to decide whether the proxy document is void. The chairman’s decisions can be challenged 
before court. 
A time limit for proxies may be included in the articles of association. The EMCA Group considers that 
there should not be a mandatory time limit because there are a number of situations where non-limited 
proxies (e.g. for shareholder associations) are needed. 
Section 7(4) shall ensure that the use of proxy is not misused by the management, especially in large 
companies with many shareholders. Section 7(3) and other sub-paragraphs of this Section shall ensure that 
the proxy is used in the interests of the represented shareholder. There is an international debate about 
misuse of proxies. Especially, there is critique on a widespread practice where directors collect proxies in 
order to establish the necessary majority for resolutions which may be in the interest of the board members. 
The preliminary guarantee against such misuse is the possibility to revoke the proxy at any time, cf. 
paragraph 2. However, in some Member States there are further restrictions regarding proxies to the board. 
Thus, for example, according to the Swedish Companies Act Chapter 7, Section 4, the company may not 
collect proxies. In the former Danish Companies Act § 80(4) proxies to the board had a time limit of 12 
months and only for the purpose of a specific general meeting for which the agenda is known in advance. 
The latter entails that the management could not be authorized to vote on proposals which are unknown for 
the shareholder and which can go against the interests of the shareholder. The Danish rule implemented the 
article 10 (2) 1. sentence of the Shareholder Rights Directive. The provision of the Directive is optional. 
The provision did not work well in practice and was repealed in 2013. 
Section 7(4) is inspired by the Swedish Companies Act 7 Chapter 4 §. The Polish COMMERCIAL 
COMPANIES CODE Article 412 § 3 forbids a member of the management board to serve as proxies. Also 
the Czech Commercial Code Section 184 forbids the management board or the supervisory board to 
represent a shareholder. 
Re Section 7(5): A proxy may represent more shareholders. Section 7(5) ensures that the proxy may vote 
in the interests and according to the instructions of different shareholders. Section 7(5) implements the 
Shareholder Rights Directive, Article 10(5). 
Section 7(6) is inspired by the UK Companies Act Section 324A. 
Section 7(7) and 7(8) follow from the Transparency Directive Article 17(2)(b) and the Shareholder Rights 
Directive, Articles 10 and 11. The Shareholder Rights Directive, as mentioned, only applies to companies 
with shares traded on a regulated market. However, the EMCA Group considers that there is a similar need 
for providing the shareholders of companies with shares on an alternative market with a proxy form. It is 
important to be able to establish the result of the voting. Thus, in many situations it is useful for the 
shareholders to know if a resolution has been passed with a large or small majority. As indicated by the 
UK listing rules, the EMCA Group considers it best practice that the three alternatives “yes”, “no” and 
“abstention from voting” are included in the proxy form. 
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Section 11.08 
Advisors 
A shareholder and proxy may attend the general meeting together with one or two advisors. The advisor(s) 
may speak on behalf of the shareholder on the general meeting. 
Comments 
There are no EU rules on advisors. A number of Member States’ Companies Acts allow shareholders to 
attend the general meeting together with advisor(s). This is for example the case in the Danish Companies 
Act Section 81 and the Swedish Companies Act Chapter 7, Section 5. In other Member States, such as 
France, this is accepted practice subject to the discretion of the secreterial board of the meeting, which 
includes usually the chair of the board of directors. 
Probably the use of advisors is most needed in public companies but the Group considers that the use of 
advisors should also be allowed in private companies. This is the case according to the Nordic Companies 
Acts. 
The advisor(s) may speak on behalf of the shareholder at the general meeting. The Group considers that a 
shareholder should only be allowed to attend the meeting with one or two advisors. The Swedish 
Companies Act, for example, allows two advisors, the Danish Companies Act only one. 
The presence of many advisors should be avoided. One financial and one legal advisor should be sufficient. 
Section 11.09 
Formalities of Attendance at General Meeting 
(1) Shareholders, who are registered in the company’s registry of shareholders or who can prove their 
rights as shareholders, may attend the general meeting. 
The title of the shareholder shall be determined on the basis of the company register of shares or any notice 
of ownership received by the company for the purpose of registration of a shareholder for the meeting. 
(2) In public companies the articles of association may provide that attendance at the general meeting or 
the exercise of voting rights shall require shareholders giving notice to the company of their attendance or 
voting not later than six days before the meeting. 
If a notice of attendance is required, the company shall prepare and make available to the shareholders a 
list of shareholders entitled to participate in the meeting. 
(3) In public companies whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated or a multilateral trading 
facility, a shareholder’s right to participate at general meeting applies to the shares held by that shareholder 
on the seventh day before the meeting (the record date). 
Comments 
Section 9(2) corresponds to the Danish Companies Act Section 84 (three days), the German AktG § 123(2) 
(maximum 6 days), the Lithuanian Companies Act Article 21 Part 1 (five days), the Polish COMMERCIAL 
COMPANIES CODE Article 406 (one week), and the Swedish Companies Act Chapter 7, Section 2 (no 
later than the day stated in the notice to the general meeting). The UK Companies Act Section 307(1) and 
(2) demands a notice between 14 and 21 days. The German AktG § 123 demands 30 days. The purpose of 
the rule is to give the company sufficient time to organize the general meeting. Therefore, the company 
may shorten the time limit. 
The Group considers that the requirements for notifying the company are for practical reasons, thus making 
it possible for the company to take care of the practical organizing of the general meeting. Therefore, the 
time limit should be short, however, it should not deny shareholders the possibility of attending the general 
meeting. Paragraph 2 applies to all companies, including traded companies, cf. paragraph 3. 
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The purpose of Section 9(2) is to avoid coups giving the board information on the shareholders who will 
attend the general meeting. If a shareholder does not notify the company of his attendance, the chairman of 
the general meeting should not allow him to attend and vote. 
Section 9(3) is based on Article 7(3) of the Shareholder Rights Directive. The Directive introduces a special 
provision on “a single record date”, which is pivotal for the shareholder’s right to attend and vote on the 
general meeting. Article 7(3) applies only to companies with share traded on a regulated market, but the 
Group is of the opinion that a similar rule should apply to companies with shares traded on multilateral 
trading facilities. According to the Directive, the record date shall not lie more than 30 days before the date 
of the general meeting to which it applies. The Group considers that the time limit should be less than 30 
days before the general meeting. Thus, for example, the Greek Companies Act states a time limit of 5 days, 
the Swedish Companies Act also 5 days, the German AktG has a time limit of 21 days and the Danish 
Companies Act Section 84 contains a time limit of 7 days. 
The Group is of the opinion that record date should be close to the date of the general meeting, in order 
that the meeting reflects as much as possible the actual shareholder structures, and hence the Group has 
chosen 7 days. 
Section 11.10 
Company’s Own Shares 
(1) The company is not allowed to vote its own shares or shares in a parent company held by a subsidiary. 
(2) Own shares are excluded for the purpose of determining the quorum or a majority of votes. 
Comments 
Re 1) The Shareholder Rights Directive contains no provisions on whether the company can vote on its 
own shares. Following the Companies Acts in most Member States, Section 10 does not allow the company 
to vote on its own shares, for example the Danish Companies Act Section 85, the French Commercial Code 
Article L. 233-31, the German AktG § 71b, the Lithuanian Companies Act Article 54 Part 7 and the 
Swedish Companies Act Chapter 7, Section 7. 
According to Article 22 (1) (a) of the Second Company Directive, the voting rights for own shares must be 
suspended. In line with the general provisions on own shares in the EMCA Chapter 7, Section 10 (1) also 
applies regarding the shares in the parent company owned by the subsidiary. 
Re 2) The company’s own shares cause problems in proportion to other provisions concerning general 
meeting decisions. For example, this applies to decisions regarding amendments to the articles of 
association, the exercise of minority rights, mergers and divisions, appointment of liquidators, auditors and 
scrutinizers, and derivative suits. Section 9 (2) supplements the provision in Section 10(1) by providing 
that own shares are not included in the mentioned situations. 
Section 10(2) corresponds with the provisions in the Danish Companies Act Section 85 and the Swedish 
Companies Act Chapter 7, Section 7. 
Section 11.11 
Conflicts of Interest 
(1) The shareholder or proxy must not take part in a vote relating to his liability to the company, including 
a resolution on the discharge of his duties. 
(2) Paragraph (1) applies also to a situation when the vote relates to the liability of another person if the 
shareholder has a material interest in the matter which may conflict with the interest of the company. 
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Comments 
Section 11 is not based on EU regulation, as there are no EU rules on shareholders’ conflicts of interest. 
Provisions on shareholders’ conflict of interest are found in most Member States, for example Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Poland and Sweden. Other Member States, for example the Czech Republic, have no 
special provisions on shareholders’ conflicts of interest. 
A shareholder does not have the same duty of care and loyalty to the company as members of the 
management. Moreover, shareholders are not obliged to act positively in the company’s interest or to 
concern themselves at all with the company’s affairs. If a shareholder participates at a general meeting, he 
or she is able to advance his or her own interests without thereby becoming liable to the company or any 
third party. However, this does not imply that a shareholder has absolute freedom with regard to satisfying 
personal interests at the expense of the company or other third parties. Especially Section 31 (the general 
clause) of this Chapter provides a basis for making a claim in tort against shareholders for losses which 
they have inflicted upon the company, other shareholders or creditors through intentional or grossly 
negligent acts. 
Shareholders have no duty of loyalty when they vote at the general meeting. In certain situations such as 
when parent companies vote on the subsidiary’s general meeting or when parent companies just decide on 
the subsidiary’s affairs, it is assumed that the parent company may have a duty of loyalty, see further below 
in Chapter 15 on groups. According to case law in some Member States, especially Germany, a duty of 
loyalty may also exist regarding major shareholders’ voting. Apart from that, shareholders are generally 
able to vote in their own interest. The only exception from this is when the general meeting has to decide 
on whether the company should discharge or sue a shareholder. If board members are also shareholders, 
they may not, in their position as shareholders, vote regarding discharge or liability of the board members. 
Similar rules are for example found in the Danish Companies Act Section 86 and the German AktG Section 
136. 
Section 11 reflects that there is a difference between the duties of the board and the duties of the 
shareholders. Board members have a duty of loyalty which is reflected in the provisions on conflict of 
interests in Chapter 9 of the EMCA. 
Chapter 9, Part 2, on board members’ conflicts of interest exclude board members from taking decisions, 
also with respect to agreements in which the board members have an interest. If, in such cases, the decision 
is moved to the general meeting, a board member who is also a shareholder may vote. Misuse of the board 
members’ votes may however be a violation of the provisions on minority protection, especially Section 
31. 
Section 11.12 
Ordinary and Extraordinary General Meetings 
(1) The ordinary general meeting shall be held once a year not later than six months after the end of each 
financial year. 
(2) The agenda of the ordinary meeting shall include at least the following resolutions: 
(a) approval of the annual statement of accounts, as required by the national regulations, 
(b) allocation of profit and/or losses, 
(c) discharge of duties by members of the board of directors/management board and supervisory board, 
(d) any other matter prescribed by the articles of association or proposed by the shareholders in 
accordance with Section 13. 
(3) The annual general meeting must be held in time for the adopted annual report to reach the Registrar 
within the time limit specified in the Financial Statements Act. The annual report must be submitted to the 
general meeting. 
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(4) In public companies, an extraordinary general meeting shall be convened upon decision of the board 
of directors/management board, supervisory board, or upon request of the auditor of the company or 
shareholders representing at least 5 % of the share capital or any smaller fraction of the capital as prescribed 
by the articles of association. 
(5) For private companies, any shareholder can request an extraordinary general meeting. Extraordinary 
general meetings to consider specific issues must be convened within two weeks of receipt of a request to 
such effect. 
(6) The articles of association may deviate from Section 12(4). 
Comments: 
Regarding 12(3), the general meeting shall be convened and organized by the board of 
directors/management board. If an extraordinary general meeting according to Section 12(3) is not 
convened, a general meeting may be convened according to Section 15(3). 
Regarding 12(4), the articles may decide that shareholders representing less than 5 % of the share capital 
may call for an extraordinary meeting or that any particular shareholder may request an extraordinary 
general meeting. 
Section 12(4) is inspired by the Danish Companies Act and the Shareholder Rights Directive, Articles 6(1) 
and 6(2). It should be noted that the percentage varies very much in Member States, e.g. Germany and 
Poland 10 %, France 5 % and the Netherlands 3 %. 
Section 12(5), which deals with private companies, is also inspired by the Danish Companies Act. 
According to the Danish Companies Act, Section 89(2), any shareholder in private companies may request 
an extraordinary general meeting. France follows the same approach Some Member States have a threshold. 
If national law sets a threshold of for example 10 %. in private companies, Section 12(6) should also refer 
to Section 12(5). A threshold of 10 % is for example found in Germany, Poland and Sweden. It should be 
noted that some Member States Companies Acts contain rules which allow private companies to circulate 
written resolutions and accompanying statements to all shareholders which, using e-mail, is a swift and 
almost cost-free mechanism which allows the small shareholder to raise issues of concern to him. See for 
example the UK Companies Act Section 290 and following. See also the Czech Commercial Code, Section 
130. According to the EMCA, Section 2 of Chapter 11 above, it is also possible to circulate written 
resolutions. 
Regarding Section 12(6), the articles in public companies may set a threshold lower than 5 % but may not 
increase the percentage. 
Section 11.13 
Agenda 
(1) A shareholder shall be entitled to propose specific issues for inclusion on the agenda of the general 
meeting. 
(2) The shareholder request specified in Subsection (1) shall be presented to the board of 
directors/management board at least six weeks before the date of the pertinent general meeting, unless the 
articles of association provide otherwise. 
(3) Not later than eight weeks before the scheduled date for an annual general meeting, public companies 
whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated or alternative market must announce the date of the 
meeting as well as the deadline for any shareholder request to include specific issues on the agenda, unless 
both dates are specified in the articles of association. 
(4) Any matter which is not on the agenda must not be decided unless all shareholders are present and 
approve the proposal. 
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(5) In public companies, the articles of association may provide that the right in subsection 13(1) is 
conditional on the relevant shareholder or shareholders holding a minimum stake in the company which 
does not exceed 5 % of the share capital. 
Comments 
According to Article 6 of the Shareholder Rights Directive, the shareholders have the right to add items on 
the agenda of the general meeting and to table resolutions. Article 6 expresses a general principle regarding 
the shareholder’s right. The right to add items to the agenda and to table draft resolutions enables 
shareholders to decisively influence general meetings. 
According to the Shareholder Rights Directive Article 6(4), companies shall ensure that, where the exercise 
of the right referred to in Section 13(1) entails a modification of the agenda for the general meeting already 
communicated to shareholders, the company shall make available a revised agenda in the same manner as 
the previous agenda in advance of the applicable record date. 
Section 13(2) entails a deadline, with reference to a specified number of weeks, i.e. at least 6 weeks, prior 
to the general meeting or the convocation, by which shareholders may exercise the right referred to in 
Section 13(1). A time limit is necessary so that the board of directors/management board can include the 
matter in the notice convening the general meeting. The amended agenda and the new resolutions should 
be circulated to shareholders. This requires that items be added to the agenda and draft resolutions be tabled 
sufficiently in advance of the general meeting, i.e. at least 6 weeks in advance of the meeting. If the request 
is received less than six weeks before the date of the general meeting, the board of directors/management 
board decides whether the request has been made with enough time for the issue to be included in the 
agenda. 
Section 13(4): Matters not on the agenda may not be dealt with. That is an important shareholder protection 
rule. See for example the similar rule in the the Danish Companies Act § 91(1) ), the Lithuanian Companies 
Act Article 27 Part 9 and the Polish COMMERCIAL COMPANIES CODE, Articles 239 and 240. 
However, there can be flexibility. For instance in France, directors can be dismissed during the meeting, 
even if this resolution was not put on the agenda, for reasons which occur during the meeting (e.g discovery 
of abuses, of mismanagement..). Case law is very flexible on those reasons. 
Section 13(5) states that where any of the rights specified in Section 13(1) is subject to the condition that 
the relevant shareholder or shareholders hold a minimum stake in the company, such minimum stake shall 
not exceed 5 % of the share capital. In some Member States there is a minimum threshold for putting items 
on the agenda; see for example the German AktG § 122(2) (5%). The Shareholder Rights Directive, Article 
6(2), allows Member States to have a threshold of 5 % of the capital in listed companies. Other Member 
States, such as the Nordic countries, have no threshold. 
There might be different experience regarding the need to have a threshold. An unlimited right for all 
shareholders might be abused, for example for political reasons. However, in the Nordic countries there is 
no negative experience regarding allowing the shareholders to add items to the agenda. 
Section 13(5) allows companies to evaluate if there is a need for a threshold. 
Section 11.14 
Recessed (Continued) General Meeting 
(1) General meetings may pass a resolution providing for a recess and continuation of its proceedings. The 
recess shall last no longer than 3 months. 
(2) Where a continued general meeting is to be held after more than two weeks, a separate notice to attend 
the meeting shall be sent pursuant to Section 15. 
(3) A minority of shareholders representing at least one tenth of all shares has the right to request a 
continued general meeting regarding resolutions mentioned in Section 12(2) (a)-(c). 
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Comments 
Some national Companies Acts include rules that allow general meetings to postpone issues on the agenda 
to be discussed at a continued general meeting, e.g. Swedish Companies Act Chapter 7, 14 §. The decision 
should be made with simple majority. 
The continued general meeting is treated as a separate general meeting compared to the original general 
meeting. 
The right for a minority according to Section 14(3) is limited to issues mentioned in Section 12(2) (a)-(c). 
Section 11.15 
Convocation of a General Meeting 
(1) A general meeting shall be convened and organized by the board of directors/management board. The 
general meeting must be held at the time indicated in the notice to attend the general meeting. 
(2) The articles of association of a company having a two-tier board may provide that the general meeting 
may be also convened by the supervisory board. 
(3) If the board of directors/management board fails to call an extraordinary general meeting within two 
weeks following a submission of the request made by a shareholder or another person or body authorized 
under Section 12(3) and 12(4), such person may petition the court or to the national Company Registrar to 
obtain authorization to convene the general meeting at the company’s cost. 
Comments 
Section 15 includes convocations of ordinary and extraordinary general meetings. The provision deals with 
the practical convocation of a meeting. 
It is the duty of the board of directors/management board to convene general meetings, cf. Section 15(1). 
The duty to organize the general meeting also includes the duty to actually hold the general meeting 
according to the notice after Section 18. 
If national CA allows for two-tier boards, the competence to convene may also be placed with the 
supervisory body, cf. Section 15(2). 
Section 15(3) refers to all costs associated with the planning of the general meeting, convening and 
organizing the meeting, and including the costs associated with the application to the national company 
Registrar or the court. 
Section 11.16 
Time of Notification 
(1) In private companies, notice of a general meeting shall be sent out no later than 4 weeks before the 
meeting and no earlier than 6 weeks before the meeting. In public companies, notice of a general meeting 
shall be sent out no later than 3 weeks and no earlier than 6 weeks before the meeting date. 
(2) The articles of association of a private company may provide that, at the latest, the notice shall be sent 
out 2 weeks before the meeting date. 
Comments 
It is important that shareholders receive information about the time of the general meeting. Article 5 of the 
Shareholder Rights Directive only decides on the latest day of the notification (21 days). The EMCA Group 
recommends that there should also be a limit on the earliest notification and suggests no earlier than 6 
weeks before the meeting and no later than 4 weeks. 
Section 16(1) is in line with Article 5(1) of the Shareholders Rights Directive which, however, only applies 
to companies traded on a regulated market. According to Section 16(2) of the EMCA it applies to all public 
companies. 
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The time of notification in private companies is not regulated by EU law. The time varies in national law. 
For example, in the UK Companies Act Section 207 it is 14 days. Also in the Polish COMMERCIAL 
COMPANIES CODE, Article 238, the time limit is 2 weeks. This is also the case according to the Danish 
Companies Act – 2 weeks at the latest and no earlier than 4 weeks before the meeting. In the Swedish 
Companies Act the time limit is no later than 4 weeks before the meeting (or according to the Articles 2 
weeks) and no earlier than 6 weeks before the meeting. 
Section 11.17 
The Mode of Giving Notice 
(1) The articles of association may specify the mode of giving notice, except as provided in paragraph 3. 
(2) A shareholder registered in the register of shares shall receive a notice in writing by registered mail or 
courier, regardless of whether notice is also given by other means, unless the articles of association provide 
otherwise. 
(3) Regardless of whether notice is given by other means of communication, notice of general meeting for 
a public company whose shares are admitted on a regulated or an alternative market shall be published on 
the company’s website. 
Comments 
As a starting point, companies may decide how notification shall occur. 
The provision on this issue states that this should be specified in the articles of association, cf. Section 
16(2). The articles may, for example, specify that notification should be given in different daily newspaper, 
via IT systems operated by the national companies register, or by notification on the company’s homepage. 
If shareholders are registered in a shareholder registry including their name, notification shall be directly 
sent out to them, cf. Section 16(2). 
Notification on the company’s homepage is mandatory for companies whose shares are admitted to trading 
on a regulated or alternative market, cf. Section 16(3). The articles of association may provide for a similar 
provision in public non-listed companies as well as in private companies. 
If shareholders do not receive a notice according to Section 17 – or to Sections 16, 18 and 19 - the general 
meeting may be void; see below in Section 27. 
Section 11.18 
The Content of Notice 
(1) A notice to attend the general meeting shall specify the following information: 
(a) The time and place of the meeting; 
(b) the agenda; a proposal to amend the articles of association shall specify the text of the proposed 
alteration; 
(c) description of the procedures of attendance at the meeting, in particular, the record date and the 
date of registration pursuant to Section 9(3); 
(d) where and how documents specified in Section 19 can be obtained or are available; 
(e) the procedure of voting by proxy, particularly the voting by proxy; 
(f) the procedures for voting by post or electronically, if applicable. 
(2) The articles of association of a private company may waive or modify the requirements set forth in 
Subsection (1), other than items (a)-(b). 
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Comments 
Section 18 is in line with Article 5(3) of the Shareholders Rights Directive. In the EMCA, however, Section 
18 applies as a starting point to all companies but it is possible to opt out of these requirements, cf. Section 
18(2) 
The notice must state the time and place for the meeting and must contain the basic information relating to 
the meeting. The notice must also contain a proposed agenda which states the business to be addressed at 
the meeting. 
If amendments to the articles of association are proposed the new wording must be stated in the notice. 
However, a reproduction of the full proposed wording is not to be given, which would be both expensive 
and cumbersome. In that case the proposed wording must be accessible to the shareholders from the time 
of convening and to be sent, free of charge, to any shareholder on simple request to such effect, cf. Section 
19(1) and 19(3). 
Section 11.19 
Provision of Documents prior to the General Meeting 
(1) In public companies, the agenda, the full text of any proposal and all documents to be submitted to the 
general meeting, shall be available for shareholders inspection at least three weeks prior to the date of the 
meeting. In companies with shares traded on a regulated market or an alternative market, all documents 
shall be available on the company’s website. 
(2) In companies with shares traded on a regulated market or an alternative market, the company shall 
make available to its shareholders the total number of shares and voting rights at the date of convocation. 
(3) Public companies shall make available to its shareholders the draft resolution, or when no resolution is 
proposed to be adopted, a comment from the competent body of the company, for each item on the proposed 
agenda of the general meeting. 
Comments 
Section 19 is inspired by the Shareholder Rights Directive Article 5(4), but to some extent the provisions 
should also apply to public companies which are not traded on a regulated market. 
The company shall indicate where and how the documents and information in Section 19 may be obtained. 
If information is made available on the company’s website, the internet address must be indicated. 
Section 11.20 
Language 
The language of the proceedings of the general meeting and of documents should be specified by the articles 
of association. 
Comments 
In large companies there are a growing number of international shareholders. Therefore there is a need to 
allow such companies to use another language than the official language of the Member State in question. 
Some Member States have already provisions regarding the choice of language at the general meeting and 
of documents which have to be presented at the general meeting, see for example the Danish Companies 
Act §§ 100 (general meeting) and 100 a (annual accounts). There are not EU provisions on language. 
The articles of association may include conditions for using other languages than the national language, for 
example that the company offers all shareholders simultaneous interpretations to and from the national 
language or that it is only allowed to change to certain other languages, cf. the Danish Companies Act § 
100. 
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The possibility to change language may be misused by the majority of shareholders. However, changes in 
the articles of association require supermajority according to Section 29 below. In case of severe misuse, 
the general clause in Section 32 may apply. 
Section 11.21 
Opening of the General Meeting and Election of Chairman 
(1) The general meeting shall be opened by the chairman of the board of directors and, in a two-tier board 
company, by the chairman of the supervisory board. In the absence of the chairman, the general meeting 
shall be opened by a member of the board of directors/management board. The person opening the meeting 
shall preside over the election of the chairman of the general meeting. 
(2) A chairman of the general meeting shall be elected by a simple majority of votes cast, unless otherwise 
provided by the articles of association. 
(3) The chairman of the meeting shall ensure that it is conducted fairly and efficiently. The chairman shall 
have powers for that purpose, including the right to manage discussions, to order voting and announce their 
results, to bring speeches to an end and, if necessary, to expel a participant from the meeting. He may not 
change the agenda or adjourn the meeting, except for a short recess. 
(4) A shareholder may challenge a decision of the chairman by requesting an immediate vote by the general 
meeting. 
Comments 
There are no EU provisions on election of the chairman or the chairman’s role. However, such provisions 
are found in the Companies Acts of almost all Member States. 
The chairman plays an important role. He conducts the general meeting and takes all necessary decisions, 
legally as well as practically. 
The chairman may be a shareholder or another person (see for example the Danish Companies Act § 101 
and the Swedish Companies Act Chapter 30 Section 7, but contrast the Polish COMMERCIAL 
COMPANIES CODE Act 409 § 1). The articles of association may decide who should be the chairman, 
for example that the chairman should be appointed by the board or is a member of the board. However, the 
chairman must act in a neutral and fair way. Therefore, it may be inappropriate to choose the company’s 
lawyer as a chairman. It should also be taken into consideration that members of the management board or 
supervisory board may have conflicts of interest chairing the general meeting. 
If the articles decide who should be the chairman, he may be dismissed by supermajority according to 
Section 28 below. Otherwise he can be dismissed by simple majority. 
Section 11.22 
Minutes of the General Meeting 
(1) The minutes of the general meeting shall record the date and place of the meeting, as well as any 
resolutions adopted during the meeting. The minutes shall specify all votes “for” and “against” the 
resolution, as well as abstentions, if any. 
(2) The articles of association may provide that the minutes shall also include a summary of the discussion. 
(3) The minutes shall be signed by the keeper of the minutes and the chairman. 
(4) The company shall keep the book of general meeting minutes. The minutes shall be available to the 
shareholders not later than a week after the meeting. 
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(5) Companies whose shares are admitted to trading or a regulated market must, for every resolution 
passed, specify at least: 
(a) the number of shares for which valid votes have been cast 
(b) the proportion of the share capital represented by such votes 
(c) the total number of valid notes. 
(6) The company must announce the results of all votes not later than one week after the general meeting. 
Comments 
It is urgent that all resolutions adopted during the meeting are kept and are available to the shareholders via 
the minutes. 
According to Section 22(3) the minutes must be signed by the chairman. In some Member States, however, 
the minute must be signed by a notary, see for example the Polish COMMERCIAL COMPANIES CODE 
Act 421 and the German AktG § 130.  
Section 22 applies also to one-man companies, see for example the German GmbHG § 48. 
Section 22(5) implements the Shareholder Rights Directive Article 14 regarding companies with shares on 
a regulated market. 
Contrast, for example, the Danish Companies Act § 101(6) and the German AktG § 130(2) Section 22 does 
not implement the exception in the Directive Article 14(1). 
Section 11.23 
Shareholders’ Right to Information 
(1) Upon request from a shareholder and when deemed by the board of directors/the management board 
not to cause material damage to the company or, be contrary to law, the company’s board shall disclose to 
the general meeting the pertinent information at the meeting in respect of any circumstances which may 
affect the evaluation of a matter on the agenda. 
(2) If the answer to a request requires information that is not at hand at the general meeting, such 
information shall be made available to the shareholders no later than two weeks after the meeting. A public 
company, whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market or an alternative market, shall publish 
such information on its website. Questions will be deemed to be answered if the relevant information is 
made available on the company’s website in the form of a ‘Question and Answer’ feature. 
(3) For public companies whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market or an alternative 
market, the disclosure requirements under Subsections (1) and (2) also apply to questions regarding any 
circumstances which may affect the assessment of the company’s financial situation. Such questions shall 
be submitted to the company at least two weeks before the date of the general meeting. 
(4) If the company refuses to provide information pursuant to Subsections (1)-(3), the shareholder has the 
right to petition the court. If the court establishes that there are no reasonable grounds to refuse information, 
it shall order the company to provide the requested information. 
(5) In a company which belongs to a group, the duty to provide information shall also apply to the 
company’s relationship to other group companies. Where the company is a parent company or controls 
other company/ies directly or indirectly, the duty to provide information shall also apply to the group 
accounts and such circumstance regarding subsidiaries as specified in Subsection (1). 
Comments 
Article 9 of the Shareholder Rights Directive provides every shareholder with the right to ask questions 
related to items on the agenda of the general meeting. The Directive does not contain any limitations 
regarding the right to ask questions. 
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Shareholders can hardly exercise their rights to vote and bring derivative suits in a proper way unless they 
have adequate information about their company. It is thus important that shareholders have effective means 
to actively exercise influence over the company. Shareholders focus on wealth creation and are also 
qualified to oversee the management not only on their own behalf, but even on behalf of other stakeholders. 
However, shareholders incentives to be active depend on the costs and difficulties attached to exercising 
influence. The more costly and burdensome it is to act, the less likely shareholders are to exercise influence. 
Section 23(1) provides that the board of directors/management board must provide the requested 
information if this can take place without material harm to the company. However, the board needs not to 
disclose information which results in the company’s trade secrets being revealed to outside parties, in 
competing interests being promoted, or in the company otherwise being materially harmed. This is in line 
with Article 9(2) of the Shareholder Rights Directive which gives the board of directors/management board 
a (high) degree of discretion if they do not want to answer by referring to the very broad terms “protection 
of confidentiality or business interests”. 
If the board of directors/management board believes that the requested information cannot be disclosed 
without material harm to the company, the shareholder who requested the information must be notified 
immediately.  
Section 23(2) is in line with the initiatives taken on EU level, which include the improvement of access to 
information. The Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC) enhances that information to be made available 
about issuers whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market. The directive requires that 
shareholders of listed companies should be provided with electronic facilities to access the relevant 
information in advance of general meetings (Article 13). This includes also the shareholders’ right to 
receive timely access to information when securities are listed in another Member State than the home 
Member State (Article 17). 
Shareholders are supposed to be fully informed before they participate at the general meeting, and should 
also be allowed to ask questions at the general meeting or even before. 
The requirements to make use of the right to ask questions differ between Member States. There is generally 
a danger that shareholders may misuse the right to ask questions and receive information on company 
matters. Therefore, most national Companies Acts include certain limitations on the right to ask questions 
and impose conditions on the exercise of this right. Whereas some states require that questions must be 
submitted in writing in advance of the meeting, other states provide that questions can only be asked orally 
at the meeting itself.  
Section 23(4) provides for a mean for the shareholders to enforce their rights. On a European level it is 
questioned whether the right to ask questions is in principle unlimited because it is argued that it can be 
misused by shareholders to harm the company. At least in the Nordic countries the unlimited right to ask 
questions has worked well so far, but national law may consider that there is a risk that shareholders misuse 
this right. The issue is often dealt with by case law. For instance, French case law considers that this right 
cannot be used as a bargaining tool in an attempt to force the company or another shareholder to buy out 
the requesting shareholder. In Germany, the Supreme Court held that a large list of precise questions asked 
by a shareholder in relation with the discharge to the management and supervisory board had to be justified 
by a need to provide valuable information for the vote.  
 
Section 33 on special investigation may also be used as a tool to force the company to answer questions. 
The remedies available to a shareholder who does not receive the information requested are very much 
dependent upon the judicial system of each country (court order to provide information – fine – damages 
etc.). Therefore, EMCA abstains from prescribing other sanctions.  
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Section 11.24 
Shareholders’ Right of Access to Company Documents 
(1) In addition to the provisions set forth in Section 23, each shareholder in a private company shall be 
afforded an opportunity to review accounts and company documents and ask questions to the extent 
necessary for the shareholder to be able to assess the company’s financial position or a particular matter. 
The shareholder may act through a proxy or an assistant. 
(2) The board directors/management board may refuse to disclose a document, or provide information 
where it would result in violation of law or material damage to the company. 
Comments 
Section 24 supplements the right to information according to Section 23. Section 24 is inspired by the 
Swedish Companies Act Chapter 7 Section 36, which, however is limited to companies with less than ten 
shareholders. Section 24 applies to all private companies. 
Section 11.25 
Voting at the General Meeting 
(1) Each shareholder must vote on his/her share in aggregate, unless otherwise provided by the articles of 
association. 
(2) For public companies, where a shareholder acts in a professional capacity on behalf of other national 
or legal persons (clients), that shareholder will be entitled to distinguish between the different shares and 
exercise the voting rights attached to different shares in different ways. 
(3) Shareholders may vote by post casting their votes in writing. Written votes can only be subject to 
requirements and restrictions that are reasonable necessary to ensure identification of the shareholders. For 
companies, which do not have shares admitted to trading on a regulated market, this option of postal voting 
may be excluded by the articles of association. 
Comments 
Section 25(2) is a special rule on proxies. It may cause problems in practice if shareholders are able to cast 
different votes, using some of their shares to vote one way, and other shares to vote in the opposite way. 
However, companies need to consider if such problems are likely to arise. Section 25(2) applies for example 
on banks which may vote on behalf of a number of shareholders. Section 25(2) corresponds with Section 
7(5) on proxies. Section 25(2) does not include private companies. In private companies, it is up to the 
shareholders to decide whether such a rule is necessary. 
Section 25(3) implements the Shareholder Right Directive Article 12, but applies also to companies whose 
shares are not traded on a regulated market, unless otherwise provided in the articles of association. 
If the articles of association so provide, shareholders may also vote by electronic means, cf. Section 4. 
Section 11.26 
Decisions Taken by Simple Majority 
Unless otherwise provided by this Act or the articles of association, all decisions taken at the General 
Meeting must be decided by a simple majority of the votes cast. Where votes involve the electing of people 
or the casting of only one vote against several options, these votes must be decided by a relative simple 
majority of votes. If a vote involving the election of people, results in a tie, the tie must be decided by lot, 
unless otherwise provided by the articles of association. 
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Comments 
The EMCA follows the “majority principle“, i.e. majority of the votes cast. The simple majority is 
calculated on shareholders present and represented. There is no need for a quorum. If the number of votes 
for and against is the same the proposed resolution will not be passed. Simple majority means that there 
are more votes for than against a proposed resolution. 
In cases where the vote concerns a resolution with more than two options, the vote must be decided by 
relative simple majority, i.e. the option with the most votes is passed. In case of a tie between the options, 
the resolution will be defeated. However, when the vote is on electing people, e.g. for the board of directors, 
a decision must be taken. Therefore, Section 26 prescribes that the tie must be decided by lot, unless 
otherwise provided by the articles of association. 
Normally votes are open, but the EMCA Group agree that a secret vote shall be ordered when it is requested 
by a shareholder present or represented at the general meeting. This is explicitly said in the Polish 
Commercial Companies Code, Article 430 
 
Section 11.27 
Provision on Very Important Decisions 
(1) Resolutions of the board of directors or management board leading to major changes in the identity or 
the character of the company or its enterprise, requires the approval of the general meeting, including but 
not limited to: 
(a) a transfer of the enterprise to a third party, 
(b) the start or termination by the company or its subsidiary of a long-lasting alliance with another 
legal person or of a commercial partnership, if such start or termination is of fundamental importance 
to the company. 
(c) the acquisition or disposal of a participating interest in the capital of another legal person equalling 
at least one third of the assets according to the company’s balance sheet with explanatory notes or, in 
case of its consolidated balance sheet, according to its consolidated balance sheet with explanatory 
notes, on the basis of the last adopted annual accounts of the company. 
(2) The absence of the general meeting’s approval on a resolution as referred to in paragraph (1), does not 
affect the authority of the board of directors/the directors to represent the company. 
Comments 
Special resolutions must be passed by a qualified majority of the votes cast at the shareholders’ meeting 
according to a number of provisions in the various Chapters of the EMCA. 
A special majority is only required if it is stated in statute or it is in the company’s articles. If there is no 
specific demand of a qualified majority, the presumption is that an ordinary majority is sufficient. 
Examples of resolutions which must be approved by qualified majority are: 
• Alteration to the Memorandum or Articles of Association. 
• Reduction of capital. 
• Variations of shareholders’ rights. 
• Disposal of the undertaking or major assets of the company. 
• Amalgamation and reconstructions. 
• Voluntary winding up of the company. The question is if there is a need for a supplementary provision 
regarding shareholders´ consent to very important decisions e.g. sale of substantial parts of the 
company or on formation of Groups. 
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The EMCA Group has discussed the need for this supplementary rule. Some Member States rely on a very 
formalistic approach : a vote of the general meeting is needed only if there is an alteration of the articles of 
association, even if the resolution. This is the case in France (except for listed companies). This approach 
was deemed not satisfactory by the EMCA Group as it leaves minority shareholders with insufficient 
protection. Therefore, in line with the scope of Chapter 11 – to enhance shareholder democracy – there is 
a need to secure shareholder approval on the most important decisions regarding the company. The EMCA 
and the national Companies Acts include and identify a number of such issues as mentioned above. 
However, this list does not cover all decisions which might be of substantial interest for the shareholders. 
The need for such a rule might be different in the various Member States. 
This supplementary rule also seems to be of specific importance in Member States where there are 
limitations on the competence of the general meeting, such as Germany. This is demonstrated by the well-
known German Holzmüller and Gelatine cases. A supplementary rule would be of less importance in 
Member States such as the Nordic countries where the general meeting is considered omnipotent. It should 
also be considered if it is possible to draft a rule that is precise enough to provide legal certainty. On the 
other hand, the German alternative rule – based on case law –, which requires shareholder approval, also 
leads to legal uncertainty. Section 27 is inspired by Dutch law, cf. Article 107 A Companies Act (Book 2, 
Dutch Civil Code). 
Section 11.28 
Void Resolutions at the General Meeting 
(1) Legal proceedings can be instituted by a shareholder or member of management if a resolution passed 
by the general meeting has not been lawfully passed or is contrary to this Act or to the company’s articles 
of association. 
(2) Legal proceedings must be instituted no later than three months after the date of the resolution, or the 
resolution will be deemed to be valid. 
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply where 
(a) the resolution could not be passed lawfully even with the consent of all shareholders; 
(b) this Act or the limited liability company’s articles of association require the consent of all or certain 
shareholders and such consent has not been obtained; 
(c) there has been a serious failure to comply with the rules governing notice of general meetings. 
(4) A shareholder who institutes proceedings after expiry of the time limit specified in Subsection (2), but 
within 24 months of the date of the resolution, and who can demonstrate reasonable grounds for the delay, 
may at the discretion of the court be permitted to apply, despite the non-compliance with the requirements 
of Subsection (2). 
(5) Where the court finds that the resolution is not lawfully passed, the court may order that it be amended 
or it may be declared invalid. The resolution may only be amended if a claim is made to such effect and the 
court is able to establish the proper contents of the resolution. The ruling of the court also applies to 
shareholders who have not instituted proceedings. 
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Comments 
There are no EU-provisions on void resolutions at the general meeting. Member States have different 
approaches. German law has an extensive regulation in AktG §§ 241 and following (but no provision in 
the GmbHG). Less extensive regulation is found in in the Greek Companies Act Articles 35a and 35b and 
in the Polish Commercial Companies Code, Articles 425-427. Even less regulation is found in the Czech 
Commercial Code Section 183. The main provision in the UK is contained in Companies Act Section 994 
regarding the protection of members against “unfair prejudice” but it is rarely if ever used to challenge 
resolutions. In France, in public and private companies, any shareholder can bring a derivative action 
against the directors, the managing director or the members of the executive and supervisory boards in the 
company’s name. In Italy, each shareholder may bring a derivative action against the directors. In the 
Danish Companies Act there is only a single Section, Companies Act § 109. Similar provisions to Danish 
law are found in the Swedish Companies Act Chapter 7, Sections 50-52. 
Section 28(1) is in line with the basic wording in most Companies Act. Together with the general clause 
below in Section 31 it enables shareholders to get a court decision on the validity of a resolution passed by 
the general meeting. 
Like the German and the Danish/Swedish law, Section 28 provides for a distinction between a void 
resolution and voidable resolutions. This distinction is found in Section 28(2) and (3). The principle that 
legal proceedings regarding voidable resolutions must be instituted with a short time limit are found in 
most Companies Act, see e.g. the Lithuanian Companies Act Article 19 Part 10, the Polish Commercial 
Companies Code Article 425. A provision like Section 28(4) after which the court may amend or (just) 
declare a resolution invalid is also found in most Member States. 
The court may decide that minor violations, for example, regarding the notice of holding the general 
meeting or the shareholders right to vote, will not nullify the general meeting or a resolution passed at the 
meeting. This principle seems to be generally accepted but may also be included in the Companies Act, see 
e.g. the Czech CC, Section 183(2). Also the principle that shareholders may ratify a voidable resolution of 
the shareholders meeting seems generally accepted and is also found in law, see e.g. the German AktG § 
244. 
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PART 2 
MINORITY PROTECTION 
Section 11.29 
Change of Articles of Association 
Any proposed resolution to amend the articles of association must be passed by at least two-thirds of the 
votes cast as well as at least two-thirds of the share capital represented at the general meeting. Resolutions 
to amend the articles of association must also fulfil any other requirements stipulated in the articles of 
association. 
Comments 
All Member States’ companies’ Acts include provisions on changing of the articles of association. 
Generally the companies’ Acts demand a qualified majority to change the articles of association, but the 
size of the majority vary. In Germany the majority is 75 % (AktG § 179, GmbHG § 53). Likewise in Poland 
and in the UK, a 75 % majority requirement is applicable, cf. COMMERCIAL COMPANIES CODE 
Article 415 and CA Sections 21 and 283,respectively. In the Czech law, in France, and in the Nordic 
countries, the majority is two-thirds, cf. the Czech Commercial Code Sections 127 and 186, the French 
Commercial Code Article L. 225-96, the Danish Companies Act § 106, the Finnish Companies Act Section 
27 § and the Swedish Companies Act Chapter 7, 42 §. In Greece the 75 %requires absolute majority or in 
some cases two-thirds of shares represented, cf. 75 %Section 31. 
Like most Member States the EMCA distinguish between general changes of the articles of association in 
Section 29 and specific changes which demand a higher majority, in Section 30. 
Section 29 demands a qualified majority of both the votes cast and the shares represented. The dual 
requirement is chosen to protect the interest of shareholders with limited voting rights. 
The articles may provide for further requirements, e.g. a quorum. 
Section 11.30 
Specific Changes of Articles 
(1) Any proposed resolution to amend the articles of association and increase shareholder obligations to 
the limited liability company requires the unanimous agreement of all shareholders. 
(2) The following proposed resolutions to amend the articles of association must be passed by at least nine-
tenths of the votes cast as well as at least nine-tenths of the share capital represented at the general meeting: 
(a) Resolutions to reduce shareholder rights to receive dividends or distribution of the company’s 
assets, including subscriptions for shares at a favorable price, to the benefit of parties other than the 
shareholders and the employees of the limited liability company or its subsidiary. 
(b) Resolutions to restrict the transferability of the shares or increase existing restrictions, including 
the adoption of provisions that make share transfers subject to the consent of the limited liability 
company or prevent any shareholder from holding shares that exceed a specific amount of the share 
capital. 
(c) Resolutions to require shareholders to redeem their shares on equal terms, except on dissolution of 
the company or in circumstances governed by Part 5 of this Act. 
(d) Resolutions whereby shareholder rights to exercise voting rights in respect of their own or other 
shareholders’ shares is restricted to a specific part of the votes or the voting share capital. 
(e) Resolutions that the shareholders, in connection with a division of the company, will not receive 
votes or shares in each of the transferee companies in the same proportion as in the transferor company. 
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(3) Shareholders who have opposed the amendments to the articles of association in Section 30(2) at the 
general meeting may demand that their shares be redeemed by making a written request no later than four 
weeks after the date of the general meeting. On redemption the company must buy the shareholders shares 
at a price corresponding to the value of the shares. 
(4) If the company has more than one class of shares, any proposed amendments to the articles of 
association that alter the respective rights attaching to each of the share classes, either by changing existing 
distinctions or creating new distinctions between such rights, must be adopted by shareholders attending 
the general meeting who hold at least two-thirds of the shares in the share class whose rights will be 
prejudiced. 
Comments 
Most Member States require a higher majority for a number of specific changes of the articles or even 
demand unanimous decisions. Section 30(1) corresponds with the principle of limited liability. The general 
meeting cannot oblige the shareholders to commit more capital or e.g. sell products from or to the company. 
A similar provision is found in the German AktG § 180. 
Section 30(2) specifies a number of resolutions which may require a majority of nine-tenths. The majority 
of nine-tenths is inspired by Danish law and partly Swedish law, but it is debatable whether the resolutions 
mentioned in Section 30(2) should instead be decided by a unanimous decision. Compare for example the 
Finnish Companies Act Section 29. However, to compensate for the majority rule in Section 30(2), EMCA 
Section 30(3) gives shareholders who oppose the amendments in Section 30(2) a right to redemption. 
Section 30(2) applies only to changes which are deemed necessary or advantageous for the company as a 
whole – as an example in connection with reconstructions – and should therefore not be hindered by a small 
minority. Section 30(2) is inspired by the Danish Companies Act § 107(3) and the German AktG § 179(3). 
Section 11.31 
General Provisions on Minority Protection 
The General Meeting may not pass a resolution which obviously is likely to give certain shareholders or 
others an undue advantage over other shareholders of the company. 
Comments: 
The principle of shareholders equal rights is included in the general provision in Section 31. It is a 
fundamental company law principle that all shares in same position enjoy equal rights in the company. 
Thus, the principle of equality is expressed in Article 42 of the 2nd Company Law Directive, in Article 4 of 
the Directive on shareholder rights (2007/36/EEC) as well as in Article 17 of the Transparency Directive 
(2004/109/EC) and Article 3 of the Takeover Bid Directive (2004/25/EC).  
Member States have essentially two different approaches which are based on the principle of equality, a fiduciary 
duty and/or the concept of abuse of majority.  
Some Member States require, with some variations, a damage to both the company’s social interest and to the minority 
shareholders. This is the case for instance of France (abus de majorité), Belgium (abus de majorité), Italy (abuso 
della maggioranza), and Portugal. In Spain, since a 2014 legislative reform, the requirement that the decision had to 
damage the social interest of the company was removed and it is enough that the decision was approved by the 
majority without there being a reasonable company need and for its own benefit to the unjustifiable detriment of 
remaining shareholders. These requirements make it usually difficult for minority shareholders  
Other Member States only require a damage to the minority shareholders. This approach is more protective and is 
expressed in several Member States’ Companies Acts, for example German AktG § 53 a. The Nordic Companies Acts 
all contain a similar provision to Section 31 in the Chapter on general meeting as well as in the Chapter on the 
management of the company. The UK Companies Act Section 172(1)(f) requires the directors to have regard to the 
need to act fairly as between members of the company. 
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Section 31 includes the requirement that the decision in question gives some shareholders a benefit that 
must be “obvious” and that this advantage can be characterized as unfair. 
The word “obvious” indicates that there must be a clearly unreasonable exercise of influence which “is 
likely to give”, i.e. it requires an objective assessment of the situation. By “undue advantage” it is meant 
that there certainly must be unfairness. The requirement that an “advantage” must be present also implies 
that this leads to a pecuniary advantage. 
If a resolution is passed violating the general clause, the resolution may be void according to Section 28 
above. The shareholders may also be liable according to Section 37 below. 
Section 11.32 
Special Examiner 
(1) A shareholder or shareholders of a company may submit a proposal for a special examiner to assess 
specific company’s operations with a view to prepare a report on their effects for the company and its 
shareholders, as well as their consistency with law and good business practices. The motion to appoint the 
special examiner shall contain at least the following information: 
(a) The scope of the examinations; 
(b) the reasons for the appointment of the examiner, 
(2) Persons that provided services for the company or a member of the same group to which the company 
belongs shall not qualify for performing the task set forth under this Section. 
(3) If the general meeting refuses to appoint the special examiner in accordance with the demand of the 
petitioner(s), owners of at least one tenth of the shares may request the court to order the company to 
appoint the special examiner in accordance with the shareholder(s) demand. Upon the request of the 
company, the court may modify the examiner’s mandate taking into account the need to avoid serious 
damage to the company and third parties. 
(4) The special examiner shall submit a report regarding the result of the examination. The report shall be 
available to the shareholders and shall be presented at a general meeting. 
(5) The remuneration of the special examiner shall be met by the company. The articles of association may 
provide that the shareholder(s) shall meet the remuneration of the examiner where his report does not 
establish any material violation of law and corporate governance standards by the company. 
Comments 
Special examinations may be carried out in order to clarify whether there are reasons to make the directors 
liable. The possibility to ask for a special examiner may also be seen as a supplement to the shareholders’ 
right to information. 
Provisions on special examiners are found for instance in France and the Nordic countries. The Danish 
Companies Act gives a minority of 25 % the right to ask for a special examiner. The Finnish and Swedish 
Companies Act gives a minority of 10 % the same right. In France the minority has to reach a 5 % threshold. 
Especially in large companies, a too high threshold makes the right rather worthless. Therefore, the EMCA 
Group prefers a threshold of 10 %. 
Section 11.33 
Liquidation due to Fraud on the Minority 
Where any shareholders in a company have wilfully contributed to passing a resolution of the general 
meeting that is in contravention of Section 31, or have otherwise abused the influence that they have over 
the company or contributed to a contravention of the EMCA or the company’s articles of association, the 
court may, upon request from shareholders representing not less than one-tenth of the share capital, order 
that the company be dissolved whether because of the duration of the abuse or other circumstances. 
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Comments 
In the case of a severe majority abuse, Section 33 provides a minority representing one-tenth of the share 
capital with the opportunity to request the company to be dissolved. The provision is the ultimate minority 
protection rule in cases where the abuse by the majority continues after the use of the redemption and buy-
out provision in Section 37 below. 
Section 33 is inspired by Nordic law (Danish Companies Act § 230, the Finnish Companies Act, Chapter 
23, Section 2 and the Swedish Companies Act Chapter 25, 21 §§). Many Member States Companies Acts 
or judges are rather reluctant to allow the liquidation of a company on the basis of an breach of equality 
among shareholders, except in extreme circumstances. Therefore, section 33 increases the protection of 
minority shareholders. 
Section 11.34 
Squeeze-Out by Request of a Shareholder Holding Nine Tenth of the Shares 
(1) Any shareholder holding more than nine-tenths of the shares in a limited liability company and a 
corresponding share of the votes may demand that the other shareholders have their shares redeemed by 
that shareholder. In this case, the other shareholders must be requested, under the rules governing notice 
for general meetings, to transfer their shares to the shareholder within four weeks. 
(2) The terms of redemption and the basis used for determining the redemption price must be set out in the 
request. It must also be stated in connection with the redemption that in the event that no agreement can be 
reached on the redemption price, such price will be fixed by an expert appointed by the court with 
jurisdiction over the place where the registered office of the company is situated. If the redemption is carried 
out for the purpose of a takeover bid under the rules in the national Securities Trading Act, the rules in that 
Act on price determination apply to the redemption, unless a minority shareholder requests that the price 
be fixed by an expert. The request must also include the information referred to in Subsection (3), first 
sentence. Finally, the request must include a statement by the central governing body of the company on 
the general terms of redemption. 
(3) Where the expert opinion or a decision made leads to a redemption price that is higher than that offered 
by the shareholder, the higher price will also be valid for the holders of shares of the same class who have 
not requested an opinion. The costs pertaining to the price determination are payable by the shareholder 
who has requested such determination. Where an opinion or decision leads to a redemption price that is 
higher than that offered by the redeeming shareholder, the court that appointed the expert may order the 
redeeming shareholder to pay the costs in whole or in part. 
Comments 
Conflicts between the majority and the minority occur regularly. The majority may oppress the minority so 
that the general clause or other minority protection rules may be used. However, misuse may be hard to 
prove. In other situations, there are simply different opinions regarding the company’s business strategy. 
This can be the case in private companies as well as in public companies. An example could be a change 
of the majority shareholder. In listed companies the takeover regulation contains the mandatory bid rule, 
which is seen as a minority protection rule. 
The squeeze-out/sell-out rule protects on one side the minority but, on the other side, makes it possible for 
large shareholders to run the company or change business strategy. Thus, a majority shareholder with 90 % 
of the votes may delist a company in connection with a takeover. 
Sections 34 and 35 are inspired by Nordic law (Danish Companies Act §§ 70 and following, the Finnish 
Companies Act Chapter 18, Section 1, and the Swedish Companies Act Chapter 22, 1 §§ and following). 
This provision is also part of the regime of groups of companies. See EMCA Chapter 15 of groups. 
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Section 11.35 
Sell Out by Request of a Minority Shareholder 
If a shareholder holds more than nine-tenths of the shares in a company and a corresponding share of the 
votes, each minority shareholder of the company may demand redemption by that shareholder. 
Comments 
See comments for Section 34.  
This provision is also part of the regime of groups of companies. See EMCA Chapter 15 of groups. 
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PART 3 
SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY 
Section 11.36 
General Provision on Liability 
(1) (1) Shareholders must provide compensation for any losses that they cause to the company, individual 
or third parties through intentional acts or omissions, or gross negligence. 
(2) Damages and under Section 36(1) may be reduced if it is considered reasonable having regard to the 
degree of fault, the amount of loss and other circumstances of the case. 
(3) If multiple persons are liable, they will be jointly and severally liable in damages. However, any person 
whose liability is reduced under Section 36(2) is only liable for the reduced amount. If any persons have 
paid the damages amount, they have a right to receive contribution from each of the other liable persons 
with regard to the degree of fault attributable to each individual and the circumstances of the case. 
Comments 
See comments for Section 13.37. 
Section 11.37 
Redemption and Buy-out 
If any shareholder has, intentionally or by gross negligence, caused a loss to the company, individual 
shareholders, the company’s creditors or other third parties, and there is a risk of continued abuse, the court 
may order that shareholder to redeem the shares belonging to the shareholder who suffers a loss or to sell 
his shares to the other shareholders. The redemption or sale shall be made at a reasonable price, which is 
to be fixed in respect of the company’s financial position and the circumstances of the case. 
Comments 
Section 37 is inspired by Nordic law (Danish Companies Act §§ 362 and 363, Finnish Companies Act 
Chapter 23, Section 2 and Swedish Companies Act Chapter 29, 3 § and following). 
Section 11.38 
Discharge 
(1) Any resolution that the company should take legal action against directors and shareholders must be 
passed by the general meeting. 
(2) Proceedings may be commenced notwithstanding any previous resolution by the general meeting 
granting exemption from liability or waiving the right to take legal action if the information about the legal 
action information about the subject matter of the proceedings which was provided to the general meeting 
before the resolution was passed was not essentially correct or complete. 
Comments 
Directors and shareholders may be liable towards the company according to Section 36 above. A resolution 
on liability towards the company must be passed by the general meeting i.e. the majority of shareholders 
according to Section 26 above. However, a resolution on discharge is not binding for subsequent general 
meeting if the resolution is based on incorrect or incomplete information. 
Section 38 does not prevent a claimant from taking action to recover personal losses according to Section 
36 and 37 above. Further, Section 40 below contains a rule on derivative suits. 
Section 38 is inspired by Nordic law, cf. Danish Companies Act § 364(2), Finnish Companies Act Chapter 
22, Section 6(2) and Swedish Companies Act Chapter 29, 11 §§. 
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Section 11.39 
Derivative Suits 
(1) If shareholders that represent not less than one-tenth of the share capital oppose any resolution to grant 
exemption from liability or waive the right to take legal action, any shareholders can commence legal 
proceedings to recover damages from the person(s) liable for the loss suffered. Shareholders who 
commence such proceedings must pay the legal cost involved, but may have such cost reimbursed by the 
company to the extent that they do not exceed the amount recovered by the company as a result of the 
proceedings. 
(2) Legal action pursuant to Section 39(1) must be taken no later than six month after the resolution of the 
general meeting that granted exemption from liability or waived the right to take legal action. 
Comments 
Section 39 is inspired by Nordic law, cf. Danish Companies Act § 364(3), Finnish Companies Act Chapter 
22, Section 7 and Swedish Companies Act Chapter 29.  
The UK Companies Act Part 11, Section 260 and following has provisions on derivative claims. In contrast 
to Nordic law, a member of a company who brings a derivative claim must apply to the court for permission 
to continue it. Sections 263 and 264 decide whether permission may be given. Also the Polish 
COMMERCIAL COMPANIES CODE Article 486 and following has rules on derivative claims. 
According to Article 486 § 2 the court may order that the claimant pay a sum by way of security for the 
possible damage incurred by the defendant should the plaintiff’s case be found to have been brought in bad 
faith or negligently. This rule is close to the Nordic Rules.
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General Comments 
1. EU law 
1.1. Accounting 
The most important Directives containing provisions on financial reporting requirements for limited 
liability companies were the following: 
• the 4th Directive (78/660/EEC) on the annual accounts of certain types of companies, and 
• the 7th Directive (83/349/EEC) on consolidated accounts. 
The 4th and 7th Directives are replaced by the Accounting Directive (2013/34/EU), which entered into force 
20 July 2013 and had to be implemented into national law by 20 July 2015. It has further been amended by 
Directive 2014/95/EU. 
According to the IAS Regulation 1606/2002, application of International Accounting Standard (IAS) have 
been adopted. Further, each IAS and International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) as well as related 
interpretations (SIC/IFRIC) are adopted by the EU in the form of regulations. 
Special accounting requirements for listed companies are found in the Transparency Directive 
(2004/109/EC) as amended by Directive 2013/50/EU. 
1.2. Auditing 
Directive 2006/43/EC contains regulations on statutory audit of annual accounts and consolidated accounts. 
The Directive has been amended by Directive 2014/56/EU. The Directive is supplemented by Regulation 
(537/2014). The Directive had to be implemented in national law by 17 June 2016. The Regulation also 
entered into force on the same date. 
The Directive aims at high-level, though not full-harmonization, of statutory audit requirements. 
Member States should organize an effective system of public oversight for statutory auditors and audit 
firms on the basis of home country control. 
The statutory auditors or audit firms should be appointed by the general meeting of shareholders or 
members of the audited entity, cf. Article 37 of the Directive. Dismissal should be possible only if there 
are proper grounds and if such grounds are communicated to the authority or authorities responsible for 
public oversight, cf. Article 38. 
Article 2 of the Directive contains definitions. According to the Directive “statutory audit” means an audit 
of annual accounts and consolidated accounts insofar as required by EU law, national law as regards to 
small undertakings, or voluntarily carried out at the request of small undertakings. 
Each public-interest entity shall have an audit committee, cf. Article 37. Public interest entities are 
companies whose transferable securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market, certain credit 
institutions and insurance undertakings and entities designated by Member States as public entities, cf. 
Article 2(f). 
The EU Commission has issued a number of Recommendations and Communications. Among those are 
Recommendation 2008/473/EC concerning the limitation of the civil liability of statutory auditors and audit 
firms and the Green Paper (COM(2010) 561 Final) on Audit Policy. Among other issues, the Green Paper 
emphasises 7 considerations on “Simplification for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs)”. 
European Model Companies Act 2017 
Chapter 12 – Annual Accounting and Auditing 
272 
2. National law 
2.1. Annual accounts 
The EU Regulation gives the Member State freedom to decide on the technical manner in which the 
Accounting Directive is implemented. Member States have chosen different methods for implementing 
accounting rules. There is a tendency that Member States implement the material rules of the Directive 
outside the Companies Act or in separate accounting laws - for example, in Germany in the HGB and in 
Greece, the Czech Republic, the Nordic countries and Poland in the Annual Accounting Act. Certain 
countries, such as France, Italy and the UK still include accounting rules in their Companies Acts. 
The different national company law rules include a number of special rules which require that companies 
prepare annual accounts and/or use annual accounts as a basis for company law rules, such as the duty to 
present annual accounts which in most Member States must be approved at the general meeting. Further, a 
number of provisions in company law refer to or make use of items from the annual accounts; see further 
below. 
2.2. Auditing 
It is also left to the Member States how to implement the Directive on auditing. Contrary to accounting 
law, most of the Member States have included rules on auditing in their Companies Acts. However, the 
contents of auditing rules vary considerably. Separate Chapters on auditing are for example found in 
Denmark (Companies Act, Chapter 9), Spain (Companies Act, Chapter IV), Sweden (Companies Act 
Chapter 9, Sections 1-48) and the UK (Companies Act Part 16, Chapter 1-7). 
3. Considerations 
As mentioned, Member States may implement the accounting rules in the Companies Acts or in separate 
Accounting Acts. Generally, the EMCA Group has chosen not to implement material accounting regulation 
in the EMCA; see further below. 
Similar to the Accounting Directive, it is up to the Member States to choose the implementation of the 
Directive on auditing. The EMCA Group has chosen not to implement the Auditing Directive in the EMCA; 
see further below. However, regarding auditing the EMCA should contain some basic rules regarding the 
general meeting’s choice of auditors, the auditors’ position on the general meeting etc.; see further below. 
The various chapters in the EMCA contain a large number of provisions in which the annual accounts and 
the auditors’ work are described and used. Paragraph 3) below therefore refers to such provisions which 
belong to other chapters of the EMCA. The aim is to decide which provisions on accounting and auditing 
should be included in Chapter 12; see below in Section paragraph 4). 
The following contains the Group’s considerations regarding how to implement in the EMCA the EU 
regulation on annual accounts and auditing. 
The following choices should be made: 
The EU regulation is implemented differently in the Member States. Regarding the accounting rules, there 
is a choice between implementation in the separate Financial Statement Acts and partly in Member States’ 
securities regulation regarding listed companies, and/or in the Companies Act. 
Regarding auditors there is a choice between implementation in a separate Auditor Act/Financial Statement 
Act or in the Companies Act. 
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3.1. Which accounting provisions should be included in the EMCA? 
Regarding accounting rules, the Group considers that the EMCA should not try to include a complete 
regulation of accounting. The fundamental accounting rules should be found in a separate Financial 
Statement Act which includes the accounting rules not only for public and private companies, which the 
EMCA is about, but also for other types of companies or businesses. To make a complete regulation of 
accounting rules would, as a start, demand a comprehensive comparative study. The EMCA Group is not 
of the opinion that it would be possible to succeed in developing a European model for accounting rules 
within the framework of a model Companies Act. Instead, the EMCA should contain a few fundamental 
rules on the company’s duty to make annual accounts and the general meeting’s approval of the annual 
account as well as regarding the duty to file the annual account with the Registrar. 
3.2. Which auditing provisions/duties should be included in the EMCA? 
Regarding auditing provisions the Group considers that the fundamental rules on auditors should be found 
in a separate Auditor’s Act, but again, the EMCA should include a few provisions on auditors which are 
closely linked to company law. 
3.3. EMCA rules on accounting and auditing 
A number of provisions regarding accounting and auditing are included in other Chapters of the EMCA, 
such as: 
Accounting: 
• In connection with contribution in kind regarding capital increases, a balance sheet must be drawn up, 
cf. Chapter 6. 
• The issuance of bonus shares is dependent on the contents of the latest annual report. 
• In the case of mergers and divisions, a merger plan and division plan, respectively, must be drawn up. 
The plan must among others include an interim balance sheet regarding the period after the latest annual 
report and an assessment report regarding contributions in kind. 
• At the company’s general meeting, decisions regarding the approval of the company’s annual accounts 
and the use of a possible profit must be made, cf. Chapter 11. 
• The company’s accounting profit is, among other things, decisive for the extent to which dividends can 
be paid out, cf. Chapter 7, and the extent to which own shares can be purchased, cf. Chapter 7. 
• The company’s annual accounts are also decisive in terms of the calculation of capital loss, cf. Chapter 
7. 
• The access to financial assistance is limited to the amount which can be paid out as dividend, cf. Chapter 
7. 
• In connection with the company’s conversion from a public company to a private company or vice 
versa, among other things, an interim balance sheet and an assessment report regarding contributions 
in kind must be drawn up, cf. Chapter 4. 
• In connection with the approval of a winding-up, decisions regarding this matter must be made on the 
basis of accounts. Likewise, winding up must be completed by drawing up a winding up account, cf. 
Chapter 14. 
• Directors are liable for bookkeeping and financial reporting procedures, cf. Chapter 9. 
Auditors: 
• Regarding formation of companies: Contributions in kind should be valuated (EMCA Chapter 2, 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 13). This valuation report in relation to formation of companies, capital increase 
and mergers and divisions may be executed by an auditor. 
• Extraordinary general meetings may be held upon request from the auditor, cf. Chapter 11). 
• The auditor is entitled to attend general meetings, cf. Chapter 11. 
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3.4. Provisions on accounting and auditing in Chapter 12 
Accounting: 
• Companies have a duty to make and submit annual accounts to the Registrar; see Sections 1 and 2 
below. 
• If the company fails to submit annual accounts to the Registrar, the Registrar can apply various 
sanctions in order to force the company to produce the accounts (such as default fines, sanctions or 
even compulsory winding up). See Sections 2 and 11 below. 
Auditors: 
• Within groups, the companies should as far as possible have the same auditor; see Section 5 below. 
• The auditor is elected/appointed by the general meeting. The EU rules have exemptions for auditors in 
small companies. For example in Denmark, those rules are implemented in the Financial Statement 
Act. Therefore, the Danish Companies Act just refers to appointment of auditors “if auditors are needed 
according to the Danish Financial Statement Act”. See similarly Section 3 below. 
• Right of a minority to elect/appoint a minority auditor; see Section 4 below. 
• Dismissal and change of the auditor; see Sections 7 and 10 below. 
• The auditor’s duties; see Section 8 below. 
• Audit records; see Section 9 below. 
• The management’s duty to provide the auditor with information; see Section 11 below. 
• A provision on audit committees; see Section 6 below. 
• Sanctions and liability; see Sections 11 and 12 below. 
Special investigation (special examiner/auditor): 
A number of Member States Companies Acts include provisions on shareholders’ right to ask for a special 
investigation of the annual accounts and/or matters related to the administration of the company. As an 
example, the Chapter on accounting and auditors in the Danish Companies Act, Sections 150 and the 
following, includes some provisions on special investigation. Similar rules are found in the Swedish 
Companies Act Chapter 10, 21 §. Another example is found in the German AktG § 258 which have rules 
on appointment of special auditors (Sonderprüfung). In the EMCA rules on special investigation are found 
in Chapter 11 on General Meeting and Minority Protection. 
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Section 12.01 
Duty to Make Annual Accounts 
(1) All companies must draw up an annual report in accordance with the provisions in the national 
Accounting Act and the EMCA. 
(2) The annual accounts should be signed by all directors. 
Comments 
The annual accounts should be presented to and be approved by the annual general meeting; see EMCA 
Chapter 11, Section 11. The Directors have the duty to prepare the annual accounts and may be liable 
towards the company, individual shareholders or creditors for losses caused by defective annual accounts. 
See Section 12 below. 
Section 12.02 
Submitting to the Registrar 
(1) The annual accounts shall be submitted to the Registrar according to the national Accounting Act. 
(2) If member of the board fail to comply with the requirement to submit the annual accounts to the 
Registrar in accordance with paragraph (1), the Registrar may impose sanctions and fines on them that 
accrue on a daily and weekly basis. 
Comments 
The approved annual accounts shall be published according to the Accounting Directive, Chapter 7 within 
a reasonable time limit, no longer than 12 months after the balance sheet date. 
For investors as well as creditors, it is important to have access to the company’s current accounts. It is 
often a sign that a company has financial difficulties, if the annual accounts are not submitted and published. 
It is therefore important that the Registrar may impose sanctions in order to motivate companies to submit 
the annual accounts on time. Detailed rules on sanctions and fines should be implemented in the accounting 
act and/or an executive order according to the Accounting Directive, Article 33. 
Section 12.03 
Appointment of Auditor(s) 
(1) If a company is subject to audit obligations under the national Financial Statements Act or any other 
statute, or if the general meeting otherwise resolves that the company’s financial statements must be 
audited, the general meeting must elect one or more approved auditors, and alternate auditors if applicable. 
Such resolution may be passed by a simple majority of votes. The articles of association may also grant 
other parties the right to appoint one or more additional auditors. 
(2) The Registrar may appoint an auditor if a company which is subject to audit obligations has no statutory 
auditor and a member of management or a shareholder so requests. The appointment remains in force until 
a new auditor has been elected by the general meeting. 
Comments 
Re 1) As a result of Directive 2014/56/EU on statutory audits (and the former Directive 2006/43/EC), 
Member States have modified the duty to have a statutory auditor. Based on criteria such as company size, 
smaller companies are exempted from this duty. Therefore, Section 3 only applies to companies which are 
subject to statutory auditing requirements or where the general meeting decides to elect an auditor. 
Re 2) The provision applies to the situation where an auditor, elected at the general meeting, retires before 
his term expires. In such a situation, the company’s management cannot just elect another auditor to 
continue with the predecessor’s work until the general meeting appoints a new auditor. Section 3(2) 
provides the Registrar with the possibility to appoint an auditor temporarily at the request of a member of 
the management or a shareholder. 
European Model Companies Act 2017 
Chapter 12 – Annual Accounting and Auditing 
276 
Section 12.04 
Minority Auditor(s) 
Any shareholder may request the Registrar to appoint an additional approved auditor to participate in the 
audit together with the other auditor(s) until the next general meeting where 
(a) shareholders holding not less than one-tenth of the capital have voted in favor of an additional 
auditor at a general meeting whose agenda included the election of an auditor; and 
(b) the request is made no later than two weeks after the date of the general meeting. 
Comments 
Section 4 is a rule on minority protection where the company has a duty to appoint an auditor according to 
Section 3. 
A provision on minority auditor is for example adopted by the Danish Companies Act (Section 144(2)), 
the Finnish Companies Act (Chapter 8, Section 5) and the Swedish Companies Act (Chapter 9). This 
provision is not based on EU rules. 
The appointment of a minority auditor requires that the company has an auditor who is elected at the general 
meeting. The minority auditor shall thus participate in the audit together with the auditor appointed by the 
general meeting. The minority auditor thus has the same rights and responsibilities as the auditor appointed 
by the general meeting. 
The Registrar is not obliged to appoint the auditor suggested by the shareholder(s). The Registrar thus can 
consider objections against a proposed auditor. 
Section 12.05 
Auditors in Groups 
(1) Any subsidiary in a group as defined by the national Financial Statements Act must, where possible, 
elect the same auditor as the auditor elected by the parent company in general meeting. 
(2) Where this is not possible, the subsidiary must elect an auditor who is a partner of the auditor elected 
by the parent company in general meeting, unless this is not possible. 
(3) If it is not possible to elect the same auditor, the group auditor should evaluate and review the work of 
the subsidiary’s auditor. 
Comments 
The provision is not based on EU law. However, Section 5 is in line with Directive 2014/56/EU on auditing, 
article 27, which states that the group auditor bears the full responsibility for the audit report in relation to 
the consolidated financial statement and further that the group auditor must evaluate and review the audit 
work performed by third country auditors. Provisions similar to Section 5 can be found in the Danish 
Companies Act (Section 145) and the Swedish Companies Act (Chapter 9:20).  
The Danish provision is limited to groups where the parent company is admitted to trading on a regulated 
market. However, the EMCA Group does not consider that Section 5 should be limited to companies on a 
regulated market. 
The aim of this provision is to ensure that the auditor elected by the parent company gets insights into the 
subsidiary’s financial situation with respect to assess the group’s financial situation as a whole. 
If the subsidiary is a foreign company, national law cannot oblige the subsidiary to elect the parent 
company’s auditor. As stated in Section 5(3) – and in line with the Directive, Article 27 as mentioned – the 
group auditor should then evaluate and review the work of the subsidiary’s auditor. 
The provisions must be seen in line with Section 11 regarding the duty to inform the auditor. 
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Section 12.06 
Audit Committees 
Alternative 1 
(1) Companies of public interest shall have an audit committee. The audit committee shall be either a stand-
alone committee of the management or supervisory board of the audited company. It shall be composed of 
non-executive members of the management or supervisory board and/or members appointed by the general 
meeting of the audited company. At least one member of the audit committee shall have competence in 
accounting and/or auditing. The committee members as a whole shall have competence relevant to the 
sector in which the audited company is operating. 
A majority of the members of the audit committee shall be independent of the audited company. The 
chairman of the audit committee shall be appointed by its members or by the supervisory board of the 
audited company and shall be independent of the audited company. 
If national law so requires, the chairman of the audit committee shall be elected annually by the general 
meeting of the audited company. 
(2) In public-interest companies which meet the criteria set out in points (f) and (t) of Article 2(1) of 
Directive 2003/71/EC the functions assigned to the audit committee may be performed by the management 
or supervisory board as a whole, provided that where the chairman of such a body is an executive member, 
he or she shall not act as chairman whilst such body is performing the functions of the audit committee. 
(3) The audit committee shall, inter alia: 
(a) inform the management or supervisory board of the audited company of the outcome of the 
statutory audit and explain how the statutory audit contributed to the integrity of financial reporting 
and what the role of the audit committee was in that process; 
(b) monitor the financial reporting process and submit recommendations or proposals to assure its 
integrity; 
(c) monitor the effectiveness of the company’s internal quality control and risk management systems 
and, where applicable, its internal audit regarding the financial reporting of the audited company, 
without compromising its independence; 
(d) monitor the statutory audit of the annual and consolidated financial statements, in particular its 
performance, taking into account any findings and conclusions by the competent authority pursuant to 
Article 26(6) of Regulation (EU) No. 537/2014; 
(e) review and monitor the independence of the statutory auditors or the audit firms and, in particular, 
the appropriateness of the provision of non-audit services to the audited company; 
(f) be responsible for the procedure for the selection of statutory auditor(s) or audit firm(s) and 
recommend the statutory auditor(s) or the audit firm(s) to be appointed in accordance with Regulation 
No. 537/2014. 
Alternative 2 
Companies of public interest shall have an audit committee. The audit committee shall be either a stand-
alone committee of the management or supervisory board of the audited company. It shall be composed of 
non-executive members of the management or supervisory board and/or members appointed by the general 
meeting of the audited company. 
National law may decide that the functions of the audit committee in public-interest companies which meet 
the criteria set out in points (f) and (t) of Article 2(1) of Directive 2003/71/EC may be performed by the 
management or supervisory board as a whole, provided that where the chairman of such a body is an 
executive member, he or she shall not act as chairman while such body is performing the functions of the 
audit committee. 
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National law on auditing shall include detailed rules on audit committees, including rules on composition 
and functions of the committee. 
Comments 
The amended Directive 2014/56/EU, Article 39, replaces the former Directive 2006/43/EC, Article 41. 
Still, in general the purpose of an audit committee is to minimize financial, operational and compliance 
risks and to enhance the quality of financial reporting as said in the preamble of the former Directive. 
The tasks of the audit committee are more closely described in the Directive, Article 39(6)(a)- (f). Thus, 
the audit committee must work together with the board and enhance the board’s financial control of the 
company. In that respect the committee should be seen in line with other board committees; see further on 
board committees in the EMCA Chapter 8, Section 23. 
The duty to have audit committees rests on ‘public-interest entities’ as defined in the Directive, Article 1(f). 
According to Article 1(f) such entities include companies whose transferable securities are admitted to 
trading on a regulated market of any Member State, but could also include other (large) companies which 
are of significant public relevance according to national law. It is up to national law to decide which 
companies are of public interest. 
In line with other provisions in the EMCA the Group is of the opinion that also companies on alternative 
markets should have audit committees as a starting point. The group considers that the burden of this duty 
may be minimized by the company because Section 6 – in line with the Directive, Article 39(2) – states 
that the functions of the audit committee may be performed by the management or supervisory board as a 
whole. It is assumed that small and medium-sized companies in the Member States will make use of this 
solution. 
One may ask, if the Member States Companies Acts are the right place to include provisions on audit 
companies. Practice in Member States varies. Provisions on audit committees are for example found in 
Polish company law, but their tasks are limited; see the Polish COMMERCIAL COMPANIES CODE 
Article 
221. In most Member States Corporate Governance Codes (such as the UK) include provisions or 
recommendations on audit committees. In other Member States provisions on audit committees are found 
in special Auditors Acts (for example in Denmark). 
The Directive does not decide the way Article 39 should be implemented. Thus, the Group expects that 
Article 39 will be implemented differently in the various Member States. Therefore, the draft includes two 
alternatives. 
Alternative 1 is a complete implementation of the Directive. 
Alternative 2 is a shorter version which refers to a more comprehensive regulation outside the national 
Companies Act. Alternative 2(1) states that all public-interest companies shall have an audit committee. 
However, in view of the size of boards in companies with reduced market capitalization and of small and 
medium-sized companies, the functions of the audit committee in alternative 2(2) allow national law to 
decide that the functions of the audit committee may be performed by the administrative or supervisory 
body as a whole. This modification is in line with the Directive, Article 39(2). 
A similar modification was found in the previous Directive 2006/43/EC, Article 41. 
As an example, the modification is used in the German AktG § 107(3) according to which public companies 
may choose to have audit committees. According to the wording of AktG § 107(3) it is up to the supervisory 
board (Aufsichtsrat) to create an audit committee if they wish. However, Germany relies on the exemption 
in the Directive that the supervisory board as such may act as an audit committee. In Germany there is no 
provision on audit committees in another Act. 
The present Danish Act on auditors implements Article 41 of the previous Directive, also allowing the 
supervisory board to function as an audit committee. 
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The EMCA Group thinks that the modification in the Directive will be used in many Member States and 
should be expressed in the (company) act. 
Section 12.07 
Dismissal and Change of Auditor(s) 
(1) Auditors may be removed by the party that appointed them. An auditor elected to audit the company’s 
financial statements under Section 3 may only be removed before his term of office expires if such removal 
is based on reasonable grounds. 
(2) If an auditor elected by the general meeting (see Section 3) resigns or is removed from office, or if an 
auditor’s appointment is otherwise terminated before the auditor’s term of office expires, the auditor must 
notify the Registrar to such effect as soon as possible. The notice must be accompanied by an adequate 
account of the reason for the termination if this took place before expiry of the auditor’s term. In companies 
whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market, an auditor elected by the general meeting 
must also notify the market of his resignation or removal as soon as possible in accordance with the 
provisions of the national Securities Trading Act. 
(3) Shareholders representing 5 % or more of the voting rights of the share capital are permitted to bring a 
claim before a court for the dismissal of the statutory auditor(s) or the audit firm(s) where there are proper 
grounds for so doing. 
(4) If a company’s auditor resigns and no alternate auditor has been elected to replace the auditor, the 
management must cause a new auditor to be elected as soon as possible in accordance with Section 3. 
Comments 
Section 7(1) and (2) implement Article 38(1) and (2) of Directive 2014/56/EU. 
Section 7(3) implements the provision in the Directive, Article 38(3), which was added in the amended 
Directive. 
No matter what the reason for resignation, it is the duty of the management to convene an extraordinary 
general meeting in order to elect a new auditor. If not, the company risks being wound up according to 
Section 12 below. 
Section 12.08 
Auditors’ Duties 
(1) The auditor shall examine the company’s annual reports in accordance with the national Auditor’s Act. 
(2) The auditor elected to audit the company’s financial statements as provided in Section 3 must comply 
with any audit requirements made by the general meeting in so far as such requirements are not contrary to 
statute, the company’s articles of association or generally accepted auditing standards. 
(3) The auditor must ensure that the company’s management complies with its obligations to draw up rules 
of procedure and prepare and keep books, records and minutes, and whether the rules on the submission 
and signing of audit records are complied with. 
(4) If the auditor finds that the requirements referred to in Subsection (2) are not fulfilled, the auditor must 
prepare a separate declaration to that effect to accompany the annual report at the general meeting, unless 
the company’s annual report is to be approved at the general meeting and the matter is mentioned in the 
audit report. 
Comments 
Ad (1) The auditing Directive contains comprehensive rules on auditing, including the scope of the 
statutory audit, use of auditing standards, audit reporting, etc. 
Detailed rules on auditing should be implemented in national auditing law. 
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Ad (2) It is a central principle in auditing that an auditor chooses by himself how to prepare and conduct 
the audit. It is not for the general meeting to decide on its scope and manner of execution. 
Ad (3) and (4) These provisions are partly inspired by the rules of the Danish Companies Act (Section 147) 
and the Swedish Companies Act (Chapter 9:3 – 9:6). 
Section 12.09 
Audit Records 
The members of the board must sign the records prepared by the auditor if the auditor is required by the 
national law, or if the auditor has kept such records in accordance with an agreement with the company. 
Comments 
This Section does not implement EU law. The provision is inspired by the Danish Companies Act, Section 
129. A minute book containing the auditor’s communications to the board regarding the auditing shall be 
submitted at every board meeting according to the national Accountants Act or according to agreement 
with the company. The purpose of the provision is to secure that all members of the board are aware of 
possible shortcomings or uncertainties which the auditor has pointed out. 
Section 12.10 
Duty to Inform Auditors 
The auditor may demand that members of the company’s board provide relevant audit information that is 
deemed to be of importance for the assessment of the company and, if the company is a parent company, 
its group. This also applies to members of the management of a national company which is a subsidiary in 
a group as defined by the EMCA. 
Comments 
This Section does not implement EU law. The provision is necessary in order to provide the auditor with 
the information needed to draw up the annual accounts. The provision in inspired by the Danish Companies 
Act Section 133, the Swedish Companies Act 9 Chapter 7 §, and the UK Companies Act Section 499. 
Section 12.11 
Compulsory Dissolution 
(1) The Registrar may request the bankruptcy court to dissolve a company, if necessary under EMCA 
Chapter 14, Sections 4 and 5, where 
(a) the Registrar has not duly received the company’s audited annual report prepared in accordance 
with the national Financial Statements Act; 
(b) the company has failed to register an auditor for the company despite having audit obligations 
under the national Financial Statements Act or any other statute; 
(c) the company has failed to register an auditor for the company despite the general meeting having 
resolved that the company’s annual report must be audited; or 
(2) The Registrar may prescribe a time limit within which the company must remedy a defect under 
subsection (1). 
(3) If the defect is not remedied on or before expiry of the time limit prescribed by the Registrar, the 
Registrar may decide that the company must be compulsorily dissolved. 
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Comments 
According to the 1st Company Law Directive 2004/101/EC Article 2 the auditors of the company must be 
registered with the Registrar. The duty of registration lies with the management of the company. Similarly, 
the annual accounts of the company must be submitted to the Registrar and be published. The Member 
States must lay down suitable sanctions to ensure that these duties are observed. 
Section 2 above gives a right to the Registrar to impose fines on the members of the board for failure to 
comply with their duty to submit the annual accounts to the Registrar. 
In most cases these sanctions would work. Ultimately, however, Section 11 authorizes the Registrar to 
request the bankruptcy court to dissolve the company, if the Registrar does not receive the annual report or 
register an auditor. 
For solvent companies the threat of compulsory dissolution will work. Provisions on compulsory 
dissolution similar to Section 11 are for example found in the Danish Companies Act § 225 and the Swedish 
Companies Act 25, Chapter 11 §. 
A useful sanction in the UK is that non-filing of their accounts will result in the company, eventually, being 
struck off the Register with the result that all its assets fall into the ownership of the Crown – i.e. the State 
– a very effective deterrent to non-filing without the need for any court winding up or anything of that 
nature; it is a purely administrative act of the Registrar with significant consequences for the company. 
They receive three warning letters before this happens. 
Section 12.12 
Civil Liability 
(1) Members of the management or supervisory board who, in the performance of their duties to make 
annual accounts and other reports, have intentionally or negligently caused damage to the company are 
liable to pay damages. The same applies where the damage is caused to shareholders or any third party. 
(2) Similar liability for damages applies to auditors. 
(3) If an auditing firm has been elected auditor, both the auditing firm and the auditor performing the audit 
are liable in damages. 
Comments 
According to the Accounting Directive 2013/34/1, Article 33(1), members of the management and 
supervisory boards should have collective responsibility for ensuring that (a) the annual financial 
statements, the management report and, when provided separately, the corporate governance statement and 
(b) the consolidated financial statements, consolidated management reports and, when provided separately, 
the consolidated corporate governance statement are drawn up according to the requirements of the 
Directive. 
As a minimum, Article 33(2) states that the members of the boards are liable towards the company. This 
does not prevent Member States from going further and providing for direct responsibility to shareholders 
or even other stakeholders, especially creditors. 
Ad (1) In line with provision on directors’ liability in the EMCA Chapter 10, Section 12 states that members 
of the management or supervisory board, which according to national law are responsible for drawing up 
annual accounts etc., are liable towards the company, shareholders and third parties. 
The legal basis for liability and the extent of liability is national tort law, which varies – and which the 
Directive does not try to harmonize. 
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Ad (2) and (3) Also auditors should be liable under national tort laws for not fulfilling their duties as 
auditors according to Directive 2014/56/EU and national law. According to national law in all Member 
States auditors may be liable towards the company. However, there are differences regarding auditors’ 
responsibility to third parties. On one side, UK law is reluctant to make auditors liable to third parties. 
Contrary to the UK, the Danish Auditor Act designates the auditor as the public’s representative, which 
according to both legal theory and case law indicates liability also towards third parties. 
In line with the rules on liability in Chapter 10, Section 12(2) states that auditors may be liable to the 
company as well as to shareholders and third parties. 
Directors’ liability also involves liability for misleading annual reports or other financial statements 
according to EMCA Chapter 10. 
The same liability standard (culpa-rule) applies to auditors, but of course the content of the auditors’ duty 
is decided by professional standards regulating the work of the auditors. 
Consideration should be given to a provision attaching civil liability to the directors where they negligently 
approve accounts which subsequently prove to be false / inaccurate. 
Too often they paint a rosy picture which turns out to be entirely inaccurate without any real consequences 
attaching to their approval of those accounts – EMCA might give a lead on that. 
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General Comments70 
1. EU Law 
Chapter 13 contains the rules on restructurings. Restructurings comprise takeovers, mergers, divisions and 
also schemes of arrangement which can be used for a wide variety of restructurings. The EU company law 
Directives cover these different forms of restructurings to a certain extent. Takeovers are covered by the 
EU Takeover Directive 2004/25/EC. Directive 2011/35/EU, the former 3rdCompany Law Directive, deals 
with domestic mergers. Domestic divisions are covered by the 6th Company Law Directive, which is 
addressed further below.  
The Directives on mergers and divisions only apply to public companies. However, Member States can 
extend the Directive’s rules to private companies as well. 
(1) The Takeover Directive 2004/25/EC has been implemented into national law in all Member States since 
2006. In many jurisdictions (e.g. Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Ireland 
Luxembourg and Sweden) an independent takeover act exists. In other jurisdictions, takeover regulation 
falls within the scope of a capital markets or a securities markets act (e.g. Estonia, Denmark, France, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal and Slovakia) or a general Companies Act (e.g. the Netherlands and 
the UK). In addition, primary legislation is often supported by a further set of takeover rules, with statutory 
effect, setting out more detailed provisions for the conduct of takeover bids.  
(2) Restructurings may also take the form of mergers or divisions and, in some jurisdictions, such as the 
Ireland and the UK, provision is made for the inclusion of more broad ranging schemes of arrangement. 
Domestic mergers fall within the scope of the former 3rd Company Law Directive 78/855/EEC (as amended 
by Directive 2007/63/EC and Directive 2009/109/EC and recodified by Directive 2011/35/EU) which 
provides a framework for mergers by acquisition, or formation of public limited liability companies.  
EU rules also apply to cross-border mergers and can be found in the 10th Company Law Directive (Cross-
Border Mergers Directive - 2005/56/EC). Cross-border mergers are regulated similarly to domestic 
mergers. However, some special provisions deal with the entry into effect of the cross-border merger and 
the registration of the merger in the registries of the Member States involved. The effective application of 
the Directive’s rules can only be achieved if similar rules apply in all involved jurisdictions. The 10th 
Directive applies to both private and public companies.  
It seems clear from the Sevic Case, C-411/03, that participation in an international merger may be regarded 
as an exercise of the right of freedom of establishment. This is of relevance for “companies or firms” in the 
sense of Article 54 TFEU, which do not fall within the scope of existing secondary law. The full range of 
secondary law (3rd Directive in combination with 10th Directive) is only available to public companies, 
private companies are covered by the 10th Directive only insofar as the national law of the Member state 
allows for mergers of this company form (see Article 4 Directive 2005/56/EC). In all other cases private 
companies, cooperatives, partnerships and other legal entities need to refer directly to the freedom of 
establishment as determined in the Sevic judgement.  
The 6th Company Law Directive 82/891/EEC provides a framework for divisions of public companies. The 
idea behind the Directive was that the rules concerning divisions should have the same approach and 
structure as the rules concerning mergers. The Directive primarily applies to “divisions by acquisition” 
(Article 2). This describes the operation whereby, after a company is wound-up without being liquidated, 
it transfers all assets and liabilities to more than one company in exchange for the allocation of the 
shareholders’ shares of the divided company in the companies receiving contributions as a result of the 
division. The same rules apply to divisions by formation of new companies (Article 21). 
Having regard to cross-border divisions, there is no EU Directive to regulate this area. However, the general 
perception is that the Sevic case, C-411/03, allows for cross-border divisions of any legal entity protected 
by the freedom of establishment. 
                                                     
70 The working group on Chapter 13 was chaired by Professor Blanaid Clarke (Trinity College Dublin, Ireland) and included 
Professor Christoph Teichmann (University of Würzburg, Germany). 
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(3) It is established case law of the European Court of Justice (Case C 378/10 – Vale) that companies being 
incorporated in the EU or EEA shall have the possibility to transfer their registered office from one Member 
State to another without having to be liquidated.  
This procedure requires the cooperation of two legal systems. It is therefore also a precondition that the 
law of the state in the territory of which the company wants to reregister acknowledges a cross-border 
transfer of the registered office. In the Vale-judgment, the ECJ concluded in relation to a cross-border 
conversion, that the refusal of the authorities of a Member State to record the company in the national 
register of the original Member State as the ‘predecessor in law’ to the converted company is not compatible 
with EU law. According to the principle of effectiveness, also stressed by the ECJ in the Vale-case, Member 
States are required to take due account of documents obtained from the authorities of the Member State of 
origin certifying that a company has complied with the formalities laid down in that Member State.  
(4) The 2011 report of the Reflection Group on the Future of European Company Law recommended that 
the Cross-border Mergers Directive should be reviewed and revised where appropriate. Such a revision 
was recommended in respect of time limits, suspension of the merger, creditors’ rights, exchange of shares 
and possibly other forms of restructuring such as cross-border contribution of assets or universal transfer 
of assets. The December 2012 Action Plan on European Company Law and Corporate Governance 
indicated an openness to amendments of the Directive. In its Action Plan, the European Commission also 
considers an initiative to provide a framework for cross-border divisions. Moreover, a study on the 
application of the Cross-border Mergers Directive has been delivered in September 2013 which suggests 
several amendments. 
2. National Law 
As mentioned above, the Directives (except for the 10th Company Law Directive) only apply to public 
companies. The national company legislation of the European Member States contains different opinions 
as to whether more simple rules should apply to private companies with regard to mergers and divisions. 
Hence, the Member States have different approaches. In some Member States, such as Finland, France, 
Italy and the Netherlands, the rules on mergers and divisions are the same for public and private companies. 
In Denmark, Germany, Spain and Sweden, some modifications have been made for private companies. In 
the UK and Ireland, restructurings of all types including mergers for private companies can be done via a 
scheme of arrangement. Although a decision involving a division can be made by the shareholders, in some 
cases the approval of a court is required.  
All Member States should have rules on cross-border mergers in their Companies Acts or secondary 
legislation. For example, in the UK the legislation on cross-border mergers is found in a statutory 
instrument, SI 2007/2974. In Germany it has been incorporated in the existing Act on Transformations 
(Umwandlungsgesetz).  
The operations governed by the 3rdand 6th Directives involve the winding up of at least one public company. 
The practical usage of such restructurings varies among the Member States. Whereas German companies 
frequently use such operations, they are seldom used in the UK and Ireland where typically the pre-existing 
public companies continue to exist. One of them will become a subsidiary of the other, and continue as a 
company on the register, possibly re-registered as a private company. Such a takeover will not be affected 
at all by these two Directives, as it is often effected by a straight takeover offer (Pt 26 UK Companies Act 
2006, s.201 Irish Companies Act 1963). In the latter case the company goes into a voluntary liquidation 
before any property is transferred.  
It seems that tax law is one of the main drivers for the choice amongst different restructuring methods. In 
Germany, for instance, the merger procedure is a tax privileged way of combining two companies, because 
the assets of the acquired company will be transferred at book value to the acquiring company. When the 
acquiring company, instead, decides to simply acquire the shares of the other company, those shares will 
have to be entered at their real value which leads to disclosure and eventual taxation of hidden reserves. 
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In the UK, a common method of acquiring control of a listed company is by way of a court sanctioned 
scheme of arrangement pursuant to the Companies Act 2006. Such a transaction does not fall within the 
scope of the Takeovers Directive. The scheme requires the consent of 75 % in value and a majority in 
number of the relevant class (shareholders, creditors) of those attending and voting in person or by proxy 
and thus generally only applies in case of a recommended offer. The transaction is effected by way of a 
single vesting order which delivers 100 % of the shares and binds all shareholders. There are two types of 
schemes available. The first is a transfer scheme which involves the shares being transferred by court order 
to an offeror in return for cash/shares to shareholders. The second and most common form of scheme is a 
cancellation scheme. Here the shares, which represent the subject of the scheme, are cancelled while the 
reserve is used to pay up new shares which are then issued to the offeror. The offerees’ shareholders then 
receive, in exchange for their cancelled shares, cash or shares in the offeror. All schemes in the UK require 
the sanction of the court which acts as a protection for the shareholders and creditors who are otherwise 
bound by the consent of 75 % in value of the shareholders or creditors, as the case may be. Similar statutory 
provisions are used in Ireland and in the UK for all manner of compromises and arrangements between 
members or classes of members and creditors or classes of creditors. 
Most Member States, such as Finland, France, Germany, Sweden and the UK, do not have rules on cross-
border divisions. Only a few Member States, such as Denmark, have chosen to create rules on cross-border 
divisions based on their rules on domestic divisions. The Danish Companies Act incorporated the 10th 
Company Law Directive on Cross-border Mergers. The Act also recognizes the consequences of the Sevic 
case, C-411/03. This implies that the Act covers both cross-border mergers and divisions. The rules apply 
to companies established in at least two different EU/EAA Member States. The rules of the Member States 
in question must be respected during the merger/division process. Participating Danish companies must 
fulfil the requirements imposed by Danish legislation regarding mergers and divisions. In turn, a foreign 
company must fulfil the law of the country where it is registered. Denmark has allowed cross-border 
divisions because of the great similarities between a division and a merger from a company law perspective. 
As with cross-border mergers, cross-border divisions can simplify a company’s access to the corporate 
environment of other Member States. 
Article 13 of the Directive 2011/35/EU requires that the Member States in their national legislation provide 
a suitable mechanism to secure the participating companies’ creditors, if the creditors’ claims are 
established before the announcement of the merger plan and are due at the time of the announcement of the 
plan. Pursuant to the Directive, the Member States’ legislation must at least provide that the creditors of 
the companies, which are involved in the merger, are entitled to adequate security. The requirement of 
security can be made if the financial situation of the dissolved companies and the continuing companies 
makes such protection necessary, and where those creditors do not already have such a security.  
The Directive does not contain any further rules concerning how the creditors are to be secured. Therefore, 
in a study on the application of the Directive, commissioned by the European Commission, it has been 
noted that the different systems of creditor protection might be an obstacle to cross-border mergers which 
would require more detailed harmonization. 
In Ireland and in the UK, in case of a scheme of arrangement, the court will take creditor protection into 
account. In Italy, the creditors can oppose a decision to merge/divide if they have not consented or waived 
the right to oppose. In the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden the creditors can submit a demurrer against 
the merger or division for the purpose of attaining security for their claims, whereas in Spain, the company 
has to advertise the merger/division three times before it can be concluded. In connection with a merger, 
creditors in Germany can make claims for security up until six months after the merger, whereas with a 
division, the acquiring company is jointly and severally liable for obligations entered into before the 
division. In Denmark an expert has to assess whether the creditors are sufficiently protected after the 
merger. 
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With regard to the cross-border transfer of the registered office, only a small number of Member States 
already provide such a procedure, amongst them Denmark and Spain. Under the EU freedom of 
establishment, however, even those Member States who do not explicitly provide for a cross-border transfer 
of the registered office are forced by EU law to enable companies from other Member States to reregister 
within their territory. According to the principle of effectiveness, which is mentioned by the ECJ in the 
Vale-case, Member States must not render impossible the exercise of rights conferred by the European 
Union legal order. Consequently, there are already cases, for instance in Germany, where courts have 
registered cross-border transfers of registered office even in the absence of a written legal text. There are, 
however, many uncertainties as to the applicable procedure in the absence of express legal provisions which 
the parties can rely on. 
3. Considerations 
It is not desirable to attempt to include all the necessary provisions required to establish a framework for 
the conduct of takeovers within the EMCA. Many of these provisions may be categorized as “market rules” 
or “bid procedures”. As part of a model Companies Act, this chapter restricts itself to setting out the board 
neutrality rule, a core company law issue which is an integral part of the takeover process. This rule applies 
only to the takeover of listed companies. However, certain other provisions of the EMCA such as squeeze 
out rights and the general duties of directors will also apply in the context of a takeover. These latter 
provisions would apply to public and private companies. 
The EMCA Group discussed whether the scheme of arrangement which is widely used in Ireland and the 
UK could serve as a model for other countries. The attractiveness of such schemes to businesses is 
demonstrated by high profile seat transfers from other Member States to the UK in order to benefit from 
the flexible rules they offer. Some group members, however, had difficulties to accept the idea that the 
principle of a majority decision should not only apply within the group of shareholders – where it is well-
established in national company laws all over Europe – but also within the creditors as a group, which 
means that individual creditors might lose their claim against their will. In English and Irish company law, 
however, this is balanced by the requirement that the scheme finally has to be approved by the court. The 
EMCA Group therefore, considered the scheme of arrangement a useful instrument also for other legal 
systems, provided that the judges are sufficiently qualified for a role as a quasi-arbitrator, responsible for 
reconciling potentially opposing interests amongst shareholders and creditors. 
Generally, the EMCA should make use of the principle of Freedom of Movement within Europe mentioned 
in the EMCA Chapter 1, Section 13. It follows from this that the EMCA should contain rules on domestic 
mergers and domestic divisions as well as cross-border mergers and cross-border divisions. In the EMCA, 
the rules on mergers and divisions apply to both public and private companies. However, regarding private 
companies, the rules contain certain modifications. Hence, the EMCA provisions are consistent with the 
relevant Directives for public limited companies but provide a simplified set of rules for private companies 
and a more flexible approach to regulation.  
The Commission has introduced simplified rules regarding the 3rd and 6th Company Law Directives. Among 
other things, the rules now allow the shareholders to agree on opting out of the directors’ explanatory report 
in both national mergers and divisions. Further, the shareholders can agree on opting out of the 
supplementary accounting statement in both national mergers and divisions. The EMCA makes use of the 
simplified rules, which the Directives make possible. The provisions on cross-border mergers are not 
limited to public or private companies from the EU or EEA Member States. In fact, the scope is opened to 
all private and public companies, as long as the applicable company law of all companies involved in the 
merger permits a cross-border merger. 
Regarding the different types of protection, the EMCA Group decided that shareholders should be protected 
by the requirement that mergers and divisions have to be approved by a qualified majority in the general 
meeting. In connection with a merger, the EMCA Group has decided not to take up the option of derogating 
from the requirement of the general meeting, except for intra-group mergers. 
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Even if a general meeting takes place, however, minority shareholders representing less than one third of 
the shares will not be able to block a merger or division. Some Member States therefore provide for a right 
of dissenting minority shareholders to sell their shares to the acquiring company (e.g. § 29 German Act on 
Transformations). Other Member States, such as the UK, do not see any need for further protection, since 
the regular merger procedure already protects the interests of shareholders in general. They have a right to 
inspect the merger plan, the management report and the expert’s report. Moreover, the expert’s report must 
in particular ensure that the share exchange ratio is fair and reasonable. Minority shareholders therefore 
will not suffer any material damage if they are forced to become shareholders of the acquiring company. 
The group therefore considers that there is no need to suggest a mandatory sell-out right as a general rule 
in the model act. It should be left to the articles of association to provide for a sell-out right in such 
exceptional cases. 
With regard to the creditors, the Member States have different models for protection. The common view is 
that the interests of the creditors should be protected. The creditors should therefore, not be forced into new 
companies without reasonable security that their claims can be honoured. According to Article 13 of 
Directive 2011/35/EU, the Member States must provide for an adequate system of protection of the interests 
of creditors of the merging companies whose claims antedate the publication of the draft terms of merger 
and have not fallen due at the time of such publication. The legislation of the Member States must at least 
provide that such creditors shall be entitled to obtain adequate safeguards where the financial situation of 
the merging companies makes such protection necessary and where those creditors do not already have 
such safeguards. In the EMCA the adequate system of protection is provided for in such a way that an 
expert must make a declaration stating that the creditors are adequately secured. This declaration can be 
subject to verification by the Registrar or the court. Thus, if the creditors are regarded as sufficiently 
secured, an automatic transfer of debts takes place (universal succession). 
The EMCA Group has deliberated on the most appropriate form of regulation regarding cross-border 
mergers. One way could be to follow the Directive so that, to a large extent, the provisions simply refer to 
the rules on domestic mergers. However, the EMCA Group is of the opinion that it will bring more clarity, 
if the rules on cross-border mergers are to be found exclusively in a part of the Chapter. 
Even though the cross-border transfer of the registered office is only regulated in a minority of Member 
States, a modern Companies Act should not abstain from regulating it. The cross-border transfer of 
registered office is part of the union-wide freedom of establishment. Practical cases where a transfer had 
been effected in the absence of a written legal text prove that there are too many uncertainties as to the 
applicable procedure where there is no express legal provisions for the parties to rely on. The EMCA Group 
therefore has opted for the implementation of a procedure on the cross-border transfer of the registered 
office thereby stressing the importance of regulating cross-border conversions. 
The 6th Company Law Directive on divisions is conditionally mandatory. This means that if there are rules 
concerning divisions in a Member State, the Directives rules on divisions must be complied with. The group 
decided to implement a dedicated part on divisions which mirrors the legislative approach of many Member 
States based on the functional interrelation between mergers and divisions. Economically and legally they 
are of a similar structure and require the same elements of regulation. The similarities which exist between 
mergers and divisions are also highlighted by the recitals of the 6th Directive. 
The EMCA Group finds it desirable to construct separate rules on cross-border divisions. There are two 
different methods of introducing such rules. The most simplistic way is to refer to the domestic rules on 
mergers (with the necessary deviations). This was the way initially chosen by the Danish Companies Act 
but it was not satisfactory in practice. Therefore, the Danish Companies Act now contains a complete set 
of rules on cross-border divisions inspired by the domestic rules but adjusted to the needs of cross-border 
divisions. The EMCA Group decided to adopt this approach for the EMCA. 
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PART 1 
TAKEOVERS BY WAY OF GENERAL OFFER 
Section 13.01 
Board Neutrality Rule 
(1) During the course of an offer, or before the date of the offer if the board of the offeree company has 
reason to believe that a bona fide offer might be imminent, the board must not, without the approval of the 
shareholders in the general meeting take any action, other than seeking alternative bids, which may result: 
(a) in the frustration of any offer or bona fide possible offer; 
(b) or in shareholders being denied the opportunity to decide on its merits. 
(2) The term “offer” means any public offer made to the shareholders of a listed company, to acquire some 
or all of those securities; the term “securities” means transferable securities carrying voting rights in a 
company. 
Comments 
The Takeover Directive makes the Board Neutrality Rule, stated in Article 9 Directive 2004/25/EG, 
optional for Member States (Article 12 Directive 2004/25/EG). The EMCA Group has the opinion, in line 
with the principle of shareholder democracy, that the Board Neutrality Rule should be adopted as a general 
rule for the behavior of the management in the course of a public offer. 
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PART 2 
RESTRUCTURING BY WAY OF SCHEME OF ARRANGEMENT 
Section 13.02 
Scheme of Arrangement 
(1) A compromise or arrangement (a scheme of arrangement) may be proposed between a company and 
its creditors, or any class of them, or its shareholders or any class of shareholders and must be approved by 
a scheme meeting. 
(2) A “scheme meeting” is a meeting of creditors (or any class of creditors) or of shareholders (or any class 
of shareholders), as the case may be, for the purpose of considering, and voting on, a resolution proposing 
that a scheme of arrangement be agreed. 
Comments 
This Part introduces schemes of arrangement which are familiar in Ireland and the UK which are 
increasingly used by EU companies to restructure their businesses. The use of these provisions by other 
Member State companies has prompted interest in these types of arrangements. Schemes can be used by 
solvent or insolvent companies to reach a compromise or arrangement with shareholders or classes of 
shareholders or creditors or classes of creditors, including secured creditors. They are extensively used 
because when a scheme is approved, a majority in number and 75 % in value of the shareholders or 
creditors, as the case may be, can bind 100 % of the class, and this is so even if the scheme overrides 
existing contractual or proprietary rights. 
The protection for the shareholders and the creditors is that all schemes require the sanction of the court 
which is only forthcoming if: 
• the statutory provisions have been complied with – great attention is paid to the documentation which 
must be presented, especially the scheme document which sets out the scheme and its impact in great 
detail;  
• the class was fairly represented by those who attended the meeting and that the statutory majority is 
acting bona fide and is not coercing the minority in order to promote interests averse to those of the 
class whom it purports to represent; and  
• the arrangement is such that an intelligent and honest shareholder or creditor of the class concerned, 
acting in respect of his interest, might reasonably approve. Great attention is paid to ensuring that the 
class meetings are properly composed of those whose rights are not so dissimilar as to prevent them 
consulting with a view to their common interest. It is not necessary to seek the consent of shareholders 
or creditors with no economic interest in the scheme.  
Schemes can be used to effect: a reorganization of capital; a takeover or merger or division; a restructuring 
in circumstances where creditors have contractual positions which require unanimity resulting in the 
significant hold-out power of minority creditors; the run-off of long term liabilities of an insurance 
company or a company with significant exposure to tort claimants (as in asbestos litigation). Insofar as the 
scheme is effecting a merger or a division in the sense of this Chapter, the provisions on mergers or 
divisions, as the case may be, apply. Other forms of restructuring, not covered by the provisions on mergers 
or divisions (and not subject to takeover rules) could be affected by scheme of arrangement. 
Section 13.03 
Scheme Meeting 
(1) Where an arrangement is proposed between a company and its creditors, or any class of them, or its 
shareholders or any class of them, the court may, on the application of the company or any creditor or 
shareholder or a liquidator or administrator, order a meeting of the shareholders or class of shareholders, 
or creditor or class of creditors, as the case may be, to be summoned in such a manner and subject to such 
disclosure requirements as the court directs. 
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(2) Without prejudice to Section 3(1), every notice summoning a meeting must include an explanatory 
statement as to the proposed scheme, its general effect, and the specific effect of the scheme on vested 
rights of those shareholders or creditors affected. 
(3) If a majority in number representing 2/3rds in value of shareholders or class of shareholders or creditors 
or class of creditors, as the case may be, present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting, 
agree to the scheme of arrangement, the scheme shall, if sanctioned by the court, be binding on all the 
shareholders, or class of shareholders, or creditors or class of creditors, as the case may be, and also on the 
company.  
(4) An order made under Section 3(3) shall have no effect until a copy of the order is delivered to the 
public registry for registration. 
Comments 
In the interest of consistency with other Chapters where extraordinary decisions of the general meeting 
require a 2/3 majority, the group agreed to require the same majority for the scheme of arrangement, in 
awareness that in Ireland and in the UK, a majority of 75 % in value is required. 
Section 13.04 
Court Decision 
(1) Where an application is made to the court for the sanctioning of a proposed arrangement and it is shown 
to the court that the arrangement has been proposed for the purposes of or in connection with 
(i) a scheme for the reconstruction of any company or companies; or 
(ii)  the amalgamation of any two or more companies; 
and that under the scheme the whole or any part of the undertaking or the property of any company 
concerned in the scheme (“the acquired company”) is to be transferred to another company (“the acquiring 
company”), the court may, by the order sanctioning the arrangement, make provision for all or any of the 
following matters: 
(a) the transfer to the acquiring company of the whole or any part of the undertaking (including 
contractual rights and entitlements) and of the property or liabilities of any acquired company; 
(b) the allotting or appropriation by the acquiring company of any shares, debentures, policies or other 
like interests in that company which under the arrangement are to be allotted or appropriated by that 
company to or for any person; 
(c) the continuation by or against the acquiring company of any legal proceedings pending by or 
against any acquired company; 
(d) the dissolution, without winding up, of any acquired company; 
(e) the provision to be made for any persons who, within such time and in such manner as the court 
directs, dissent from the arrangement; 
(f) such incidental, consequential and supplemental matters as are necessary to secure that the 
reconstruction or amalgamation shall be fully and effectively carried out. 
(2) Where an order under this Section provides for the transfer of property or liabilities, that property shall, 
by virtue of the order, be transferred to and vest in the acquiring company. Those liabilities shall, by virtue 
of the order, be transferred to and become the liabilities of the acquiring company, and in the case of any 
property, it shall, if the order so directs, be freed from any charge which, by virtue of the arrangement, 
ceases to have effect. 
(3) The court may not sanction a compromise or arrangement between a limited-liability company and its 
creditors of shareholders or any class of them which falls within parts 3 (mergers), 4 (cross-border transfer 
of the registered office) or 5 (divisions) of this chapter unless the relevant requirements of these parts are 
complied with in the compromise or arrangement. 
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Comments 
In the interest of consistency with other parts of this Chapter Section 4 (3) requires the court to take into 
account the provisions on mergers, cross-border transfer of the registered office and divisions. A 
comparable provision can be found in Section 903 UK Companies Act 2006. 
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PART 3 
MERGERS 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Section 13.05 
Definitions 
(1) A “merger by acquisition” is the operation whereby one or more companies are wound up without 
liquidation and transfer to another company all its assets and liabilities in exchange for the issue of shares 
in the acquiring company to the shareholders of the company or companies being acquired and, as the case 
may be, a cash payment.  
(2) A “merger by the formation of a new company” is the operation whereby two or more companies are 
wound up without liquidation and transfer to a company incorporated by themselves, all their assets and 
liabilities in exchange for the issue to their shareholders of shares in the new company and, as the case may 
be, a cash payment.  
(3) For the purpose of this Part on Mergers the “merging companies” shall mean all the companies 
participating in the merger. “The company being acquired” shall mean the company which is going to be 
wound up without liquidation and transferring all its assets to the “acquiring company”, the latter meaning 
the company to which the assets are transferred – be it an existing company (in the case of a merger by 
acquisition) or a new company (in the case of a merger by formation of a new company). 
Comments 
The definitions contained in Directive 2011/35/EU require that the shareholders of the acquiring company 
must receive, if applicable, a cash payment not exceeding 10 % of the nominal value of the shares. This 
part of the definition contained in the Directive can be derogated from (cf. Article 30 of the Directive). 
Thus, the 10 % limitation has not, for example, been implemented in the Danish Companies Act and in the 
German Act on Transformations. According to these national provisions, a merger may also take place 
where no consideration is made in form of shares or payment, or where a cash payment exceeds 10 % of 
the nominal value of the shares. The EMCA takes the same view meaning that the non-cash payment may 
be more than 10 %.  
The definitions in Section 5(3) are based on the wording used in the official English version of Directive 
2011/35/EU. 
Section 13.06 
Companies in Liquidation 
A merger by acquisition or by formation of a new company may also be effected where one or more of the 
companies which are ceasing to exist are in liquidation, provided that this option is restricted to companies 
which have not yet begun to distribute their assets to their shareholders. 
Comments 
Section 6 makes use of the option contained in Article 3(2) and Article 4(2) of Directive 2011/35/EU. A 
comparable provision can be found in § 3(3) German Act on Transformations. 
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DOMESTIC MERGERS 
Section 13.07 
Merger Plan 
(1) Subject to Section 7(2) where a merger of either type specified in Section 5 is proposed to be entered 
into, the board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, of the merging companies must 
draw up and agree a joint merger plan. 
(2) If the merger only involves private limited companies, the shareholders may agree that no merger plan 
should be drawn up (but see Section 12(8)). 
(3) If the merger involves public limited companies, the merger plan must state, at least: 
(a) the type, name and registered office of each of the merging companies, including, if applicable, of 
the newly formed company; 
(b) the ratio applicable to the exchange of securities or shares representing the company capital and 
the amount of any cash payment; 
(c) the terms relating to the allotment of shares in the acquiring company; 
(d) the date from which the holding of such shares entitles the holders to participate in profits and any 
special conditions affecting that entitlement; 
(e) the date from which the transactions of the company being acquired shall be treated for accounting 
purposes as being those of the acquiring company; 
(f) any special conditions, including special rights or restrictions, whether in regard to voting, 
participation in profits, share capital or otherwise, which will apply to shares or other securities issued 
by the acquiring company in exchange for shares or other securities in the company or companies being 
acquired; 
(g) any payment or benefit in cash or otherwise, paid or given or intended to be paid or given to any 
independent person referred to in Section 9 and/or to any director of any of the merging companies 
insofar as it differs from the payment or benefit paid or given to other persons in respect of the merger 
and the consideration, if any, for any such payment or benefit; 
(h) a draft instrument of incorporation and articles of association if a new limited liability company is 
formed by the merger. 
(4) Save as provided in Section 7(5), the board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, 
of each of the merging companies must deliver a copy of the merger plan to the Registrar who must at least 
one month before the date of any meeting of that company summoned for the purpose of approving the 
merger (see Section 12), publish notice of receipt of the plan. 
(5) Section 7(4) does not apply in respect of a company if the merger plan is freely available on the 
company’s website (and the Registrar has been notified of the website address) throughout the period 
beginning one month before, and ending on, the date of any meeting of the company summoned for the 
purpose of approving the merger. In the case of a public company, the merger plan must be made freely 
available on the company’s website. 
Comments  
According to Article 5 Directive 2011/35/EU the administrative or management bodies – depending on 
whether the company applies a one-tier or a two-tier system (see Chapter 8) – of the merging companies 
shall draw up a merger plan in writing. The Directive is only applicable to public companies, therefore 
Section 7(2) allows for an exception in the case of a private company if all the shareholders agree. 
The merger plan must be published in accordance with Article 3 of Directive 2009/101/EC. But a company 
shall be exempt from the publication requirement if it makes the merger plan available on its website (see 
Article 6 Directive 2011/35/EU). 
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Section 13.08 
Directors’ Explanatory Report 
(1) Subject to Section 14 (3) and Section 15(2), the board of directors or the management board, as the 
case may be, of each of the merging companies shall draw up a detailed written report explaining the merger 
plan and setting out the legal and economic grounds for them, in particular the share exchange ratio. That 
report shall also describe any special valuation difficulties which have arisen. 
(2) The board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, of each of the merging companies 
shall inform the general meeting of their company and the board of directors or the management board of 
the other merging companies so that the latter may inform their respective general meetings of any material 
change in the assets and liabilities between the date of preparation of the merger plan and the date of the 
general meetings which are to decide on the merger plan. 
(3) The report referred to in Section 8(1) and/or the information referred to in Section 8(2) shall not be 
required if all the shareholders and the holders of other securities conferring the right to vote of each of the 
merging companies have so agreed. 
Comments 
Section 8 is based on Article 9 Directive 2011/35/EU, making use of the option (Article 9(3) of the 
Directive) to waive the requirement of a directors’ report by unanimous shareholder vote. 
Section 13.09 
Expert’s Examination and Report to Shareholders 
(1) One or more independent experts, acting on behalf of each of the merging companies, shall examine 
the merger plan and draw up a written report to the shareholders. The experts shall be entitled to secure 
from each of the merging companies all information they consider necessary for the discharge of their 
duties. 
(2) That report must state in particular whether, in the expert’s opinion, the share exchange ratio is fair and 
reasonable. The expert’s statement must at least indicate the method or methods used to arrive at the share 
exchange ratio proposed; state whether such method or methods are adequate in the case in question; 
indicate the values arrived at using each such method and give an option on the relative importance 
attributed to such methods in arriving at the value decided on. The report shall also describe any special 
valuation difficulties which have arisen. 
(3) The expert’s report has to make a declaration as to whether the creditors of each of the merging 
companies, whose claims antedate the publication of the merger plan and have not fallen due at the time of 
such publication, can be considered to be sufficiently protected after the merger or whether the financial 
situation of the merging companies requires particular safeguards. 
(4) The independent experts shall be appointed by the competent court at the request of each merging 
company. At the request of all the merging companies, one or more joint experts may be appointed to draw 
up a single report on all the merging companies. The appointed expert shall be a person eligible for 
appointment as a statutory auditor. 
(5) Neither an examination of the merger plan nor an expert report shall be required if all the shareholders 
and the holders of other securities conferring the right to vote of each of the companies involved in the 
merger have so agreed. 
Comments 
Section 9 is based on Article 10 Directive 2011/35/EU. Section 9(4) makes use of the option to appoint one 
or more independent experts for all the merging companies (see Article 10(1) Directive). Section 9(5) 
makes use of the option to waive the requirement of an expert’s report by unanimous shareholder vote. 
Section 9(3) is part of the creditor protection regime and will be explained below (see Section 13). 
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Section 13.10 
Supplementary Balance Sheet 
(1)  This Section applies if the last annual accounts of any of the merging companies relate to a financial 
year ending more than 6 months before the board of directors or the management board, as the case may 
be, of the company adopts the merger plan. 
(2) Where one of the merging companies falls within Section 10(1) above, the board of directors or the 
management board, as the case may be, of the company must prepare a supplementary accounting 
statement, unless the shareholders and, where applicable, the holders of other securities conferring the right 
to vote, of each of the merging companies, unanimously agree that no such statement is required. 
(3) Where such statement is required, it must consist of a balance sheet, or a consolidated balance sheet, 
as the case may be, dealing with the state of affairs of the relevant company or group as at a date not more 
than three months before the merger plan (see above Section 7) was adopted, and the statement must be 
approved by the board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, of the relevant company. 
(4) The supplementary balance sheet shall not be required if the company publishes a half yearly financial 
report in accordance with Article 5 of Directive 2004/109/EC and makes it available to shareholders in 
accordance with Section 11. 
(5) The shareholders and all holders of other securities conferring the right to vote may agree that no 
interim balance sheet should be prepared, notwithstanding that the merger plan has been signed more than 
six months after the end of the financial year to which the company’s most recent annual report relates. 
Comments 
The rules in Section 10 are based on Article 11 of Directive 2011/35/EU. Article 11(1)(c) states that “All 
shareholders shall be entitled to inspect at least the following documents at the registered office at least one 
month before the date fixed for the general meeting which is to decide on the draft terms of merger: […] 
where applicable, an accounting statement drawn up as at a date which must not be earlier than the first 
day of the third month preceding the date of the draft terms of merger, if the latest annual accounts relate 
to a financial year which ended more than six months before that date”. 
Member States may require, however, that an accounting statement shall not be required if all the 
shareholders and the holders of other securities conferring the right to vote of each of the companies 
involved in the merger have so agreed. The group proposes to make use of this Member State option. 
Section 13.11 
Inspection of Documents 
(1) The shareholders of each of the merging companies must be able, within a period of one month before 
the meeting called to approve the merger (see Section 12), to inspect and make copies of any of the 
documents listed below either at the registered office of that company or by freely accessing them on the 
company’s website for downloading and printing.  
(2) The relevant documents are: 
(a) the merger plan;  
(b) where applicable, the directors' explanatory report;  
(c) where applicable, the expert’s report to shareholders; 
(d) the companies’ annual accounts and annual reports for the previous three financial years together 
with any supplementary accounting statement required by Section 10. 
Comments 
Section 11 is based on Article 11 of Directive 2011/35/EU.  
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Section 13.12 
General Meetings of Merging Companies 
(1) Subject to Section 12 (8) and Section 14 (4), the merger plan must be approved by a majority in number, 
representing 2/3 in value, of each class of shareholders of each of the merging companies, present and 
voting, either in person or by proxy at a meeting. 
(2) Where the merger is a merger by formation of a new company, the memorandum or draft memorandum 
and articles or draft articles shall be approved by an ordinary resolution of each of the merging companies. 
(3) The board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, of each of the merging companies 
must report: 
(a) to every meeting of the shareholders, or any class of shareholders, of that company summoned for 
the purpose of agreeing to the merger plan, and  
(b) to the board of directors of the management board, as the case may be, of every other merging 
company, any material changes in the property and liabilities of that company between the date when 
the merger plan was adopted and the date of the meeting in question. 
(4) The board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, of each of the other merging 
companies must in turn: 
(a) report those matters to every meeting of the shareholders, or any class of shareholders, of that 
company summoned for the purpose of agreeing to the merger plan; or 
(b) send a report of those matters to every shareholder entitled to receive notice of such a meeting. 
(5) Section 12(3) and (4) do not apply if all the holders of shares and other securities conferring the right 
to vote in general meetings of each of the merging companies have so agreed. 
(6) If the merger only involves private limited companies, and if the shareholders have agreed under 
Section 7(2) that no merger plan should be drawn up, the following issues must be addressed in connection 
with the adoption of the merger: 
(a) the names and any secondary names of the private limited companies, including whether the name 
or secondary name of any non-surviving company is to be adopted as a secondary name of the surviving 
company; 
(b) the consideration offered for the shares in a non-surviving private limited company; 
(c) the time from which any shares offered as consideration will confer on the holders a right to receive 
dividends; 
(d) the time from which the rights and obligations of a non-surviving private limited company are 
considered to have been transferred for accounting purposes; and 
(e) the articles of association if a new private limited company is formed by the merger. 
(7) If the merger only involves private limited companies, and if the shareholders have agreed under 
Section 7(2) that no merger plan should be drawn up, identical resolutions must have been passed by all of 
the existing private limited companies participating in the merger with regard to the requirements in Section 
12(6). 
(8) In the case of any merger by acquisition, it is not necessary for the merger plan to be approved by the 
shareholders of the acquiring company if the court is satisfied that the conditions set out in Section 12(9) 
to (12) have been complied with. 
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(9) The first condition is that either: 
(a) the publication of notice of receipt of the merger plan by the Registrar took place in respect of the 
acquiring company at least one month before the date of the first meeting of shareholders, or any class 
of shareholders, of the company being acquired (or, if there is more than one company being acquired, 
any of them) summoned for the purposes of agreeing to the merger plan; or 
(b) the merger plan is made freely available on the company’s website, details of which have been 
notified to, and published by the Registrar, at least one month before the date of the first meeting of 
shareholders, or any class of shareholders, of the company being acquired (or, if there is more than one 
company being acquired, any of them) summoned for the purposes of agreeing to the merger plan, and 
the merger plan remains available on the website throughout the period beginning one month before, 
and ending on, that date. 
(10) The second condition is that each of the documents listed in the applicable paragraphs of Section 
11 (2) relating to the acquiring company and the company being acquired (or, if there is more than one 
company being acquired, each of them): 
(a) are available for inspection and copying by the shareholders of the acquiring company during the 
period beginning one month before, and ending on, the date of any such meeting as is mentioned in 
Section 12 (9) (a) to inspect that document at the registered office of that company; or 
(b) are made freely available on the company’s website and remain available on the website throughout 
the period beginning one month before, and ending on, the date of any such meeting as is mentioned 
in Section 12 (9) (a). 
(11) The third condition is that no shareholder or shareholders of the acquiring company, holding not 
less than 5 % of the paid-up capital of the company which carried the right to vote at general meetings of 
the company (excluding any shares in the company held as treasury shares) has required, during that period, 
a meeting of the shareholders to be called for the purpose of deciding whether or not to agree to the merger. 
(12) The board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, of each of the merging 
companies must notify the Registrar about the resolution on the merger or, as the case may be, deliver 
evidence that no resolution was necessary. The board of directors or the management board, as the case 
may be, must also notify the Registrar about the expert’s declaration on the creditors’ position as referred 
to in Section 9 (3). 
(13) The Registrar shall publish notice of receipt of the documentation mentioned in Section 12 (12) 
and of the content of the expert’s declaration on the creditors’ position or that, according to Section 9 (5) 
no expert’s report has been drawn up. 
Comments 
Article 7 of Directive 2011/35/EU requires that a merger is to be adopted by the general meeting in each 
of the merged companies with at least 2/3 majority. Some Member States such as Germany, Ireland and 
the UK require a higher majority of 75 %, but most Member States follow the Directive in requiring a 2/3 
majority. 
Article 9(2) of Directive 2011/35/EU contains a duty of the companies to inform their respective general 
meetings of any material change in the assets and liabilities between the date of preparation of the merger 
plan and the date of the general meetings which are to decide on the merger plan. According to Article 9 
(3) of the Directive, Member States may provide that such information shall not be required if the 
shareholders and the holders of other securities conferring the right to vote have agreed to waive this 
requirement. 
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According to Article 8 of the Directive, the Member States need not require approval of the merger by the 
general meeting of the acquiring company if certain conditions are met. These conditions include that the 
merger plan is published, for the acquiring company, at least one month before the date fixed for the general 
meeting of the company or companies being acquired which are to decide on the merger plan. Further, all 
shareholders of the acquiring company must be entitled to inspect the documents at the registered office of 
the acquiring company. Finally, shareholders who own at least 5 % of the shares in the acquiring company 
may demand a general meeting of the acquiring company to be called to decide whether to approve the 
merger. This possibility of derogation is used in a number of Member States, including Denmark (Section 
247 CA) and Sweden (Chapter 23, Section 15 CA). Germany applies the derogation for public companies 
(§ 62 Act on Transformations) but not for private companies.  
The reason for derogating from the requirement of a decision by the general meeting in the acquiring 
company is that the merger, for the acquiring company, is a standard business acquisition and that there is 
less need for protecting the minority in a case where 90 % of the shares are already held by the acquiring 
company. 
Section 13.13 
Creditor Protection 
(1) Creditors whose claims antedate the publication as referred to in Section 7(4) and (5) and have not 
fallen due at the time of such publication may claim adequate securities if one of the following conditions 
is fulfilled: 
(a) the expert’s declaration referred to in Section 9(3) concludes that the creditors are not sufficiently 
protected after the merger; 
(b) the expert’s declaration referred to in Section 9(3) concludes that the financial situation of the 
merging companies requires additional safeguards for creditors; 
(c) no expert’s report has been drawn up according to Section 9(5). 
(2) Creditors claiming adequate securities under Section 13(1)(c) must credibly demonstrate that due to 
the merger the satisfaction of their claim is at stake and that no adequate safeguards have been obtained 
from the company.  
(3) The creditors must file their claim no later than four weeks after the date on which the Registrars of all 
of the merging companies published the notice referred to in Section 12(13). The final implementation of 
the merger as referred to in Sections 19 can only be registered upon expiry of the time allowed for filing 
such claims. 
Comments 
Article 13 of Directive 2011/35/EU requires that the Member States, in their national legislation, provide 
an adequate system of protection of the interests of creditors in the merging companies whose claims 
predated the publication of the merger plan and have not fallen due at the time of such publication. These 
principles also apply to debenture holders (see Article 14 of Directive 2011/35/EU). The Directive does 
not contain any further rules concerning how the creditors are to be secured. The legislations of the Member 
States contain different solutions. 
The Polish Commercial Companies Code Article 496 includes a rule on priority of creditors, meaning that 
at the time of separate management of the assets of the companies, the creditors of each company shall 
enjoy priority of satisfaction from the assets of their original debtor over the creditors of the remaining 
merging companies. Creditors of a merging company who report their claims within six months of the date 
of the announcement of the merger and demonstrate with probability that their satisfaction is threatened by 
the merger, may require that their demands be secured.  
Under German law (§ 22 Transformation Act) the creditors have the right to claim adequate securities if 
they can credibly demonstrate that due to the merger the satisfaction of their claims is at stake and that no 
adequate safeguards have been obtained from the company.  
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According to the Swedish Companies Act, the merger plan shall be reviewed by one or more auditors in 
respect of each of the acquiring companies and, in the event of a merger by acquisition, the company being 
acquired (cf. Chapter 23, Section 11). In the case of acquisition, it shall be specifically indicated in the 
statement whether the auditors, in their review, have found that the merger would jeopardize the payment 
of claims held by creditors of the company being acquired. If the auditors state that they have found that 
the merger jeopardizes the position of such creditors, the creditors must be notified (cf. Chapter 23, Section 
19). The creditor protection works so that the creditors can prevent the merger if they do not receive 
payment or get securities for their claims (cf. Sections 22-23).  
The Danish Companies Act has a similar solution. In addition to the statement referred to in Section 241, 
the valuation experts must make a declaration as to whether the creditors of each limited liability company 
can be considered to be sufficiently protected after the merger (Section 242 Danish Companies Act 
Companies Act). However, the shareholders may decide, by unanimous agreement, not to obtain a 
declaration by a valuation expert on the creditors’ position, this equally means that a creditor can go to 
court to seek protection. If there is a declaration on the creditors’ position, this will have to be filed in the 
companies’ register. If there is no declaration, this fact will also have to be disclosed to the companies 
register and will be included in the register’s public statement on the merger procedure (Section 244 Danish 
Companies Act). 
Sections 9 and 13 follow a combined approach: In order to deliver the relevant information, the expert’s 
report shall contain a declaration on the situation of the creditors. If the expert declares that the claims are 
sufficiently protected, the creditors have no right to require additional safeguards. If the expert’s report is 
waived by the shareholders, the creditors may claim securities individually and will have to demonstrate 
that due to the merger the satisfaction of their claim is at risk. 
Section 13.14 
Merger by Acquisition of a Wholly Owned Subsidiary 
(1) This Section applies in the case of a merger by acquisition where all of the shares and other securities 
conferring the right to vote at general meetings of the company being acquired (or, if there is more than 
one company being acquired, of each of them) are held by or on behalf of the acquiring company.  
(2) The merger plan need not give the particulars mentioned in Section 7(3)(b), (c) or (d). 
(3) The requirements of the following Sections do not apply: 
(a) Section 8 (directors’ explanatory report),  
(b) Section 9 (expert’s report).  
(4) It is not necessary for the merger plan to be approved at a general meeting of each of the merging 
companies if the court is satisfied that the conditions in Section 14(5) and (6) are fulfilled and that no 
requirement as provided for in Section 14(7) has been made. 
(5) The publication of the merger plan as provided for in Section 7(4) and (5) must be effected as regards 
each company involved in the merger, at least one month before the merger takes effect.  
(6) At least one month before the merger takes effect, all shareholders of the acquiring company must be 
able to inspect and make copies of, at the company’s registered office, the documents listed in Section 
11(2)(a) to (d) relating to each company involved in the merger, unless such document was freely available 
on the company’s website throughout that period. 
(7) One or more shareholders of the acquiring company, who together held no less than 5 % of the paid-
up capital of the company which carries the right to vote at general meetings of the company (excluding 
any shares in the company held as treasury shares) are entitled to require a meeting of each class of 
shareholders to be called for the purpose of deciding whether or not to agree to the scheme. 
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Section 13.15 
Merger by Acquisition of a Non-wholly Owned Subsidiary 
(1) This Section applies in the case of a merger by acquisition where 90 % or more (but not all) of the 
relevant securities of the company being acquired (or, if there is more than one company being acquired, 
of each of them) are held by or on behalf of the acquiring company. 
(2) If the conditions in Section 15(3) and (4) are met, the requirements of the following Sections do not 
apply: 
(a) Section 8 (directors’ explanatory report), 
(b) Section 9 (expert’s report), 
(c) Section 10 (supplementary accounting statement), 
(d) Section 11 (inspection of documents), and 
(e) Section 12(3) and (4) (report on material changes of assets of merging company). 
(3) The first condition is that the merger plan provides that every other holder of relevant securities has the 
right to require the acquiring company to acquire those securities. 
(4) The second condition is that, if a holder of securities exercises that right, the consideration to be given 
for those securities is fair and reasonable. 
(5) It is not necessary for the merger plan to be approved at a meeting of the shareholders, or any class of 
shareholders, of the company being acquired if the court is satisfied that the conditions in Section 15(6) to 
(9) have been complied with. 
(6) The first condition is that either Section 15(6) (a) or (b) below is satisfied. 
(a) This subsection is satisfied if publication of notice of receipt of the merger plan by the Registrar 
took place in respect of the company being acquired at least one month before the date of the first 
meeting of shareholders, or any class of shareholders, of the acquiring company summoned for the 
purpose of agreeing to the scheme. 
(b) This subsection is satisfied if the merger plan is freely available on the website of the company 
being acquired, the Registrar published notice giving details of that website in the Gazette at least one 
month before the date of the first meeting of shareholders, or any class of shareholders, of the acquiring 
company summoned for the purpose of agreeing to the scheme, and the merger plan remained available 
on the website throughout the period beginning one month before, and ending on, the date of the 
meeting. 
(7) The second condition is that Section 15(6) (a) or (b) is satisfied for each of the documents listed in the 
applicable paragraphs of Section 11(2)(a) to (d) relating to the company being acquired and the acquiring 
company (or, if there is more than one company being acquired, each of them). 
(a) This subsection is satisfied for a document if the shareholders of the company being acquired were 
able during the period beginning one month before, and ending on, the date mentioned in Section 
15(6)(a) to inspect that document at the registered office of that company. 
(b) This subsection is satisfied for a document if the document is freely available on the website of the 
company being acquired and the document remains available on the website throughout the period 
beginning one month before, and ending on, the date of the meeting. 
(8) The third condition is that the shareholders of the company being acquired were able to obtain copies 
of the documents mentioned in Section 11, or any part of those documents, on request and free of charge, 
throughout the period beginning one month before, and ending on, the date of the meeting. 
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(9) The fourth condition is that: 
(a) one or more shareholders of the company being acquired, who together held not less than 5 % of 
the paid-up capital of the company which carried the right to vote at general meetings of the company 
(excluding any shares in the company held as treasury shares) would have been able, during that period, 
to require a meeting of each class of shareholders to be called for the purpose of deciding whether or 
not to agree to the scheme; and  
(b) no such requirement was made. 
Comments 
Sections 14 and 15 are based on Articles 24-29 of Directive 2011/35/EU. 
Section 13.16 
Protection of Holders of Securities to which Special Rights Attach  
(1) A person who, other than in his capacity as shareholder, may exercise a particular right against a 
company being acquired, such as a right to a distribution of profits or a right to acquire shares, must obtain 
an equivalent right in the acquiring company. 
(2) Section 16(1) does not apply if: 
(a) the holder has agreed otherwise, or 
(b) the holder is, or under the merger plan is to be, entitled to have the securities purchased by the 
acquiring company on terms that the court considers reasonable. 
Comments 
This provision is derived from Directive 2011/35/EU, Article 15 and the Dutch Civil Code, Section 2:320; 
see also DCC 2:334. 
Section 13.17 
Sell-out right of Dissenting Shareholders  
Any shareholder in any of the merging companies who voted against the approving of the merger in the 
general meeting may request the acquiring company to acquire his or her shares for cash, if the articles of 
the company in which he or she holds a share provide for such a sell-out right. 
Comments 
Shareholders in general are sufficiently protected by the merger procedure, in particular by the expert’s 
report confirming the share exchange ratio to be fair and reasonable. The group therefore considers that 
there is no need to suggest a mandatory sell-out right as a general rule in the model act. It should be left to 
the articles of association to provide for a sell-out right in such cases. 
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Section 13.18 
Legal Scrutiny and Pre-Merger Certificate 
(1) The competent court of each of the merging companies must check and certify the existence and 
validity of the legal acts and formalities required of the merging companies.  
(2) For each of the merging companies the board of directors or the management board, as the case may 
be, shall file an application for legal scrutiny which is accompanied at least by the following documents: 
(a) the merger plan as approved by the general meeting of the merging companies; 
(b) the minutes of the general meeting of the company; 
(c) the directors’ explanatory report; 
(d) the expert’s report; 
(e) the supplementary balance sheet, if applicable. 
(3) If any document mentioned in Section 18(2) is dispensable in the particular case, the company must 
deliver documentation evidencing the applicability of the relevant exception. It shall also, at the request of 
the competent court, deliver any other documentation which is needed to scrutinize the legality of the 
merger. 
(4) The court has to issue a certificate confirming the legality of the merger. On receipt of this certificate 
the Registrar of the company will have to register the merger. The “acquiring” company Registrar must not 
register the merger unless he receives confirmation from the “acquired” company Registrar that the merger 
has been registered there. 
Comments 
Article 16 of Directive 2011/35/EU requires legal scrutiny of the merger which can be effected either by a 
public notary or by the supervision of a court or a public authority. Since the model act in general does not 
require notarization of corporate documents, the group opted for the model of supervision by a court. 
In Member States, such as the Netherlands, where the merger plan is to be drawn up by a notary, there is 
no need for supervision by a court. Some Member States, such as Germany, apply both methods in requiring 
a notarial deed and nevertheless giving the court the competence to examine the legality of the merger. 
Section 13.19 
Legal Effect of the Merger 
(1) The merger shall be effective upon registration by the Registrar of the acquiring company. 
(2) From the effective date according to Section 19(1), a merger by acquisition or formation carried out in 
accordance with the requirements above shall have the following effects: 
(a) the transfer, both as between the company being acquired and the acquiring company and as regards 
third parties, to the acquiring company of all the assets and liabilities of the company being acquired; 
(b) the shareholders of the company being acquired become shareholders of the acquiring company;  
(c) no shares in the acquiring company shall be exchanged, however, for shares in the company being 
acquired held either:  
(i) by the acquiring company itself or through a person acting in his own name but on its behalf; 
or  
(ii) by the company being acquired itself or through a person acting in his own name but on its 
behalf; 
(d) the company being acquired ceases to exist. 
(e) The acquiring company is obliged to effect, to the shareholders of the company (or companies) 
being acquired, any cash payment required by the merger plan. 
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(3) From the effective date according to Section 19(1), the merger may only be annulled by order of the 
court which it may do only if the legal requirements to draw up a merger plan or to approve the plan by 
general meeting of each of the merging companies have not been observed. 
Comments 
Section 19 is based on Article 19 and 22 of Directive 2011/35/EU. 
 
Section 13.20 
Civil Liability of Management and Independent Persons towards Shareholders 
A director of any of the merging companies or an independent expert who has reported pursuant to Section 
9 will be held liable for any loss or damage suffered by any shareholder or creditor by reason of their 
misconduct in the preparation or implementation of the merger. 
Comments 
Section 20 is based on Article 20 and 21 of Directive 2011/35/EU. The directive requires a provision on 
civil liability of board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, and experts towards the 
shareholders of the merging companies. Section 20 also includes liability towards creditors. This is due to 
the fact that creditor protection in Section 13 was linked to a declaration of the expert on the situation of 
the creditors. Since the creditors have no right to claim further securities if the expert’s report states that 
their claims are sufficiently protected, the creditors should have a civil claim against an expert if he or she 
did not assess the risk correctly. 
CROSS-BORDER MERGERS 
Section 13.21 
Cross-border mergers 
Limited liability companies that are subject to this Act may participate in cross-border mergers in which 
the other participating companies are also limited liability companies and where a cross-border merger is 
permitted by the applicable company law. 
Comments 
The 10th Company Law Directive 2005/56/EEC contains rules on cross-border mergers. The Directive had 
to be implemented by Member States by 15 December 2007. 
According to the ECJ Sevic case C-411/03, it is a breach of Article 54 TFEU on freedom of establishment 
to prohibit mergers between companies in at least two different Member States, when similar mergers are 
permitted under national law. 
The Directive on cross-border mergers includes the same key elements contained in the rules on domestic 
mergers. Article 4 (1) (b) and (2) of the Directive refer to the provisions concerning national mergers which 
aim to protect creditors, shareholders and employees of the merging companies. In this way, the provisions 
of the Directive 2011/35/EU on national mergers also apply to cross-border mergers. This is supplemented 
with the demands of 10th Directive, which provides for cross-border mergers. 
The EMCA Group has deliberated on the most appropriate form of regulating cross-border mergers. One 
way could be to follow the Directive so that, to a large extent, the provisions simply refer to the rules on 
domestic mergers. However, the Group is of the opinion that it will bring more clarity on the regulation, if 
the rules on cross-border mergers are complete. 
Section 21 allows cross-border mergers between public as well as private companies, if the applicable 
company law permits such a cross-border merger. 
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The provision definitely covers cross-border mergers between companies which are governed by the law 
of EU or EEA Member States because these states can be expected to have implemented the relevant EU 
Directives and are bound by the EU freedom of establishment. Thus for example a Danish private company 
can merge with a German Aktiengesellschaft (AG) or a UK public company can merge with a German 
GmbH. Next to this the EMCA also opens the merger provisions to companies being governed by the law 
of other states, if the cross-border conversion is permitted by the applicable company law. 
Section 13.22 
Merger Plan 
(1) The board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, of each of the merging companies 
must draw up and sign a joint merger plan, which must include information and provisions on 
(a) the type, name and registered office of each of the merging companies, including, if applicable, of 
the newly formed company; 
(b) the ratio applicable to the exchange of securities or shares representing the company capital and 
the amount of any cash payment; 
(c) the amount of the appropriate cash compensation for a sell-out right under Section 30, if applicable; 
(d) the terms relating to the allotment of shares in the acquiring company; 
(e) the likely impact of the cross-border merger on employment in the merging companies; 
(f) the date from which the holding of such shares entitles the holders to participate in profits and any 
special conditions affecting that entitlement; 
(g) the date from which the transactions of the company being acquired shall be treated for accounting 
purposes as being those of the acquiring company; 
(h) any special conditions, including special rights or restrictions, whether in regard to voting, 
participation in profits, share capital or otherwise, which will apply to shares or other securities issued 
by the acquiring company in exchange for shares or other securities in the company or companies being 
acquired; 
(j) any payment or benefit in cash or otherwise, paid or given or intended to be paid or given to any 
independent person referred to in Section 24 and/or to any director of any of the merging companies 
insofar as it differs from the payment or benefit paid or given to other persons in respect of the cross-
border merger and the consideration, if any, for any such payment or benefit; 
(k) a draft instrument of incorporation and articles of association if a new limited liability company is 
formed by the cross-border merger. 
(l) where appropriate, information on the procedures by which arrangements for the involvement of 
employees in the definition of their rights to participation in the company resulting from the cross-
border merger are determined; 
(m) information on the evaluation of the assets and liabilities which are transferred to the company 
resulting from the cross-border merger; 
(n) dates of the merging companies’ accounts used to establish the conditions of the cross-border 
merger. 
(2) For each of the merging companies the following particulars shall be published in the national gazette: 
(a) the type, name and registered office of each of the merging companies; 
(b) the register in the sense of Article 3 (2) Directive 2009/101/EC where documentation on companies 
is filed for each of the merging companies; 
(c) an indication, for each of the merging companies, of the arrangements made for the exercise of the 
rights of creditors and any minority shareholders of the merging companies and the address at which 
complete information on those arrangements may be obtained free of charge. 
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(3) Save as provided in Section 22 (4), the board of directors or the management board, as the case may 
be, of each of the merging companies must deliver a copy of the merger plan to the Registrar who must at 
least one month before the date of any meeting of that company summoned for the purpose of approving 
the merger (see Section 27), publish notice of receipt of the plan. 
(4) Section 22 (3) does not apply in respect of a company if the merger plan is freely available on the 
company website (and the Registrar has been notified of the website address) throughout the period 
beginning one month before, and ending on, the date of any meeting of the company summoned for the 
purpose of approving the merger. In the case of a public company, the merger plan must be made freely 
available on the companies’ websites. 
(5) Where the cross-border merger is carried out by an acquiring company which holds all the shares and 
other securities conferring the right to vote in the company or companies being acquired, Section 22 (1) 
points (b), (c) and (d) do not apply. 
Comments  
The provision in Section 22 (1) implements Article 5 of Directive 2005/56/EC. Article 5 does not refer to 
rules on domestic mergers, but contains an independent enumeration of the information that the merger 
plan must include. The enumeration in Section 22 (1) follows the Directive. Section 22 (2) is based on 
Article 6 of Directive 2005/56/EC. Section 22 (3) and (4) are the same provisions as for domestic mergers 
(see Section 7 (4) and (5)). The exception of Section 7 (2) for shareholders of private companies to agree 
that no merger plan should be drawn up has not been applied for the cross-border merger, since Directive 
2005/56/EC does not provide such exception. Section 22 (5) is based on Article 15 (1) Directive 
2005/56/EC. 
Section 13.23 
Directors’ Explanatory Report 
(1) The board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, of each of the merging companies 
shall draw up a detailed written report intended for the shareholders explaining and justifying the legal and 
economic aspects of the cross-border merger, in particular the share exchange ratio and, if applicable, the 
cash compensation for a sell-out right. That report shall also describe any special valuation difficulties 
which have arisen. It shall also explain the implications of the cross-border merger for shareholders, 
creditors and employees. 
(2) The board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, of each of the merging companies 
shall inform the general meeting of their company and the board of directors or the management board of 
the other merging companies so that the latter may inform their respective general meetings of any material 
change in the assets and liabilities between the date of preparation of the merger plan and the date of the 
general meetings which are to decide on the merger plan. 
Comments 
According to the rules on domestic mergers, shareholders can agree to derogate from the requirement of 
preparing a directors’ report, see above Section 8 (3). However, the 10th Directive on cross-border mergers, 
which applies to both private and public companies, requires that a merger statement must always be 
prepared in connection with a merger. Therefore, the possibility of derogating from preparing a merger 
statement is not included in Section 23. 
Section 13.24 
Expert’s Examination and Report to Shareholders  
(1) One or more independent experts, acting on behalf of each of the merging companies, shall examine 
the merger plan and draw up a written report to the shareholders. The experts shall be entitled to secure 
from each of the merging companies all information they consider necessary for the discharge of their 
duties. 
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(2) The report must state in particular whether, in the expert’s opinion, the share exchange ratio is fair and 
reasonable. The expert’s statement must at least indicate the method or methods used to arrive at the share 
exchange ratio proposed and, if applicable, the cash compensation for a sell-out right; state whether such 
method or methods are adequate in the case in question, indicate the values arrived at using each such 
method and give an opinion on the relative importance attributed to such methods in arriving at the value 
decided on. The report shall also describe any special valuation difficulties which have arisen. 
(3) The expert’s report has to make a declaration as to whether the creditors of each of the merging 
companies whose claims predate the publication of the merger plan and have not fallen due at the time of 
such publication can be considered to be sufficiently protected after the merger or whether the financial 
situation of the merging companies requires particular safeguards. 
(4) The independent experts shall be appointed by the competent court at the request of each merging 
company. At the request of all the merging companies, one or more joint experts may be appointed to draw 
up a single report on all the merging companies. The appointed expert shall be a person eligible for 
appointment as a statutory auditor. 
(5) Neither an examination of the merger plan nor an expert report shall be required if all the shareholders 
and the holders of other securities conferring the right to vote of each of the merging companies in the 
merger have so agreed. The same applies where the cross-border merger is carried out by an acquiring 
company which holds all the shares and other securities conferring the right to vote in the company or 
companies being acquired. 
Comments 
Section 24 is similar to Section 9 on national mergers. It also takes into account Article 8 of Directive 
2005/56/EC and the special remedy of minority shareholders to be entitled to sell their shares to the 
company being acquired (see Section 30). Section 24 (5), second sentence, is based on Articles 8 (4) and 
15 (1) of Directive 2005/56/EC. 
Section 13.25 
Supplementary Balance Sheet 
(1) This Section applies if the last annual accounts of any of the merging companies relate to a financial 
year ending more than 6 months before the board of directors or the management board, as the case may 
be, of the company adopt the merger plan.  
(2) Where one of the merging companies falls within Section 25 (1) above, the board of directors or the 
management board, as the case may be, of the company must prepare a supplementary accounting 
statement, unless the shareholders and, where applicable, the holders of other securities conferring the right 
to vote, of each of the merging companies unanimously agree that no such statement is required.  
(3) Where such statement is required, it must consist of a balance sheet, or a consolidated balance sheet, 
as the case may be, dealing with the state of affairs of the relevant company or group as at a date not more 
than three months before the merger plan was adopted by the board of directors or the management board, 
as the case may be, and the statement must be approved by the board of the relevant company.  
(4) The supplementary balance sheet shall not be required if the company publishes a half yearly financial 
report in accordance with Article 5 of Directive 2004/109/EC and makes it available to shareholders in 
accordance with Section 26.  
(5) The shareholders and all holders of other securities conferring the right to vote may agree that no 
interim balance sheet should be prepared, notwithstanding that the merger plan has been signed more than 
six months after the end of the financial year to which the company’s most recent annual report relates.  
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Comments 
Article 4 (1) (b) and (2) of Directive 2005/56/EC refer to the provisions concerning national mergers which 
aim towards protecting the creditors, shareholders and employees of the merging companies. In this way, 
the provisions of Directive 2011/35/EU on national mergers also apply to cross-border mergers. This is 
supplemented with the demands of Directive 2005/56/EC which provides for cross-border mergers. Hence, 
Section 25 is identical to Section 10 above. 
Section 13.26 
Inspection of Documents 
(1) The shareholders of each of the merging companies must be able, within a period of one month before 
the meeting called to approve the merger (see Section 27) to inspect, and make copies of, any of the 
documents listed below either at the registered office of that company or by freely accessing them on the 
company’s website for downloading and printing. 
(2) The relevant documents are: 
(a) the merger plan; 
(b) the directors’ explanatory report; 
(c) where applicable, the expert’s report to shareholders; 
(d) the companies’ annual accounts and annual reports for the last three financial years together with 
any supplementary accounting statement required by Section 25. 
Comments 
Section 26 is based on Section 11 regarding national mergers. 
Section 13.27 
General Meetings of Merging Companies 
(1) Subject to Section 27 (7), the merger plan must be approved by a majority in number, representing 
2/3rd in value, of each class of shareholders of each of the merging companies, present and voting, either 
in person or by proxy at a meeting. 
(2) Where the merger is a merger by formation of a new company, the memorandum or draft memorandum 
and articles or draft articles shall be approved by an ordinary resolution of each of the merging companies. 
(3) The directors of each of the merging companies must report: 
(a) to every meeting of the shareholders, or any class of shareholders, of that company summoned for 
the purpose of agreeing to the merger plan, and  
(b) to the board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, of every other merging 
company, any material changes in the property and liabilities of that company between the date when 
the merger plan was adopted and the date of the meeting in question.  
(4) The board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, of each of the other merging 
companies must in turn: 
(a) report those matters to every meeting of the shareholders, or any class of shareholders, of that 
company summoned for the purpose of agreeing to the merger plan, or 
(b) send a report of those matters to every shareholder entitled to receive notice of such a meeting. 
(5) The general meeting of each of the merging companies may reserve the right to make implementation 
of the cross-border merger conditional on express ratification by it of the arrangements decided on with 
respect to the participation of employees in the company resulting from the cross-border merger. 
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(6) Section 27 (3) and (4) do not apply if all the holders of shares and other securities conferring the right 
to vote in general meetings of each of the merging companies have so agreed. 
(7) In the case of any merger by acquisition, it is not necessary for the merger plan to be approved by the 
shareholders of the acquiring company if: 
(a) the acquiring company holds all the shares and other securities conferring the right to vote in the 
company or companies being acquired, or, 
(b) the court is satisfied that the conditions set out in Section 27 (8) to (10) have been complied with. 
(8) The first condition is that either: 
(a) the publication of notice of receipt of the merger plan by the Registrar took place in respect of the 
acquiring company at least one month before the date of the first meeting of shareholders, or any class 
of shareholders, of the company being acquired (or, if there is more than one company being acquired, 
any of them) summoned for the purposes of agreeing to the merger plan; or 
(b) the merger plan is made freely available on the company website, details of which have been 
notified to, and published by the Registrar, at least one month before the date of the first meeting of 
shareholders, or any class of shareholders, of the company being acquired (or, if there is more than one 
company being acquired, any of them) summoned for the purposes of agreeing to the merger plan, and 
the merger plan remained available on the website throughout the period beginning one month before, 
and ending on, that date. 
(9) The second condition is that each of the documents listed in the applicable paragraphs of Section 26 
(2) relating to the acquiring company and the company being acquired (or, if there is more than one 
company being acquired, each of them): 
(a) are available for inspection and copying by the shareholders of the acquiring company during the 
period beginning one month before, and ending on, the date of any such meeting as is mentioned in 
Section 27 (8) (a) to inspect that document at the registered office of that company; or 
(b) are made freely available on the company website and remain available on the website throughout 
the period beginning one month before, and ending on, the date of any such meeting as is mentioned 
in Section 27 (8) (a). 
(10) The third condition is that, no shareholder or shareholders of the acquiring company, holding not 
less than 5 % of the paid-up capital of the company which carried the right to vote at general meetings of 
the company (excluding any shares in the company held as treasury shares) has required, during that period, 
a meeting of the shareholders to be called for the purpose of deciding whether or not to agree to the merger. 
(11) The board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, of each of the merging 
companies must notify the Registrar about the resolution on the merger or, as the case may be, deliver 
evidence that no resolution was necessary. The board of directors or the management board, as the case 
may be, must also notify the Registrar about the expert’s declaration on the creditors’ position as referred 
to in Section 24 (3). 
(12) The Registrar shall publish notice of receipt of the documentation mentioned in Section 27 (11) 
and of the content of the expert’s declaration on the creditors’ position or that, according to Section 24 (5) 
no expert’s report has been drawn up. 
Comments 
Article 9 of Directive 2005/56/EC requires approval of the cross-border merger by the general meeting of 
each of the merging companies. It refers to the provisions which are applicable to domestic mergers. Section 
27 therefore is based on Section 12 which deals with national mergers. 
Section 27 (5) is based on Article 9 (2) of Directive 2005/56/EC, Section 27 (7) (a) is based on Article 15 
(1) of Directive 2005/56/EC. 
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Section 13.28 
Creditor Protection 
(1) Creditors whose claims antedate the publication as referred to in Section 22 (3) and (4) and have not 
fallen due at the time of such publication may claim adequate securities if one of the following conditions 
is fulfilled: 
(a) the expert’s declaration referred to in Section 24 (3) concludes that the creditors are not sufficiently 
protected after the merger; 
(b) the experts’ declaration referred to in Section 24 (3) concludes that the financial situation of the 
merging companies requires additional safeguards for creditors; 
(c) no expert’s report has been drawn up according to Section 24 (5). 
(2) Creditors claiming adequate securities under Section 28 (1) c) must credibly demonstrate that due to 
the merger the satisfaction of their claim is at stake and that no adequate safeguards have been obtained 
from the company. 
(3) The creditors must file their claim no later than four weeks after the date on which the Registrars of all 
of the merging companies published the notice referred to in Section 27 (12). The final implementation of 
the merger as referred to in Section 33 can only be registered upon expiry of the time allowed for filing 
such claims. 
Comments 
Pursuant to Article 4 (2) of Directive 2005/56/EC the provisions and formalities for the protection of 
creditors shall be applied, taking into account the cross-border nature of the merger. The procedure whereby 
the creditors have to file their claims prior to the merger taking effect is also suitable for cross-border 
transactions. Section 28 on creditor protection therefore is similar to Section 13 on national mergers. 
Section 13.29 
Protection of Holders of Securities to Which Special Rights Attach  
(1) A person who, other than in his capacity as shareholder, may exercise a particular right against a 
company being acquired, such as a right to a distribution of profits or a right to acquire shares, must obtain 
an equivalent right in the acquiring company. 
(2) Section 29 (1) does not apply if: 
(a) the holder has agreed otherwise; or 
(b) the holder is, or under the merger plan is to be, entitled to have the securities purchased by the 
acquiring company on terms that the court considers reasonable. 
Comments 
This provision is similar to Section 16 on national mergers.  
Section 13.30 
Sell-out Right of Dissenting Shareholders  
The company being acquired by another company not being subject to the same national law as the 
company being acquired has to offer, in the merger plan, to those of its shareholders who have opposed the 
merger at the general meeting to acquire their shares in return for appropriate cash compensation upon 
written request by such shareholders no later than four weeks after the date of the general meeting. 
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Comments 
Article 4 (2) of Directive 2005/56/EC grants Member States the right to adopt provisions designed to ensure 
appropriate protection for minority shareholders who have opposed the cross-border merger. Some Member 
States, like Denmark, Germany, Italy and Spain, grant minority shareholders a sell-out right in a cross-
border merger. While the sell-out right of dissenting shareholders is optional in the case of a national merger 
(see Section 17), it should be mandatory for cross-border mergers. 
Section 13.31 
Merger by Acquisition of a Non-wholly Owned Subsidiary 
(1) This Section applies in the case of a merger by acquisition where 90 % or more (but not all) of the 
relevant securities of the company being acquired (or, if there is more than one company being acquired, 
of each of them) are held by or on behalf of the acquiring company.  
(2) If the conditions in Section 31 (3) and (4) are met, the requirements of the following Sections do not 
apply: 
(a) Section 23 (directors’ explanatory report),  
(b) Section 24 (expert’s report),  
(c) Section 25 (supplementary accounting statement),  
(d) Section 26 (inspection of documents), and  
(e) Section 27 (3) and (4) (report on material changes of assets of merging company).  
(3) The first condition is that the merger plan provides that every other holder of relevant securities has the 
right to require the acquiring company to acquire those securities.  
(4) The second condition is that, if a holder of securities exercises that right, the consideration to be given 
for those securities is fair and reasonable.  
Comments 
Section 31 (1) to (4) are similar to Section 15 (1) to (4) on national merger. The option of not having the 
merger plan approved by a general meeting of the company being acquired (see Section 15 (5) for national 
mergers) has not been applied to the cross-border merger since Article 15 (2) of Directive 2005/56/EC only 
allows simplifications regarding the reports by an independent expert and the documents necessary for 
scrutiny. 
Section 13.32 
Legal Scrutiny and Pre-Merger Certificate 
(1) The competent court of the company or companies being acquired must check and certify the existence 
and validity of the legal acts and formalities as regards that part of the procedure which concerns the 
merging companies subject to its national law.  
(2) The board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, of the company or the companies 
being acquired shall file an application for legal scrutiny which is accompanied at least by the following 
documents: 
(a) the merger plan as approved by the general meetings of the merging companies; 
(b) the minutes of the general meeting of the company; 
(c) the directors’ explanatory report; 
(d) the expert’s report; 
(e) the supplementary balance sheet, if applicable. 
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(3) If any documents mentioned in Section 32 (2) are dispensable in the particular case, the company must 
deliver documentation evidencing the applicability of the relevant exception. It shall also, at the request of 
the competent court, deliver any other documentation which is needed to scrutinize the legality of the 
merger. 
(4) The court has to issue without delay to each of the companies’ subject to its national law a certificate 
conclusively attesting to the proper completion of the per-merger acts and formalities. 
Comments 
Section 32 is based on Articles 10 and 11 of Directive 2005/56/EC which requires legal scrutiny of the 
cross-border merger and the issuance of a pre-merger certificate conclusively attesting to the proper 
completion of the pre-merger acts and formalities. 
Article 10 (3) of Directive 2005/56EC has not been implemented in the EMCA, since EMCA (unlike 
national systems like Austria or Germany) does not include a procedure to scrutinize and amend the ratio 
applicable to the exchange of shares. 
Section 13.33 
Legal Effect of the Merger 
(1) The court competent for the acquiring company must check and certify the existence and validity of 
the legal acts and formalities as regards that part of the procedure which concerns the merging companies 
subject to its national law including, if applicable, the formation of a new company resulting from the cross-
border merger. The court shall in particular ensure that the merging companies have approved the common 
merger plan in the same terms and, where appropriate, that arrangements for employee participation have 
been made in accordance with Section 35. Section 32 (2) and (3) apply accordingly. The merging 
companies must also submit to the court the certificates referred to in Section 32 (4) within six months of 
its issue. 
(2) The merger shall be effective upon registration by the Registrar of the acquiring company. The 
Registrar shall notify, without delay, the company register of the company or companies being acquired 
that the merger has taken effect. Deletion of the old registration, if applicable, shall be effected on receipt 
of that notification, but not before. 
(3) From the effective date according to Section 33 (2), a merger by acquisition or formation carried out 
in accordance with the requirements above shall have the following effects: 
(a) the transfer, both as between the company being acquired and the acquiring company and as regards 
third parties, to the acquiring company of all the assets and liabilities of the company being acquired; 
(b) the shareholders of the company being acquired become shareholders of the acquiring company;  
(c) no shares in the acquiring company shall be exchanged, however, for shares in the company being 
acquired held either: 
(i) by the acquiring company itself or through a person acting in his own name but on its behalf; 
or 
(ii) by the company being acquired itself or through a person acting in his own name but on its 
behalf; 
(d) the rights and obligations of the merging companies arising from contracts of employment or from 
employment relationships and existing at the date on which the merger takes effect shall, by reason of 
that merger taking effect, be transferred to the acquiring company on the date on which the merger 
takes effect; 
(e) the company being acquired ceases to exist. 
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(4) The acquiring company is obliged to make to the shareholders of the company (or companies) being 
acquired any cash payment required by the merger plan. 
(5) From the effective date according to Section 33 (2), the merger cannot be declared null and void. 
Comments 
Section 33 is similar to Section 19 on national mergers and based on Articles 13 and 14 of Directive 
2005/56/EC. Section 33 (5) is based on Article 17 of Directive 2005/56/EC. 
Section 13.34 
Civil Liability of Management and Independent Persons towards Shareholders 
A director of any of the merging companies or an independent expert who has reported pursuant to Section 
24 will be held liable for any loss or damage suffered by any shareholder or creditor by reason of their 
misconduct in the preparation or implementation of the merger. 
Comments 
Section 34 is similar to Section 20 on national mergers.  
Section 13.35 
Employee Participation 
In the cases referred to in Article 16 (2) of Directive 2005/56/EC, the participation of employees in the 
acquiring company shall be regulated in accordance with the principles and procedures laid down in Article 
16 (3) to (7) of Directive 2005/56/EC. 
Comments 
Article 16 of Directive 2005/56/EC provides for the protection of employee participation rights in certain 
circumstances. These procedures are designed in accordance with those already established by Directive 
2001/86/EC on the involvement of employees in the European Company. The Directive on the European 
Company has to be implemented by every Member State and the procedure to be applied in case of a cross-
border merger is to a large extent derived from that Directive. This procedure requires a detailed framework 
for establishing a special negotiation body of employees and for negotiations between this special 
negotiation body and the management bodies of the companies involved. These procedures do not belong 
to the core of company law but rather have to be adapted to the national systems of worker participation. 
Therefore, EMCA abstains from regulating such procedures deriving from the applicable national law. 
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PART 4 
CROSS-BORDER TRANSFER OF REGISTERED OFFICE – CROSS-BORDER 
CONVERSION 
Section 13.36 
Cross-border Transfer of Registered Office 
(1) Limited liability companies that are subject to this act may transfer their registered office cross-border 
thereby changing the applicable company law. The transfer shall not result in the winding up of the 
company or the creation of a new legal person. 
(2) A company may not transfer its registered office if proceedings for winding up, liquidation, insolvency 
or suspension of payments or other similar proceedings have been brought against it. 
(3) Companies from other jurisdictions may apply for registration under this Act, thereby transferring their 
registered office in the meaning of Section 36 (1), under the following conditions: 
(a) the company has to present documentation to the Registrar conclusively evidencing the legal acts 
and formalities as regards the part of the procedure which is governed by its applicable national law 
prior to the cross-border transfer of the registered office; 
(b) the company applying for reregistration will have to comply with the provisions of this Act on 
formation and registration. The company applying for reregistration must also submit to the court the 
certificate referred to in Section 45 (4) within six months of its issue. 
Comments 
It is established case law of the European Court of Justice (Case C 378/10 – Vale) that the right to 
accomplish a cross-border conversion is protected by the freedom of establishment. Limited liability 
companies may transfer their registered office from one Member State to another and thereby change the 
applicable law without having to be liquidated. The EMCA Group therefore is of the opinion that provisions 
on a cross-border conversion should be included in any modern Companies Act.  
The EMCA Group tried to create substantive rules regulating the corporate operation as such. Following 
these rules, the transfer of the registered office shall lead to a change in the applicable company law. The 
group was aware of the fact that EU Member States apply different theories regarding the connecting factor 
which determines the applicable company law. That a change of the applicable company law, however, 
requires at least a transfer of the registered office of the company from the state of origin to the new state 
of incorporation, seems to be a common denominator.  
Therefore the model created for the EMCA shall not be seen as a final decision between the “incorporation 
theory” and the “real seat theory”. An adapting state is free to add a provision whereby the transfer of the 
central administration is also required for a cross-border conversion. Also it should be noted, that the cross-
border operation always requires the combination of two legal systems. This means that it depends on the 
other legal system involved whether the transfer of the registered office will be sufficient to change the 
applicable company law. The following provisions are to a certain extent derived from the Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 2157/2001 on the European Company. Article 8 of this Regulation already provides 
for a cross-border transfer of the registered office. Other parts of the following provisions are derived from 
the procedure of the cross-border merger which involves in a comparable way the need to protect particular 
interests, such as those of minority shareholders, creditors and employees. 
Section 36 (1) is derived from Article 8 (1) Regulation (EC) No. 2157/2001, Section 36 (2) is derived from 
Article 8 (15) of that Regulation. 
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Section 13.37 
Cross-border Transfer Plan 
(1) The board of directors of the management board, as the case may be, of the company must draw up 
and sign a cross-border transfer plan, which must include information and provisions on 
(a) the current name, registered office and number of the company; 
(b) the proposed registered office of the company after the transfer; 
(c) the proposed articles of association of the company; 
(d) any implication the transfer may have on employees’ involvement; 
(e) the proposed transfer time table; 
(f) the amount of the appropriate cash compensation for a sell-out right under Section 44; 
(g) any other rights provided for the protection of shareholders and creditors; 
(2) The following particulars shall be published in the national gazette: 
(a) the type, name and registered office of the company; 
(b) the register in the sense of Chapter 3 Section 6 of this Act where documentation on companies is 
filed for the company; 
(c) an indication of the arrangements made for the exercise of the rights of creditors and any minority 
shareholders of the company and the address at which complete information on those arrangements 
may be obtained free of charge. 
(3) Save as provided in Section 37 (4), the board of directors or the management board, as the case may 
be, of the company must deliver a copy of the cross-border transfer plan to the Registrar who must at least 
one month before the date of any meeting of that company summoned for the purpose of approving the 
cross-border transfer (see Section 41), publish notice of receipt of the plan. 
(4) Section 37 (3) does not apply in respect of a company if the cross-border transfer plan is freely available 
on the company website (and the Registrar has been notified of the website address) throughout the period 
beginning one month before, and ending on, the date of any meeting of the company summoned for the 
purpose of approving the transfer. In the case of a public company, the cross-border transfer plan must be 
made freely available on the companies’ websites. 
Comments  
The provision in Section 37 are based on Article 8 (2) Regulation (EC) No. 2157/2001/EC, on the one 
hand, and on Section 22 on the cross-border merger, on the other hand.  
Section 13.38 
Directors’ Explanatory Report 
The board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, of the company shall draw up a 
detailed written report explaining and justifying the legal and economic aspects of the transfer and 
explaining the implications of the transfer for shareholders, creditors and employees. 
Comments  
Section 38 is based on Article 8 (3) Regulation (EC) No. 2157/2001.  
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Section 13.39 
Expert’s Examination and Report to Shareholders  
(1) One or more independent experts, acting on behalf of the company, shall examine the cross-border 
transfer plan and draw up a written report to the shareholders. The experts shall be entitled to secure from 
the company all information they consider necessary for the discharge of their duties. 
(2) The report must state in particular whether, in the expert’s opinion, the cash compensation for the sell-
out right (see Section 44) is fair and reasonable. The expert’s statement must at least indicate the method 
or methods used to arrive at the value of the cash compensation; state whether such method or methods are 
adequate in the case in question, indicate the values arrived at using each such method and give an option 
on the relative importance attributed to such methods in arriving at the value decided on. The report shall 
also describe any special valuation difficulties which have arisen. 
(3) The independent experts shall be appointed by the competent court at the request of the company. The 
appointed expert shall be a person eligible for appointment as a statutory auditor. 
(4) Neither an examination of the cross-border transfer plan nor an expert report shall be required if all the 
shareholders and the holders of other securities conferring the right to vote of the company have so agreed. 
Comments 
Section 39 is similar to Section 9 on national mergers and Section 24 on cross-border mergers. Even though 
there is no need to evaluate a share exchange ratio in the case of a cross-border transfer of the registered 
office, the sell-out right of the minority shareholders (see Section 44) requires a fair and reasonable 
valuation of the cash compensation to be offered for the shares. Court litigation as to whether the 
compensation is fair and reasonable could considerably delay or even block the transfer. The Act therefore 
proposes to leave the evaluation to an independent expert who will be liable for any misconduct (see Section 
47). 
The expert’s report is not necessary if all the shareholders have so agreed. In such a case usually the 
shareholders will unanimously approve the transfer. If there are no opposing shareholders, there will be 
nobody to claim a sell-out right in the sense of Section 44 and no expert’s report will be required. 
Section 13.40 
Inspection of Documents 
(1) The shareholders of the company must be able, within a period of one month before the meeting called 
to approve the transfer (see Section 41) to inspect, and make copies of, any of the documents listed below 
either at the registered office of the company or by freely accessing them on the company’s website for 
downloading and printing. 
(2) The relevant documents are: 
(a) the cross-border transfer plan; 
(b) the directors’ explanatory report; 
(c) where applicable, the expert’s report to shareholders; 
Comments 
Section 40 is based on Article 8 (4) of Regulation (EC) No. 2157/2001. 
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Section 13.41 
General Meeting Approving the Transfer 
(1) The cross-border transfer plan must be approved by a majority in number, representing 2/3rd in value, 
of each class of shareholders of the company, present and voting, either in person or by proxy at a meeting. 
(2) The general meeting may reserve the right to make implementation of the cross-border transfer of 
registered office, conditional on express ratification by it of the arrangements decided on with respect to 
the participation of employees. 
(3) The board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, of the company must notify the 
Registrar about the resolution on the transfer. 
(4) The Registrar shall publish notice of receipt of the documentation mentioned in Section 41 (3). 
Comments 
Section 41 is based on Article 8 (6) of Regulation (EC) No. 2157/2001. Section 41 (1) and (2) are similar 
to the provisions on cross-border mergers (see Section 27 (1) and (5)) and is due to the fact that there may 
be a need for negotiations on employee involvement in the course of the cross-border transfer procedure 
(see Section 48). 
Section 13.42 
Creditor Protection 
Creditors whose claims predate the publication as referred to in Section 37 (3) and (4) and have not fallen 
due at the time of such publication may claim adequate securities if they can credibly demonstrate that due 
to the cross-border transfer of registered office the satisfaction of their claim is at risk and that no adequate 
safeguards have been obtained from the company. The creditors must file their claim no later than four 
weeks after the date on which the Registrar of the company published the notice referred to in Section 41 
(4). The final implementation of the transfer as referred to in Section 46 can only be registered upon expiry 
of the time allowed for filing such claims. 
Comments 
Unlike a merger, the transfer of the registered office usually will not affect the position of the creditors. 
The company will continue to exist under a new applicable law, but the assets and liabilities of the company 
remain unchanged. Therefore, the need for creditor protection is less obvious than in the case of a cross-
border merger. There may be, however, exceptional cases where the transfer is accompanied by a transfer 
of assets or where the transfer could be part of an abusive way to weaken the position of creditors. Section 
42 takes account of such cases offering to creditors the opportunity to demonstrate why they think that, due 
to the cross-border transfer of the registered office, the satisfaction of their claims is at risk. A similar 
provision can be found in the German Act accompanying the introduction of the European Company (§ 13 
SE-Ausführungsgesetz). Article 8 (7) of Regulation (EC) No. 2157/2001 expressly gives Member States 
the right to lay down requirements to adequately protect creditors in the case of a cross-border transfer of 
the registered office. 
Section 13.43 
Protection of Holders of Securities to Which Special Rights Attach  
(1) A person who, other than in his capacity as shareholder, may exercise a particular right against the 
company, such as a right to a distribution of profits or a right to acquire shares, must obtain an equivalent 
right in the company after the cross-border transfer of the registered office.  
(2) Section 43 (1) does not apply if: 
(a) the holder has agreed otherwise, or  
(b) the holder is, or under the cross-border transfer plan is to be, entitled to a sell-out right as mentioned 
in Section 44. 
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Comments 
This provision is similar to Section 29 on cross-border mergers. It protects holders of securities who might 
lose their specific rights attached to the security by transferring the company into another legal system. 
Section 13.44 
Sell-out Right of Dissenting Shareholders 
The company has to offer, in the cross-border transfer plan (Section 37 (1) f), to those of its shareholders 
who have opposed the transfer at the general meeting to acquire their shares in return for appropriate cash 
compensation upon written request by such shareholders no later than four weeks after the date of the 
general meeting. 
Comments 
The provision is similar to Section 30 regarding the cross-border merger. The interest of minority 
shareholders is comparable in a situation of a cross-border transfer of the registered office. This is also 
acknowledged by Article 8 (5) of Regulation (EC) No. 2157/2001 which allows Member States to ensure 
appropriate protection for minority shareholders who oppose the transfer. 
The cross-border transfer leads to the application of another legal system which may have less or different 
rules on minority protection. Therefore, minority shareholders who opposed the transfer in the general 
meeting should have the possibility of leaving the company prior to the transfer. The value of the 
compensation shall be determined by independent experts (see Section 39). 
Section 13.45 
Legal Scrutiny and Pre-transfer Certificate 
(1) The competent court of the company must assess and certify the validity of those acts and formalities 
required by and governed by its national law.  
(2) The board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, of the company shall file an 
application for legal scrutiny which is accompanied at least by the following documents: 
(a) the cross-border transfer plan as approved by the general meeting; 
(b) the minutes of the general meeting of the company; 
(c) the directors’ explanatory report; 
(d) the expert’s report. 
(3) If any documents mentioned in Section 45 (2) have been dispensed with in the particular case, the 
company must deliver documentation evidencing the applicability of the relevant exception. It shall also, 
at the request of the competent court, deliver any other documentation which is needed to scrutinize the 
legality of the cross-border transfer of the registered office. 
(4) The court must issue without delay to the company a certificate conclusively attesting to the proper 
completion of the pre-transfer acts and formalities. 
Comments 
Section 45 is similar to Section 32 on cross-border merger and is also derived from Article 8 (8) of 
Regulation (EC) No. 2157/2001 on the cross-border transfer of the registered office of a European 
Company. 
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Section 13.46 
Legal Effect of the Transfer of the Registered Office 
(1) The cross-border transfer of the registered office shall be effective upon registration by the Registrar 
of the new register. The Registrar or the competent court, as the case may be, of the new register must 
assess and certify the validity of the acts and formalities carried out by the company and which are required 
by the procedure of the new registration. The Registrar shall notify, without delay, the company register 
where the company has been incorporated prior to the transfer that the transfer has taken effect. Deletion 
of the old registration shall be effected on receipt of that notification, but not before. 
(2) From the effective date according to Section 46 (1), the transfer cannot be declared null and void. 
Comments 
Section 46 is similar to Section 33 on cross-border mergers and is also based on Article 8 (9) to (12) of 
Regulation (EC) No. 2157/2001. 
Section 13.47 
Civil Liability of Management and Independent Persons towards Shareholders 
A director of the company or an independent expert who has reported pursuant to Section 38 will be held 
liable for any loss or damage suffered by any shareholder or creditor by reason of their misconduct in the 
preparation or implementation of the transfer. 
Comments 
Section 47 is similar to Section 34 on cross-border mergers. 
Section 13.48 
Employee Participation 
The principles and procedures laid down in Article 16 (3) to (7) of Directive 2005/56/EC shall apply, 
mutatis mutandis, to the cross-border transfer of the registered office if the company, in the six months 
before the publication of the cross-border transfer plan as referred to in Section 37, is operating under an 
employee participation system within the meaning of Article 2 (k) of Directive 2001/86/EC and where the 
national law applicable to the company after the cross-border transfer of the registered office does not 
provide for at least the same level of employee participation. 
Comments 
In the case of a cross-border transfer of the registered office, the applicable system of employee 
participation may be affected. In the case of a cross-border mergers, Article 16 of Directive 2005/56/EC 
provides for the protection of employee participation rights in such cases. A comparable system has been 
established by Directive 2001/86/EC on the involvement of employees in the European Company. Section 
48 refers to the principles to be applied in the case of a cross-border merger. These principles should be 
either applied by analogy or should be implemented in a special act on employee protection in cross-border 
restructurings. Such procedures are, however, not part of the core of company law but have to be adapted 
from the national systems of worker participation.
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PART 5 
DIVISIONS 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Section 13.49 
Definitions 
(1) A “division by acquisition” is the operation whereby a company is wound up without liquidation and 
transfers to more than one company all its assets and liabilities in exchange for the issue of shares in the 
acquiring companies to the shareholders of the company being divided and, as the case may be, a cash 
payment. 
(2) A “division by the formation of new companies” is the operation whereby a company is wound up 
without liquidation and transfers to more than one company incorporated by it, all its assets and liabilities 
in exchange for the issue to the shareholders of the company being divided of shares in the new companies 
and, as the case may be, a cash payment. 
(3) For the purpose of this Part on Divisions the “companies involved in the division” shall mean all the 
companies participating in the division. “The company being divided” shall mean the company which is 
going to be wound up without liquidation and transferring all its assets to the “acquiring companies”, the 
latter meaning the companies to which the assets are transferred – be it an existing company (in the case of 
a division by acquisition) or a new company (in the case of a division by formation of new companies). 
Comments 
The definitions are based on Articles 2 and 21 of Directive 82/891/EEC on national divisions. The 
requirement that the shareholders of the company being divided must receive, if applicable, a cash payment 
not exceeding 10 % of the nominal value of the shares can be derogated from (cf. Article 24 of the 
Directive). Thus, the 10 % limitation has not, for example, been implemented in the Danish Companies 
Act and in the German Act on Transformations. According to these national provisions, a division may 
also take place where no consideration is made in form of shares or payment, or where cash payment 
exceeds 10 % of the nominal value of the shares. The EMCA takes the same view meaning that the non-
cash payment may be more than 10 %. 
Section 13.50 
Companies in Liquidation 
A division by acquisition or by formation of new companies may also be effected where the company 
which is ceasing to exist is in liquidation, provided that this option is restricted to companies which have 
not yet begun to distribute their assets to their shareholders. 
Comments 
Section 50 makes use of the options contained in Article 3(2) and Article 4(2) of Directive 2011/35/EU on 
national mergers which also apply to divisions (see Article 2 (2) and Article 21 (2) of Directive 
82/891/EEC). 
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DOMESTIC DIVISIONS 
Section 13.51 
Division Plan 
(1) Subject to Section 51 (2) where a division of either type specified in Section 49 is proposed to be 
entered into, the board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, of the companies involved 
in the division must draw up and agree a division plan. 
(2) If the division only involves private limited companies, the shareholders may agree that no division 
plan should be drawn up (but see Section 56 (8)).  
(3) If the division involves public limited companies, the division plan must state, at least: 
(a) the type, name and registered office of each of the companies involved in the division, including, 
if applicable, of the newly formed companies; 
(b) the ratio applicable to the exchange of securities or shares representing the company capital and 
the amount of any cash payment; 
(c) the terms relating to the allotment of shares in the acquiring company; 
(d) the date from which the holding of such shares entitles the holders to participate in profits and any 
special conditions affecting that entitlement; 
(e) the precise description and allocation of the assets and liabilities to be transferred to each of the 
acquiring companies; 
(f) the date from which the transactions of the company being divided shall be treated for accounting 
purposes as being those of one or other of the acquiring companies; 
(g) any special conditions, including special rights or restrictions, whether in regard to voting, 
participation in profits, share capital or otherwise, which will apply to shares or other securities issued 
by the acquiring companies in exchange for shares or other securities in the company being divided; 
(h) any payment or benefit in cash or otherwise, paid or given or intended to be paid or given to any 
independent person referred to in Section 53 and/or to any director of any of the companies involved 
in the division insofar as it differs from the payment or benefit paid or given to other persons in respect 
of the division and the consideration, if any, for any such payment or benefit; 
(j) a draft instrument of incorporation and articles of association if a new limited liability company is 
formed by the division. 
(4) Save as provided in Section 51 (5), the board of directors or the management board, as the case may 
be, of each of the companies involved in the division must deliver a copy of the division plan to the Registrar 
who must at least one month before the date of any meeting of that company summoned for the purpose of 
approving the division (see Section 56), publish notice of receipt of the plan. 
(5) Section 51 (4) does not apply in respect of a company if the division plan is freely available on the 
company’s website (and the Registrar has been notified of the website address) throughout the period 
beginning one month before, and ending on, the date of any meeting of the company summoned for the 
purpose of approving the division. In the case of a public company, the division plan must be made freely 
available on the company’s website. 
Comments 
According to Article 3 Directive 82/891/EEC the administrative or management bodies – depending on 
whether the company applies a one-tier or a two-tier system (see Chapter 8) – of the companies involved 
in the division shall draw up a division plan in writing. The Directive is only applicable to public companies, 
therefore Section 51 (2) allows for an exception in the case of a private company if all the shareholders 
agree. 
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The division plan must be published in accordance with Article 4 of Directive 82/891/EEC. But a company 
shall be exempt from the publication requirement if it makes the division plan available on its website (see 
amendments to Article 4 of Directive 82/891/EEC by Article 3 of Directive 2009/109/EC). 
Section 13.52 
Directors’ Explanatory Report 
(1) The board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, of each of the companies involved 
in the division shall draw up a detailed written report explaining the division plan and setting out the legal 
and economic grounds for them, in particular the share exchange ratio and the criterion determining the 
allocation of shares. That report shall also describe any special valuation difficulties which have arisen. 
(2) The board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, of each of the companies involved 
in the division shall inform the general meeting of their company and the board of directors or the 
management board of the other companies involved in the division so that the latter may inform their 
respective general meetings of any material change in the assets and liabilities between the date of 
preparation of the division plan and the date of the general meetings which are to decide on the division 
plan. 
(3) The report referred to in Section 52 (1) and/or the information referred to in Section 52 (2) shall not be 
required if all the shareholders and the holders of other securities conferring the right to vote of each of the 
companies involved in the division have so agreed. 
Comments 
Section 52 is based on Article 7 Directive 82/891/EEC. Section 52 (3) makes use of the option to waive the 
requirement of a directors’ report by unanimous shareholder vote (see Article 10 of Directive 82/891/EEC). 
Section 13.53 
Expert’s Examination and Report to Shareholders  
(1) One or more independent experts, acting on behalf of each of the companies involved in the division, 
shall examine the division plan and draw up a written report to the shareholders. The experts shall be 
entitled to secure from each of the companies involved in the division all information they consider 
necessary for the discharge of their duties. 
(2) That report must state in particular whether, in the expert’s opinion, the share exchange ratio is fair and 
reasonable. The expert’s statement must at least indicate the method or methods used to arrive at the share 
exchange ratio proposed; state whether such method or methods are adequate in the case in question; 
indicate the values arrived at using each such method and give an option on the relative importance 
attributed to such methods in arriving at the value decided on. The report shall also describe any special 
valuation difficulties which have arisen. 
(3) The expert’s report has to make a declaration as to whether the creditors of each of the companies 
involved in the division, whose claims antedate the publication of the division plan and have not fallen due 
at the time of such publication, can be considered to be sufficiently protected after the division or whether 
the financial situation of the companies involved in the division requires particular safeguards. 
(4) The independent experts shall be appointed by the competent court at the request of each company 
involved in the division. At the request of all the companies involved in the division, one or more joint 
experts may be appointed to draw up a single report on all the companies involved in the division. The 
appointed expert shall be a person eligible for appointment as a statutory auditor.  
(5) Neither an examination of the division plan nor an expert report shall be required if all the shareholders 
and the holders of other securities conferring the right to vote of each of the companies involved in the 
division have so agreed. 
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Comments 
Section 53 is based on Article 8 Directive 82/891/EEC. Section 53 (4) makes use of the option to appoint 
one or more independent experts for all the merging companies (see Article 8 (1) Directive). Section 53 (5) 
makes use of the option to waive the requirement of an expert’s report by unanimous shareholder vote (see 
Article 10 of Directive 82/891/EEC). Section 53 (3) is part of the creditor protection regime and will be 
explained below (see Section 57). 
Section 13.54 
Supplementary Balance Sheet 
(1) This Section applies if the last annual accounts of any of the companies involved in the division relate 
to a financial year ending more than 6 months before the board of directors or the management board, as 
the case may be, of the company adopts the division plan.  
(2) Where one of the companies involved in the division falls within Section 54 (1) above, the board of 
directors or the management board, as the case may be, of the company must prepare a supplementary 
accounting statement, unless the shareholders and, where applicable, the holders of other securities 
conferring the right to vote, of each of the companies involved in the division, unanimously agree that no 
such statement is required.  
(3) Where such statement is required, it must consist of a balance sheet, or a consolidated balance sheet, 
as the case may be, dealing with the state of affairs of the relevant company or group as at a date not more 
than three months before the division plan (see above Section 51) was adopted by the board of directors or 
the management board, as the case may be,, and the statement must be approved by the board of the relevant 
company.  
(4) The supplementary balance sheet shall not be required if the company publishes a half yearly financial 
report in accordance with Article 5 of Directive 2004/109/EC and makes it available to shareholders in 
accordance with Section 55. 
Comments 
The rules in Section 54 are based on Article 9 of Directive 82/891/EEC. Article 9 (1) (c) states that “All 
shareholders shall be entitled to inspect at least the following documents at the registered office at least one 
month before the date of the general meeting which is to decide on the draft terms of division: […] where 
applicable, an accounting statement drawn up as at a date which must not be earlier than the first day of the 
third month preceding the date of the draft terms of division, if the latest annual accounts relate to a financial 
year which ended more than six months before that date”. 
Member States may require, however, that an accounting statement shall not be required if all the 
shareholders and the holders of other securities conferring the right to vote of each of the companies 
involved in the division have so agreed (see Article 10 of Directive 82/891/EEC). The EMCA group 
proposes to make use of this Member State option. 
European Model Companies Act 2017 
Chapter 13 – Restructurings 
329 
Section 13.55 
Inspection of Documents 
(1) The shareholders of each of the companies involved in the division must be able, within a period of 
one month before the meeting called to approve the division (see Section 56), to inspect and make copies 
of any of the documents listed below either at the registered office of that company or by freely accessing 
them on the company’s website for downloading and printing. 
(2) The relevant documents are: 
(a) the division plan; 
(b) where applicable, the directors’ explanatory report; 
(c) where applicable, the expert’s report to shareholders; 
(d) the companies’ annual accounts and annual reports for the previous three financial years together 
with any supplementary accounting statement required by Section 54. 
Comments 
Section 55 is based on Article 9 of Directive 82/891/EEC. 
Section 13.56 
General Meetings of Companies Involved in the Division 
(1) Subject to Section 56 (8) and Section 58 (2), the division plan must be approved by a majority in 
number, representing 2/3 in value, of each class of shareholders of each of the companies involved in the 
division, present and voting, either in person or by proxy at a meeting. 
(2) Where the division is a division by formation of a new company, the memorandum or draft 
memorandum and articles or draft articles shall be approved by an ordinary resolution of each of the 
companies involved in the division. 
(3) The board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, of each of the companies involved 
in the division must report: 
(a) to every meeting of the shareholders, or any class of shareholders, of that company summoned for 
the purpose of agreeing to the division plan, and 
(b) to the board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, of every other merging 
company, any material changes in the property and liabilities of that company between the date when 
the division plan was adopted and the date of the meeting in question. 
(4) The board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, of each of the other companies 
involved in the division must in turn: 
(a) report those matters to every meeting of the shareholders, or any class of shareholders, of that 
company summoned for the purpose of agreeing to the division plan; or 
(b) send a report of those matters to every shareholder entitled to receive notice of such a meeting. 
(5) Section 56 (3) and (4) do not apply if all the holders of shares and other securities conferring the right 
to vote in general meetings of each of the companies involved in the division have so agreed. 
(6) If the division only involves private limited companies, and if the shareholders have agreed under 
Section 51 (2) that no division plan should be drawn up, the following issues must be addressed in 
connection with the adoption of the division: 
(a) the names and any secondary names of the private limited companies, including whether the name 
or secondary name of any non-surviving company is to be adopted as a secondary name of the surviving 
company; 
(b) the consideration offered for the shares in a non-surviving private limited company; 
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(c) the time from which any shares offered as consideration will confer on the holders a right to receive 
dividends; 
(d) the time from which the rights and obligations of a non-surviving private limited company are 
considered to have been transferred for accounting purposes; 
(e) the precise description and allocation of the assets and liabilities to be transferred to each of the 
acquiring companies; 
(f) provision for the treatment of assets or liabilities not explicitly allocated, especially of assets or 
liabilities unknown on the date on which the division is prepared, providing that not explicitly allocated 
assets and liabilities shall be allocated in the same proportion; 
(g) the allocation to the shareholders of the company being divided of shares in the acquiring 
companies and the criterion upon which such allocation is based; and 
(h) the articles of association if a new private limited company is formed by the division. 
(7) If the division only involves private limited companies, and if the shareholders have agreed under 
Section 51 (2) that no division plan should be drawn up, identical resolutions must have been passed by all 
of the existing private limited companies participating in the division with regard to the requirements in 
Section 56 (2). If this is not the case, the resolution to implement the division is considered to have lapsed. 
(8) In the case of any division by acquisition, it is not necessary for the division plan to be approved by the 
shareholders of the acquiring company if the court is satisfied that the conditions set out in Section 56 (9) 
to (12) have been complied with.  
(9) The first condition is that either: 
(a) the publication of notice of receipt of the division plan by the Registrar took place in respect of the 
acquiring company at least one month before the date of the first meeting of shareholders, or any class 
of shareholders, of the company being divided summoned for the purposes of agreeing to the division 
plan; or 
(b) the division plan is made freely available on the company website, details of which have been 
notified to, and published by the Registrar, at least one month before the date of the first meeting of 
shareholders, or any class of shareholders, of the company being divided summoned for the purposes 
of agreeing to the division plan, and the division plan remains available on the website throughout the 
period beginning one month before, and ending on, that date. 
(10) The second condition is that each of the documents listed in the applicable paragraphs of Section 
55 (2) relating to the acquiring company and the company being divided: 
(a) are available for inspection and copying by the shareholders of the acquiring company during the 
period beginning one month before, and ending on, the date of any such meeting as is mentioned in 
Section 56 (9) (a) to inspect that document at the registered office of that company; or 
(b) are made freely available on the company website and remain available on the website throughout 
the period beginning one month before, and ending on, the date of any such meeting as is mentioned 
in Section 56 (9) (a). 
(11) The third condition is that, no shareholder or shareholders of the acquiring company, holding not 
less than 5 % of the paid-up capital of the company which carried the right to vote at general meetings of 
the company (excluding any shares in the company held as treasury shares) has required, during that period, 
a meeting of the shareholders to be called for the purpose of deciding whether or not to agree to the division. 
(12) The board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, of each of the companies 
involved in the division must notify the Registrar about the resolution on the division or, as the case may 
be, deliver evidence that no resolution was necessary. The board of directors or the management board, as 
the case may be, must also notify the Registrar about the expert’s declaration on the creditors’ position as 
referred to in Section 53 (3). 
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(13) The Registrar shall publish notice of receipt of the documentation mentioned in Section 56 (12) 
and of the content of the expert’s declaration on the creditors’ position or that, according to Section 53 (5) 
no expert’s report has been drawn up. 
Comments 
Article 5 of Directive 82/891/EEC requires that a division is to be adopted by the general meeting in each 
of the companies involved in the division with at least 2/3 majority. Some Member States such as Germany, 
Ireland and the UK require a higher majority of 75 %, but most Member States follow the Directive in 
requiring a 2/3 majority. 
Article 7 (3) of Directive 82/891/EEC contains a duty of the companies to inform their respective general 
meetings of any material change in the assets and liabilities between the date of preparation of the division 
plan and the date of the general meetings which are to decide on the division plan. According to Article 10 
of the Directive, Member States may provide that such information shall not be required if the shareholders 
and the holders of other securities conferring the right to vote have agreed to waive this requirement. 
According to Article 6 of the Directive, the Member States need not require approval of the division by the 
general meeting of an acquiring company if certain conditions are met. These conditions include that the 
division plan is published, for the acquiring company, at least one month before the date fixed for the 
general meeting of the company or companies being divided which are to decide on the division plan. 
Further, all shareholders of the acquiring company must be entitled to inspect the documents at the 
registered office of the acquiring company. Finally, shareholders who own at least 5 % of the shares in the 
acquiring company may demand a general meeting of the acquiring company to be called to decide whether 
to approve the division. The reason for derogating from the requirement of a decision by the general 
meeting in the acquiring company is that the division, for the acquiring company, is a standard business 
acquisition and that there is less need for protecting the minority in a case where 90 % of the shares are 
already held by the acquiring company.  
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Section 13.57 
Creditor Protection 
(1) Creditors whose claims antedate the publication as referred to in Section 51 (4) and (5) and have not 
fallen due at the time of such publication may claim adequate securities if one of the following conditions 
is fulfilled: 
(a) the expert’s declaration referred to in Section 53 (3) concludes that the creditors are not sufficiently 
protected after the division; 
(b) the expert’s declaration referred to in Section 53 (3) concludes that the financial situation of the 
companies involved in the division requires additional safeguards for creditors; 
(c) no expert’s report has been drawn up according to Section 53 (5). 
(2) Creditors claiming adequate securities under Section 57 (1) (c) must credibly demonstrate that due to 
the division the satisfaction of their claim is at stake and that no adequate safeguards have been obtained 
from the company.  
(3) The creditors must file their claim no later than four weeks after the date on which the Registrars of all 
of the companies involved in the division published the notice referred to in Section 56 (13). The final 
implementation of the division as referred to in Sections 62 and 63 can only be registered upon expiry of 
the time allowed for filing such claims. 
(4) In so far as a creditor of an acquiring company to which the obligation has been transferred in 
accordance with the division plan has not obtained satisfaction, the acquiring companies will be jointly and 
severally liable for that obligation. 
Comments 
Article 12 of Directive 82/891/EEC requires that the Member States, in their national legislation, provide 
an adequate system of protection of the interests of creditors in the companies involved in the division 
whose claims predated the publication of the division plan and have not fallen due at the time of such 
publication. These principles also apply to debenture holders (see Article 12 (5) of Directive 82/891/EEC). 
Sections 53 and 57 follow the same approach as has been regulated in this Act for mergers (see Section 9 
and 13): In order to deliver the relevant information, the expert’s report shall contain a declaration on the 
situation of the creditors. If the experts declare that the claims are sufficiently protected, the creditors have 
no right to require additional safeguards. If the expert’s report is waived by the shareholders, the creditors 
may claim securities individually and will have to demonstrate that due to the division the satisfaction of 
their claim is at risk. 
Based on Article 12 (3) of Directive 82/891/EEC, Section 57 (4) introduces an additional safeguard in so 
far as a creditor will be entitled to sue not only the acquiring company to which his claim has been 
transferred but also the other acquiring company or companies. 
Section 13.58 
Division by Acquisition of a Wholly Owned Subsidiary 
(1) This Section applies in the case of a division by acquisition where all of the shares and other securities 
conferring the right to vote at general meetings of the company being divided are held by or on behalf of 
the acquiring companies. 
(2) It is not necessary for the division plan to be approved at a general meeting of each of the companies 
being involved in the division if the court is satisfied that the conditions in Section 58 (3) and (4) are 
fulfilled. 
(3) The publication of the division plan as provided for in Section 51 (4) and (5) must be effected as regards 
each company involved in the division, at least one month before the division takes effect. 
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(4) At least one month before the division takes effect, all shareholders of the acquiring companies must 
be able to inspect and make copies of, at the company’s registered office, the documents listed in Section 
55 (2) (a) to (d) relating to each company involved in the division, unless such document was freely 
available on the company’s website throughout that period. 
(5) Where a general meeting of the company being divided is not summoned, the information provided for 
in Section 52(2) covers any material change in the assets and liabilities after the date of preparation of the 
division plan. 
Section 13.59 
Division by Acquisition of a Non-wholly Owned Subsidiary 
(1) This Section applies in the case of a division by acquisition where 90 % or more (but not all) of the 
relevant securities of the company being divided are held by or on behalf of the acquiring companies. 
(2) It is not necessary for the division plan to be approved at a meeting of the shareholders, or any class of 
shareholders, of an acquiring company if the court is satisfied that the conditions in Section 59 (3) to (5) 
have been complied with. 
(3) The first condition is that publication of notice of receipt of the division plan by the Registrar took 
place in respect of the acquiring company at least one month before the date of the first meeting of 
shareholders, or any class of shareholders, of the company being divided summoned for the purpose of 
agreeing to the scheme. 
(4) The second condition is that the shareholders of the acquiring company were able during the period 
beginning one month before, and ending on, the date mentioned in Section 59 (3) to inspect the documents 
specified in Section 55 (2) at the registered office of that company. 
(5) The third condition is that one or more shareholders of the acquiring company, who together held not 
less than 5 % of the paid-up capital of the company which carried the right to vote at general meetings of 
the company (excluding any shares in the company held as treasury shares) would have been able, during 
the period set out in Section 59 (3), to require a meeting of each class of shareholders to be called for the 
purpose of deciding whether or not to agree to the division plan, and that no such requirement was made. 
Comments 
Sections 58 and 59 are based on Articles 6 and 20 of Directive 82/891/EEC, as amended by Article 3 of 
Directive 2009/109/EC. 
Section 13.60 
Protection of Holders of Securities to Which Special Rights Attach  
(1) A person who, other than in his capacity as shareholder, may exercise a particular right against a 
company being divided, such as a right to a distribution of profits or a right to acquire shares, must obtain 
an equivalent right in the acquiring companies. 
(2) Section 60 (1) does not apply if: 
(a) the holder has agreed otherwise, or 
(b) the holder is, or under the division plan is to be, entitled to have the securities purchased by the 
acquiring companies on terms that the court considers reasonable. 
Comments 
This provision is similar to Section 16 on mergers and based on Article 13 of Directive 82/891/EEC. 
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Section 13.61 
Sell-out right of Dissenting Shareholders  
Any shareholder in any of the companies involved in the division who voted against the approving of the 
division in the general meeting may request the acquiring companies to acquire his or her shares for cash, 
if the articles of the company in which he or she holds a share provide for such a sell-out right. 
Comments 
Shareholders in general are sufficiently protected by the division procedure, in particular by the expert’s 
report confirming the share exchange ratio to be fair and reasonable. The group therefore considers that 
there is no need to suggest a mandatory sell-out right as a general rule in the model act. It should be left to 
the articles of association to provide for a sell-out right in such cases. 
Section 13.62 
Legal Scrutiny and Pre-division Certificate 
(1) The competent court of each of the companies involved in the division must check and certify the 
existence and validity of the legal acts and formalities required of the companies involved in the division.  
(2) For each of the companies involved in the division the board of directors or the management board, as 
the case may be, shall file an application for legal scrutiny which is accompanied at least by the following 
documents: 
(a) the division plan as approved by the general meeting of the companies involved in the division; 
(b) the minutes of the general meeting of the company; 
(c) the directors’ explanatory report; 
(d) the expert’s report; 
(e) the supplementary balance sheet, if applicable. 
(3) If any documents mentioned in Section 62 (2) is dispensable in the particular case, the company must 
deliver documentation evidencing the applicability of the relevant exception. It shall also, at the request of 
the competent court, deliver any other documentation which is needed to scrutinize the legality of the 
division. 
(4) The court has to issue a certificate confirming the legality of the division. On receipt of this certificate 
the Registrar of the company will have to register the division. The Registrar of each the company being 
divided must not register the division unless he receives confirmation from the Registrars of all the 
acquiring companies that the division has been registered there. 
Comments 
Article 14 of Directive 82/891/EEC requires legal scrutiny of the division which can be effected either by 
a public notary or by the supervision of a court or a public authority. Since the model act in general does 
not require notarization of corporate documents, the group opted for the model of supervision by a court. 
In Member States, such as the Netherlands, where the division plan is to be drawn up by a notary, there is 
no need for supervision by a court. Some Member States, such as Germany, apply both methods in requiring 
a notarial deed and nevertheless giving the court the competence to examine the legality of the division. 
Section 13.63 
Legal Effect of the Division 
(1) The division shall be effective upon registration by the Registrar of the company being divided. 
(2) From the effective date according to Section 63 (1), a division by acquisition or by formation of a new 
company carried out in accordance with the requirements above shall have the following effects: 
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(a) the transfer, both as between the company being divided and the acquiring companies and as 
regards third parties, to each of the acquiring companies of all the assets and liabilities of the company 
being divided; such transfer shall take effect with the assets and liabilities being divided in accordance 
with the allocation laid down in the division plan; 
(b) the shareholders of the company being divided become shareholders of the acquiring companies;  
(c) no shares in an acquiring companies shall be exchanged, however, for shares in the company being 
divided held either 
(i) by that acquiring company itself or through a person acting in his own name but on its behalf; 
or 
(ii) by the company being divided itself or through a person acting in his own name but on its 
behalf; 
(d) the company being divided ceases to exist. 
(3) The acquiring companies are obliged to effect, to the shareholders of the company being divided, any 
cash payment required by the division plan. 
(4) Where an asset is not allocated by the division plan and where the interpretation of this plan does not 
make a decision on its allocation possible, the asset or the consideration therefor is allocated to all the 
acquiring companies in proportion of the share of the net assets allocated to each of those companies under 
the division plan. 
(5) Where a liability is not allocated by the division plan and where the interpretation of this plan does not 
make a decision on its allocation possible, each of the acquiring companies will be jointly and severally 
liable for it.  
(6) From the effective date according to Section 63 (1), the nullity of the division must be ordered in a 
court judgement. The court can only declare nullity of the division if the legal requirements to draw up a 
division plan or to approve the plan by general meeting of each of the companies involved in the division 
have not been observed. 
Comments 
Section 63 is based on Articles 17 and 19 of Directive 82/891/EEC. 
Section 13.64 
Civil Liability of Management and Independent Persons towards Shareholders 
A director of any of the companies being involved in the division or an independent expert who has reported 
pursuant to Section 53 will be held liable for any loss or damage suffered by any shareholder or creditor by 
reason of their misconduct in the preparation or implementation of the division. 
Comments 
Section 64 is based on Article 18 of Directive 82/891/EEC. The directive requires a provision on civil 
liability of board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, and experts towards the 
shareholders of the companies involved in the division. Section 64 also includes liability towards creditors. 
This is due to the fact that creditor protection in Section 57 is linked to a declaration of the experts on the 
situation of the creditors. Since the creditors have no right to claim further securities if the expert’s report 
states that their claims are sufficiently protected, the creditors should have a civil claim against an expert 
if he or she did not assess the risk correctly. 
European Model Companies Act 2017 
Chapter 13 – Restructurings 
336 
CROSS-BORDER DIVISIONS 
Section 13.65 
Cross-Border Divisions 
Limited liability companies that are subject to this Act may participate in cross-border divisions in which 
the other participating companies are also limited liability companies and where a cross-border merger is 
permitted by the applicable company law.  
Comments 
Whereas the cross-border merger is dealt with by the Directive 2005/56/EEC there is no EU directive on 
the cross-border division. According to the ECJ Sevic case C-411/03, however, it is considered to be part 
of the EU freedom of establishment to participate in cross-border transactions, when similar transactions 
are permitted under national law. Since the EMCA, Part 5, regulates the division of national companies, 
there is also a need to regulate cross-border divisions. 
It seems that so far no Member State of the EU or the EEA has introduced provisions on a cross-border 
division. The following provisions therefore are partly based on the provisions of this Act on national 
divisions and partly, insofar as the interests of shareholders, creditors and employees are particularly 
affected by the cross-border nature of the transaction, on the provisions of this Act on cross-border mergers. 
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Section 13.66 
Division Plan 
(1) The board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, of the companies involved in the 
division must draw up and agree a division plan which must include information and provisions on: 
(a) the type, name and registered office of each of the companies involved in the cross-border division, 
including, if applicable, of the newly formed companies; 
(b) the ratio applicable to the exchange of securities or shares representing the company capital and 
the amount of any cash payment; 
(c) the amount of the appropriate cash compensation for a sell-out right under Section 74, if applicable; 
(d) the terms relating to the allotment of shares in the acquiring company; 
(e) the precise description and allocation of the assets and liabilities to be transferred to each of the 
acquiring companies; 
(f) the likely impact of the cross-border division on employment in the companies involved in the 
division; 
(g) the date from which the holding of such shares entitles the holders to participate in profits and any 
special conditions affecting that entitlement; 
(h) the date from which the transactions of the company being acquired shall be treated for accounting 
purposes as being those of the acquiring company; 
(i) any special conditions, including special rights or restrictions, whether in regard to voting, 
participation in profits, share capital or otherwise, which will apply to shares or other securities issued 
by the acquiring company in exchange for shares or other securities in the company or companies being 
acquired; 
(k) any payment or benefit in cash or otherwise, paid or given or intended to be paid or given to any 
independent person referred to in Section 68 and/or to any director of any of the companies involved 
in the cross-border division insofar as it differs from the payment or benefit paid or given to other 
persons in respect of the division and the consideration, if any, for any such payment or benefit; 
(l) a draft instrument of incorporation and articles of association if a new limited liability company is 
formed by the division. 
(m) where appropriate, information on the procedures by which arrangements for the involvement of 
employees in the definition of their rights to participation in the company resulting from the cross-
border division are determined; 
(n) information on the evaluation of the assets and liabilities which are transferred to the company 
resulting from the cross-border division;  
(o) dates of the companies’ accounts involved in the division used to establish the conditions of the 
cross-border division. 
(2) For each of the companies involved in the cross-border division the following particulars shall be 
published in the national gazette:  
(a) the type, name and registered office of each of the companies involved in the cross-border division; 
(b) the register in the sense of Article 3 (2) Directive 2009101/EC where documentation on companies 
is filed for each of the companies involved in the cross-border division; 
(c) an indication, for each of the companies involved in the cross-border division, of the arrangements 
made for the exercise of the rights of creditors and any minority shareholders of the companies and the 
address at which complete information on those arrangements may be obtained free of charge. 
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(3) Save as provided in Section 66 (4), the board of directors or the management board, as the case may 
be, of each of the companies involved in the division must deliver a copy of the division plan to the Registrar 
who must at least one month before the date of any meeting of that company summoned for the purpose of 
approving the division (see Section 71), publish notice of receipt of the plan. 
(4) Section 66 (3) does not apply in respect of a company if the division plan is freely available on the 
company website (and the Registrar has been notified of the website address) throughout the period 
beginning one month before, and ending on, the date of any meeting of the company summoned for the 
purpose of approving the division. In the case of a public company, the division plan must be made freely 
available on the companies’ websites. 
Comments  
Section 66 is based on Section 51 on national divisions and Section 22 on cross-border mergers. 
Section 13.67 
Directors’ Explanatory Report 
(1) The board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, of each of the companies involved 
in the cross-border division shall draw up a detailed written report explaining the division plan and setting 
out the legal and economic grounds for them, in particular the share exchange ratio and the criterion 
determining the allocation of shares. That report shall also describe any special valuation difficulties which 
have arisen. 
(2) The board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, of each of the companies involved 
in the division shall inform the general meeting of their company and the board of directors or the 
management board of the other companies involved in the division so that the latter may inform their 
respective general meetings of any material change in the assets and liabilities between the date of 
preparation of the division plan and the date of the general meetings which are to decide on the division 
plan. 
Comments 
Section 67 is based on Section 52 on national divisions and Section 23 on cross-border mergers. 
Section 13.68 
Expert’s Examination and Report to Shareholders 
(1) One or more independent experts, acting on behalf of each of the companies involved in the division, 
shall examine the division plan and draw up a written report to the shareholders. The experts shall be 
entitled to secure from each of the companies involved in the division all information they consider 
necessary for the discharge of their duties. 
(2) That report must state in particular whether, in the expert’s opinion, the share exchange ratio is fair and 
reasonable. The expert’s statement must at least indicate the method or methods used to arrive at the share 
exchange ratio proposed and, if applicable, the cash compensation for a sell-out right; state whether such 
method or methods are adequate in the case in question; indicate the values arrived at using each such 
method and give an option on the relative importance attributed to such methods in arriving at the value 
decided on. The report shall also describe any special valuation difficulties which have arisen. 
(3) The expert’s report has to make a declaration as to whether the creditors of each of the companies 
involved in the division, whose claims antedate the publication of the division plan and have not fallen due 
at the time of such publication, can be considered to be sufficiently protected after the division or whether 
the financial situation of the companies involved in the division requires particular safeguards. 
(4) The independent experts shall be appointed by the competent court at the request of each company 
involved in the division. At the request of all the companies involved in the division, one or more joint 
experts may be appointed to draw up a single report on all the companies involved in the division. The 
appointed expert shall be a person eligible for appointment as a statutory auditor.  
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(5) Neither an examination of the division plan nor an expert report shall be required if all the shareholders 
and the holders of other securities conferring the right to vote of each of the companies involved in the 
division have so agreed. 
Comments 
Section 68 is based on Section 53 on national divisions and Section 24 on cross-border mergers. 
Section 13.69 
Supplementary Balance Sheet 
(1) This Section applies if the last annual accounts of any of the companies involved in the division relate 
to a financial year ending more than 6 months before the board of directors or the management board, as 
the case may be, of the company adopt the division plan. 
(2) Where one of the companies involved in the division falls within Section 69 (1) above, the board of 
directors or the management board, as the case may be, of the company must prepare a supplementary 
accounting statement, unless the shareholders and, where applicable, the holders of other securities 
conferring the right to vote, of each of the companies involved in the division, unanimously agree that no 
such statement is required. 
(3) Where such statement is required, it must consist of a balance sheet, or a consolidated balance sheet, 
as the case may be, dealing with the state of affairs of the relevant company or group as at a date not more 
than three months before the division plan was adopted by the board of directors or the management board, 
as the case may be, and the statement must be approved by the board of the relevant company. 
(4) The supplementary balance sheet shall not be required if the company publishes a half yearly financial 
report in accordance with Article 5 of Directive 2004/109/EC and makes it available to shareholders in 
accordance with Section 70. 
Comments 
Section 69 is based on Section 54 on national divisions. 
Section 13.70 
Inspection of Documents 
(1) The shareholders of each of the companies involved in the division must be able, within a period of 
one month before the meeting called to approve the division (see Section 71), to inspect and make copies 
of any of the documents listed below either at the registered office of that company or by freely accessing 
them on the company’s website for downloading and printing. 
(2) The relevant documents are: 
(a) the division plan; 
(b) where applicable, the directors’ explanatory report; 
(c) where applicable, the expert’s report to shareholders; 
(d) the companies’ annual accounts and annual reports for the previous three financial years together 
with any supplementary accounting statement required by Section 69. 
Comments 
Section 70 is based on Section 55 on national divisions. 
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Section 13.71 
General Meetings of Companies Involved in the Cross-border Division 
(1) Subject to Section 71 (6), the division plan must be approved by a majority in number, representing 
2/3 in value, of each class of shareholders of each of the companies involved in the cross-border division, 
present and voting, either in person or by proxy at a meeting. 
(2) Where the division is a division by formation of a new company, the memorandum or draft 
memorandum and articles or draft articles shall be approved by an ordinary resolution of each of the 
companies involved in the division. 
(3) The board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, of each of the companies involved 
in the division must report: 
(a) to every meeting of the shareholders, or any class of shareholders, of that company summoned for 
the purpose of agreeing to the division plan, and 
(b) to the board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, of every other merging 
company, any material changes in the property and liabilities of that company between the date when 
the division plan was adopted and the date of the meeting in question. 
(4) The board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, of each of the other companies 
involved in the division must in turn: 
(a) report those matters to every meeting of the shareholders, or any class of shareholders, of that 
company summoned for the purpose of agreeing to the division plan; or 
(b) send a report of those matters to every shareholder entitled to receive notice of such a meeting. 
(5) Section 71 (3) and (4) do not apply if all the holders of shares and other securities conferring the right 
to vote in general meetings of each of the companies involved in the division have so agreed. 
(6) In the case of any division by acquisition, it is not necessary for the division plan to be approved by the 
shareholders of the acquiring company if the court is satisfied that the conditions set out in Section 71 (7) 
to (9) have been complied with. 
(7) The first condition is that either: 
(a) the publication of notice of receipt of the division plan by the Registrar took place in respect of the 
acquiring company at least one month before the date of the first meeting of shareholders, or any class 
of shareholders, of the company being divided summoned for the purposes of agreeing to the division 
plan; or 
(b) the division plan is made freely available on the company website, details of which have been 
notified to, and published by the Registrar, at least one month before the date of the first meeting of 
shareholders, or any class of shareholders, of the company being divided summoned for the purposes 
of agreeing to the division plan, and the division plan remains available on the website throughout the 
period beginning one month before, and ending on, that date. 
(8) The second condition is that each of the documents listed in the applicable paragraphs of Section 70 
(2) relating to the acquiring company and the company being divided: 
(a) are available for inspection and copying by the shareholders of the acquiring company during the 
period beginning one month before, and ending on, the date of any such meeting as is mentioned in 
Section 71 (7) (a) to inspect that document at the registered office of that company; or 
(b) are made freely available on the company website and remain available on the website throughout 
the period beginning one month before, and ending on, the date of any such meeting as is mentioned 
in Section 71 (7) (a). 
(9) The third condition is that, no shareholder or shareholders of the acquiring company, holding not less 
than 5 % of the paid-up capital of the company which carried the right to vote at general meetings of the 
company (excluding any shares in the company held as treasury shares) has required, during that period, a 
meeting of the shareholders to be called for the purpose of deciding whether or not to agree to the division. 
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(10) The board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, of each of the companies 
involved in the division must notify the Registrar about the resolution on the division or, as the case may 
be, deliver evidence that no resolution was necessary. The board of directors or the management board, as 
the case may be, must also notify the Registrar about the expert’s declaration on the creditors’ position as 
referred to in Section 68 (3). 
(11) The Registrar shall publish notice of receipt of the documentation mentioned in Section 71 (10) 
and of the content of the expert’s declaration on the creditors’ position or that, according to Section 68 (5) 
no expert’s report has been drawn up. 
Comments 
Section 71 is based on Section 56 on national mergers and Section 27 on cross-border mergers. 
Section 13.72 
Creditor Protection 
(1) Creditors whose claims antedate the publication as referred to in Section 66 (3) and (4) and have not 
fallen due at the time of such publication may claim adequate securities if one of the following conditions 
is fulfilled: 
(a) the expert’s declaration referred to in Section 68 (3) concludes that the creditors are not sufficiently 
protected after the division; 
(b) the expert’s declaration referred to in Section 68 (3) concludes that the financial situation of the 
companies involved in the division requires additional safeguards for creditors; 
(c) no expert’s report has been drawn up according to Section 68 (5). 
(2) Creditors claiming adequate securities under Section 72 (1) (c) must credibly demonstrate that due to 
the cross-border division the satisfaction of their claim is at stake and that no adequate safeguards have 
been obtained from the company. 
(3) The creditors must file their claim no later than four weeks after the date on which the Registrars of all 
of the companies involved in the division published the notice referred to in Section 71 (11). The final 
implementation of the division as referred to in Section 76 and 77 can only be registered upon expiry of 
the time allowed for filing such claims. 
(4) In so far as a creditor of an acquiring company to which the obligation has been transferred in 
accordance with the division plan has not obtained satisfaction, the acquiring companies will be jointly and 
severally liable for that obligation. 
Comments 
Section 72 is based on Section 57 on national divisions and on Section 28 on cross-border mergers. 
Section 13.73 
Protection of Holders of Securities to Which Special Rights Attach  
(1) A person who, other than in his capacity as shareholder, may exercise a particular right against a 
company being divided, such as a right to a distribution of profits or a right to acquire shares, must obtain 
an equivalent right in the acquiring companies. 
(2) Section 73 (1) does not apply if: 
(a) the holder has agreed otherwise, or 
(b) the holder is, or under the division plan is to be, entitled to have the securities purchased by the 
acquiring companies on terms that the court considers reasonable. 
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Comments 
Section 73 is based on Section 60 on national divisions and on Section 29 on cross-border mergers. 
Section 13.74 
Sell-out Right of Dissenting Shareholders  
The company being divided has to offer, in the division plan, to those of its shareholders who have opposed 
the cross-border division at the general meeting to acquire their shares in return for appropriate cash 
compensation upon written request by such shareholders no later than four weeks after the date of the 
general meeting if the acquiring company is not subject to the same national law as the company being 
divided. 
Comments 
Section 74 is based on Section 30 on cross-border mergers. 
Section 13.75 
Division by Acquisition of a Non-wholly Owned Subsidiary 
(1) This Section applies in the case of a division by acquisition where 90 % or more (but not all) of the 
relevant securities of the company being divided are held by or on behalf of the acquiring companies. 
(2) It is not necessary for the division plan to be approved at a meeting of the shareholders, or any class of 
shareholders, of an acquiring company if the court is satisfied that the conditions in Section 75 (3) to (4) 
have been complied with. 
(3) The first condition is that the cross-border division plan provides that every other holder of relevant 
securities has the right to require the acquiring companies to acquire those securities. 
(4) The second condition is that, if a holder of securities exercises that right, the consideration to be given 
for those securities is fair and reasonable. 
Comments 
Section 75 is based on Section 31 on cross-border mergers. 
Section 13.76 
Legal Scrutiny and Pre-division Certificate 
(1) The competent court of the company being divided must check and certify the existence and validity 
of the legal acts and formalities required of the company.  
(2) For the company being divided the board of directors or the management board, as the case may be, 
shall file an application for legal scrutiny which is accompanied at least by the following documents: 
(a) the division plan as approved by the general meeting of the companies involved in the division; 
(b) the minutes of the general meeting of the company; 
(c) the directors’ explanatory report; 
(d) the expert’s report; 
(e) the supplementary balance sheet, if applicable. 
(3) If any document mentioned in Section 76 (2) is dispensable in the particular case, the company must 
deliver documentation evidencing the applicability of the relevant exception. It shall also, at the request of 
the competent court, deliver any other documentation which is needed to scrutinize the legality of the 
division. 
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(4) The court has to issue without delay to each of the companies’ subject to its national law a certificate 
conclusively attesting to the proper completion of the per-division acts and formalities. 
Comments 
Section 76 is based on Section 62 on national divisions and on Section 32 on cross-border mergers. 
Section 13.77 
Legal Effect of the Division 
(1) The court with jurisdiction over the acquiring companies must assess and certify the validity of the acts 
and formalities carried out by the companies as regards compliance with the relevant national law 
including, if applicable, the formation of a new company resulting from the cross-border division. The 
court shall in particular ensure that the companies involved in the cross-border division have approved the 
common division plan in the same terms and, where appropriate, that arrangements for employee 
participation have been made in accordance with Section 79. Section 76 (2) and (3) apply accordingly. The 
acquiring companies must also submit to the court the certificate referred to in Section 76 (4) within six 
months of its issue. 
(2) The cross-border division shall be effective upon registration by the Registrar of the company being 
divided. The Registrar shall notify, without delay, the company register of the companies being acquired 
that the cross-border division has taken effect. Deletion of the old registration, if applicable, shall be 
effected on receipt of that notification, but not before. 
(3) From the effective date according to Section 77 (2), a division by acquisition or by formation of a new 
company carried out in accordance with the requirements above shall have the following effects: 
(a) the transfer, both as between the company being divided and the acquiring companies and as 
regards third parties, to each of the acquiring companies of all the assets and liabilities of the company 
being divided; such transfer shall take effect with the assets and liabilities being divided in accordance 
with the allocation laid down in the division plan; 
(b) the shareholders of the company being divided become shareholders of the acquiring companies; 
(c) no shares in an acquiring companies shall be exchanged, however, for shares in the company being 
divided held either: 
(i) by that acquiring company itself or through a person acting in his own name but on its behalf; 
or 
(ii) by the company being divided itself or through a person acting in his own name but on its 
behalf; 
(d) the rights and obligations of the companies involved in the cross-border division arising from 
contracts of employment or from employment relationships and existing at the date on which the 
division takes effect shall, by reason of that division taking effect, be transferred to the acquiring 
companies on the date on which the division takes effect; 
(e) the company being divided ceases to exist. 
(4) The acquiring companies are obliged to make, to the shareholders of the company being divided, any 
cash payments required by the division plan. 
(5) Where an asset is not allocated by the division plan and where the interpretation of this plan does not 
make a decision on its allocation possible, the asset or the consideration therefore is allocated to all the 
acquiring companies in proportion of the share of the net assets allocated to each of those companies under 
the division plan. 
(6) Where a liability is not allocated by the division plan and where the interpretation of this plan does not 
make a decision on its allocation possible, each of the acquiring companies will be jointly and severally 
liable for it. 
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(7) From the effective date according to Section 77 (2), the cross-border division cannot be declared null 
and void. 
Comments 
Section 77 is based on Section 63 on national divisions and on Section 33 on cross-border mergers. 
Section 13.78 
Civil Liability of Management and Independent Persons towards Shareholders 
A director of any of the companies being involved in the division or an independent expert who has reported 
pursuant to Section 68 will be held liable for any loss or damage suffered by any shareholder or creditor by 
reason of their misconduct in the preparation or implementation of the division. 
Comments 
Section 78 is based on Section 64 on national divisions. 
Section 13.79 
Employee Participation 
In the cases referred to in Article 16 (2) of Directive 2005/56/EC, the participation of employees in the 
acquiring companies shall be regulated in accordance with the principles and procedures laid down in 
Article 16 (3) to (7) of Directive 2005/56/EC. 
Comments 
Section 79 is based on Section 35 on cross-border mergers.
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General Comments71 
1. EU law 
So far there are no EU rules on voluntary dissolutions of companies via liquidation. In 1987, the European 
Commission introduced the Draft Liquidation Directive,72 which has not been developed further in the 
following years. Many of the situations stated in the Draft Directive can be found in all Member States. 
Where investments are made in a company in another Member State it is in principle desirable that a similar 
legal protection regarding the procedure involved in liquidation is offered to shareholders or creditors. 
Cross-border investments are common and increasing and thus it makes it relevant to offer shareholders 
and creditors an equal protection regardless their own identities or that of the company they have invested 
in. This was also the aim of the Draft Liquidation Directive. 
The draft Directive aimed to limit the situations in which a company may be dissolved automatically by 
way of legislation (e.g. involuntary dissolution). This aim is also expresses in Article 12 of the 1st Company 
Law Directive (2009/101/EC), which limits the cases in which a company may be declared invalid. The 
same applies to the Single-Member Company Directive (2009/102/EC), which requires that a certain 
situation – i.e. all shares being held by a single shareholder – does not lead to the company’s automatic 
dissolution. 
In all circumstances, the Draft Liquidation Directive required that disclosure is ensured in connection with 
all dissolution decisions. Moreover, the draft directive established the principle of a procedure which is 
effected by liquidators over whose appointment the shareholders are to have a say. The liquidators are liable 
for damages in case of negligence resulting in loss and they may be dismissed on substantial grounds. 
Banks and other financial institutions were not subject to the Draft Liquidation Directive. 
When an SE transfers its registered office outside the Community, or in any other manner no longer 
complies with the requirements of Article 7 of the SE-Regulation, the member state must take appropriate 
measures to ensure compliance or take necessary measures to ensure that the SE is liquidated. 
The EU Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings 1346/2000 came into force on 31 May 2002, now recast 
Regulation 2015/848 which applies to proceedings opened after 26 June 2017.73 The main purposes of the 
Regulation are to set rules governing where in the EU, insolvency proceedings have to be opened, which 
country’s laws have to apply to those proceedings and to ensure that the proceedings and the effect of the 
proceedings are recognized throughout the EU. The overall effect of these rules is to make it easier to deal 
with the affairs of an insolvent debtor who has affairs in more than one EU country. 
The Regulation aims to increase legal certainty by providing clear rules, which determine jurisdiction, 
ensure that courts handling different proceedings will work closely with one another when debtors are faced 
with insolvency proceedings in several Member States, and provide reliable information to creditors by 
binding Member States to publish key decisions regarding the commencement of insolvency proceedings. 
The main advantage of the Regulation is that it establishes a clear structure for the commencement and 
recognition of insolvency proceedings where there is a cross-border element involving business in more 
than one Member State and the centre of main interests of the debtor is located in the EU. 
2. National law 
As mentioned above, so far there is no EU harmonization regarding the dissolution and liquidation of a 
company. However, the rules in the different Member States are quite similar. Unless it involves a transfer, 
the liquidation of a company usually includes the following steps: 
• notifying the body that initially registered the company to cancel the company license or employers’ 
entry in the register; 
• complying with social security and tax obligations; 
                                                     
71 The working group on Chapter 14 was chaired by Professor Evanghelos Perakis (University of Athens, Greece) and included 
Professor Monica Fuentes (Complutense University of Madrid, Spain). 
72 Draft Proposal DOC XV/43/87-EN. 
73 The Regulation is directly applicable in all Member States except Denmark, so litigants can plead it in the national courts. 
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• selling off the company’s property; 
• paying off any outstanding company debts. 
Procedures to liquidate a company are a matter for each Member State and vary from one country to the 
other. The EU Member States regulate the winding up of a company in different national laws, for example 
in the Companies Act in Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France (for voluntary liquidation), Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Slovenia, Sweden; in the general Commercial Code in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia and 
Slovakia; in the Civil Code in Italy. 
The core insolvency legislation is regulated in national insolvency law (e.g. Austrian Insolvency Act 2010, 
Belgium Bankruptcy Law 1997, Bulgarian Trade Act 1999, Czech Insolvency Act 2006, Danish 
Bankruptcy Act 2011, Dutch Bankruptcy Act 2007, Estonian Bankruptcy Act 2004, Finnish Bankruptcy 
Act 2004, French Commercial Code of 2000, German Insolvency Code 1994, Greek Bankruptcy Code 
2007, Hungarian Bankruptcy and Liquidation Proceedings Act 1991, Irish Companies Act 2012, Italian 
Insolvency Law 1942, Latvian Insolvency Law 2010, Lithuanian Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2016, Maltese 
Commercial Code 2003, Polish Act on Bankruptcy and Reorganization 2009, Portuguese Insolvency and 
Business Recovery Code 2004, Romanian Law on insolvency proceedings 2014, Slovakian Act on 
Bankruptcy and Restructuring 2006, Slovenian Financial Operations, Insolvency Proceedings and 
Compulsory Dissolution Act 2007, Spanish Bankruptcy Law 2003, Swedish Bankruptcy Act 1987, UK 
Insolvency Act 1986). 
One of the most important insolvency developments in recent years has been the recognition that the 
activity of companies and the nature of company structures (especially groups of companies) is such that 
insolvency of any size necessarily involves a cross-border element. EC Regulation 1346/2000 on 
Insolvency Proceedings reflects these issues and came into effect on 31 May 2002 (except for Denmark), 
now recast Regulation 2015/848. The Regulation does not attempt to harmonize insolvency procedures 
throughout the EU, however, and generally the applicable law is the national law of the state in which 
proceedings are opened. The Regulation applies only when the debtor has its business within the EU (other 
than Denmark) and it deals only with procedures, assets and creditors within the EU. 
3. Considerations 
The EMCA Group has pledged to adopt a “functional approach” to the topics to be included in the EMCA. 
In this sense it could be argued that company law and insolvency law can constitute (and in fact they do 
constitute) one single topic or at least a “continuum” and therefore, insolvency law should/might be 
included in the EMCA. However, this has the inherent risk of burdening EMCA with a very large amount 
of legislation, not always connected with company law considerations, which might discourage the states 
from adopting it. It should also be mentioned that insolvency law (especially today) is national in many 
aspects and deeply influenced by considerations of stakeholders’ protection. In the UK, the response to the 
“functional approach” has not consisted in incorporating insolvency into company law but rather the 
opposite, i.e. relocating dissolution and liquidation from company to insolvency law. Besides, creditor 
protection as a procedural system is highly path-dependent and not easy to harmonize. 
In this respect it is worth quoting Paul Davies:74  
“The provisions relating to winding up and dissolution are now to be found almost exclusively in 
the Insolvency Act 1986 and Part IV of the Insolvency Rules and not in the Companies Act: and 
rightly so where the company is insolvent. But although insolvency is the most common reason for 
winding up, it is far from being the only one and, when the company is fully solvent, it seems, on 
the face of it, somewhat illogical to treat the process as part of insolvency law rather than company 
law. The reason why the legislation relating to liquidation of solvent companies is in the Insolvency 
Act is probably to avoid duplicating those many provisions that apply whether or not the company 
is insolvent – to repeat them in the Companies Act would have added substantially to the length of 
the combined legislation”. 
                                                     
74 P. Davies, Gower & Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law, 8th ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, 2008), p. 1217. 
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On this basis, the EMCA Group has decided to include the matters of winding up and dissolution in the 
EMCA and not leave them to the insolvency legislation. On the other hand, in the Group’ opinion, the 
matters regarding insolvency itself should be left to the national insolvency legislation. 
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PART 1 
DEFINITIONS 
Section 14.01 
Definitions 
In the present Chapter the following definitions shall apply: 
(a)  “Dissolution” means the occurrence of one of the events enumerated in Part 2 of the present 
Chapter, and which marks the beginning of the liquidation period. 
(b) “Liquidation” means the procedure for the winding up of the dissolved company and its affairs. 
(c) “Extinction” of the company means the completion of the liquidation of the dissolved company 
and the disappearance of the legal personality of the latter; it is evidenced by the de-registration of the 
company. 
(d) “Insolvency” means a situation when a debtor is generally unable to pay its debts as they mature 
or when the debtor’s liabilities exceed the value of its assets; “Insolvency proceedings” mean the 
collective proceedings commenced in cases of insolvency, which are subject to court supervision, either 
for reorganization or liquidation. 
Comments 
The current (mainly continental European) use of the term “dissolution” refers to the fact that a company 
is dissolved and (immediately thereafter) put into liquidation (“Auflösung” and “Abwicklung”, 
“dissolution” and “liquidation”, “scioglimento” and “liquidazione”, “opløsning” and “liqvidation”, 
“disolución” and “liquidación”, “dissolução” and “liquidação”, “λύση” and “εκκαθάριση” etc.). Therefore, 
dissolution happens first and liquidation follows.  
Elsewhere, and mainly in the UK, the terms are used inversely. First is the winding up and last (upon 
completion of the latter) comes the “dissolution” of the company, meaning the moment, where the company 
loses its legal personality and is extinguished (see title of the Chapter IX of the UK Insolvency Act 1986: 
“Dissolution of Companies after Winding up”). 
In Chapter 14 the terms are used in their “continental” version. “Dissolution” is the moment where the 
company for the reasons stated in Part 2 enters the phase of “liquidation”, while the final disappearance of 
the company is called “extinction” (extinciόn, cancellazione, περάτωση), evidenced by the “de-
registration” of the company. 
Re 4) These definitions essentially reproduce those adopted by the Uncitral Legislative Guide on 
Insolvency Law (2005), p. 5. 
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PART 2 
DISSOLUTION OF THE COMPANY 
Section 14.02 
Dissolution by Resolution of the General Meeting 
(1) The company can be dissolved at any time by resolution of the shareholders’ general meeting, taken 
with the qualified majority of at least two-thirds of the votes cast as well as at least two-thirds of the share 
capital represented at the general meeting (Section 29 of Chapter 11 of EMCA), unless the articles of 
association provide for a higher majority. 
(2) A resolution of the general meeting providing for the transfer of the registered seat of the company to 
another country shall not cause the dissolution of the company, if the country of destination does not oppose 
the transfer of the seat and the legal personality of the company is continued in that country. 
Comments 
Under the EMCA a company is dissolved in three categories of cases: in the case of “voluntary” dissolution 
(Section 2), in cases of “automatic” dissolution (i.e. dissolution by operation of the law, Section 3) and 
when the court orders its dissolution (Sections 4 and 5). 
In Section 2 the “voluntary” dissolution is provided. It is added that the transfer of the company’s seat to 
another country (either a Member State or a third country) does not entail the dissolution of the company, 
if the receiving country recognizes that transfer. This provision is in conformity with European Court of 
Justice case law relating to the transfer of the statutory seat. However, since EMCA is national and not EU 
law, the above provision does not oblige Member States to recognize the transfer. 
In many countries, a “serious” loss of the subscribed capital may also lead to (voluntary) dissolution by 
decision of the general meeting. This is in principle provided by Directive 2012/30/EU (Article 19), which, 
in such a case, requires the general meeting “to consider whether the company should be wound up or any 
other measures taken”. This rule is to be found in EMCA Chapter 8, Section 30. 
Re 1) A qualified majority is usually required (e.g. Danish Companies Act Section 217, German AktG § 
262(2), Greece, Article 47a of Law 2190/1920). In Spain (see Article 364, 193, 201 of the Companies Act), 
an ordinary majority suffices. 
Section 14.03 
Causes of Automatic Dissolution 
The company shall be automatically dissolved, 
(a) When the duration of the company expires, unless the shareholders’ general meeting before the 
expiration has decided to extend it; 
(b) If the competent court has opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the company, unless the 
insolvency law of that court provides otherwise. 
(c) If the competent court has denied to open insolvency proceedings because of insufficiency of assets 
of the company able to cover the cost of such proceedings. 
Comments 
Re a) Subsection a provides that a company is dissolved upon expiration of its term. However, the 
shareholders’ meeting can extend its duration by decision taken before the expiration. If such decision 
comes after the expiration, the company is “reactivated” in conformity with Section 24. Also, in the EMCA, 
the articles of associations can provide that the duration of the company can be illimited, See Chapter 2, 
Section 4. 
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Re b): Subsection b provides that insolvency proceedings, when opened by the court, entail in principle the 
dissolution of the company. However, this matter has some ambiguities. Some countries accept the 
dissolution of the company when insolvency proceedings are commenced (for example Germany, Greece, 
Poland,) and this is the idea of Subsection b. In some other countries (such as Spain), the dissolution comes 
only when the liquidation phase of the insolvency proceedings has been initiated (the latter fits better with 
the idea of preservation of the undertaking). The problem is compounded by the fact that the lex concursus 
(law applicable to the insolvency proceeding) and the lex societatis (law applicable to the company) do not 
necessarily coincide. 
Re 3) The grounds for dissolution under this provision reflects situations provided for in some national 
laws (e.g. German Insolvency Law § 26; Greek Insolvency Code Article 6 § 2), whereby the court will 
reject a request to open insolvency proceedings, which would otherwise dissolve the company, because the 
available assets are insufficient to cover the costs of the procedure. 
Section 14.04 
Causes of Judicial Dissolution 
The company can be dissolved by a non-appealable court decision issued at the request of any person 
having a legitimate interest, 
(a) In the case of nullity of the company pronounced by the competent court; 
(b) If the company’s object has been implemented or when its implementation has become illegal or 
manifestly impossible, unless the general meeting has modified the articles of association so that the 
objects of the company are modified, expanded or limited. 
Comments 
Section 4 provides for the cases where a company is dissolved as a consequence of a court decision. 
Re a) A first case of judicial dissolution occurs when the court pronounces the nullity of the company. 
Under Section 13 of Chapter 3, “the EMCA contains no special provisions on situations where a company 
should be declared null and void. As a result thereof, the EMCA does not contain provisions on the effects 
of the nullity. However, it does not entirely preclude that a company can be declared null by a court 
decision”. Therefore, the wording of the above Section 4 covers this eventuality. Thus the pronouncement 
of nullity is mentioned in Section 4 as one of the causes of dissolution. 
In all cases where action by a court is envisaged, the jurisdiction needs to be specified. This however, is a 
general issue and the EMCA leaves the matter to the national legislator who wishes to adopt the EMCA. 
In many cases it may be appropriate to leave the matter to the Registration Authority. 
Section 14.05 
Other Causes of Judicial Dissolution 
The company can be dissolved by a non-appealable court decision, 
(a) Issued at the request of any shareholder, if the organs of the company have been paralyzed for a 
non-temporary reason, including equal participations, and this has caused the impossibility of the 
company to function; 
(b) Issued in the cases and at the request of the persons prescribed in the articles of association of the 
company; 
(c) In the cases of Section 33 of Chapter 11 (liquidation due to fraud on the minority) and of Section 
11 of Chapter 12 (compulsory dissolution). 
Comments 
In Section 5 the grounds for (judicial) dissolution may be invoked only by certain persons, whereas the 
grounds specified in Section 4 are absolute and may be relied upon by any party having a legitimate interest. 
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Re a): This is for example the case in France (Civil Code Article 1844-7, applicable to all companies) and 
in Greece (Law on companies limited by shares Article 48a). 
Re b): It should be possible to specify grounds for dissolution in the articles of association as, for example, 
under the Spanish Corporate Enterprise Act Article 362, but contrast the German AktG § 262. This would 
allow for the freedom, for example, to fix a time limit in the articles for the company’s existence, not by 
reference to a specific duration, but also by reference to the occurrence of certain events. However, for 
reasons of legal certainty, it is better not to have automatic dissolution but have the court decide whether 
the grounds for dissolution, as provided by the articles, have indeed occurred. 
Re c): This Subsection refers to the right of the Registrar to request the court to dissolve a company. It is 
inspired by the Danish Companies Act Section 225, the Finnish Companies Act Section 20:4, the Greek 
Law on companies limited by shares Article 48, and the Portuguese Companies Code Article 143. 
Section 14.06 
Registration of Dissolution 
(1) The management board or the liquidator shall cause the registration of the dissolution of the company 
in the Register. With the exception of the cases provided in Section 3, the dissolution shall take effect as 
from such registration. 
(2) Until the registration of the dissolution has been made, the general meeting of the company by 
resolution taken with qualified majority can revoke a dissolution previously agreed to by the general 
meeting in accordance with Section 2 (1). 
(3) Should registration of the dissolution not occur within a reasonable time, any person having a legitimate 
interest may ask the court to order the registration. The management board and the liquidator are liable for 
any damage caused by the delay. 
Comments 
Re 1) It is important to register the dissolution as it results in a change of the company’s purpose, i.e. the 
company is no longer doing business. See for example Czech Commercial Code 68(1) and German AktG 
§ 263. 
RE 2) In order to protect the interests of the shareholders in the value of the company as a going concern it 
should be ensured that a qualified majority has the right to reverse dissolution of the company before the 
registration has been effected (e.g. Polish Commercial Companies Code Article 460). Thus, the general 
meeting may always decide, with the same majority, to withdraw its decision on the company’s dissolution, 
i.e. to cancel the liquidation in progress, as long as the dissolution has not been registered (cf. Danish 
Companies Act Section 231). 
Re 3) National law must regulate the scope of liability of the liquidator (see Sections 22 – 23 below). 
Section 14.07 
Interim Duties of the Management Board 
Until the liquidator assumes his/her duties, the management board of the company shall continue to manage 
the company with a view to avoid detriment to the integrity and the value of the company’s assets. 
Comments 
Section 7 is intended to bridge the gap between the moment of dissolution of the company and the time 
when the liquidator or the liquidators assume their duties. During that period, the pre-existing management 
must remain in duty and carry out any necessary transactions in order to preserve the company’s assets 
until the appointment of liquidators. However, even after the liquidator has assumed his/her duties, the 
previous management still has a duty to assist the liquidator (Sections 13 Subsection 4 and 17 Subsection 
17 of this Chapter) 
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Section 7 is inspired by the Danish Companies Act Section 229, the German AktG § 265(1) and the Italian 
Civil Code Article 2486. 
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PART 3 
LIQUIDATION OF THE COMPANY 
Section 14.08 
The Phase of Liquidation 
(1) The dissolution of the company shall be followed by its liquidation. When the dissolution of the 
company is caused by the opening of insolvency proceedings, the rules of insolvency law shall apply. 
(2) Instead of placing a company into liquidation, the court may order the immediate cancellation of the 
company from the Register without liquidation, if the assets of the company are not adequate to cover the 
costs of liquidation, or if there is no information about the existence of assets, unless a shareholder, a 
creditor or a third party undertakes to bear the costs of the liquidation. The court may act upon request of 
the liquidator or shareholders holding at least the 5 % of the capital or, in case of no par value shares, the 
5 % of the total number of the shares issued. 
Comments 
The decision to carry out the dissolution of the business marks the beginning of the liquidation process and 
the appointment of one or more liquidators. After its dissolution, a company only continues to exist for the 
purpose of its liquidation. 
Re 2) Section 8(2) is inspired by German Insolvency Law (§ 26 InsO) (see also article 3 of Greek Insolvency 
Law), which provides that insolvency proceedings are not to be opened if the available assets are 
insufficient to cover the costs of the procedure, cf. also German AktG 264 (2). See also Finnish Companies 
Act Section 20-2. The purpose of this provision is to avoid a liquidation procedure if in fact there is 
practically nothing to liquidate. 
Section 14.09 
The Company during Liquidation 
(1) During liquidation the company maintains its legal personality. The name of the company must mention 
the fact that the company is “in liquidation”. 
(2) During liquidation the shareholders maintain their rights. 
(3) The rules concerning the functioning of the organs, including the auditors, as well as the organization 
and the operation of the company shall apply also during the period of liquidation, unless the law provides 
otherwise or such rules are inconsistent with the manner and the purpose of liquidation. 
(4) During liquidation the company may merge or be divided. It can also be subject to insolvency 
proceedings under the conditions and in accordance with applicable insolvency law. 
(5) Unless otherwise provided by the law, the liquidation shall be governed by the provisions of the articles 
of association. 
(6) The period of liquidation constitutes one financial period. 
(7) During liquidation the commencement or the continuation of execution against the assets of the 
company is suspended. 
Comments 
Re 1) The fact that the company is in liquidation is recorded in the national Register (see Section 6) and 
the words “in liquidation” are added (cf. Czech Commercial Code § 70(2), Danish Companies Act Article 
234 and Polish Commercial Companies Code § 461(2)). The legal personality of the company is not 
affected by reason of its dissolution, for as long as the liquidation proceedings are not completed. 
Re 2) The status of the shareholders is unaffected by the liquidation. 
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Re 3) From the moment a liquidator is appointed, he adopts the legal position which the administrative, 
management or supervisory bodies had before liquidation, presumptively in accordance with ordinary 
company law principles. The company law provisions applicable to undissolved companies continue to 
apply until completion of the liquidation, unless required otherwise by law or by the purpose of the 
liquidation (cf. German AktG § 264(3)). 
Re 4) Dissolution and the ensuing liquidation proceedings do not prohibit a merger or a division of the 
dissolved company. It is also possible to open insolvency proceedings if the conditions of the latter are met, 
for example if there has been a “cessation of payments” of the company during liquidation. In the first case 
(merger etc.) the company will normally be reactivated as per Article 24 of this Chapter. In the second case 
insolvency law will henceforth apply. 
Re 5) The provision of Subsection 5 states that the liquidation proceedings will be governed by the articles 
of association, “unless otherwise stated in the law”. This means that the articles can contain provisions on 
the manner in which liquidation has to be conducted, if such provisions are not contrary to the law, mainly 
in matters concerning the protection of creditors. 
[Re 7) This provision, if followed by the national legislator, essentially means that the liquidation procedure 
will resemble a collective procedure. The liquidation will be smoother and quicker and equal treatment of 
creditors will be better served.  
Section 14.10 
Appointment of Liquidator 
(1) The liquidation is carried out by one or more liquidators, natural persons or legal entities, shareholders 
or third parties. Persons disqualified from being members of the management board are not allowed to act 
as liquidators. 
(2) Unless the articles of association or the general meeting of shareholders provide otherwise, the 
liquidation is carried out by one liquidator. At the request of shareholders holding at least the 10 % of the 
capital or, in case of no par value shares, the 10 % of the total number of the shares issued the court may 
increase the number of liquidators. 
(3) The liquidator shall be appointed by the court in the case of judicial dissolution and by the general 
meeting by an majority resolution in all other cases. 
(4) if the dissolved company remains without a liquidator and no action is taken for the appointment or the 
replacement of the liquidator within a reasonable time, a liquidator shall be appointed by the court at the 
request of any person having a legitimate interest. 
Comments 
Section 10 deals with the nomination of liquidators. Subsection 1 allows for one or more liquidators. While 
the general rule is one liquidator, under Subsection 2, the articles may require the appointment of more 
liquidators. Thus, the appointment of one liquidator - which is the simplest solution - is possible only if the 
articles do not require more liquidators. In all instances the court may nominate additional liquidators, if 
this is justified by the circumstances, mainly in cases of complicated and difficult liquidations. 
Re 1) This provision should be coordinated with the provision regarding the appointment of directors, since 
the latter cannot be legal persons (see EMCA, Chapter 8, Section 18). As a rule, a liquidator must be a 
qualified insolvency practitioner (cf. UK Insolvency Act Sections 230 (19- (5), 389 and 390, the Lithuanian 
Civil Code Article 2.108 Part 3). This means that in principle the liquidator must be – amongst other 
requirements – typically a member of a recognized professional body and independent of the company 
concerned. 
Re 2) This provision provides for minority protection, allowing shareholders holding 10 % of the share 
capital to apply to the court for the appointment of additional liquidator(s) who will liquidate the company 
together with the liquidator elected at the general meeting (cf. Polish Commercial Companies Code Article 
463 § 2). 
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Re 3 and 4) In the case where a resolution for voluntary liquidation has been passed, the shareholders shall 
appoint the liquidator (cf. UK Insolvency Act Section 91(1)), unless otherwise provided by the law or the 
articles of association. Where there is no liquidator appointed for whatever reason, the court may appoint 
one (cf. UK Insolvency Act Section 108). 
Section 14.11 
Replacement of Liquidator 
(1) The general meeting has the right to replace the liquidator at any time, provided that such replacement 
is on the agenda. 
(2) At the request of shareholders holding at least the 10 % of the capital or, in case of no par value shares, 
the 10 % of the total number of the shares issued and upon serious grounds, including the unjustified delay 
of the liquidation, the court may replace the liquidator or the liquidators, specifying the functions to be 
performed by the new liquidator or liquidators.  
Comments 
Re 1) The replacement of the liquidator is a serious matter and such matter needs to be mentioned on the 
agenda of the general meeting called to replace him. Admittedly, since the agenda is drawn up by the 
liquidator himself, the replacement becomes obviously more difficult. On the other hand a minority of 
shareholders has the right to convene a general meeting specifying the agenda. 
Re 2) Section 380.1 of the Spanish Corporate Enterprise Act requires 20 % of the capital and requires a 
serious ground (“iusta causa”). In Germany, liquidators who have not been appointed by the court may be 
removed by the shareholders’ meeting at any time. Bulgarian law demands 5 %, Lithuanian law 10 %.. 
Section 14.12 
Applicable Rules on Liquidator 
(1) As soon as the liquidator is appointed, he/she replaces the former management board and the former 
supervisory board. 
(2) Unless otherwise provided in the law or the articles of association the provisions regarding the 
management board shall apply to the liquidator. The term of office of the liquidator shall be equal to that 
of the liquidation period. 
(3) The appointment and the replacement of liquidators shall be registered in the Register. 
Comments 
Re 1) When a company is in liquidation, it is represented by its management until a liquidator has been 
nominated (see also Section 7 of this Chapter). After that, the company is represented by the liquidator who 
replaces the management. This implies that all company’s bodies, except for the general meeting, lapse as 
a result of the liquidation (see also Section 9 of this Chapter). The liquidator carries out the liquidation and 
the winding up of the company until the end of the liquidation proceedings. See for example Finnish 
Companies Act Section 20:9(1) and Swedish Companies Act Section 25:30. 
Re 2) The liquidator shall be subject to the provisions of the EMCA on the management and supervisory 
board (cf. Finnish Companies Act Section 20:9(1)). A liquidator shall act instead of the management and 
shall be charged with the duty of carrying out the liquidation. 
Re 3) Once appointed, the liquidator shall be registered (cf. Czech Commercial Code Section 71(2) (within 
10 days) Danish Companies Act Article 220, Finnish Companies Act Section 20:10, German AktG § 266 
and Polish Commercial Companies Code § 464(1)). 
The remuneration of the liquidator follows the general rules applicable to the management board. 
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Section 14.13 
General Duties and Powers of Liquidator 
(1) Upon assuming their duties, the liquidator shall take possession of all assets of the company and shall 
manage and administer them for the purposes of an efficient liquidation. 
(2) An efficient liquidation is a liquidation procedure, which in the shortest time period is likely to bring 
the maximum return to the creditors and the shareholders. 
(3) The liquidator shall have the power to represent the company vis-à-vis third parties in the same way as 
the management board. Unless the articles of association or the general meeting provide otherwise, all 
liquidators, should more than one be appointed, acting jointly, shall represent and bind the company. 
However, a notice to the company can validly be made to any liquidator. 
(4) If requested by the liquidator, the last management board of the company shall assist the liquidator in 
the operations of the liquidation. 
Comments 
Duties owed by the liquidator are duties owed to the company and not to individual shareholders, creditors 
or other stakeholders. Title to the company’s assets is not automatically vested in the liquidator but remains 
vested in the company. When carrying out his/her functions, the liquidator acts as an agent of the company. 
The basic duty of the liquidator in all types of liquidations is to wind up the company’s affairs, to collect 
in and realise the company’s assets and to make distributions to the creditors in accordance with the 
statutory scheme, with any surplus being returned to shareholders. 
Re 1) This Subsection provides that the liquidator is vested with managerial duties for the purpose of 
liquidating the company. 
Re 3) If more than one liquidator have been appointed, all the liquidators are authorized to represent the 
company jointly, unless the articles or the body with authority to make such appointment provide otherwise 
(cf. German AktG § 269(2)). If a statement with legally binding effect is to be made to the company, it 
shall suffice if such statement is made to one liquidator (cf. German AktG § 269(2)). The power of the 
liquidator to represent the company may not be limited, see for example German AktG § 269 (5), and Polish 
Commercial Companies Code § 469. 
Re 4) Former members of the management, if so required, must cooperate in the liquidation proceedings 
(cf. Spanish Corporate Enterprise Act Article 374(2)). 
Section 14.14 
Invitation of Creditors to Notify Their Claims 
(1) Upon assuming their duties, the liquidator shall invite creditors to notify their claims against the 
company with supporting documents, if any, within a time period of not less than three months. The 
invitation shall be published in the Register and in newspapers according to the reasonable judgement of 
the liquidator in one or more languages that creditors are expected to understand. The liquidator shall also 
proceed to individual invitation of creditors, if this is possible. 
(2) Notification of a claim is not a prerequisite for the payment of the creditor. However, creditors who 
notify after the deadline fixed for notification and who were not known to the company may demand 
satisfaction of their claims only from the as yet undistributed assets of the company. 
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Comments 
Re 1) The liquidator is obliged to notify the company’s creditors to file their claims, referring in such notice 
to the dissolution of the company (cf. Danish Companies Act Section 221(1), the Finnish Companies Act 
Section 20:14, German AktG § 267 and Polish Commercial Companies Code). The time period, however, 
varies in the different Member States (e.g. reasonable period but not shorter than 3 months in the Czech 
Republic, 3 months in Denmark and 6 months in Poland). The EMCA Group considers a three-month 
period is appropriate as it gives the creditors sufficient time to demand satisfaction of their claims. The 
liquidator will also be obliged to invite the creditors on an individual basis, if this is possible, mainly when 
creditors and their addresses are known. 
Re 2) Section 14(2) gives late and unknown creditors the opportunity to make their claims after the deadline 
and to demand satisfaction of their claims from the as yet undistributed assets of the company (cf. Polish 
Commercial Companies Code § 475). 
Section 14.15 
Information to be Provided to Shareholders during Liquidation 
(1) During the liquidation the shareholders have the right to be informed about the progress of the 
liquidation. The information must be given periodically, at least once in every semester. The means of 
information can be chosen by the liquidator so as to ensure that this information reaches all shareholders 
in a timely and equal manner. 
(2) If the liquidation is not completed in one year as from the dissolution of the company, the liquidator 
shall convene a general meeting, to which they shall present a detailed report and a balance sheet about the 
operations of liquidation, the reasons of the delay and the prospects of its conclusion. This report and the 
balance sheet shall be registered in the Register and posted on the company’s website. If during the 
liquidation new operations are carried out, these must be explained in the notes accompanying the balance 
sheet. 
(3) The balance sheet provided in this Section shall be audited, if the law so requires for the balance sheets 
of the company, and it must be submitted for approval to the general meeting. 
(4) This Section shall apply for all subsequent years, subject to Section 16. 
Comments 
Re 1) Shareholders must be notified of the liquidation progress (cf. Spanish Enterprise Act Article 388(1)). 
Notice must be given by the most effective means. 
Re 2-4): Companies in liquidation must continue to submit a balance sheet, until the liquidation has been 
completed (cf. Danish Companies Act Section 224). These provisions are inspired by the Italian Civil Code 
Article 2490. 
Section 14.16 
Acceleration Plan 
(1) If after three years as from its commencement the liquidation is not concluded, the liquidator shall 
present to the general meeting a plan for the acceleration of the liquidation. In this plan the liquidator shall 
state the reasons for the delay and shall propose adequate measures for the completion of the liquidation as 
soon as possible. Such measures may consist in agreements with third parties for the settlement of claims 
or liabilities of the company, such as waiving of rights, compromises, termination of judicial or arbitration 
procedures, prepayment of debts, collection of future debts at a discount, termination of contracts, transfer 
of assets to third parties or arbitration agreements. 
(2) If the general meeting approves the acceleration plan, the liquidator is obliged to implement it. His/her 
responsibility for the actions provided in the plan arise only to the extent that the liquidator provided 
insufficient, false or misleading information to the general meeting. 
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Comments 
The Acceleration Plan is inspired by the Greek Law on companies limited by shares, Article 49. The 
purpose of the acceleration plan is to secure that the liquidation process is finished without undue delay. 
Similar provisions are not found in other Member States’ company laws. 
Section 14.17 
Operations of Liquidation 
(1) Within three months of the opening of liquidation the liquidator has the duty to draw up an inventory 
of all assets of the company as well as a balance sheet. The members of the previous management board 
have the duty to assist the liquidator in drawing up the inventory and the balance sheet and, if they have a 
legitimate interest, have the right to add their own remarks on the latter. 
(2) The liquidator shall conclude all pending affairs of the company. He can also undertake new operations, 
if the serve the purposes of an efficient liquidation. 
(3) The liquidator shall liquidate all assets of the company. To the extent possible, the company’s 
undertaking shall be sold as a going concern. 
(4) The liquidator shall collect all claims and pay all debts of the company. He shall also claim any unpaid 
capital to the extent that this is necessary for the purposes of liquidation. Non- mature or disputed debts 
may be paid by depositing the relevant amount in accordance with the general rules. 
(5) Any liquidation surplus shall be distributed to the shareholders. Such distribution shall not be made 
before all debts to known creditors have been paid; however, if adequate security is provided, an interim 
distribution may be made before that time. 
(6) The liquidator shall keep the accounts and the books of the company. 
(7) If the company has sufficient assets for the payment of the creditors, the articles of association can 
provide, or the general meeting can decide a different manner of disposal of the assets or the attribution of 
certain assets to one or more shareholders, provided that an independent chartered accountant has 
previously evaluated such assets and confirmed their sufficiency for the payment of the creditors. 
Comments 
This Section deals with the liquidation proceedings. 
Re 1) The three-month period starts from the day where the liquidation has been registered, cf. Section 6. 
Within three months of the start of the liquidation the liquidator must prepare an inventory and a balance 
sheet for the company to the date on which it was dissolved. 
Re 2) The liquidator shall close current business, collect receivables, perform obligations and liquidate the 
assets of the company. He/she will have the right to sue the former management of the company for 
damages. New business shall be transacted only where needed to close current business (cf. Greek Law on 
companies limited by shares Article 49(4), Polish Commercial Companies Code § 468 and Spanish 
Corporate Enterprise Act Article 384). The aim of this is to take the actions necessary to terminate the 
operations of the company, in an orderly manner. 
Re 3) The liquidator shall carry out the sale of the assets of the company as a whole in order to obtain the 
best price available. 
Re 4) Money, securities and other documents as well as valuables may be deposited by the debtor for the 
creditors in accordance with the general rules (like for example the „Hinterlegung”, as per § 372 of the 
German Civil Code). See a similar provision in the Polish Commercial Companies Act § 473. 
Re 5) Liquidation proceeds may not be distributed to shareholders until all debts to creditors have been 
settled. Any surplus shall be distributed pursuant to the rules in the articles of association or, in the absence 
thereof, established by the general meeting (cf. Danish Companies Act Section 222 and Spanish Corporate 
Enterprise Act Article 3391(1)). 
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Re 7) If the articles of association or the general meeting so permit and the assets are sufficient to repay 
creditors, it is possible that certain arrangements are provided regarding the disposal of the assets. For 
example, it is possible for certain members to be paid their share by returning assets to them that they 
previously contributed to the company, provided that such assets continue to form part of the company’s 
estate. If that is going to be done and there is no surplus left to pay each member his share in cash after the 
rest of the assets have been sold and the company’s creditors have been paid, the member or members who 
are to receive their share in kind must pay the difference in cash to the other members (cf. Portuguese Code 
of Commercial Companies Article 148 and Spanish Corporate Enterprise Act Article 393). 
Section 14.18 
Final Balance Sheet 
At the end of the operations of liquidation and before any distributions are made, the liquidator shall draw 
up and submit to the shareholders the following statements: Final financial statements, a general report on 
the operations of liquidation and (in case of insufficiency of assets) a draft distribution plan. The 
distribution plan shall rank creditors in accordance with the general national rules. The liquidator shall 
cause the registration of the above statements in the Register. 
The financial statements provided in this Section shall be audited, if the law so requires for the balance 
sheets of the company. 
Comments 
Once the liquidation procedures have been concluded, the liquidator must present a report on the assets and 
financial position of the company (through an inventory and balance sheet) and a report on the actions 
taken and proposed distribution of the assets left after outstanding transactions have been carried out, credit 
collection, and payment of debts (cf. Czech Commercial Code Section 75(1), Danish Companies Act 
Article 224, Finnish Companies Act Section 20:16, Greek Law on companies limited by shares Article 
49(5) and Spanish Corporate Enterprise Act Article 390(1)). 
Section 14.19 
Final General Meeting 
(1) Within ninety days following the registration of the statements of Section 18, a general meeting of 
shareholders shall be convened by the liquidator. 
(2) The agenda of the above general meeting shall include the approval of the above statements. 
(3) Within a month as from the approval by the general meeting of the above statements, any creditor or 
shareholder may oppose the distribution plan before the court. The court may order changes to the plan in 
accordance with the rights and the ranking of each applicant. Distributions may be made before the court’s 
judgement only insofar as the creditors or shareholders’ position is not affected by the opposition. 
(4) Any liquidation dividends, which have not been collected by shareholders or creditors, in accordance 
with the directions of the liquidator, shall be deposited by the liquidator in a bank in the name of the 
creditors or the shareholders who did not collect them. 
Comments 
The statements prepared under Section 18 of this Chapter must be submitted to the general meeting for 
approval (cf. Czech Commercial Code Section 75(1), Danish Companies Act Article 224, Greek Law on 
companies limited by shares Article 49(5) and Spanish Corporate Enterprise Act Article 390(1)). 
Re 3) The resolution of the general meeting approving the balance sheet, the report and the proposal for 
distribution of the assets may be challenged by members who did not vote in favor of it within 1 month 
from the date on which the resolution was passed (cf. Czech Commercial Code Section 75(2), Spanish 
Corporate Enterprise Act Article 390(2)). 
Re 4) A similar provision can be found in the Spanish Corporate Enterprise Act Article 394(2). 
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PART 4 
EXTINCTION OF THE COMPANY 
Section 14.20 
Extinction – De-registration – Books 
(1) Upon completion of liquidation, the company shall be extinguished and its legal personality terminated. 
(2) A company shall not be extinguished if the company is reactivated in accordance with Section 24 of 
the present Chapter. 
(3) The liquidator shall cause the cancellation of the extinguished company from the Register (de-
registration). 
(4) The books and records of the extinguished company shall be kept for a period of ten years by the person 
appointed to that effect by the general meeting or as directed by the court. The right to inspect them by 
those who had that right before the extinction can be exercised if the person making the request prepays 
any expenses. 
Comments 
Re 1-3) After the completion of the winding-up process, the company is removed from the Register and it 
ceases to exist (cf. Czech Commercial Code Section 75b(2), Danish Companies Act Article 224, Finnish 
Companies Act Section 20:17 Polish Commercial Companies Code § 478, Spanish Corporate Enterprise 
Act Article 396 and UK Insolvency Act Sections 201(1), (2) and 205(1), (2)). 
Re 4) A similar provision can be found in the German AktG § 273(2), the Italian Civil Code Article 2496, 
and the Polish Commercial Companies Code § 476. 
Section 14.21 
Subsequent Appearance of Assets or Liabilities 
(1) If after de-registration of the company new assets are discovered, the liquidator shall liquidate such 
assets and distribute the proceeds to the creditors and, if possible, to the shareholders. If a liquidator does 
not exist or refuse to act, the court of the last seat of the company shall appoint a substitute at the request 
of any person having a legitimate interest. This paragraph shall not apply if the new assets are inadequate 
for covering the costs of the continued liquidation. 
(2) The liquidator or the substitute may re-register the company, to the extent this is necessary for the 
completion of the operations of paragraph 1. The court may also order re-registration. 
(3) Paragraph 1 shall apply mutatis mutandis if new liabilities are discovered, but only to the extent that 
new assets make their payment possible. However, the creditors have the right to claim from the 
shareholders any monies received by the shareholders as proceeds of the liquidation as well as from the 
liquidator, if he/she is in fault. 
Comments 
Re 1 – 2) The liquidator of a company, which has been deleted from the register following liquidation or 
compulsory dissolution, is obliged to continue the liquidation if additional funds have become available for 
distribution. The court may appoint a new liquidator and/or order that the company be restored to register 
if this is necessary. However, only the liquidation procedure is resumed (cf. Czech Commercial Code 
Section 75b, Danish Companies Act Section 235, Finnish Companies Act Section 20:18 and UK 
Companies Act Section 1029). 
Re 3) Similar provisions can be found in the Italian Civil Code Article 2495, in the Portuguese Companies 
Code Article 163, and the Spanish Corporate Enterprise Act Article 399(1). However, the Polish 
Commercial Companies Code does not include an obligation to return proceeds received in good faith, cf. 
§ 475(2). 
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PART 5 
CIVIL LIABILITY 
Section 14.22 
Civil Liability of Liquidator 
The liability of the liquidator is governed by the provisions on the liability of directors. 
Comments 
For the provisions governing the liability of directors, see EMCA Chapter 10. 
Section 14.23 
Civil Liability of Previous Management after Dissolution 
The members of the last management board may be liable to the shareholders and the creditors for failing 
to assist with the liquidation of the company in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter (Sections 7, 
13 Subsection 4 and 17 Subsection 1) where that failure to assist can be shown to have caused direct loss 
to the shareholders and creditors. 
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PART 6 
REACTIVATION OF THE COMPANY 
Section 14.24 
Conditions of Reactivation 
(1) The company, which has been dissolved, can be reactivated if circumstances change such that the 
grounds for dissolution are no longer relevant and the shareholders’ general meeting has so decided. The 
decision of the general meeting shall be taken with the qualified majority. 
(2) Such reactivation is not permitted if liquidation has been completed or the most significant assets of 
the company have already been liquidated. 
(3) The liquidator or the new management board shall cause the re-registration of the company in the 
Register. 
Comments 
Re 1) The company can be reactivated following a decision passed at a shareholders’ meeting.  
Re 2) In Denmark this is the case if no distribution has been made, cf. Danish Companies Act Section 231. 
Section 14.25 
Effects of Reactivation 
(1) Following the registration of the reactivation, the reactivated company resumes its operations. If the 
general meeting so decides, the reactivated company can at the same time be converted into another legal 
form or be merged with another company. 
(2) The general meeting that decides the reactivation shall also appoint a new management board [or a 
supervisory board]. 
Comments 
The effect of restoration is that the company is deemed to have continued in existence as if it has not been 
struck off (cf. UK Companies Act Section 1028(1)).
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General Comments75 
1. EU Law 
There is no specific regulation on groups by European Union law. A proposal of a ninth directive,76 which 
was largely inspired by German law, was dropped by the end of 1980s, due to the lack of support for this 
approach. 
2. National Law 
Groups of companies are a major economic phenomenon. Since the middle of the last century, enterprises 
have increasingly chosen to organize and to conduct their business activities in the form of a network of 
individual separate companies rather than as a single corporate entity: therefore, the group of companies – 
and not the single company – is the prevailing form of the modern enterprise. 
As a legal phenomenon, groups are a well-known and established topic in several sectors of the law, either 
in a national or in a European context, e.g. tax law, accounting law, competition law, labour law, and so 
on. Yet, its treatment in the area of company law has proved to be a difficult, disparate and mostly unsolved 
issue. 
At the national Member States level, there are four major approaches: comprehensive regulation, partial 
regulation, case law recognition of the interest of the group, and lack of treatment (except what is required 
by EU directives). 
The first approach consists in a global and comprehensive regulation of groups of companies. This 
approach originates in Germany (1965), and has been followed suit closely by Portugal (1986), Hungary 
(1988-2012), Czech Republic (1991-2012), Slovenia (1993) and Croatia (1993). It can be noted that this 
approach has also been adopted in Albania (2008) and Turkey (2012). Outside Europe, it also influenced 
countries such as Brazil (1976). Austria and Poland, although being very close in legal tradition to Germany 
(like all other countries who adopted the German approach), chose not to adopt it. However, the Austrian 
case law on groups is at least as rigid as in Germany. 
A second approach consists in a partial or selective regulation, which deals with some major questions of 
groups of companies without aiming, however, to regulate it in a complete and comprehensive manner. 
This is the case of Italy, which adopted a new regime for groups in 2003 (Italian Civil Code Article 2497 
et seq.). Italian law recognizes the interest of the group. It is influenced by German law but is considered 
to be more flexible. 
The third approach is the French one. It derives from the 1985 Rozenblum decision of the French Supreme 
Court. In that decision, the court recognized the interest of the group. As a consequence, the directors of a 
subsidiary may take into consideration the interest of the group when making a decision that prejudices the 
subsidiary, provided that several conditions are satisfied. This flexible case law approach is recognized in 
other Member States (e.g. Belgium, Estonia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the Nordic countries and 
Spain). 
Finally, some Companies Acts have no specific provisions on group interest. This approach is followed for 
instance in the UK. However, as regards the UK, it should be remembered that directors of a subsidiary are 
able to take into account the interests of the group in making their decisions. The risk of unduly favouring 
the parent is mitigated by the risk of the subsidiary director’s personal liability for wrongful trading. From 
a functional perspective, the British approach might not be very different from the French one. 
                                                     
75 The working group on Chapter 15 was chaired by Professor Pierre-Henri Conac (University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg) and 
included Professor José Engrácia Antunes (Catholic University of Portugal (Porto), Portugal) and Professor Isabelle Urbain-
Parleani (University of Paris-Descartes, France). 
76 Preliminary Draft of a Directive Based on Article 54, 3 (g) on Harmonization of the Law of Groups of Companies (Part I - EEC 
Doc. XI/328/74-E, Part II - EEC Doc. XV/593/75-E). A German version of the draft can be found in M. Lutter, Europäisches 
Gesellschaftsrecht, 2nd ed. (Walter de Gruyter, 1984), pp. 187-225. 
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Apart from these formal distinctions, the real difference is between Member States that recognize or not 
the interest of the group. The issue is whether the directors of a subsidiary can permit some disadvantage 
to the subsidiary in the pursuit of the interests of the group, without having to compensate the subsidiary 
for this damage immediately, or within a short time period, and to the full amount ? The EMCA group has 
chosen to recognize the group interest. 
The “Forum Europaeum on Group Law”, composed of a group of Academics, published in 2000 a 
proposition for a European regulation of groups of companies based on some standards and rules – entitled 
“The Corporate Group Law Principles and Proposals”.77 This proposal was influenced by German law 
(“Konzernrecht”), although the drafters moved away from the system put in place in 1965. It was also 
influenced by French case law (the so-called “Rozenblum” doctrine), and by French and UK law 
(“obligations aux dettes”, wrongful trading). The starting point and aim of the Forum Europaeum was, to 
a certain extent, different from the one of EMCA, since the goal was to adopt a European Community 
solution, and not a national Act. Therefore, once the basic standards were set, many points were left to 
Member States discretion and options were suggested. The proposal of the Forum Europaeum was not 
adopted at the EU level, due apparently to a lack of support by professionals, at the time, for such regulation. 
However, the work of the Forum Europaeum has been used as a basis for the EMCA Chapter 15 on Groups. 
The decision of the Forum Europaeum to recognize the group interest showed the way forward. Since 2000, several 
Member States have moved in this direction, through statute or case law. The Czech Republic moved from the German 
approach to the Rozenblum doctrine when introducing their new their Commercial code in 2014. In 2015, two 
decisions of the Supreme Court of Estonia and Spain introduced the Rozenblum doctrine in their respective 
jurisdictions. Some Member States are also considering moving in this direction. A 2014 report in Greece supported 
the implementation into Greek law of the Rozenblum doctrine even while adopting some elements of German law. 
No Member State has moved from Rozenblum, or similar, doctrines toward the rigid approach of compensating any 
losses, although, some elements of the German approach have been usually included (e.g. dependency report, sell-out 
right). Therefore, iit appears that the Rozenblum doctrine has reached a status approaching ius commune for Member 
States that recognize the interest of the group. Currently, a majority of Member States recognize the interest of the 
group to a certain extent either through case law or legislation. A minority of Member States do not recognize the 
interest of the group at all or only in particular situations. 
The debate on the recognition of the group interest was also relaunched at the EU level by the Report of 
the Reflection Group on the Future of EU Company Law (2011)78 which called the European Commission 
to consider “subject to evidence that it would be a benefit to take action at the EU level, to adopt a 
recommendation recognising the interest of the group.”79 Since 2012, there have also been calls for an EU 
intervention, based on the French Rozenblum approach, such as the 2015 Proposal of the Forum Europaeum 
on Company Groups (FECG), “to facilitate the management of cross-border company groups in Europe” 
(2015), calling for a directive,80 and the 2015 report of the French Think Tank Club des Juristes “Towards 
Recognition of the Group Interest in the European Union” calling for a Framework recommendation.81 In 
2016, the European Company Law Experts (ECLE) also recommended that the Commission develop an 
EU “instrument” on Related Party Transactions with a special regime within groups where companies could 
take into account the interest of other group companies or of a group as a whole.82 Also, in October 2016, 
the Informal Company Law Expert Group (ICLEG), attached to the European Commission, published 
“Report on the recognition of the interest of the group”.83 
                                                     
77 The steering committee of the “Forum Europaeum on Group Law” was composed of Professors Peter Hommelhoff, Klaus J. 
Hopt, Marcus Lutter, Peter Doralt, Jean-Nicolas Druey, and Eddy Wymeersch. 
78 The members of the Reflection Group were José Engrácia Antunes, Theodor Baums, Blanaid Clarke, Pierre-Henri Conac, Luca 
Enriques, András Hanák, Jesper Lau Hansen, Harm-Jan de Kluiver, Vanessa Knapp, Noëlle Lenoir, Leena Linnainmaa, Stanislaw 
Soltysinski and Eddy Wymeersch. Many members of the Reflection Group are also members of the EMCA. 
79 Report of the Reflection Group On the Future of EU Company Law (2011), p. 65. The report is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/company/modern/reflectiongroup_report_en.pdf. 
80 Forum Europaeum on Company Groups, Proposal to Facilitate the Management of Cross-Border Company Groups in Europe, 
ECFR 2015, pp. 299–306.  
81 Club des Juristes (CDJ), Towards Recognition of the Group Interest in the European Union?, June 2015. 
82 European Company Law Experts, A proposal for reforming group law in the European Union – Comparative Observations on 
the Way Forward, 2016. The article is available on https://europeancompanylawexperts.wordpress.com/. 
83 The ICLEG Report on t Report on the recognition of the interest of the group is available on : 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/company-law/icleg_recommendations_interest_group_final_en.pdf 
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The group of companies, being an economic reality and being also dealt with in many other legal branches, 
should also be recognized and regulated by Company Law. However, the EMCA does not aim to develop 
a global and systematic legal regulation for groups, based on a rigid conception of the autonomy of the 
single company and aiming basically at the protection of subsidiary companies, its minority shareholders 
and creditors. Instead, the main objective of the EMCA Chapter on Groups of Companies is to establish a 
cluster of rules aiming to facilitate and enhance the flexibility of the formation, organization and 
functioning of this leading form of business organization. 
3. Considerations 
The EMCA Chapter on groups is focused on the issue at the heart of group reality: the management of the 
group. Protection of subsidiary companies and related interests (shareholders, creditors) should not be 
ignored, of course, but it should not be achieved through excessively burdensome rules. The Chapter also 
pays special attention to the parent corporation. It complements the traditional “bottom-up” approach of 
groups of companies (exclusively focused on the subsidiary or dependent companies) by a “top-down” 
perspective, which takes into account the effects of the group at the level of its parent corporation. Likewise, 
the regulation distinguishes between wholly-owned and not wholly-owned subsidiaries, as protection is 
less necessary in the former case and the functioning of the group should be as flexible as possible. Finally, 
the EMCA Chapter on groups takes also into account the international nature of many groups. In order to 
reach these general goals, the EMCA Chapter on groups includes the following main principles and rules: 
In order to enhance and facilitate the functioning of the group, the Chapter proposes that 
• the right of a parent company to give instructions to a subsidiary is recognized, without creating a 
specific liability or burden on the parent company, as this power corresponds to reality. Companies 
Acts which entitle the parent company with a legal power of direction over subsidiaries only on the 
condition that an over-reaching protection is granted to creditors, minority shareholders and the 
subsidiary itself, have proven to provide a legal regime which is deemed to be too rigid and with little 
practical efficacy. 
• the right to manage the group and its constituent members in the interests of the group is also 
recognized. The EMCA Chapter on groups is inspired by the Rozenblum doctrine. This will provide 
protection for the management of the parent and subsidiary company against liability (civil and 
criminal), under certain conditions, when they manage the companies as one entity, which is the reality 
of a group. 
• the right to squeeze-out minority shareholders is accepted within a group. 
• the international dimension of the group, where applicable, is recognized. 
• intra-group transactions: related party transactions are subject to approval by the board of directors in 
the EMCA. This follows the UK approach of submitting related party transactions to a decision of the 
board, except, in listed companies, when they cross certain thresholds. Therefore, exemptions from 
approval by the general shareholders’ meeting of intra-group transactions are not needed in the EMCA 
Chapter on Groups. 
The protection of minority shareholders and creditors at the level of the subsidiary company is assured 
through general provisions, like in the United Kingdom, with some specific rights: 
• as to minority shareholders: sell-out rights (US appraisal rights); 
• as to creditors: introduction of parent liability. 
The protection of shareholders at the level of the parent company is also taken into account, namely by 
creating special mechanisms aimed at ensuring shareholders in the parent company have access to 
information concerning the subsidiary’s affairs. 
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PART 1 
DEFINITIONS 
Section 15.01 
Definition of a Group 
A group is the entity comprising the parent company and all its national and foreign subsidiaries or entities, 
unless otherwise indicated. 
Comments 
In a comparative perspective, the definition of a group has been mainly constructed on the basis of two 
different concepts. One is the concept of “unified management” (e.g., Section 18 of German Corporation 
Act). The other is the concept of control (e.g., Section 1159 (1) UK Companies Act, Section 7 of the Danish 
Companies Act, Section 12(1) of the Finnish Companies Act, Article 22 of the Directive 2013/34/EU of 
26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of 
certain types of undertakings, etc.). 
The EMCA definition of a group of companies adopts the latter view. The definition was inspired by the 
pre 2011 version of IAS 27 Consolidated Financial Statements and Accounting for Investment in 
Subsidiaries and IFRS 10 Consolidated Financial Statements, which replaced IAS 27 and has been endorsed 
by the European Commission.84 The notion of control is the basis for consolidation in IFRS 10 as it was in 
the pre-2011 version of IAS 27. 
The term company in “parent company” refers to the definition of “company” in the EMCA. A natural 
person cannot be a “parent company”. 
The parent company is a national company unless otherwise indicated. The term “entity” refers to any 
unincorporated body such as a trust. 
Because of the reference to “all its national and foreign subsidiaries”, the term “subsidiaries” in this Chapter 
includes both national and foreign companies, unless otherwise provided. Most Companies Acts do not 
refer to foreign subsidiaries. One exception is Finnish law, which refers to “national and foreign” 
subsidiaries. Section 12 of the Finnish Companies Act Group holds that “(1) If a limited liability company 
exercises control over another domestic or foreign corporation or foundation, as referred to in Chapter 1, 
Section 5, of the Accounting Act, the limited liability company shall be the parent company and the other 
corporation or foundation a subsidiary. The parent company and its subsidiaries form a group”. 
The definition of the group or parent and subsidiary (See. Section 2) applies in this Chapter and in all the 
EMCA, unless otherwise provided. 
Section 15.02 
Definition of Parent and Subsidiary 
A “subsidiary” is a company subjected to the control, as defined in Sections 5 and 6, of another company, 
the “parent” company, either directly or indirectly through another subsidiary. 
Comments 
Several Companies Acts refer to the concept of control as the core concept of the definition of “group” or 
of the parent-subsidiary relationships (Section 1159 (1) UK Companies Act, Section 7 of the Danish 
Companies Act, Section 12(1) of the Finnish Companies Act, Section 42 of the Spanish Commercial Code). 
The same approach is evident in Article 22 of the Directive 2013/34/EU of 26 June 2013 on the annual 
financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings.  
                                                     
84 Commission regulation (EU) no. 1254/2012 of 11 December 2012, OJ EU L 360/1, 29.12. 2012. 
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Other Member States have a definition of subsidiary which is limited to holding more than 50 % of capital 
or votes (e.g. Article L. 233-1 of the French Commercial Code). This approach seems too restrictive. A 
company should be considered a subsidiary as soon as it is controlled. 
Control may be held by the parent company over a subsidiary either directly or indirectly. Companies are 
affiliated if one is a subsidiary of the other or both are subsidiaries of the same company. The term 
“affiliated companies” (or the UK Companies Act “associated companies”) is sometimes used in 
Companies Acts but is not predominant. Therefore, it is not used in the EMCA itself since rules for affiliated 
companies can be applied by using the term subsidiary or member of the group. 
Section 15.03 
Definition of a Wholly-owned Subsidiary 
A “wholly-owned company” is a company with no other shareholders except its parent company or any 
other subsidiary of its parent company or persons acting on behalf of its parent or such subsidiaries. 
Comments 
A definition of wholly-owned subsidiary is useful since, in the absence of minority shareholders, more 
flexibility should be allowed in the operations and the management of the group. This definition is limited 
to companies whose capital is owned at 100 % by the parent company, either directly or by other 100 % 
owned companies. 
This provision is inspired from the UK (Section 1159 (2) UK Companies Act). 
Section 15.04 
Definition of Control 
Control is the power to govern, alone or with other shareholders, the financial and operating policies of a 
subsidiary. It may be de jure or de facto. 
Comments 
This definition is inspired by the pre 2011 version of IAS 27 Consolidated Financial Statements and 
Accounting for Investment in Subsidiaries. For instance, Danish law has also adopted the definition from 
IAS 27 with the exception of the sentence “so as to obtain returns from its activities”. This term is also 
excluded from the EMCA Chapter on groups due to the fact that it is an economic concept. 
The willingness to hold the shares for the long term or not should not be taken into consideration in order 
to decide whether or not there is control. 
Section 15.05 
Definition of De Jure Control 
Control of a subsidiary exists where a company owns, directly or indirectly, more than half of the voting 
rights in that subsidiary, unless, in exceptional circumstances, it can be clearly demonstrated that such 
ownership does not constitute control. 
Comments 
The definition of de jure control is inspired by the pre 2011 version of IAS 27 Consolidated Financial 
Statements and Accounting for Investment in Subsidiaries. The owning of majority of votes is also 
considered in most Companies Acts as a criterion for the assessment of control over a company (e.g., Czech 
Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain). In some countries, the 
presumption of control linked to majority voting rights is irrebuttable (e.g., Czech Republic, France, 
Poland) where in others it is a rebuttable presumption (e.g., Denmark, Germany, Portugal). 
The organization of control in two different articles facilitates the identification by outside parties of the 
basis of the control. 
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Section 15.06 
Definition of De Facto Control 
Where one company holds half or less than half of the voting rights in another company, control exists if 
the former has: 
(a) the right to exercise more than half of the voting rights by virtue of an agreement with other 
investors; 
(b) the right to control the financial and operating policies of a company under any articles of 
association or agreement; 
(c) the right to appoint or remove the majority of the members of the governing body, and this body 
has control of the business; or 
(d) the right to exercise the actual majority of votes at general meetings or an equivalent body and thus 
the actual control of the business. Control is presumed when a majority of the members of the governing 
body of a company has been appointed by a company holding half or less than half of the voting rights 
in the company (the Relevant Company) for two successive financial years. The Relevant Company is 
deemed to have effected such appointments if, during that financial year, it held a fraction of the voting 
rights greater than 40 %, and if no other shareholder directly or indirectly held a fraction greater than 
its own. 
Comments 
Re a) The term “power”, used by the pre 2011 version of IAS 27 Consolidated Financial Statements and 
Accounting for Investment in Subsidiaries, has been substituted by the term “right”, as it is more usual in 
Company law and is not an economic term. 
Re c) The governing body is the board of directors in a company with a unitary board or the supervisory 
board in a company with a two-tier board. 
The right to appoint a majority of the members of the governing body, despite not having a majority of the 
votes, can originate, from the specific structure of the company (e.g. Société par actions simplifiée in 
France) or from law. 
In case the right to appoint and to remove is not held by the same persons, control will be deemed to be 
exercised by the person who can remove the members of the governing body. 
Re d) Presumptions should play a major role in defining the existence of a factual control, as some 
companies might want to pretend that they are not controlling another company. Therefore, the burden of 
proof has been reversed in a way that it should be up to that company to allege and demonstrate that it does 
not have control. The first and second presumption originates from the Directive 2013/34/EU of 26 June 
2013 and French law (Article L. 233-16 of the Commercial Code). 
The definition of factual control, adopted in Subsection d, is inspired by the pre 2011 version of IAS 27. 
Section 15.07 
Calculation of Participation 
In calculating voting right for the purpose of Sections 5 and 6, rights to subscription and purchase of shares 
carrying voting rights that are currently exercisable or convertible are to be included. 
Any voting rights attaching to shares owned by the subsidiary itself or by its subsidiaries must be 
disregarded in the determination of the voting rights in a subsidiary held by the parent company. 
Comments 
Similar provisions are found in Germany (Section § 20, par. 2 of German Corporation Act), Denmark 
(Section 7(4) of Danish Companies Act), etc. The consideration of the so-called future or potential voting 
rights is common in capital market laws, relating to the disclosure of significant shareholdings. However, 
there are several Companies Acts which do not take into account this potential capital (e.g. France). 
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Paragraph (2) is necessary, because otherwise the real controlling influence of the parent company would 
be underestimated. 
Section 15.08 
Duty to Disclose Control 
(1) The management of the parent company must inform in writing the management of a subsidiary as 
soon as control has been established or removed. 
(2) As soon as it is informed, the subsidiary, unless it is a foreign subsidiary and such obligation is not 
recognized by the law of the country whose rules apply to the subsidiary, must inform without delay the 
parent company of the number of shares and voting rights held by it in the parent company, and in any 
other companies. 
Comments 
Re (1). It is necessary for a subsidiary company to be informed of the acquisition or the end of control by 
the parent company, so that the former knows its legal situation, since certain rules apply only to controlled 
companies. Moreover, this written declaration or notification could also operate as a sort of publicity or 
transparency for groups of companies, since the existence of a group is based on a control linkage between 
parent and subsidiaries. This type of provision can be found in some national Companies Acts (e.g., Section 
134 of the Danish Companies Act, Section 15 of Finnish Companies Act). A similar -but not identical- duty 
of information (“deberes de información de la pertenencia al grupo”), complemented by a duty of publicity 
on the commercial registry (“Deber de inscripción del grupo”), was also provided by the 2013 Spanish 
Proposal of a Code on Commercial Companies (Sections 291-7 and 291-8). 
According to paragraph 2, in case of establishing control, it is necessary also for the subsidiary to inform 
the parent company of any shares or voting rights held in other companies, since this can have the effect of 
extending the scope of the group, by extension to previously existing subsidiaries or by creation of new 
ones thanks to the addition of shares and/or voting rights held by the parent and the new subsidiary. 
This duty only applies to national subsidiaries (but also in respect to foreign parent companies), since the 
law of a State cannot impose obligations on foreign companies. 
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PART 2 
GROUP MANAGEMENT 
Section 15.09 
Right of a Parent Company to Give Instructions to the Management of a Subsidiary 
(1) A parent company, acting as a shareholder in the general shareholders’ meeting or through its board of 
directors or senior management, has the right to give instructions to the organ of management of its 
subsidiaries. A subsidiary may receive instructions from any parent company, including a foreign parent 
company. 
(2) Subject to the conditions specified in Section 16 and the exceptions in Subsection (3), the organ of 
management of a subsidiary shall comply with the instructions issued by its parent. 
(3) The following members of the management of a subsidiary are not bound by any instruction: 
(a) Directors and managers who were not appointed by the parent company or by the controlling 
shareholder, but as a result of provisions in the articles of associations, or a shareholders’ agreement or 
of any law or regulation. 
(b) Directors who are defined as “independent directors” according to the applicable Corporate 
Governance Code, when the company is subject to such a code. 
(c) Directors who are employee representatives. 
(4) A non-wholly-owned subsidiary needs to disclose in the Commercial registry whether or not its 
management is directed by the parent. In the absence of a contrary disclosure, a wholly-owned subsidiary 
is presumed to be subject to instructions of its parent company and does not need to make a disclosure in 
the Commercial registry, except to disclose that it is wholly-owned. This disclosure is for the information 
of third parties and shareholders only. 
Comments 
As a matter of fact, in groups, subsidiaries receive instructions, whether oral or written, from the 
management of the parent company because subsidiaries are usually managed according to business lines. 
However, in the overwhelming number of Companies Acts, this reality is not recognized due to the 
predominance of the concept of the legal autonomy of the subsidiary. This provision is designed to 
reconcile law and the reality by treating subsidiaries in a different way than autonomous companies. It does 
so by giving a legal status to instructions, which should provide more legal certainty for the managers and 
directors of the parent as well as of the subsidiary. 
Some national legal orders (e.g., Germany, Section 322 AktG) recognize a legal power of direction to 
parent companies only on the condition that a “legal group” is formed, that is, the parent assumes in advance 
special rights and liabilities toward the subsidiary (e.g., duty to cover annual losses), its creditors (e.g., 
unlimited liability in the case of wholly-owned subsidiaries in Germany) or its minority shareholders (e.g, 
compensation and sell-out rights). 
Likewise, the Forum Europaeum had a similar view and proposed that the parent, under certain conditions, 
be “entitled by unilateral declaration to assume the management of the subsidiary”. However, the regime 
proposed by Forum Europaeum was subject to certain rules which are not adopted by the EMCA. This 
approach was similar to the German intercompany agreements for contractual groups (Section 291-307 
AktG). 
The Forum Europaeum proposal made the right to assume management of the company conditional on an 
“unilateral declaration”, which would need to be “registered in the Commercial Registers of both the parent 
and subsidiary”. This proposal is not adopted here as it would be a formal requirement, which does not 
seem necessary, since the EMCA does not create a special liability towards third parties only because 
instructions are given (see however Section 17 on parent liability). 
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However, the EMCA provides that a non-wholly-owned subsidiary needs to disclose in the Commercial 
registry whether or not its management is directed by the parent. This disclosure is for the information of 
third parties and shareholders only. It does not trigger any specific right and is simply a matter of 
transparency. It is at the discretion of the directors to decide at what point to publish the declaration, taking 
into account the number of instructions received, their importance, or simply the existence of a group-wide 
policy. 
The Forum Europaeum proposal also made the right to assume management of the company conditional 
on the parent company holding “a sufficient majority to enable it to alter the articles of association of a 
subsidiary”. The EMCA does not adopt this limitation since, as soon as control is established, whatever the 
level, the management and the board of directors of the subsidiary will normally feel compelled to follow 
instructions by the parent company. For the same reason, it is not proposed to limit this power to give 
instruction to wholly-owned companies. 
Finally, in the proposal of the Forum Europaeum, the legal consequence of the Group Declaration include 
the assumption of the parent of liability for losses in the subsidiary in case of winding-up (creditor-
protection) and the obligation to compensate minority shareholders in the subsidiary (minority protection). 
The approach chosen in the EMCA is to consider groups and the power of direction of parent companies 
over subsidiaries as a reality, which has not to be formally “legalized” or “declared”. Why would the parent 
company form a “legal group” with its subsidiaries, if the price for obtaining a legitimation of its power of 
direction were so high? Why would the parent enter into such a “unilateral declaration” and face an 
increased risk of liability when, as a matter of fact, it could already instruct the subsidiary as to how to act?  
The subsidiary must fulfill the instructions given by the parent company. Otherwise, the managers and 
directors of the subsidiary shall resign. Instructions issued by the parent company are binding on the 
subsidiary. 
Accepting the power of direction of parent companies over subsidiaries as a “de facto” phenomenon, does 
not mean to accept that it can be exercised without any limits or constraints. 
First of all, the right of the parent to issue binding instructions to subsidiaries is limited by the conformity 
to the interests of the group (Section 16 of this Chapter). If the instructions are contrary to the interests of 
the subsidiary and not in conformity with the conditions set in Section 16, the organ of management of the 
subsidiary will be liable for breach of their duty of care if they execute such instructions. 
Secondly, minority shareholders of the subsidiary are sufficiently protected either by the general rules or 
by sell-out rights, providing them with an exit route from the group. 
Thirdly, creditors and third parties also have protection, in case of subsidiary insolvency, by the general 
provision of parent liability of Section 17. 
Finally, some organs of management of a subsidiary are not bound by the instructions of the parent 
company. This is the case in subsidiaries where such organs are not appointed by the parent company. For 
instance, in Italy, some members of the board of directors in listed companies are appointed to represent 
minority shareholders. The exception covers appointments under a shareholders’ agreement which may 
entitle a non-controlling shareholder to representation on the board. The reason is that specific protection 
that minority shareholders have bargained for should not be removed by the fact that the company belongs 
to a group. This protection should be respected. 
Although the EMCA recognizes that the situation of listed subsidiary is specific and protection of the public 
should be set at a higher level, Section 9 applies to them. The reason is that there is no logical reason to 
distinguish between listed and non-listed companies, especially provided that there are significant 
protections in other chapters for minority shareholders (sell-out rights) and creditors (wrongful parent 
liability). However, the rule should not apply to “independent directors”, who are being required by listed 
companies regulations and corporate governance codes, since it would be contrary to their independence. 
The same exception also applies explicitly to “directors who are employee representatives”. 
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The right to give instructions is vested in the company organ entitled to manage and represent the company 
according to the EMCA, including senior management. Instructions may have any form (written, oral, etc.) 
and may only be addressed to the organ of management of the subsidiary. This includes the board of 
directors of the subsidiary. The right to give instructions benefits any parent company, not just the direct 
parent company. This will provide flexibility in the organization of the group, since the ultimate parent 
company can let another subsidiary -with regional competence for instance- give instructions to sub-
subsidiaries. 
The right to give instructions benefits any parent company, as to all subsidiaries, including foreign 
subsidiaries as long as the foreign law allows subsidiaries to receive instructions from a parent company. 
Similarly, the EMCA provides, in Paragraph (1), that subsidiaries can receive instructions from a foreign 
parent company. 
Section 15.10 
Right of Access to Information at the Level of the Subsidiary 
The board of directors, or equivalent body, and the management of the parent company, including a foreign 
one, has the right to obtain any information from a subsidiary, unless such communication would violate 
the law of a country which applies to the subsidiary or the rights of third parties. 
Comments 
Groups need information from the subsidiaries for legal reasons, such as drawing up the accounts. Groups 
which are acting as integrated entities usually also need information from the subsidiaries for business 
reasons, such as assuring quality control across subsidiaries. 
A similar provision exists in some national Companies Acts (e.g. Denmark). Of course, the right of access 
to information of the parent company is subject to limits. The reference to the violation of the “the law of 
the country which applies to the subsidiary” includes different types of rules (e.g. banking secrecy) and 
different types of companies (national and foreign subsidiaries). These are not just the laws of the country 
where the subsidiary is incorporated but also of those countries where it operates. Likewise, rights of the 
third parties may not be affected by such right of access to information (e.g. transfer of valuable data, like 
client data).  
This provision will also facilitate the enforcement of the special investigation mentioned in Section 16, 
since the management of the parent company, when requested by a special examiner, will not be able to 
argue that it cannot access this information. This power should be recognized also to a foreign parent 
company. 
Section 15.11 
Right to Squeeze-out 
(1) A parent company, controlling more than 90 % of the shares and votes of the subsidiary, has the right 
to purchase the remaining shares. 
(2) The provisions of Section 34 of Chapter 11 of the EMCA apply to the purchase. 
Comments 
The right to squeeze-out is also recognized in Chapter 11 “General Meeting and Minority Protection” when 
the majority shareholder holds more than 90 % of the shares and a corresponding share of the votes. The 
shareholder can be a natural or legal person so that the right to squeeze-out is not limited to group situations. 
Therefore, the provision in the Chapter on groups simply refers to the one in Chapter 11. However, a 
reference to the relevant provisions in Chapter 11 has been left in the Chapter on Groups since the existence 
of a squeeze-out right, although not limited to groups, is a significant part of the regime on groups. 
The right to squeeze-out is recognized in Section 34 of Chapter 11. 
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The right to squeeze out minority shareholders is recognized in many national laws (Section 70 of the 
Danish Companies Act, §§ 327a-327f of the German AktG, Section 49c of Greek Corporation Law, Section 
490 of the Portuguese Companies Act). In several others, it is restricted to listed companies (e.g., “offre 
publique de retrait obligatoire” in France, “diritto di acquisto” in Italy, etc.). Section 11 applies to listed 
and unlisted subsidiaries alike. It only applies to subsidiaries which are subject to the EMCA. 
The possibility to squeeze-out minority shareholders is the counterpart of the sell-out rights included in the 
EMCA. It is also a way to facilitate the formation of fully-integrated groups. 
Also Article 15 of the Thirteenth Directive on takeovers, under certain conditions, grants any shareholder 
acquiring 90 % (or more, depending on the Member State) of the voting shares of a listed corporation 
through a tender offer, the right to cash out minorities at a fair price. 
The Forum Europaeum also proposed the creation of a squeeze-out right when a shareholder holds 90 % 
or 95 % of the shares. 
The Danish Companies Act, especially as to the determination of the redemption price, served as model for 
Section 34 of chapter 11. 
According to EMCA, a company can have a single shareholder (see Chapter 2 Formation of Companies). 
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PART 3 
PROTECTION OF SHAREHOLDERS OF THE PARENT COMPANY 
Section 15.12 
Right of Information and to Request a Special Investigation 
The relationship between the companies of the group, including companies formerly members of the group, 
are subject to the rights of information and the right to request a special investigation, as provided in Section 
32 of Chapter 11. 
Comments 
Most national companies law provides for some sort of investigation rights. 
This provision, which is linked to the right to ask questions in Chapter 11 (General Meetings and Principles 
of Minority Protection), aims to prevent the management of the parent company from refusing to answer 
questions about the situation of the group as a whole on the basis that the information is located at the level 
of a subsidiary. Similar provisions can be found in some legal orders (e.g., Section 102 of the Danish 
Companies Act, Section 290 of the Portuguese Companies Act, Section 32 of the Swedish Companies Act). 
Likewise, whereas the right to request a special investigation is a general right covered in the Chapter on 
shareholders’ meeting and minority protection, it is particularly important in groups, especially since the 
information might be available only at the level of the subsidiary. The Forum Europaeum was of the same 
view and proposed that the parent, under certain conditions, should be “entitled by unilateral declaration to 
assume the management of the subsidiary”. However, the regime proposed by the Forum Europaeum 
proposal was more restrictive. It required a reasonable suspicion of “gross breach” of the law or of the 
articles of association, and not just a simple breach. 
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PART 4 
PROTECTION OF SHAREHOLDERS AND CREDITORS OF THE SUBSIDIARY 
Section 15.13 
Corporate Opportunity within a Group 
When a subsidiary is not wholly-owned, a parent company, including a foreign one, must not itself or 
through another subsidiary exploit a corporate opportunity of that subsidiary unless it has received the 
approval of the disinterested directors of the subsidiary, and if there are none, of the non-controlling 
shareholders of the subsidiary. 
Comments 
A parent company may be a director of the subsidiary and, in that capacity, it would be subject to the 
general prohibition of benefiting from corporate opportunities, unless it has received the approval of the 
board by the disinterested directors (see EMCA Section 6 of Chapter 9, Directors’ duties). However, a 
parent company might not always be a director, for instance because it is located several levels above the 
level of the subsidiary. Therefore, section 13 complements the prohibition applicable to directors. 
In the case of a subsidiary, it is less possible to rely on disinterested directors of the subsidiary. 
The prohibition applies to a foreign parent company. It also applies to a national parent company regarding 
its foreign subsidiaries. 
Section 15.14 
Right of Shareholders to Request a Special Investigation 
The shareholders of a subsidiary can request a special investigation in the parent company in relation to a 
decision which has affected that subsidiary, under the same conditions as mentioned in Section 12. 
Comments 
The right of the expert to investigate should also apply upstream. The Forum Europeaum proposal included 
this point but it was not very specific. This possibility of an upstream special investigation is provided for 
by Dutch company law (Section 351, al. 2, of the Dutch Civil Code). 
The right of shareholders to request a special investigation into decisions of the parent company is limited 
to decisions which have affected the subsidiary. 
Section 15.15 
Right to Sell-out 
(1) When a parent company owns directly or indirectly more than 90 % of the shares and of the voting 
rights of a subsidiary, any other shareholder(s) may request that their shares be purchased by the parent 
company. 
(2) The shareholders of a subsidiary can request in court that the parent company or another person 
designated by it purchase their shares. 
(3) Companies can opt-out of the sell-out right if the shareholders agree to the opt out by the majority 
required to alter the articles of association. 
(4) The provisions of Section 35 of Chapter 11 of the EMCA apply to the purchase. 
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Comments 
The EMCA offers minority shareholders a right to sell-out. When a parent owns, directly or indirectly, 
more than 90 % of the shares and of the voting rights, the minority shareholders may request, in court, that 
their shares to be purchased by the parent or another person designated by it. The provision in paragraph 
15 (1) is the equivalent to the squeeze-out right of Section 11. It only applies to a subsidiary which is subject 
to the EMCA, even if the parent company is not. 
A similar provision is recognized today by national laws, like Poland (“reversed squeeze-out” of Section 
418 of the Polish Companies Act), Portugal (“right to be bought” of Section 490, n°5 and 6 of Portuguese 
Companies Act) or Hungary (Section 3: 53(1) and 3 : 324(2) of the new Hungarian Civil Code). In several 
other Member States the sell-out right is restricted to listed companies (e.g., France). 
A very interesting regime on sell-out rights is to be found in the part on groups of the Italian Civil Code 
(Article 2497-quater), which was introduced in 2003. The Italian regime served as a model for Section 
15(1), but with some differences since fewer EMCA situations give rise to a right to sell-out. On the one 
hand, the EMCA was mindful not to create a situation where the ease of exercising the right of withdrawal 
would force groups to maintain a higher level of cash than would be necessary for business purposes. On 
the other hand, the EMCA does not subject the exercise of sell-out rights to the fact that the parent company 
exercises direction over the subsidiary. 
Re 2) The provision is not framed restrictively despite the cost to the parent company of having to maintain 
sufficient liquidity to cover sell-out rights. It proved difficult to find a common trigger for the sell-out right. 
Therefore, the idea is that the national legislature or judges should specify the grounds, depending on the 
practice in that jurisdiction.  
The provision in paragraph (2) would allow shareholders who consider that they are the victims of an abuse 
by majority shareholders to file a petition in court requesting their shares to be bought back. Section 31 of 
Chapter 11 includes a provision equivalent to the “abuse of majority” (the General Meeting may not pass 
a resolution which obviously is likely to give certain shareholders or others an undue advantage over other 
shareholders of the company). The provision in Section 15 does not refer to the German concept of an 
”important cause“ (“wichtiger Grund”), which would also be applicable here and leaves a significant 
freedom to judges to decide. In addition to an abuse of majority, such cases could be, for instance, unfair 
prejudice, the lack of payment of dividends for a long period, the existence of detrimental related party 
transactions, etc. 
Section 15.16 
Interest of the Group 
(1) If the management of a subsidiary, whether or not as a result of an instruction issued by the parent 
company, acts in a way contrary to the interests of the subsidiary, a director or manager shall not be deemed 
to have acted in breach of their fiduciary duties if 
(a) the decision is in the interests of the group as a whole, and 
(b) the management, acting in good faith on the basis of the information available to them and that 
would be available to them if they complied with their fiduciary duties before taking the decision, may 
reasonably assume that the loss/damage/disadvantage will, within a reasonable period, be balanced by 
benefit/gain/advantage, and 
(c) the loss/damage/disadvantage, referred to in the first sentence hereof, is not such as would place 
the continued existence of the company in jeopardy. 
(2) If the subsidiary is wholly-owned, paragraph (1)(b) does not apply. 
(3) The management of the subsidiary may refuse to comply with instructions from the parent company if 
the conditions set in paragraph (1) are not satisfied. 
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Comments 
Section 16 is a complement to Section 9 (Right of a parent company to give instructions to the management 
of a subsidiary) and recognizes the notion of the “interest of the group”. It creates a basic rule, in compliance 
with which directors and managers of a company, member of a group, may either exercise or be subject to 
a directing and coordinating activity. 
The recognition of the interest of the group would be helpful not only for the parent company but also for 
the directors of the subsidiary company. As mentioned in the Report of the Reflection Group on the Future 
of EU Company Law (2011) “a major advantage of the recognition of the interest of the group is that it 
provides more clarity to the directors of the subsidiary as to which transaction or operations they can 
approve.”85 The recognition of the interest of the group provides, to a certain extent, this legal certainty. 
Section 16 does not provide a definition of the “interest of the group”. The reason is that a satisfactory 
definition would be very difficult, if not impossible, to find given the almost infinite diversities of situations 
in groups. Therefore, it is left to judges to decide on a case-by-case basis. This approach creates some 
uncertainty but which should be rather limited because judges usually do not tend to second-guess the 
business decisions of management, as long as the company has not filed for bankruptcy. 
In general, the lack of definition should act as a supplementary protection for minority shareholders or for 
creditors alike by allowing judges to apply Section 16 in a flexible way. 
The approach of the EMCA is similar to the one adopted by most if not all national Companies Acts for an 
individual company. The notion of “social interest” of a company is usually not defined for the same 
reasons as it should not be defined for a group. Because of the lack of definition, there is no requirement 
that the interest of the group should tend towards a harmonization of the interest of the parent company and 
the subsidiary. However, in certain circumstances, a judge applying Section 16 could adopt this approach. 
The approach is influenced by the French Rozenblum case, which is a criminal case law. In France, the 
main criminal law tool against self-dealing is the provision against abuse of corporate assets (abus de biens 
sociaux). It punishes, among others, board chairmen, directors or managing directors of a public limited 
company or a limited liability company who “use the company’s property or credit, in bad faith, in a way 
which they know is contrary to the interests of the company, for personal purposes or to favor another 
company or undertaking in which they have a direct or indirect interest”. The penalty is a prison term of 
up to five years (with no minimum). French courts have created a special safe harbor in case of abuse of 
corporate assets within groups (the so-called “Rozenblum doctrine”). This doctrine admits a “group 
defense” under certain conditions. First, there must be a group characterized by capital links between the 
companies. Second, there must be strong, effective business integration among the companies within the 
group. Third, the financial support from one company to another company must have an economic quid 
pro quo and may not break the balance of mutual commitments between the concerned companies. Fourth, 
the support from the company must not exceed its possibilities. In other words, it should not create a risk 
of bankruptcy for the company. This approach is also adopted in the German Criminal Code (Section 266 
German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch)). 
Section 16 is inspired by the Rozenblum doctrine but with some simplifications. The Rozenblum doctrine 
is sometimes considered, in and outside France, to be obscure and its successful application hardly 
predictable due to the number of conditions to be satisfied. Therefore, Section 16 adopts a simpler and 
more flexible approach. The main difference is that there is no requirement that the group has a balanced 
and firmly established structure. However, the existence of an interest of the group implies that there must 
be a long-term and coherent group policy. The Forum Europaeum also adopted the Rozenblum approach 
but with some modifications. The Forum Europaeum proposal made this protection conditional on there 
being evidence of compliance with instructions which would “be recorded in a continuous manner” and 
that the management would report on their reliance on these provisions at “the next general meeting of the 
subsidiary”. This approach is not kept in the EMCA, since it would be formalistic. 
                                                     
85 Report of the Reflection Group On the Future of EU Company Law (2011), p. 60. 
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Many European countries have similar approaches to the French “Rozenblum doctrine”. This is the case in 
the Nordic countries, in Belgium, in the Netherlands (“Nimox doctrine”), in Italy (“teoria dei vantaggi 
compensative”. The Czech Republic recently moved toward a regime similar to Rozenblum (Section 71 
and following, of Czech Law No. 90/2012 on commercial companies and cooperatives, Business 
Corporations Act). 
In the UK, directors are able to take into account of the interests of the group in reaching a decision about 
what will promote the company’s success for the benefit of its members. If there is a doubt that something 
is in the interests of the company (e.g. giving a guarantee for the benefit of the group), any doubt about 
whether this involves a breach of the director's duties can be dealt with by the shareholders passing a 
resolution to approve the action proposed. However, because directors may incur personal liability for 
wrongful trading by the company if the company goes into insolvent liquidation and the director knew or 
ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect of avoiding this and did not take every step 
to minimize the potential loss to the creditors, directors will be very careful not to prefer the interests of the 
group over the interests of the creditors of the company if the company may become insolvent. 
Section 16(1) protects the managers of the subsidiary against liability, if they take a decision or apply an 
instruction contrary to the interests of the subsidiary by taking into account the interests of the group. 
However, in case an instruction violates Section 16(1), the issue must be addressed of whether subsidiary 
managers “must” obey or “may” refuse to obey ? 
On the one hand, if the management of the subsidiary “must” obey, it is a relief for the directors, as they 
would be exempted from liability in such case. It also makes the functioning of the group more effective 
as instructions are always binding. On the other hand, there are severe drawbacks to this approach. First, it 
would imply a lower level of protection for creditors and minority shareholders, since the directors would 
not act as a shield in a case where they think that the instructions violate the interests of the subsidiary, 
even taking into account the interests of the group. This would leave the management of the subsidiary 
with the only choice to comply or to resign. Both alternatives are unfavorable to the minority shareholders, 
at the very moment where they most need protection. Second, if the parent is located in another Member 
State or in a foreign state, it might be difficult, complex and costly, for the minority shareholders to sue 
them in this other State, since the management of the subsidiary will be exempted from liability because 
the instruction was binding for them. This increases the risk of abuses by parent companies. Finally, even 
if the recognition of the interest of the group is a necessary and useful relaxation from the protection of the 
interest of the minority shareholders and of creditors at the level of the subsidiary, this recognition is not 
without risks. These risks should be mitigated by a cautious approach and any instruction must be given in 
respect of the law. 
From the perspective of effective management of the group, this approach has the disadvantage of allowing 
the directors of the subsidiary, in certain circumstances, to resist the directions of the parent company. 
However, such situations where the subsidiary would refuse to execute a binding instruction from the parent 
company should also remain exceptional. In cases where the directors do refuse to act but do not resign, 
the issue could be settled swiftly by the removal of the directors concerned at the next general shareholders’ 
meeting, possibly following a judicial request of the parent company (see. Section 15 of Chapter 11 General 
Meetings and Principles of Minority Protection). Therefore, the parent will always have the last word. The 
opposition by the management of the subsidiary could also lead the parent company to reconsider its 
decision, possibly after a discussion with the management of the subsidiary or because of complaints by 
minority shareholders. The interests of the minority shareholders and creditors are better protected by this 
right to refuse to apply the instruction. The EMCA noted that under German company law, in the case of a 
contractual group (“Vertragskonzern”, § 302 AktG), the managers of the subsidiary “may” refuse to comply 
with instructions from the parent company in case of manifest (“offensichtlich”) violation of the interests 
of the parent company or of the companies affiliated with it (§ 308(2) AktG). 
Therefore, the EMCA has decided that, if an instruction of the parent company violates Section 16(1), the 
management of the subsidiary is not obliged to comply. The approach of the EMCA seems to be more 
protective than the German approach since the right to refuse to apply an instruction is granted to the 
management even if the instruction is not a manifest (“offensichtlich”) violation of the interests of the parent 
company or of the companies affiliated with it. However, this is justified since the EMCA approach is more 
flexible and does not require an automatic compensation of disadvantages. 
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In case that the management of the subsidiary decides to apply an instruction which violates Section 16(1), 
they will remain liable. 
The safe-harbor also applies to wholly-owned subsidiaries. However, in such case, Section 16(2) eliminates 
the requirement provided for in paragraph (b) that “the management may reasonably assume that the 
loss/damage/disadvantage will, within a reasonable period, be balanced by benefit/gain/advantage.” This 
is so because if the subsidiary is wholly-owned, the management of the parent and the subsidiary should 
have more freedom to manage the company and to transfer value as long as they do not place the continued 
existence of the company in jeopardy. 
Section 15.17 
Parent liability 
(1) Whenever a subsidiary company, which has been managed according to instructions issued by its parent 
in the interest of the group, has no reasonable prospect, by means of its own resources, of avoiding a 
winding-up (crisis point), the parent company is obliged without delay to effect a fundamental restructuring 
of the subsidiary or to initiate its winding-up procedure. 
(2) If the parent company act in contravention of paragraph 1, it shall be held liable for any unpaid debts 
of the subsidiary company incurred after the crisis point. 
(3) If the parent company has managed the subsidiary to the detriment of the subsidiary and in violation of 
the interest of the group, it shall be held liable for any unpaid debts of the subsidiary which are the 
consequences of the harmful instructions. 
(4) The right to claim compensation provided for in paragraph 2 and 3 hereof can be invoked only by the 
liquidator/administrator/administrative receiver/receiver of the subsidiary. The liquidator is obliged to 
exercise such claim if creditors holding 10 % of the debts of the subsidiary request it. The insolvency court 
may itself initiate the said claim. 
Comments 
Section 17 is inspired by the concept of “wrongful trading” which originates in the UK (Section 214 
Insolvency Act 1986) but presents a significant difference. However, instead of making the directors liable 
for “wrongful trading”, it makes the parent company liable. This difference is designed to cover situations 
in which the subsidiary would be subject to instructions while at the same time there would be no directors 
representing the company in the board of the subsidiary. 
Section 17 is close to the Forum Europaeum proposal, but with some modifications. It is also influenced 
by the Report of the Reflection Group on the Future of EU Company Law (2011), which suggested that the 
“Rozenblum doctrine”, if applied at the European level, should distinguish two situations: “(i) where the 
subsidiary is not close to insolvency and (ii) where it is close to insolvency. In case the subsidiary has no 
reasonable prospect of, by means of its own resources, avoiding a winding-up (crisis point), directors of 
the subsidiary should protect creditors and therefore unbalanced transactions to the prejudice of the 
subsidiary should not be protected”. This is in effect the result reached by Section 17. Where a subsidiary 
reaches a crisis point, the parent company has the duty to start without delay insolvency proceedings of the 
subsidiary, in order to effect a fundamental restructuring or alternatively to liquidate the subsidiary. 
It is not presumed that the parent knew or should have known that the subsidiary company had arrived at a 
crisis point because the parent is not always aware of the situation of the subsidiary, even if it issues 
instructions to it. 
Section 17 establishes a link between the unpaid debts of the subsidiary and the instructions given by the 
parent company. Therefore, it is close to the French action for damages for insufficient assets (action en 
responsabilité pour insuffisance d’actif). Section 17 is not an action of “piercing the corporate veil” but is 
more an action for damages based on fault. 
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The formulation ensures the existence of a link between power and liability of the parent company in case 
of bankruptcy of a subsidiary. As a matter of fact, the default of a subsidiary may be caused by the control 
exercised by the parent company but may also emerge from purely fortuitous and unpredictable 
circumstances (e.g., natural catastrophes, strikes, financial crisis, insolvency of important subsidiary 
debtors, abrupt modification of market environment or legal environment). In such a case, to impute a 
special liability on the parent corporation would be too rigid a solution, creating a windfall protection for 
subsidiary creditors (which the creditors of independent companies do not enjoy at all). It might also force 
the adoption of centralized structures of governance of groups as a way to prevent liability for subsidiary 
defaults. By limiting the parent company duties in the event of bankruptcy of the subsidiary (restructuring 
or winding-up) to the case of those subsidiaries, which were consistently managed in the interests of the 
group, and not in its own interests, one could ensure a flexible system of imputation of such duties. 
The Forum Europaeum proposal conditioned this protection to the fact that evidence of compliance would 
“be recorded in a continuous manner” and that the management would report the invocation of the 
provisions “to the next general meeting of the subsidiary”. This approach is not kept in Section 17, since it 
would be formalistic.
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General Comments86 
1. EU law 
The primary source of secondary EU law regulating branches is the 11th Council Directive concerning 
disclosure requirements in respect of branches opened in a Member State by certain types of companies 
governed by the law of another State (Directive 89/666/EEC). The Directive was adopted in 1989 and had 
to be implemented in national law by the end of 1991. As the name indicates, the Directive is focusing on 
the disclosure requirements which branches have to fulfil, and therefore the Directive was closely linked 
to the 1st Company Law Directive which harmonizes the disclosure requirements that companies have to 
fulfil in the Member State in which they are incorporated (Directive 68/151/EEC now codified in Directive 
2009/101/EC). The importance of the Directive lies in the fact that in the field of company law the law 
exhaustively regulates the disclosure requirements that Member States can impose on branches of 
companies (but not regarding branches from outside the EU/EEA) covered by the Directive. Furthermore, 
in regulating disclosure requirements the Directive also indirectly regulates certain substantial issues 
relating to the annual accounts, the powers of representatives of the branch etc. 
Branches of credit institutions and financial institutions are governed by special rules laid down in Directive 
89/117/EEC. 
Branches are also protected by the freedom of establishment found in Article 49 and 54 TFEU. The Court 
of Justice of the European Union (hereafter the Court) has in several important judgments paved the way 
for the use of branches in the EU by making use of these provisions. These judgments can be grouped in 
different ways. Some of them are focusing on discrimination against branches. Here it will normally be 
natural to compare the regulation of branches to that of other companies in the Member State of 
establishment. But the Court has also been keen to examine non-discriminating restrictions on setting up a 
branch. The Court takes the position that requiring a company (which must comply with the rules of its 
place of incorporation) additionally to comply with the (company) rules in the Member State in which it 
sets up a branch may in itself be a restriction of the freedom of establishment.87 If there are such company 
law requirements to branches, they may still be justified if the following four conditions are fulfilled: they 
must be applied in a non- discriminatory manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the 
public interest; they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue, and 
they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it. 
Finally, the Court has held in a line of important cases that the setting up of a branch is not an abuse of the 
freedom of establishment even if the company has no activities in the Member State in which the company 
is incorporated. It was established in Case C-212/97, Centros that even if a person chooses to set up his or 
her company in the Member State with the least restrictive company law rules and then proceeds to set up 
branches in other Member States, there will be no abuse of the freedom of establishment. In the same case 
the Court did allow that there could be situations where it can be established on a case by case basis that 
there is an abuse because the person is pursuing a different objective than those behind the freedom of 
establishment. However, subsequent cases show that there will be very few cases where the Member State 
is in a position to argue that the incorporation in a different Member State and the setting up of a branch 
are likely to be considered abuse of the freedom of establishment. 
Following the decision in Centros, there was an increase in the number of branches registered in some 
Member States. Most likely the reason for this was that some business entrepreneurs chose to incorporate 
in other Member States and set up a branch instead of incorporating through a local company. However, in 
recent years the number of branches seems to have adjusted to a lower level indicating that such a use of 
branches is less frequent. 
Whereas the freedom of establishment only applies to companies incorporated in the EU (and the EEA 
area), the 11th Company Law Directive regulates not only branches opened in a Member State by a company 
formed in another Member State but also branches set up by companies formed outside the EU/EEA. 
                                                     
86 The working group on Chapter 16 was chaired by Professor Karsten Engsig Sørensen (Aarhus University, Denmark). 
87 See the argument in ECJ Case C-167/01, Inspire Art, para. 101. 
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2. National law 
The Member States have implemented the 11th Company Law Directive differently. Some Member States 
have implemented the regulation of foreign branches in the Companies Act. This is for example the case 
in Denmark and Greece. Others have implemented most of the rules either in a separate act focusing on 
branches (see for example Poland and Sweden), in an act dealing with registration of commercial 
enterprises (as for example Germany, where the rules are found in the HGB), or simultaneously in company 
law and registration law acts (such as Portugal and the UK). The issue of accounts for branches is often 
dealt with in the specific accounting acts. 
Apart from the topics regulated in the 11th Company Law Directive the Member States have often regulated 
different aspects of branches. This would include a regulation of branch managers and their duties, a 
regulation of branch names, a regulation of how branches are deregistered in the register etc. 
Some Member States impose more stringent requirements on branches of companies incorporated outside 
the EU/EEA. It seems that the stricter requirements are mainly focused on disclosure and are thus an 
implementation of the 11th Company Law Directive. 
In some Member States the regulation of branches also includes the situation where a company incorporated 
in the Member States sets up branches in other regions of that Member State. 
National regulation also touches upon issues which are not related to core company law. This would for 
example be issues dealing with the taxation of branches (including bookkeeping), issues dealing with 
choice of law in activities relating to the branch, and issues relating to the insolvency proceedings of such 
branches. 
3. Considerations 
The EMCA Chapter 1 contains a number of general principles. Among them is Section 13, which supports 
the Treaty’s principle of freedom of establishment. As mentioned above, this freedom also includes the 
freedom to establish branches, and after the ECJ case law – Centros etc. – the number of branches has 
increased. The case law on freedom of establishment as well as the 11th Company Law Directive have 
imposed a framework for using branches in the EU. With respect to company law, the Group considers that 
there is a need to have rules which cover substantial issues relating to branches. 
The 11th Company Law Directive imposes an exhaustive regulation on which disclosure requirements it is 
possible to impose on branches of companies from other EU/EEA Member States. These requirements as 
well as the boundaries set out by the right of establishment are respected in the EMCA. 
The aim of the 11th Company Law Directive is to lower the costs and minimize the barriers to set up 
branches. The Model Law Group intends to minimize the cost and barriers not only in the areas covered by 
the Directive, but also in general. 
As for branches of companies from outside the EU/EEA the Group has decided to keep the rules as close 
as possible to those applicable to branches of companies from the EU/EEA. However, in accordance with 
the 11th Company Law Directive the Group has decided that more stringent rules on the drawing up and 
auditing of accounts may be necessary where the account of the company does not correspond to the 
harmonized rules on accounts in the EU. Thus, the Group has chosen to make use of the rule in Article 9 
of the Directive. 
As mentioned above, some Member States have rules on setting up branches in regions of the Member 
States. Since such rules are not necessary in all States rules on regulation hereof are not included in this 
Chapter. However, the Group recognizes that some Member States, for instance due to a decentralized 
registration system, may have a need to adopt such rules. 
The Group has decided that the issues relating to branches which are not core company law should not be 
dealt with in the EMCA. Several of these issues such as choice of law and insolvency proceedings are often 
harmonized on an EU level which makes it less important to include them in the EMCA. 
The special rules applicable to financial institutions are not addressed in the EMCA. 
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Section 16.01 
Right to Have Branches 
Foreign public companies, private companies, and companies with a similar corporate form that are 
incorporated abroad may operate via a branch in the EMCA States. 
Comments 
Section 1 states that foreign companies have a right to establish branches in Member States. The rules do 
not distinguish between companies incorporated in other EU/EEA Member States and those incorporated 
outside the EU/EEA. 
As the EMCA is limited to public and private companies, so are the rules on branches limited to these 
corporate forms. However, the 11th Company Law Directive also covers other corporate forms, and the 
rights for these to set up branches should be ensured elsewhere in national law. 
For companies incorporated in the EU/EEA, Section 1 is in accordance with the rules on establishment in 
Article 49 of the Treaty, after which establishment can take place by setting up agencies, branches or 
subsidiaries. 
Section 16.02 
Duty to Register 
(1) A branch is deemed to exist where there is an actual pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed 
establishment that is staffed and set up for an indefinite period defined. A company which establishes an 
activity in accordance with this definition must register the branch with the Registrar. 
(2) Where a company is opening more than one branch, each should be registered with the Registrar. 
(3) Registration and the documents and items listed in Section 3 should be submitted to the Registrar before 
the economic activity is commenced. 
Comments 
The 11th Company Law Directive does not impose a duty to register when a branch is set up, but since the 
Member States have a duty to ensure that certain information about branches is disclosed such a duty is an 
implicit necessity. The law only applies to companies covered by the 1st Company Law Directive, e.g. those 
defined in Chapter 1, Section 3 of the law or for companies incorporated outside the EU/EEA companies 
of a similar type. The Statute on the European Company requires that branches of a SE company should be 
registered with the same register, but rules on SE companies are not covered by the EMCA. 
Re 1) Section 2(1) imposes a duty to register if a company fulfils the definition in this paragraph. There is 
no definition of a branch in the 11th Company Law Directive, but it must be assumed that the concept of a 
branch must be interpreted along the same line as the concept of a branch in Article 49 of the TFEU. The 
wording chosen in the definition of a branch in Article 2(1) is partly taken from the Case C-221/89, 
Factortame II. Future case law from the Court could narrow down the definition. Thus, a branch is 
considered to exist where there is an actual pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed establishment 
for an indefinite period defined. There should also be some sort of staff who can act on behalf of the 
company, even though there is no requirement for a full-time presence at the place of business. 
Re 2) Section 2 (2) is inspired by Article 5 of the 11th Company Law Directive. 
Re 3) Registration should be conducted before the commercial activity is commenced. The activities can 
be commenced after registration has been requested and thus before the registration is completed and the 
information is disclosed in the register. The registration should be completed within reasonable time. 
European Model Companies Act 2017 
Chapter 16 – Branches of Foreign Companies 
396 
Section 16.03 
Documents and Items Subject to Disclosure 
(1) For branches established by companies incorporated in the EU or EEA the following documents and 
items should be submitted to the Registrar for disclosure in the register: 
(a) The address of the branch; 
(b) The activities of the branch; 
(c) The register in which the company file mentioned in Article 3 of Council Directive 68/151/EEC 
[now 2009/101/EC] is kept, together with the registration number in that register; 
(d) The name and legal form of the company; 
(e) The appointment, termination of office and particulars of the persons who are authorized to 
represent the company in dealings with third parties and in legal proceedings. These can either be a 
company organ constituted pursuant to law or as members of any such organ, or it can be other persons 
who are appointed as permanent representatives of the company for the activities of the branch. In the 
former case the company should disclose how the company organ and/or its members can represent the 
company in accordance with the disclosure by the company as provided for in Article 2 (1) (d) of 
Directive 2009/101/EC and in the latter case the company should disclose the extent of the powers of 
the permanent representatives; 
(f) The winding-up of the company, the appointment of liquidators, particulars concerning them and 
their powers and the termination of the liquidation in accordance with disclosure by the company as 
provided in Article 2 (1) (h), (j) and (k) of Directive 2009/101/EC; 
(g) Insolvency proceedings, arrangements, compositions, or any analogous proceedings to which the 
company is subject; 
(h) The accounting documents of the company as drawn up, audited and disclosed pursuant to the law 
of the Member State by which the company is governed in accordance with the Directives of 
accounting; 
(j) The closure of the branch; 
(k) The instruments of incorporation and the memorandum and articles of association if they are 
contained in a separate instrument; 
(l) An attestation from the register referred to in paragraph (c) of this Article relating to the existence 
of the company. 
(2) For branches of companies incorporated outside the EU and EEA areas the following documents and 
items should be submitted and disclosed: 
(a) The address of the branch; 
(b) The activities of the branch; 
(c) The law of the State by which the company is governed; 
(d) Where the law so provide the register in which the company is entered and the registration number 
in that register; 
(e) The name and legal form of the company; 
(f) The appointment, termination of office and particulars of the persons who are authorized to 
represent the company in dealings with third parties and in legal proceedings. These can either be a 
company organ constituted pursuant to law or as members of any such organ, or it can be other persons 
who are appointed as permanent representatives of the company for the activities of the branch. The 
extent of the powers of the persons authorized to represent the company must be stated, together with 
whether they may do so alone or must act jointly; 
(g) The winding-up of the company, the appointment of liquidators, particulars concerning them and 
their powers and the termination of the liquidation; 
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(h) Insolvency proceedings, arrangements, compositions, or any analogous proceedings to which the 
company is subject; 
(j) The accounting documents of the company are drawn up, audited and disclosed pursuant to the law 
of the State by which the company is governed. Where these are not drawn up in a manner equivalent 
to those found in the EU directives on accounting the company should disclose accounting documents 
produced according to the directives covering the activities of the branch; 
(k) The closure of the branch; 
(l) The instruments of incorporation and the memorandum and articles of association if they are 
contained in a separate instrument; 
(m) An attestation from the register referred to in paragraph (c) of this Section relating to the existence 
of the company if the law provides for such a registration. 
(3) The company should register amendments to the documents referred to in paragraph (1)(j) and (2)(k) 
as well as any changes in the other items listed above should be registered as soon as possible and within a 
period of one month after the changes have taken place. The accounting documents listed in (1)(h) and 
(2)(i) should be registered no more than one month after they have been finalized according to the 
applicable law. 
(4) The instruments of incorporation according to paragraph (1)(j) and (2)(k) as well as the account drawn 
up according to (1)(h) and (2)(i) should be translated into one of the official domestic languages or 
submitted in English. 
(5) If a company registers more than one branch and these are registered in different registers in the 
Member State, the registration of the documents listed in (1)(h) and (1)(j) as well as (2)(i) and (2)(k) should 
be listed in the register of the company’s choice. Disclosure of the other branches shall cover the particulars 
of the branch register where the documents mentioned were disclosed as well as the number of the branch 
in that register. 
Comments 
According to Article 2 of the 11th Company Law Directive, certain information, the instruments of 
incorporation, the articles of association and the accounting documents must be disclosed. From Article 4 
it appears that it may be required that the documents mentioned should be translated into one of the official 
domestic languages. National company law may not add further requirements to the lists in the Directive 
Articles 2(1) and 2(2). 
Re 1) This provision is inspired by Article 2 and 3 of the 11th Company Law Directive. The list in Article 
2(1) is compulsory whereas the list of documents and items in Article 2(2) is optional. The Group has 
chosen to adopt two of the four items listed in Article 2(2), as it does not think that it is necessary to ask 
for the disclosure of the signature of the persons who can represent the company nor an indication of the 
securities on the company’s property situated in the Member State. 
Re 1 e) Section 1(e) states which persons are authorized to represent the company. 
It should be possible to list several persons as being authorized to represent the company. These can be 
either company organs or members of such organs or it could be persons who are given the power to 
represent the company in relation to the activities of the branch. For company organs and member of those 
it should be listed whether they have the power to represent the company alone or together with other 
members according to Article 9 of the 1st Company Law Directive. For permanent representatives the 
company may give these different powers and these may not be as far-reaching as the power to act 
according to Article 9 of the 1st Company Law Directive. The Registrar should accept and disclose such a 
limited authority. It should be mentioned that some Member States require that the permanent 
representatives have an unlimited power to represent the company, but this requirement infringes on Article 
2(1)(e) of the 11th Company Law Directive. 
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Re 1 f) It is important to inform the Registrar where the branch is registered if the company is wound up 
etc. This is necessary in order for the Registrar to decide on the deregistration of the branch, see below in 
Section 7. 
Re 1 g) Regarding insolvency proceedings etc., see comments to 1 f). 
Re 1 h) The accounting documents have to be drawn up and audited according to the law where the 
company is incorporated. These accounts should be submitted as they are and additional requirements for 
special audit or special accounts for the branch activities cannot be required. This, however, does not affect 
the Member States’ power to require tax accounts. 
Re 2) Section 3(2) is inspired by Articles 8 and 9 of the 11th Company Law Directive. The list in Article 8 
is not exhaustive, but the Group decided that the disclosure requirements should basically be the same apart 
from the rules on accounts where accounts drawn up and audited according to the rules’ applicable to 
domestic companies can be applied where appropriate. 
Re 2 e) Section 2(e) is inspired by Article 8(h) of the 11th Company Law Directive. Article 8(h) is 
compulsory. See also the comments to Section 1(e). 
Re 2 i) The accounting documents of the company as drawn up, audited and disclosed pursuant to the law 
of the State by which the company is governed. Where they are not drawn up in a manner equivalent to the 
EU Directives on accounts, the company should submit accounting documents covering the branch 
activities drawn up and disclosure according to the rules applicable to domestic companies. 
Re 2 l) Section 3(2)(l) is not compulsory according to Article 8 of the Directive. 
Re 3) According to the 11th Company Law Directive changes to instruments of constitutions as well as 
accounting documents should be disclosed. This provision ensures that also other changes to the 
information register should be submitted, and clarifies the time limits within which registration should take 
place. Furthermore, the effect of not registering changes, including changes in whom can represent the 
company and their power is regulated in accordance with what is the case when domestic companies neglect 
to register changes. 
Re 4) According to Articles 4 and 9(2) of the 11th Company Law Directive Member States may require 
translation into the official language used in the state of registration. The Group believes that it serves the 
purpose of disclosure if the accounts, and the corporate charter are provided either in the official language 
used in the register or in English. Thus the English translation of the document can be used in all 
jurisdictions where a branch is registered, which may lover the translation costs. The directive makes it 
possible to require a certified translation, and the Group recommends that a certified translator in any 
Member State or EEA State should suffice. 
Re 5) This Section is inspired by Articles 5 and 9(2) of the 11thCompany Law Directive. The provision is 
only relevant in the situation where branches are registered in different registers. 
Section 16.04 
Branch Names and Trading Disclosure 
(1) A branch must have a name and may have secondary names. The name of the foreign company must 
be included in the branch’s name. If the company is under liquidation or under insolvency proceedings, 
information about the status of the company must be added to the company’s name. 
(2) The name of a branch should clearly indicate the corporate form of the branch and it should not be 
similar or likely to be confused with a domestic company form. 
(3) The name of a branch should differ from other names already registered in the State where the branch 
is set up, and should not be likely to mislead. If the company is prevented from using its own name in 
regards to the branch, it can choose a different name for the branch. 
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(4) Letters and order forms, as well as webpages used by a branch shall state the register in which the file 
in respect of the branch is kept together with the number of the branch in that register. For branches of 
companies incorporated in the EU and EEA, the information prescribed by Article 4 of Directive 
68/151/EEC should also be listed. For companies incorporated outside the EU and EEA, the register in 
which the company is entered and the registration number should also be stated given that the law of the 
State by which the company is governed requires entry in a register. 
Comments 
Re 1) A branch must have an individual name. If a foreign company has more branches, each branch can 
have a different name. 
The background to the second sentence in Section 4(1) is that the company is liable for the obligations that 
the branch enters into. Therefore, it is significant for the contracting parties to be informed whether the 
company is wound up or involved in other kinds of reconstructions. See also Section 6 concerning 
deregistration. 
Re 2) It should be clear to those dealing with the branch that it is not a domestic company. Therefore, the 
branch should not use an indication which could be confusing with one of the domestic company forms. If 
the name or abbreviation of the company type is similar to that of domestic companies, confusion should 
be avoided by requiring that the nationality of the company is added to the name. 
Re 3) The name used by the branch should fulfil the same requirements as apply to domestic companies, 
see Chapter 2, Section 19. This may mean that a company cannot use its own name for the branch. This is 
a restriction of the right of establishment, but the Group is of the opinion that this restriction can be justified 
to protect the interest of those companies which already use the name and to avoid confusion among third 
parties dealing with the company. It should, however, be mentioned that some Member States have chosen 
either to relax the requirements for branch names or have taken the position that by making it clear that the 
branch is a branch of a foreign company, confusion is avoided. 
Re 4) The provision is inspired by Articles 6 and 10 of the 11th Company Law Directive. The directive 
requires letters and order forms to contain the listed information and there is no definition of what that is. 
The Group has added that the webpage of the branch should include this information if the branch has a 
webpage. The 1st Company Law Directive was amended by Directive 2003/58/EC to make it clear that the 
information which should go on the letters and forms should also appear on the webpage of the company. 
The Group finds it appropriate to extend this to webpages used by the branch. 
Section 16.05 
Branch Management 
(1) The company must list a branch manager. The branch manager should have the power to represent the 
company to some extent and as a minimum should be able to represent the company in legal proceedings. 
(2) The branch manager must fulfil the same requirements as persons who are appointed as directors of 
domestic companies, see Chapter 8, Section 21. 
(3) The branch manager is responsible for making the registration of documents and items according to 
Section 2 and ensuring disclosure according to Section 3. Furthermore, the branch manager should ensure 
that the branch is removed from the register in the situations specified in Section 6. 
Comments 
A branch management, however, is necessary to ensure that at least one person is able to represent the 
company in legal proceedings related to the branch as well as one person is made responsible for ensuring 
compliance with Section 2, 3 and 6. The consequences of a breach of this duty should be specified. 
The branch manager should fulfil those conditions as to age and qualification that are required by directors 
of domestic companies, see Chapter 8, Section 18. If the person is disqualified from acting as a director 
under the law of the state in which the branch is situated, that person should also be barred from acting as 
a branch manager. 
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Section 16.06 
De-registration 
(1) A branch must be removed from the Register if; 
(a) The foreign company is dissolved; 
(b) The company closes the branch; 
(c) The branch has no branch manager and this defect is not remedied before the expiry of a time limit 
set by the Registrar; 
(d) The branch manager has failed to file the accounting documents for the foreign company according 
to national accounting laws. This is in accordance with Section 2(1)(h) and 2(2)(h) within the time limit 
given in Section 2(3), and the defect is not remedied by the expiry of a time limit set by the Registrar; 
or 
(e) The company is not incorporated in an EU or EEA Member State, and a branch creditor establishes 
that his claim cannot be satisfied out of the company’s assets in the country. 
(2) If it appears that the matter that provided the basis for deletion from the system no longer exists after 
deletion, the Registrar may re-register the branch upon request from the foreign company. The Registrar 
may prescribe rules about the re-registration of branches. 
(3) In the circumstances referred to in paragraph (1), paragraph e, the foreign company may not conduct 
business through a branch before re-registration has been affected. The branch may not be re-registered, 
until the creditor has either been paid in full or has consented to the establishment of a new branch. 
Comments 
Re 1 a) When the Registrar receives information that the foreign company is dissolved, the Registrar must 
deregister the branch. In practice the information of the company being dissolved may not reach the 
Registrar where the branch is registered. As the registers will be interconnected according to Directive 
2012/17/EU, it should be possible to set up a co-operation between the national Registrars to ensure that 
once a company is dissolved, information about this fact is sent to the Registrar where the branch was 
registered. 
Re 1 e) If a company carries on business through a number of branches and only one of them is deregistered, 
the business can continue through the other branches, see in this way Section 6 (3). However, branches of 
companies from the EU/EEA countries cannot be removed as it would conflict with the EU rules on 
establishment and exchange of services. Therefore, Section 6 (1)(e) only applies to branches of companies 
from outside the EU/EEA. The provision contains a rule of creditor protection. 
Section 6 (1)(e) is not based on EU law. It is inspired by the Danish Companies Act Section 350 (1)(4). 
See also comments to paragraph 3 below. 
Re 3) Section 5 (3) is inspired by the Danish Companies Act Section 350 (3). It is not based on EU law. 
The provision secures the creditors. Thus, the creditor may ask for deregistration of the branch according 
to paragraph 1 (e) and thereby put pressure on the company. 
